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By W. E. C. Coxe

IN 1857 the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, whose main line extended from Philadelphia to Pottsville, Pennsylvania, with branches into the coal regions of Schuylkill County, made a contract with the Fairmount Rolling Mill, at Philadelphia, for the rerolling of some four thousand tons of iron rails. The essential features of the agreement were that the old rails should be piled with puddled iron and rolled into flats for the rail pile, which latter was to be of a section seven inches square, and after being heated, and reduced, by rolling, to a bloom of a section about five inches by six inches, was to be reheated, before being finished into the rail of the T pattern, four inches high, weighing sixty-four pounds per yard. Great care was exercised in the execution of this contract, and the rails being distributed over all parts of the road, gave general satis¬faction by their excellent wear. Five years afterward, the principal proprietor and manager of the Fairmount Rolling Mill was elected President of the Reading Railroad, and very many of the rails made under his supervision were still in use in the tracks of the company, of which he had just assumed the management. His first efforts were, therefore, directed to the procuring of more rails of the same quality wherewith to replace those worn out. Here he encountered some trouble, makers refusing to bid because of the details in the specification, the required reheating being the objectionable feature, for which it was generally intimated they would not be sufficiently remunerated for the increased labor, extra coal consumed, and the changes necessary from the established methods of working. Most of the new rails were, therefore, bought, and the old rails rerolled without regard to any particulars as to the manner of piling, heating, etc., each manufacturer furnishing what he deemed the best article possible for the money. As a consequence, rails of all imaginable grades were placed in the tracks, some giving out in six

Jan 1, 1877

By Joseph Pogue

THE past year in the petroleum industry was one of overproduction, rising inventories, low prices, and meagre to vanishing profits. This outcome was the result of a long period of intensive and uncompensated effort on the part of both financial and industrial interests, to stimulate supply on the theory that the primary problem facing the petroleum industry was the development of an adequate reserve of raw material to protect a large and ever-growing investment. The stimulus was applied in various forms and through diverse channels: capital had, long flowed into the industry in excessive amounts under the attraction of large expected profits; the price level for crude petroleum had persistently been influenced -by speculative considerations, with the result that prices declined slowly in periods of flush production and were quick to advance in anticipation of statistical improvement, thus maintaining a superfluous degree of stimulus on wildcatting and on drilling; speculation in inventories had led to the unsound, or at least unusual, business practice of accumulating huge stocks of oil; and, above all, the industry had directed the potent force of technology to the expansion of supply and achieved radical results in accelerating oil discovery, speeding up the rate of oil extraction, and enlarging the recovery of gasoline and lubricating oils from the raw material. In short, the economic conditions of 1927 were exactly those to which the objectively driven enterprise of the petroleum industry had long been directed; and the undesirable financial consequences arising. therefrom reflected no lack of success in what had been set out to be achieved, but rather the failure to have established concurrently the necessary means of economic control to prevent the immediate conversion of reserves into current supply, and likewise the oversight in neglecting to apply the technological force to the enlargement and diversification of the market for petroleum products. Perhaps, when viewed in its longer perspective, 1927 will stand out as the turning point in the economic policy of the petroleum industry, when the technique of rationalizing production made its, initial claim for recognition.

Jan 1, 1928

By Kenneth J. Kurry

12.2-1. Introduction. Successful management constantly strives to improve its methods and equipment in order to produce a better product at reduced cost. It is not enough that managers be cost conscious and industrious in these days of rapid, dramatic technological development. They must keep abreast of these developments-new or improved methods, machines, and equipment. Most of the machines and equipment have been carefully designed and perfected by reliable companies. However, improvements and progress often evolve from a definite need and are most successful in a particular operation. What may be the "answer" to the requirements of one company may be totally useless or inefficient to those of another. The manager of today must continuously evaluate the myriad proposals for change that result from modern technology-in terms of the particular needs and objectives of his company-to determine correctly which will best satisfy those needs and reach those objectives. Each new method or piece of equipment must receive careful study to make certain it is compatible with the entire operation. It may solve a problem in one department only to create a new problem in another. There are many pitfalls to be avoided in obtaining the necessary facts, and often these problems are unrelated to the actual use of the equipment or method being studied. All facets of the operation being considered must be thoroughly studied to determine if the method is compatible to the entire operation. For example, in considering a possible recommendation that a certain method and type of equipment be used to transport ore, some of the factors that should receive close scrutiny are: blasting procedure, maintenance, turning radius, percent grades, weather extremes, dumping problems, tire problems, length of haul, operator acceptance, or mismatched equipment. Failure to consider every factor-large and small, present and future-in evaluating a proposed change can mean a large investment in a new method or machine that will have to be continued for years at higher-than-antici-

