Government: Legislation, Regulations, & Court Rulings - The Year That Minerals Policy Wasn’t

The administration came on as a strong supporter of the mining industry in April of 1982 when President Reagan delivered his long-awaited minerals policy statement. He promised to reduce America's minerals vulnerability, and called for spending billions on meeting stockpile goals for strategic minerals, opening up federal lands for mineral exploration, elimination of barriers to deep sea mining, and regulatory relief. He defended the favorable tax incentives in the Economic Recovery Act as a stimulus to private research and development that would ensure the availability of materials essential to the nation's economy and national defense. But the administration just didn't seem to get anywhere. Congress, environmentalists, and even foreign governments fought White House-proposed legislation on all fronts, delivering the ultimate coup in forcing Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Anne Burford's resignation and the subsequent EPA staff house cleaning in early 1983. Anti-Reaganites scored victory after victory against Reagan's efforts to stimulate the minerals industry. Congress was stalemated on so many mining-related issues that not much was done either for or against the industry. And the US was not to get its way on the issue of sea mining either. Most of Reagan's mineral policy objectives failed to be met. Three months after the National Materials and Minerals Program Plan was presented and the Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and the Environment was made its coordinator, the head of the Cabinet Council James Watt blamed lack of progress in reviving the mining industry and creating a better strategic stockpile on the weak economy and the House of Representatives, which repeatedly thwarted efforts to open wilderness lands to mining. Congress The 97th Congress spent much of its time saying no in 1982-to the Reagan administration's deep cuts in energy and environment programs, to major changes in clean air and water laws, to oil and gas leasing in wilderness, and to killing the Department of Energy. Most of 1982 (and 1981) was spent in heated budget disputes. Some things that did not happen: • The administration and industry failed to get changes in controls of hazardous air pollutants and sulfur dioxide emissions that are implicated in the phenomenon known as acid rain. Industry had wanted to relax requirements for new industries building in clean air regions where the air act demands prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) of air quality, and to relax requirements tightening up the regulation of emissions of hazardous air pollutants. The air battle is expected to continue on five major fronts-acid rain, hazardous air pollutants, PSD, automobile pollution, and nonattainment. • Regulatory reform legislation to overhaul the way government carries out the law died a slow death last year. Business groups and the administration said federal agencies should be required to consider cost-effective measures of reaching regulatory objectives of protecting public health, safety, and the environment. Opponents, including environmentalists, feared such action would delay, weaken, or scuttle important regulations. • Congress turned thumbs down several times on proposals for oil and gas leasing in wilderness but could not agree on any new wilderness recommendations (see The Wilderness Battle). • Congress refused to open the door to the Reagan administration's plan to raise up to $4 billion a year from sales of federal lands. The administration identified surplus and excess federal lands, mostly obsolete buildings or isolated tracts of land, that could be sold by the General Services Administration (GSA) to help out the federal budget deficit. Congress took no action. Some things that did happen: • Congress extended the Defense Production Act (DPA) for six months through March 1983 without changing the 32-year-old law. That came after it failed to resolve sharp differences over proposals for critical minerals programs. Differences concerned both the amount of funds and the scope of programs that would be authorized under the DPA's Title III. Some proponents pressed for $5 billion in funding for loan guarantees or purchase commitments to spur domestic production of minerals such as cobalt. Other members of Congress wanted smaller amounts of funding, and the Reagan administration, until about November, had opposed any use of federal funds for strategic mineral programs. These measures were certain to come up again before the DPA extension expired in March. • House supporters of the Critical Materials Act of 1982 were unable to come up with the twothirds majority needed to pass the bill, so it died on the House floor in December. The bill proposed that a council be established with responsibility for coordinating federal materials research and development. The administration opposed the council creation contending that the Cabinet Council