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By Joseph Pogue

THE past year in the petroleum industry was one of overproduction, rising inventories, low prices, and meagre to vanishing profits. This outcome was the result of a long period of intensive and uncompensated effort on the part of both financial and industrial interests, to stimulate supply on the theory that the primary problem facing the petroleum industry was the development of an adequate reserve of raw material to protect a large and ever-growing investment. The stimulus was applied in various forms and through diverse channels: capital had, long flowed into the industry in excessive amounts under the attraction of large expected profits; the price level for crude petroleum had persistently been influenced -by speculative considerations, with the result that prices declined slowly in periods of flush production and were quick to advance in anticipation of statistical improvement, thus maintaining a superfluous degree of stimulus on wildcatting and on drilling; speculation in inventories had led to the unsound, or at least unusual, business practice of accumulating huge stocks of oil; and, above all, the industry had directed the potent force of technology to the expansion of supply and achieved radical results in accelerating oil discovery, speeding up the rate of oil extraction, and enlarging the recovery of gasoline and lubricating oils from the raw material. In short, the economic conditions of 1927 were exactly those to which the objectively driven enterprise of the petroleum industry had long been directed; and the undesirable financial consequences arising. therefrom reflected no lack of success in what had been set out to be achieved, but rather the failure to have established concurrently the necessary means of economic control to prevent the immediate conversion of reserves into current supply, and likewise the oversight in neglecting to apply the technological force to the enlargement and diversification of the market for petroleum products. Perhaps, when viewed in its longer perspective, 1927 will stand out as the turning point in the economic policy of the petroleum industry, when the technique of rationalizing production made its, initial claim for recognition.

Jan 1, 1928

By Joseph E. Pogue

The past year in the petroleum industry was one of overproduction, rising inventories, low prices, and meagre to vanishing profits. This outcome was the result of a long period of intensive and uncompensated effort on the part of both financial and industrial interests, to stimulate supply on the theory that the primary problem facing the petroleum industry was the development of an adequate reserve of raw material to protect a large and ever-growing investment. The stimulus was applied in various forms and through diverse channels: capital had long flowed into the industry in excessive amounts under the attraction of large expected profits; the price level for crude petroleum had persistently been influenced by speculative considerations, with the result that prices declined slowly in periods of flush production and were quick to advance in anticipation of statistical improvement, thus maintaining a superfluous degree of stimulus on wildcatting and on drilling; speculation in inventories had led to the unsound, or at least unusual, business practice of accumulating huge stocks of oil; and, above all, the industry had directed the potent force of technology to the expansion of supply and achieved radical results in accelerating oil discovery, speeding up the rate of oil extraction, and enlarging the recovery of gasoline and lubricating oils from the raw material. In short, the economic conditions of 1927 were exactly those to which the objectively driven enterprise of the petroleum industry had long been directed; and the undesirable financial consequences arising therefrom reflected no lack of success in what had been set out to be achieved, but rather the failure to have established concurrently the necessary means of economic control to prevent the immediate conversion of reserves into current supply, and likewise the oversight in neglecting to apply the technological force to the enlargement and diversification of the market for petroleum products. Perhaps, when viewed in its longer perspective, 1927 will stand out as the turning point in the economic policy of the petroleum industry, when the technique of rationalizing production made its initial claim for recognition.

Jan 1, 1928

By George W. Doffing

Numerous contradictory statements have been made in the past regarding the importance of the seasonal influence of demand for motor fuel on prices of oil securities. It has often been said that the time to buy oil securities is in the spring, or just prior to the heavy consuming season for gasoline. The fallacy of this argument is brought out in the following paragraphs. Seasonality of Oil-security Prices The indexes used in this paper as indicators of prices of oil securities and general industrials are those compiled by Standard Statistics Co. The oil producing and refining stock index includes 14 representative petroleum companies, while the all-industrials index is made up of 347 issues. All figures are stated as relatives, with 1926 = 100. The primary basis of the index, and one that gives a good weighting of the relative importance of the company within the industry, is the total market value of the stock issue outstanding; i.e., the market price times the number of shares outstanding. Adjustments are made for the addition or elimination of issues from the group index, for stock dividends, split-ups, stock rights, et cetera. At the present time the oil producing and refining index includes the following companies: Atlantic Refining Co., Consolidated Oil Corporation, Continental Oil Co., Gulf Oil Corporation, Humble Oil & Refining Co., Ohio Oil Co., Royal Dutch Co., Shell Union Oil Corporation, Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Standard Oil Company of California, Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey), Texas Corporation, Union Oil Company of California. In calculating the seasonal for oil-security prices several periods have been selected as indicat,ive of major changes in the industry, as follows: 1. 1918 through 1936. This gives an over-all picture of the industry during the motor-vehicle, motor-fuel era. 2. 1927 through 1936. This period includes the control stages, both voluntary and coercive. 3. 1927 to September, 1933. This is the pre-code period of control.