Jan 1, 1968

By Frederick Görannsen

McDuffie county, once a part of Columbia county, lies in the eastern part of central Georgia, about 20 miles west of the Savannah river, and bounded on the northtwest by Little river. Wrightsboro, now almost forgotten, was one of the principal towns of Georgia before the Revolutionary war, and much of the land hereafter described as belonging to one of the principal gold-bearing sections of the South had been taken up by the early agricultural settlers, and was already under cultivation. Indeed, some of the present mining companies can trace their chain of title back to the original grant of King George III., made in 1771. The first discovery of gold in Georgia, however, was not made until 1823, when two English miners, who had emigrated to this country and were traveling as peddlers through this section, discovered quartz, rich in gold, on what is now known as " the 40-acre lot," and owned by the Columbia Mining Go. These men had no money to buy the lands, and not being able to stake off a claim and begin work, as is the custom in other places, they were forced to seek the aid of the native farmers. In this we are told that they were for a long time unsuccessful; the farmers and land-owners not knowing or caring anything about gold mining. In 1826, Jeremiah Griffin, a wealthy farmer, became interested with them, and they did some prospecting and located several rich veins. Mr. Griffin soon became enthusiastic, and bought about three thousand acres of supposed gold-lands, lying along Little river.. This purchase was unfortunate for the mining industry, as it effectually shut out all other prospectors, and confined entirely to Mr. Griffin and his associates the mining development of the whole region. As a consequence, the ground was never covered, arid there are virgin lands in this section now, which offer to the prospector as

Jan 1, 1903

By A. M. Gaudin, D. W. Fuerstenau

By streaming potential techniques, the zeta potential of quartz has been measured as a function of the concentration of dodecylammonium salts at different pH values. These experiments indicate that adsorption of dodecylammonium ions takes place as individual aminium ions until a certain critical concentration is reached in the double layer, at which point the adsorbed collector ions begin to associate into patches of ions, called hemi-micelles. Because of its effect on the surface potential of quartz, pH controls the adsorption of dodecylammonium ions. The value of cooperating agents and nonionized constituents of flotation systems is discussed. A PREVIOUS investigation' of the role of pH in the flotation of quartz with anionic collectors is here extended to an inquiry of how the cationic collector, dodecylammonium acetate, is adsorbed at the quartz-solution interface. The equilibrium amount of this collector adsorbed by quartz has already been measured as a function of concentration and pH.2,3 The weight of prior evidence has suggested that two mechanisms are involved in the adsorption of this collector by quartz, but with existing adsorption measurements alone it is not possible to determine what the mechanisms are. Gaudin and Bloecher2 postulated that a polymolec-ular adsorption coating begins to form before the first monolayer has been completed. Gaudin and Morrow4 indicated that a similar situation might exist in the film of dodecylammonium ions on hematite. A study of electrokinetic potentials at the quartz-solution interface provides some detail toward a fuller understanding of the adsorption mechanism. Experimental Results The zeta potential at the quartz-solution interface was calculated from streaming potential data measured with the apparatus described in detail in a thesis by Fuerstenau5 and briefly in a paper by Gaudin and Fuerstenau.1 The quartz used in these experiments was a 48/65-mesh fraction prepared in the manner described previously.' Zeta potential of quartz was obtained for various amounts of the amine salt at pH 4, 7, 10, 11. In

Jan 1, 1956

By Charles Macdonald

It may seem to be almost unnecessary to occupy the time of the Institute in further consideration of a question which has been so comprehensively treated in papers already on file in our own Transactions and in those of the American Society of Civil Engineers. Unfortunately, however, the results of these concerted efforts have not been materially to increase our stock of Knowledge in the direction sought for; and as the necessity for this information is becoming.more and more apparent as the demand for structural materials increases, it is believed that by continuing the agitation by means of discussions in this and kindred societies, whose members are vitally interested in obtaining reliable data as to the properties of the materials they are called upon to work with, public opinion may be educated up to the importance of exerting such an influence upon the law-makers of the country as will result in the formation of a competent board, with adequate means at its disposal, to carry out this great work in a manner alike acceptable to the makers and users of the materials in question. It may be proper in the first place to glance briefly at what has been attempted thus hr, then to indicate some of the more important lines of needed investigation, and finally to consider reasons why government aid may with propriety be sought for in carrying on the work. At a convention of the Society of Civil Engineers held at Chicago June 5th, 1872, it was, on motion of General William Sooy Smith, resolved, that, " Whereas, American engineers are now mainly dependent upon formula for the calculation of strength of the different form of iron and steel, not based on experiments upon American materials and manufacture; and " Whereas, There differ greatly in many of their ch~racteristics front thoae of foreign production, both in their nature and forma: therefore,

