Sharing Risks And Rewards In International Contract Negotiations

The American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical, and Petroleum Engineers
Pedro L. Lizaur
Organization:
The American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical, and Petroleum Engineers
Pages:
5
File Size:
249 KB
Publication Date:
Jan 1, 1985

Abstract

INTRODUCTION The degree of success of an association between parties in establishing a new venture ultimately depends on three factors: a. the venture's underlying economic strength, which is based on the complementarity of the comparative advantages brought by each party to the negotiating table; b. the ability to reach an agreement which satisfies each party's objectives and constraints; and, c. the capacity to design and implement a funding structure which is consistent with the project economics. A thorough assessment of the venture's profitability and associated risks under alternative technical and economic scenarios is the basis for a sound "go" or "no go" decision. In-depth evaluation of the risks and rewards to each of the parties involved under alternative legal and financial structure must be the foundation for a long lasting "how to go" decision. The allocation of risks and rewards should be consistent with the objectives and constraints of all parties and the sharing mechanisms, established in the contract, should be flexible to assure the long-term stability of the agreement. Rapidly changing economic conditions during the last decade have had a dramatic impact on the envisaged allocation of risks and rewards between host countries and private investors. The effects of these changes, and the fact that the relative strengths of the parties involved may shift during the life of a project (e.g. before and after major capital investments have been made), have forced the renegotiation of a multitude of contracts. Therefore, the present and future stability of an economic agreement would depend not only on the originally designed provisions, but also on provisions which allow for the automatic adjustment of rewards to project sponsors under a variety of future economic situations. A pre-condition for the allocation and quantification of risks and rewards is the definition of standards of measurement used by each of the parties. This is critical in international negotiations when one of the parties represents the national interests of a country. The understanding and use of different standards for the measurement of rewards for risk taken between a government and private enterprise facilitate the negotiation of a satisfactory agreement. This is possible because certain trade-offs between the negotiating parties may have different relative values. STANDARDS OF MEASUREMENT OF REWARDS FOR RISK TAKEN The negotiating process takes a step forward when the parties are able to focus on their interests, explore different alternative solutions and then base results on a set of objective standards. Unfortunately, the parties frequently put more effort into "staking out" and defending positions, than into understanding their intrinsic interests. Moreover, when one party, such as a governemnt owned corporation, represents a country's national interests, the negotiation process increases in complexity. Private firms focus on commercial profitability, using discounted cash flow techniques such as NPV, IRR, or ROE. In contrast, the government is also concerned with the project's impact on the local socio-economic environment. Without entering into a discussion of alternative economic development theories and approaches, there exist several possible measures that could be pragmatically utilized by each party in evaluating the socio-economic impact of a project. The more complete measure is the National Profitability (NP). The NP is a discounted cash flow procedure similar in structure to IRR or NPV but in which the project's financial cash inflows and outflows and discount rates are adjusted to take into consideration the local conditions. The NP is calculated on an unlevered basis and all taxes and duties are removed from the project
Citation

APA: Pedro L. Lizaur  (1985)  Sharing Risks And Rewards In International Contract Negotiations

MLA: Pedro L. Lizaur Sharing Risks And Rewards In International Contract Negotiations. The American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical, and Petroleum Engineers, 1985.

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