Jan 1, 1937

By R. V. Whetsel, V. R. Gargias, J. W. Ristori

WoRld consumption of petroleum and its substitutes in 1941, the amount of which obviously is largely conjectural, is estimated at 2,066,653,000 bbl. This is 48,689,000 bbl. more than the previous year and is an all-time high. Except for the United States, this figure does not include consumption for military purposes. Consumption in the United States also reached an all-time high during 1941, totaling 1,492,000,000 bbl., or 158,230,000 bbl. more than the previous peak year of 1940. On the other hand, it is estimated that civil consumption in countries outside of the United States decreased 109,541,ooo bbl. as compared with the previous year. Demand for military purposes and/or additions to stocks in countries outside of the United States is estimated at 304,507,000 bbl. during 1941, compared with 209,635,000 bbl. in 1940. This increase was due largely to blitzkrieg warfare on several fronts. especially Russia; entailing large expenditures of petroleum by both sides because of the immense area covered by the fighting forces, the long supply lines necessary and the intensity of the fighting. It is interesting to note in this connection that Axis-controlled countries, excluding Japan, had an estimated production of approximately 89,000,000 bbl. of petroleum and its substitutes in 1941. The peacetime consumption of these countries in 1938, for example, was about 183,000,000 bbl. It is believed that the minimum to which civil consumption could possibly be re-duced in wartime is 20 per cent of that of peacetime, which would call for a minimum consumption of 37,000,000 bbl. in these countries in 1941 for civil purposes. This

Jan 1, 1942

By V. R. Gargias, J. W. Ristori, R. V. Whetsel

WoRld consumption of petroleum and its substitutes in 1941, the amount of which obviously is largely conjectural, is estimated at 2,066,653,000 bbl. This is 48,689,000 bbl. more than the previous year and is an all-time high. Except for the United States, this figure does not include consumption for military purposes. Consumption in the United States also reached an all-time high during 1941, totaling 1,492,000,000 bbl., or 158,230,000 bbl. more than the previous peak year of 1940. On the other hand, it is estimated that civil consumption in countries outside of the United States decreased 109,541,ooo bbl. as compared with the previous year. Demand for military purposes and/or additions to stocks in countries outside of the United States is estimated at 304,507,000 bbl. during 1941, compared with 209,635,000 bbl. in 1940. This increase was due largely to blitzkrieg warfare on several fronts. especially Russia; entailing large expenditures of petroleum by both sides because of the immense area covered by the fighting forces, the long supply lines necessary and the intensity of the fighting. It is interesting to note in this connection that Axis-controlled countries, excluding Japan, had an estimated production of approximately 89,000,000 bbl. of petroleum and its substitutes in 1941. The peacetime consumption of these countries in 1938, for example, was about 183,000,000 bbl. It is believed that the minimum to which civil consumption could possibly be re-duced in wartime is 20 per cent of that of peacetime, which would call for a minimum consumption of 37,000,000 bbl. in these countries in 1941 for civil purposes. This

