Pricing And' Buyer Selection Alternatives

By American tradition, if not by rational decision, publicly owned natural resources have been transferred to private industry for processing. The process of transfer requires specific determination of the price which the patentee, buyer, or lessee must pay to the government in exchange for the right to develop a resource, and selection of the patentee, buyer, or lessee from among several possible contestants. Pricing of natural resources owned by the government presents a set of problems quite different from ordinary commodity pricing. Natural resources in situ are not homogeneous commodities. Within any class of natural resources, specific leasable parcels will differ in value by reason of location and accessibility, as well as quality and quantity. Thus, there is no "going price;" every lease within a specific resource class will have a different value. To complicate further the pricing and buyer selection problems, competition may not be reliable. Natural-resource markets are characterized by oligopsony conditions. In a significant number of cases, as will be shown later, there has been only one bidder for a given lease, and in most lease sales the number of bidders is equal to or less than three. As a further complication, there is great uncertainty regarding the value of specific resources, even among the best-informed buyers, as well as within the leasing agency. In some instances, particularly with regard to oil and gas resources, there may be uncertainty about the presence of resources, as well as the quantity and quality of any resources contained in the tract offered for lease. In other cases, such as oil shale and some deep ocean minerals where new technologies are involved, the presence of the resource is clearly established. There may be a relatively high degree of knowledge about the quantity and quality of the resource, but there is great uncertainty concerning the cost of production. These problems in total make it difficult for the leasing agency to appraise accurately the resource to be leased, as well as for the potential bidder to calculate a bid price that will yield him a normal profit. The pricing goal of the federal government as the seller or lessee may be to capture the economic rent; that is, the price of a resource might equal its discounted present value. A required price substantially above this amount would either generate no bids, or, in the long run, would bankrupt the buyer. A price below this amount is a disguised subsidy to the lessee. A subsidy to mineral lessees, as to any other economic interest group, as a minimum should be justified by a clear showing of net external benefits from the economic activity. In the case of timber sales by the U.S. Forest Service, the Forest Service Handbook asserts that "the aim in national forest stumpage appraisal is to determine market value,"8 and "market value" is equated to "fair market value." Regarding minerals, there is no reference in legislation or regula-