Changes In The Financial Structure Of The Mining Industry Over Time

INTRODUCTION The financial structure of the mining industry has changed strikingly over the last thirty years. The changes that have taken place in the last ten years include both the acceleration of adverse trends in familiar balance sheet numbers and ratios, and the subtle but extensive increase in the complexity and diversity of funding sources, both on and off the balance sheet. The objectives of this paper are: 1. to briefly trace the evolution of trends in the mining industry's financial structure; 2. to focus in more detail on changes in the last decade; and 3. to analyze those trends both within the framework of capital structure theory, and in the context of changes in business and economic conditions. This survey focuses primarily on the mining companies listed on the major U.S. stock exchanges, since financial data for these firms are readily available. The producers of minerals are a diverse lot, however, and the quantitative data on "the mineral industry" as characterized in this survey fails to encompass the financial arrangements for the bulk of production worldwide, whether owned by governments or private-sector enterprises. Even large portions of the U.S. minerals industry - subsidiaries of still larger firms, medium-sized privately-held companies, and the small miners - were not included in the quantitative part of the analysis. THE EVOLUTION OF THE INDUSTRY'S FINANCIAL STRUCTURE In the aftermath of the business failures of the Great Depression, most borrowers and lenders considered minimal debt on the balance sheet the soundest policy. By the 1950's, however, a body of literature was developing which demonstrated that the use of leverage could improve the value of the firm, given a corporate tax structure which allows interest, but not dividends, to be deducted from income. Optimal Capital Structure The objective of undertaking a new project is to improve the wealth of the current owners of the firm. If internally-generated funds are insufficient to allow growth at the desired rate, the company can raise funds either by issuing new equity, or by incurring debt. The most attractive source is the one which will provide the funds for the lowest cost. Both stockholders and lenders expect to receive compensation for use of their funds at a rate which reflects two things: (1) the return they could earn in alternative investments, and (2) the riskiness of the projected return. Factors which increase business risk include the variability of demand, sales prices and input prices, and "operating leverage", or the proportion of fixed to variable costs. In addition, from the investors' point of view, the use of financial leverage concentrates risk onto the shareholders, because lenders enjoy a prior claim in the event of bankruptcy. So although financial leverage can increase a project's expected rate of return, and therefore, presumably, earnings per share, too much debt will be perceived as uncomfortably risky by equity investors, and have a negative effect on stock prices. In theory, then, there should be an optimal level of debt which the firm's managers should seek to obtain in its financial structure. The desirable proportion of debt should in general be lower for a firm with a higher inherent business risk. In addition to their own judgement, financial managers are sensitive to the attitudes of lenders, rating agencies, and investment bankers in setting financial targets (Scott and Johnson). In practice, financial structure will also depend upon the company's growth rate and level of profitability, and conditions in the capital markets at a given time.