Jan 1, 1942

By V. R. Garfias, R. V. Whetzel, J. W. Ristori

Since the entry of the United States into global war, virtually all data and information necessary for compiling figures on world petroleum consumption have become unavailable. This situation undoubtedly will continue until the world petroleum industry can return to a peacetime basis. During the past 10 years, the authors, by publishing annual estimates of .world consumption, have attempted to emphasize the importance of a yearly world-wide survey of petroleum supply and demand. It is beconling more and more evident that statistics for the United States alone can no longer give a comprehensive idea of the state of the petroleum industry, even within the United States itself. Therefore, when conditions in the industry again become normal, it is the hope of the authors that those bureaus equipped to do so will carry forward the study of petroleum supply and demand on a world-wide basis. Enough data and information are available, however, to attempt a rough estimate of world output of crude petroleum and petroleum substitutes for 1942, which to some extent may reflect the trend of world consumption. This estimate by countries, as compared with the output in 1941, is shown in Table I. The world production of crude petroleum and petroleum substitutes for 1942 is estimated at 2,208,000,000 bbl., or a decrease of 171,000,000 bbl. under 1941. Crude production is believed to have decreased by about 200,000,000 bbl., (about 9 per cent); while petroleum substitutes increased by 28,500,000 bbl., (nearly 20 per cent). The decline of crude output in the United States is estimated at 19,000,000 bb1.—less than 2 per cent; while that in foreign countries is estimated at 180,000,000 bbl., or more than 20 per cent. The marked decline abroad is due largely to losses in Venezuela and Colombia, where the lack of ocean transportation became the controlling factor, and in the East Indies and Burma, where military invasion brought about the destruction of the fields. The production of petroleum substitutes in 1942 apparently reached a new high figure of 7.5 per cent of the total world petroleum output. The important features of petroleum production outside of the United States are the changes that have taken place during the year in the supply of the Axis countries. In Japan the output for 1941 was estimated at 8,800,000 bbl., 5,500,000 of which were petroleum substitutes. It is believed that the output of synthetic oils during 1942 substantially increased, raising the total interior production of Japan to nearly 10,-ooo,ooo bbl. Also, during 1942 Japanese armed forces gained possession of oil fields having a normal peacetime output of about 78,000,000 bbl. per year. The production of these areas for 1942 is estimated at some 23,000,000 bbl., which indicates that Japan is now getting at least 33,000,000 bbl. a year, which exceeds by 8,000,000 bbl. Its

Jan 1, 1943

By J. W. Ristori, V. R. Garfias, R. V. Whetzel

Since the entry of the United States into global war, virtually all data and information necessary for compiling figures on world petroleum consumption have become unavailable. This situation undoubtedly will continue until the world petroleum industry can return to a peacetime basis. During the past 10 years, the authors, by publishing annual estimates of .world consumption, have attempted to emphasize the importance of a yearly world-wide survey of petroleum supply and demand. It is beconling more and more evident that statistics for the United States alone can no longer give a comprehensive idea of the state of the petroleum industry, even within the United States itself. Therefore, when conditions in the industry again become normal, it is the hope of the authors that those bureaus equipped to do so will carry forward the study of petroleum supply and demand on a world-wide basis. Enough data and information are available, however, to attempt a rough estimate of world output of crude petroleum and petroleum substitutes for 1942, which to some extent may reflect the trend of world consumption. This estimate by countries, as compared with the output in 1941, is shown in Table I. The world production of crude petroleum and petroleum substitutes for 1942 is estimated at 2,208,000,000 bbl., or a decrease of 171,000,000 bbl. under 1941. Crude production is believed to have decreased by about 200,000,000 bbl., (about 9 per cent); while petroleum substitutes increased by 28,500,000 bbl., (nearly 20 per cent). The decline of crude output in the United States is estimated at 19,000,000 bb1.—less than 2 per cent; while that in foreign countries is estimated at 180,000,000 bbl., or more than 20 per cent. The marked decline abroad is due largely to losses in Venezuela and Colombia, where the lack of ocean transportation became the controlling factor, and in the East Indies and Burma, where military invasion brought about the destruction of the fields. The production of petroleum substitutes in 1942 apparently reached a new high figure of 7.5 per cent of the total world petroleum output. The important features of petroleum production outside of the United States are the changes that have taken place during the year in the supply of the Axis countries. In Japan the output for 1941 was estimated at 8,800,000 bbl., 5,500,000 of which were petroleum substitutes. It is believed that the output of synthetic oils during 1942 substantially increased, raising the total interior production of Japan to nearly 10,-ooo,ooo bbl. Also, during 1942 Japanese armed forces gained possession of oil fields having a normal peacetime output of about 78,000,000 bbl. per year. The production of these areas for 1942 is estimated at some 23,000,000 bbl., which indicates that Japan is now getting at least 33,000,000 bbl. a year, which exceeds by 8,000,000 bbl. Its

