The History Of Financing A Multinational Mining Company

Members of the Society of Mining Engineers may well regard it as rather unusual that a paper on this subject is being presented by someone whose first taste of mining came at the age of 60 or so - someone who last heard of cathodes and anodes in 1938. On the other hand, the title does refer to the financing of a mine and at least I can claim to have spent all my business life since the war until 1981 in the world of banking, though this inevitably means that I have been used to looking at these and other problems through what you might regard as the wrong end of the telescope. The lending of money, and more particularly the provision of finance for commerce and industry, is the central job of a banker and I have been involved in this in various ways over many years, but regrettably only very marginally in the world of mining. As you will see from what follows, the rather specialised form of finance which RTZ required was, to my regret, not provided by the British banking community since the great majority of the finance came from American banks and, to a lesser extent, from German banks. I am most indebted to Mr. Roy Wright for a great deal of the nuts and bolts in this paper. He was one of the three central figures in the growth and expansion of RTZ during the 1950's and 1960's and was right at the centre of the negotiations with bankers, with governments and with many others. The going, as you will see, was far from easy. The essential basis for the financing of each of the RTZ group's mining projects was a firm long-term sales contract for sufficient of the output of the particular mine to produce the cash flow necessary to service the loans. Wherever possible, loans were raised in the same currency as the sales contracts were made. Each sales contract was designed to give the customer the product he wanted with a long-term assurance of supply and at the same time to give the bankers the protection they required. Thus the marketing concept and the financing concept for a particular mine formed one overall plan, and talks with the customers and the bankers were conducted in parallel until a satisfactory marketing/financial package was agreed in principle. Preliminary talks were begun soon after the discovery of a potentially viable orebody. As confidence about a discovery increased, customers were persuaded to enter into contingent sales contracts before the very detailed and costly business of the economic and technical feasibility study of the mine was launched; such a study might cost 10% or more of the estimated total capital cost. At the same time provisional understandings were reached with the bankers. The contingent sales contracts usually gave a period of grace of eighteen months to two years, during which time the decision whether or not to continue with the mine had to be made. This decision rested mainly on the result of the feasibility study and also on coming to a firm agreement with the bankers. If all went well and the mine went ahead, then the contingent sales contracts became firm, but they fell away if the decision was negative. The Company was fortunate that during the whole period when its major mines were being developed, world trade was increasing rapidly and Japan was becoming a dominant industrial power. The Japanese supported many of the mines, including Hamersley Iron Ore, Lornex Copper, Bougainville Copper to name a few, with the basic long-term sales contracts that enabled their development. The Germans supported Palabora and to a lesser extent Bougainville. The mines were financed as individual projects generally with a loan/equity ratio of about 65/35, without legal recourse to RTZ for the loans. RTZ was, however, responsible for providing any capital overruns required to bring the mines into commercial operations. Nevertheless, the RTZ management regarded itself as morally responsible to the lenders because, Palabora aside, the sales contracts had either a fixed selling price (like Hamersley), an indexed price (like the Elliot Lake Uranium Mines and Mary Kathleen), or a floor price (as in Lornex, Bougainville and Rossing). Thus the Company believed that any financial failure would have been due to poor management or technical