Escondida: A Project Financing For The 1990s

INTRODUCTION Raising capital in the 1990s is a timely subject. However, many of us thought why should raising capital in the 1990s prove to be unlike it was in the 19805, the 1970s, the 1%0s, or earlier? There are a lot of creative people in banking and in corporate treasury departments. New tools and techniques are continuing to emerge, many of which are discussed in other papers in this book. While we have new financing tools at our disposal, the underlying issue has not changed. Projects and investments must be judged on their own merits. If they cannot be justified by conventional financial analysis, they should not be built. If they can be justified, it is likely that the financing will be available. The challenges faced in raising capital in this decade will persist to the next. The issues of the 1980s -- currency fluctuation, disruptive merger and acquisition activity, commodity price volatility, political risk, and debt crisis -- will all persist in an increasingly international business environment. I will focus on the financing we have just completed for the Escondida Copper Project in Chile. The Escondida financing is structured along the classic project financing model developed in the late 1970s, but it deals with issues of the 1980s and the 1990s. The financing was intriguing, not just because of the technical issues involved, but also the challenge of reaching an agreement in a large and diverse group. Escondida had the one essential feature that made its financing possible. It was commercially very attractive. It would produce at low cost a commodity (copper concentrates) that direct consumers felt would be in tight supply. The project had the direct support not only of its sponsors, but also its customers, and, very importantly, its host government. The non- recourse financing of Escondida would not have been possible without the support of these parties, and without the robust economics that made this effort worthwhile. The issue was more complicated. Operations in all parts of the world entail some political exposure. This project is in Chile, where there was a constitutional requirement that a plebescite be held when the project would be in its early stages. This plebescite would determine the fate of a 15 year old military dictatorship. The project is copper, a commodity generally deemed to be in surplus. Copper has a history of price volatility (whose price has varied from $.58 to $1.53 per pound over the past two years). It is politically sensitive, not only in Chile, but in the United States, Canada and other developed countries. The project is international, with all the problems of dealing with a variety of currencies, a variety of cultures, and a variety of laws and commercial practices. The project is also large and capital intensive, with a total cost of U.S. $1.1 billion. ESCONDIDA PROJECT Escondida, the largest known copper ore body in the world, was discovered in March of 1981, by Utah International in a joint venture with Getty Oil Company. In 1984, both Utah and Getty were involved in ownership changes, Utah being acquired by BHP. A later restructuring of the ownership of Escondida resulted in BHP, as manager, carrying a 60% interest, Rio Tinto-Zinc Corporation (RTZ) 30%, and a consortium of Japanese companies led by Mitsubishi Corporation with 10%. The Japanese consortium is incorporated as JECO (Japan Escondida Corporation). This ownership structure, which spread ownership around the world, was the first tangible step toward managing both the commercial and political risk associated with the project.