Jan 1, 1943

By V. R. Garfias, R. V. Whetsel, J. W. Ristori

Preliminary estimates indicate that world consumption of petroleum and related fuels in 1938 will be close to 1,908,000,000 bbl., or approximately 7,000,000 bbl. less than in 1937. This total does not include military consumption in foreign countries, which for obvious reasons is not made public. Foreign military consumption in any one year, however, is approximately represented by the difference between the total production of petroleum and related fuels and the "partial total" consumption above noted, after adding any decrease, or subtracting any increase in stocks in the United States. Fig. 1 illustrates this "difference" and shows that in 1937 and 1938, owing to the wars in China and Spain and the possibility of armed conflict in Central Europe, foreign military consumption—and possibly additions to foreign stocks—increased nearly 70,000,000 bbl. in 1937 over 1936 and remained at this high rate throughout 1938. No official information on foreign oil stocks is available to the writers. Table 1, recently published, purports to give the oil in storage in some of the European countries, but it is not known whether the figures include oil stocks for military purposes. It should be noted that with the annexation by Germany of Austria and part of Czechoslovakia the consumption of the country has increased to 53,000,000 bbl., which is about 36,000,000 short of the German produc-

Jan 1, 1939

By J. W. Ristori, R. V. Whetsel, V. R. Garfias

Preliminary estimates indicate that world consumption of petroleum and related fuels in 1938 will be close to 1,908,000,000 bbl., or approximately 7,000,000 bbl. less than in 1937. This total does not include military consumption in foreign countries, which for obvious reasons is not made public. Foreign military consumption in any one year, however, is approximately represented by the difference between the total production of petroleum and related fuels and the "partial total" consumption above noted, after adding any decrease, or subtracting any increase in stocks in the United States. Fig. 1 illustrates this "difference" and shows that in 1937 and 1938, owing to the wars in China and Spain and the possibility of armed conflict in Central Europe, foreign military consumption—and possibly additions to foreign stocks—increased nearly 70,000,000 bbl. in 1937 over 1936 and remained at this high rate throughout 1938. No official information on foreign oil stocks is available to the writers. Table 1, recently published, purports to give the oil in storage in some of the European countries, but it is not known whether the figures include oil stocks for military purposes. It should be noted that with the annexation by Germany of Austria and part of Czechoslovakia the consumption of the country has increased to 53,000,000 bbl., which is about 36,000,000 short of the German produc-

Jan 1, 1939

By V. R. Garfias, R. V. Whetsel, J. W. Ristori

World consumption of petroleum and related fuels for civil purposes in 1939 was close to 2,024,000,000 bbl., or approximately 110,000,000 bbl. more than in 1938, the United States accounting for 96,000,000 bbl. of the increased amount. With the annexation of Czechoslovakia and part of Poland, civil consurnption in Germany during 1939, notwithstanding sevre rationing in the last four months of the year, was 54,000,000 bbl., or only 1,600,000 bbl. less than in 1938, and domestic production of pctroleum and related fuels was some 34,000,000 bbl. short of civil consumption. The mounting petroleum requirements of the military forces of greater Germany are, of course, not included in these figures of civil consumption. To supply this deficiency Germany now must rely almost exclusively on the Rumanian fields, which in 1939 produced about 35,000,000 bbl in ewes, of the Rumanian civil consumption. However, these fields arc supplying and have supplied for years the oil requirements of the neighboring

Jan 1, 1940

By J. W. Ristori, R. V. Whetsel, V. R. Garfias

World consumption of petroleum and related fuels for civil purposes in 1939 was close to 2,024,000,000 bbl., or approximately 110,000,000 bbl. more than in 1938, the United States accounting for 96,000,000 bbl. of the increased amount. With the annexation of Czechoslovakia and part of Poland, civil consurnption in Germany during 1939, notwithstanding sevre rationing in the last four months of the year, was 54,000,000 bbl., or only 1,600,000 bbl. less than in 1938, and domestic production of pctroleum and related fuels was some 34,000,000 bbl. short of civil consumption. The mounting petroleum requirements of the military forces of greater Germany are, of course, not included in these figures of civil consumption. To supply this deficiency Germany now must rely almost exclusively on the Rumanian fields, which in 1939 produced about 35,000,000 bbl in ewes, of the Rumanian civil consumption. However, these fields arc supplying and have supplied for years the oil requirements of the neighboring

Jan 1, 1940

By R. V. Whetsel, V. R. Garfias

It is estimated that during 1936 world consumption of petroleum, its products and related fuels reached an all-time peak of 1,757,778,000 bbl., an increase of 143,000,000 bbl. over 1935. As indicated in Table 1, world output of petroleum and related fuels exceeded demand by 92,510,000 bbl. during the year, as compared to an excess output of 88,000,000 bbl. during 1935. Production within the United States exceeded domestic demand by approximately 51,000,-000 bbl. in 1936, as compared to an excess output of 53,000,000 bbl. in the previous year. Outside the United States, production exceeded demand by 41,510,000 bbl. in 1936 and by 35,000,000 bbl. in 1935, indicating that foreign output is making no progress toward curtailment in line with demand. Table 1 also combines excess production in the United States with the favorable balance of exports over imports, showing that stocks in the United States were reduced by 23,400,000 bbl. in 1936, as compared to 22,447,000 bbl. in the previous year. In the rest of the world, excess output over demand combined with the excess of imports over exports from the United States indicates an unfavorable balance of approximately

Jan 1, 1937

By Ernest R. Lilley

THOSE acquainted with the fundamental differences between the, educational .systems of Great Britain and. the United States would hardly expect .the training of men for the petroleum industry to proceed along the same lines- in the two countries. The youth entering an English university is, except in the case of-the student from some of the British colonies or from foreign countries, almost invariably a product of the English "public school." This is in no sense comparable .with the American public school. It is a private institution, frequently of considerable age and heavily endowed. In many aspects it seems to be comparable with the American preparatory school. Yet to some extent its activities remind one of the first years of the undergraduate: course in the American college. Certainly it takes to-itself many of the social, functions of the American college.

Jan 1, 1931

By AIME AIME

ON March 14, the University of Tulsa was accepted as a member of the North Central Association of Colleges, which ranks Tulsa among the leading universities of the country. A. G. OIiphant recently donated to the new school of petroleum engineering a splendid collection of books on geology, valued at $25,000. Waite Phillips, an oil producer and chairman of directors of The Independent Oil & Gas Co., donated $150,000 for a petroleum engineering building

Jan 1, 1929

By Harry H. Power

WHILE the attention of all engineering branches is focused today on changes and improvements in the several curricula, we are concerned here with the many questions arising in industry and college concerning the preparation for the petroleum engineering profession. The succession of problems confronting the petroleum engineer demands a degree of versatility not ordinarily encountered in other professions. As a consequence, the student cannot acquire mastery of all the several engineering branches represented in field practice, and as an alternative, he has learned to appreciate the value of thorough training in the basic or fundamental sciences as a preliminary foundation for professional work. While our attention is directed primarily to the training of engineers in educational institutions, it is necessary that the ultimate education of the professional engineer be kept in mind. It is apparent that his success as an engineer is limited not only by his educational and job experience, but by his native endowments: mentality, personality and health. The engineer's lack of job experiences often proves as much a handicap as the lack of adequate college training. If the final product proves to be satisfactory, both industry and technical institutions are to be congratulated. However, if the product is found wanting, the one most responsible should be apprehended. FITNESS FOR PROFESSION For the most part, students of engineering colleges have had their interests in applied science awakened at a relatively early age. Many of them entered college as a convenient means of acquiring a technical education, but undoubtedly would have had better prospects in a shorter program offered by institutions of noncollege grade. The activating motive of practical interest is also strong in students suitable for college training, but in many cases an intellectual interest must be awakened in order that it may survive graduation. Numerous engineers believe that this progressive process of selection and determination of career aims is one of the essential services rendered by the engineering colleges. Industrialists, who are more interested in quality than quantity of petroleum engineering graduates, have pointed out the good that should result if more empha¬sis were given to the work of eliminating the misfits. They also point out the protective measures that have been taken by other professions for the betterment of professional standards. Mention has been made of the beneficial results to be obtained by collective determination of the market for the products of engineering schools, particularly in that the students unsuited to the profession would have an opportunity to prepare themselves for employment more suited to their personalities and other qualifications. In the event that such a system of coordinated personnel direction is developed by the

Jan 1, 1941

By Harry H. Power

WHILE the attention of all engineering branches is focused today on changes and improvements in the several curricula, we are concerned here with the many questions arising in industry and college concerning the preparation for the petroleum engineering profession. The succession of problems confronting the petroleum engineer demands a degree of versatility not ordinarily encountered in other professions. As a consequence, the student cannot acquire mastery of all the several engineering branches represented in field practice, and as an alternative, he has learned to appreciate the value of thorough training in the basic or fundamental sciences as a preliminary foundation for professional work. While our attention is directed primarily to the training of engineers in educational institutions, it is necessary that the ultimate education of the professional engineer be kept in mind. It is apparent that his success as an engineer is limited not only by his educational and job experience, but by his native endowments: mentality, personality and health. The engineer's lack of job experiences often proves as much a handicap as the lack of adequate college training. If the final product proves to be satisfactory, both industry and technical institutions are to be congratulated. However, if the product is found wanting, the one most responsible should be apprehended. FITNESS FOR PROFESSION For the most part, students of engineering colleges have had their interests in applied science awakened at a relatively early age. Many of them entered college as a convenient means of acquiring a technical education, but undoubtedly would have had better prospects in a shorter program offered by institutions of noncollege grade. The activating motive of practical interest is also strong in students suitable for college training, but in many cases an intellectual interest must be awakened in order that it may survive graduation. Numerous engineers believe that this progressive process of selection and determination of career aims is one of the essential services rendered by the engineering colleges. Industrialists, who are more interested in quality than quantity of petroleum engineering graduates, have pointed out the good that should result if more emphasis were given to the work of eliminating the misfits. They also point out the protective measures that have been taken by other professions for the betterment of professional standards. Mention has been made of the beneficial results to be obtained by collective determination of the market for the products of engineering schools, particularly in that the students unsuited to the profession would have an opportunity to prepare themselves for employment more suited to their personalities and other qualifications. In the event that such a system of coordinated personnel direction is developed by the

Jan 1, 1941

By H. H. Kaveler

Education is for the purpose of developing citizenship, and, if it is pursued for the additional purpose of preparing for a professional career, such as engineering, it is also directed to developing a knowledge of essential science, aptitude for the application of science to practical situations, and a knowledge of the industrial art in which the engineer will be engaged. The process of education required for engineering must of necessity extend beyond the classroom into industry. For that reason, the education of engineers should be divided as between the university and industry. Specialization in engineering should logically come as a result of experience in an industry. The student cannot take the time in a university, and, the university cannot teach the skills required to develop a specialist without sacrifice to the more essential broad purposes of formal education. In addition to talent in science, aptitude in the application of scientific fact, and knowledge of the industrial art, the engineer should possess certain personal qualities which are helpful in the pursuit of a professional career. Those personal qualities are: the ability to work as a partner in an enterprise, the ability to do jobs in a way whereby job performance is a means of gaining experience and increased responsibility, the capacity to write and speak in an understandable manner, and, a Proper regard for the "significance of answers." These pcrsOnal qualities may be of almost equal importance to acabemic accomplishments in the field of science. Development of such personal qualities are an essential part of the student's training in the university and in industry. They can be developed effectively through the leadership of instructors. Compulsory Education Nature played a mean trick On the human race when the evolutionary Process failed to develop in the individual a capacity to inherit knowledge. Were knowledge transmissible in a cumulative manner from generation to generation, mankind would be by inheritance wise beyond measure within a few generations. Then there would be little if any need for a "system of education." As matters stand, however, all must suffer the burden of starting life at the "zero " level of learning from which station each rises depending upon individual capacity to assimilate knowledge left of record by our predecessors and the individual effort exerted to compensate for Nature's failure to endow the offspring with intelligence. In the United States some degree of education is generally regarded as essential and necessary. Therefore, all citizens are subjected by law to an educational process covering the primary school age from six to sixteen years. Beyond the schooling required by law, many attend secondary schools, and beyond that, schools of higher learning. Our standard of living is at a level that permits an increasingly large fraction of the population the opportunity to go through all of the formal educational process. As a result, education in the colleges and universities has almost reached a mass production level. In spite of the high

Jan 1, 1949

By C. W. Brown

In the author's experience and contact with engineering students the old form of recitations had grown into the lecture system in which the student was a passive receiver of digested material. Later, the tutorial system was developed because it was felt that the lecture system was breaking down. The student was too passive and was simply trying to absorb what was given him. The seminary method was then introduced and for the particular field the author believes that there is no better method, but that for 20 years he has been trying to change the attitude of the student in certain courses from a passive, almost noncommittal, to an active participation, to change him from a receiver to a doer. The student cannot look over the whole field. That must be presented by the instructor in charge. A topic such as structure or glaciation is taken up and from that standpoint are argued all the geologic problems that might confront the engineer. Problems relating to dams and foundations, and structures, tunnels and excavations, are particularly adaptable to the method. Usually, however, the problem comes to the engineer in more complicated form. By virtue of the character of the material the same topic cannot be assigned to the entire class. Different phases of the topic must be assigned. The greatest difficulty in after life comes in that the student cannot analyze the problem and has not the ability to see that there is a problem. He has had little or no training in the gathering of material and very little training in the arrangement of a report. Consequently, selecting different problems, putting them before small groups, and then starting the student on the way to make the knowledge of his particular topic an integral part of his own mentality, is something that will fix that part of the work firmly in his mind. Professor Brown has insisted on an introductory step in a great many classes, in that without the student knowning very much more than the general outline of the topic or problem, he is made in inductive fashion to take up the entire problem, look it over, and prepare an outline as far as he can; in other words, to expose the problem to his own mind. This preliminary outline is discussed with the student and if the arrangement or logic, with regard to the end in view, are faulty, he is shown where

Jan 1, 1929

By R. L. Langenheim

Cooperative education for engineers is based on the premise that theory and practice are inseparable in training men for the engineering profession, and the two must be advanced simultaneously in order to train men most successfully and efficiently. The teaching of theory obviously should be done by the college but the practice must be obtained in the field where the application of the theory is made. The ideally trained engineer is one that knows theory, can apply the theory to practice, can direct, and work with, his fellow men. The old four-year plan of training engineers does a fair job of teaching the underlying theory of engineering but neglects entirely the training necessary for application of the theory, except through laboratory experiments, and the training in adjustments necessary to direct and work with men. An engineer, like a lawyer, doctor, dentist or other professionally trained man, cannot practice until he has had practical experiences that give him a knowledge of the other phases of his profession. The doctor serves as an interne, the lawyer reads law in the office of a practicing attorney, and the engineer must enter the profession as a laborer or as an apprentice, unless he has had the advantage of a cooperative education. Cooperative education provides the opportunity for the coordination of practical and theoretical training for the engineering profession throughout the period of training and thus eliminates many that are unfit to enter the profession, giving them an opportunity to seek other fields for which they may be better fitted, and reduces the overhead in industry that results from a large turnover of men not fitted for the profession. The Cooperative Plan Cooperative education in engineering is no longer an experiment. It was inaugurated at the University of Cincinnati in 1904 by Dean Herman Schneider, and has worked successfully ever since. Over twenty schools offer this type of education and many thousands of young men have had the opportunity to receive their technical training under this plan. Under the cooperative plan a student attends class for a period of eight weeks, then enters industry for eight weeks, maintaining this schedule

Jan 1, 1937

By L. C. Uren

Some of US have been impressed with the need for a better understanding of the future place of the engineer in the petroleum industry. In academic work we are continually asked to advise students as to the opportunities in different directions, to guide them in their selection of professions, and it would be extremely helpful to those in academic lines of work to have the opinion of engineers from the industry relative to the need for petroleum engineers. IS the industry going to require a continually growing number of engineers in the future years, or have we perhaps reached equilibrium in that regard ? In anticipation of this meeting, I undertook to canvass opinion among a number of engineers of my acquaintance and I have been rather astonished to learn that the expenditure on engineering salaries in the producing branch of the oil industry is extremely low. I have figures from eight or 10 of the larger oil companies and it seems to be a fair statement on the basis of these figures to say that the average American oil company is devoting less than 2 per cent. of its gross expenditures in oil production to the payment of engineering salaries. A few examples will be of interest. I shall not mention names of individual companies, but one large Mid-Continent company is spending slightly less than 1 per cent. of its gross expenditure—that is, less than 1 per cent. of the total expenditure in the producing department—on engineering salaries and about as much on engineering research, which might properly be regarded as a phase of its engineering work. Another Mid-Continent company is spending about 11/4 per cent. on engineering salaries. A large California company is spending about l1/2 per cent. The largest figure that has come to my attention is that of an important Rocky Mountain and Mid-Continent company that is spending a little more than 6 per cent., but that is apparently an extreme case. The petroleum producing industry is a highly technical business in these days. It is spending in excess of $500,000,000 annually in new

Jan 1, 1929