Jan 1, 1882

By James Douglas

In discussing the waste upon which hinges, or is supposed to hinge, so largely the preservation of our national resources, the conclusions reached would be more reliable if actual experience were consulted, and fewer deductions were drawn from general statements, which are often the product of the imagination. It cannot be questioned that the value of by-products has .not been sufficiently appreciated by us, and that our tardiness in recovering the useful ingredients of the escaping gas of our coke-ovens is one of the most glaring instances of shortcoming in that direction. And yet even for that sin there is some palliation in the immature condition of affiliated industries. I presume that it is admitted, without argument, that, except under very exceptional conditions, all the elements cannot be recovered from most of the ores or natural products which we treat. While it is a shame that the by-products from our coke-ovens should be dissipated, Edward W. Parker's report to the U. S. Geological Survey for 19061 supplies a fairly good excuse in justification of this appalling waste. He says (pp. 773 to 774.): " What has been already commented on in previous reports about the slowness of manufacturers to change from the better known but wasteful beehive practice to the by-product recovery method of coke manufacture is particularly emphasized in the statistics presented in this chapter. For it would appear from the table following that the construction of by-product ovens had about come to a standstill, especially when the records for the preceding five years are taken into consideration. At the close of 1901, when there were only 1,165 by-product ovens completed in the United States, there were 1,533 in course of construction, 498 of which were completed during the following year. At the close of 1902, 1,346 retort ovens were building, 293 of which were added to the completed plants in 1903. At the close of 1903, 1,335 new ovens were building and 954 of these

Jan 1, 1910

By H. T. Mercer, A. C. Paulson

The composition of steel and the theory of its heat treatment have been so ably discussed elsewhere that it is unnecessary to go into the subject here. The purpose of this paper is to describe briefly the method of treating drill steel at the Copper Range mines, giving some of the troubles encountered and the manner in which they were overcome or corrected. To study the matter properly, it was necessary to devise a system of records that would show the actual underground performance of the drills. To illustrate this system, the records of the Champion mine are used, as it is at this mine that most of the work along these lines has been done. Reports from each drill machine are made daily by the shop and mine, and tables compiled from these reports show the footage drilled, steel broken, drills received and sent out at the shop, drills sharpened, and bits cut off. These data show what each machine or party is doing and whether the miners' supply of drills is kept up to date. There have been times when the supply of drills has been short and time lost by the miner in looking for drills. The daily records show the number and condition of drills on hand at all times. Under the old method of sharpening, the drills were heated in a coke furnace, the proper degree of heat being judged by color. Then they were sharpened in a machine, reheated in a second coke furnace where the proper heat was again determined by color, and quenched in water. While this method was fairly successful in the hands of a careful workman and for the solid steel used in the old piston drill machine, the introduction of the faster water machine, using hollow steel, produced changes both underground and in the shop. Much more was expected of the hollow-steel and hammer-type machine, with its improved method of rotation, but troubles due to breakage, burnt bits, uneven tempering, etc., at once appeared.

Jan 1, 1922

By Gerald V. Jergensen

Does an idea have merit? What does it cost to implement? Can the concept be implemented successfully? The ultimate proof is to try, then see. However, when there are many millions of dollars at stake, blindly building and trying requires considerable courage. Owners and investors in retrospect might choose other less complimentary words. So we might ask, "How might we establish the feasibility of an idea or concept before committing large sums of money to the ultimate test?" From this basic and prudent question, has evolved the engineering concept of the feasibility study. A feasibility study is simply a systematic evaluation of an idea or concept to determine the prospects for success. In a literal sense, a feasibility study considers an idea in terms of its data base, "builds" the idea on paper, "operates" that idea, calculates the cost and benefits, then measures the probable success in terms of some economic, technical or financial standard. Feasibility studies can be quite modest in scope yet provide useful insights as to the viability of an idea. A study might be initiated only to examine the completeness or validity of the metallurgical data base. Another study could be a search for a workable idea or solution to an already-identified possibly troublesome problem. In this latter case, the question, "Will it work?" may be far more important than, "How much will it cost?" Feasibility studies are sometimes global in scope, involving several dozens of specialists and examining an entire "grass roots" mining complex. Other studies may be less ambitious but equally important in examining an expansion proposal or developing new operating techniques. Studies may be commissioned to remove plant bottle-necks, solve maintenance problems and so on. The terms study and feasibility study are used interchangeably in this chapter. They denote a systematic method to examine a proposed concept or idea. DATA BASE Typically, studies are initiated with a minimum amount of specific information and a maximum number of assumptions. As the work proceeds and the data base expands, assumptions are replaced

Jan 1, 1982

By Owen R. Rice

Changes in coke hardness affect the working of the blast furnace, for soft coke is an obstacle to proper furnace operation. Soft coke is due to a low hydrogen-oxygen ratio in the coal charged; increasing this ratio increases the hardness of the coke. The best means of determining the hardness of coke is the combined tumbler and ball-mill. What is Good Coke? It is not always appreciated that the correct answer may be such a reliable forecast to the physical condition of the blast furnace, and incidentally its entire operation, that among the ordinary variations in other raw materials and also in operating conditions, it assumes a position of primary significance. Inasmuch as coke forms two-thirds of the total bulk of material charged, this assertion will not seem exaggerated, and in the subsequent discussion its applicability will be presented. Coke is the ideal blast-furnace fuel because it is strong and hard enough to resist the crushing and grinding effects of the furnace burden, and its porosity allows the ready passage of gas upward through the charge, and rapid combustion before the tuyeres. Coke deprived of its strength and with a cell structure physically frail and chemically susceptible to solution by carbon dioxide has its chief asset eliminated. When the melting zones are approached the fluid cinder trickling toward the hearth will envelope the small pieces of coke and form a sticky mass that will retard the free passage of gas. Blast pressure will then rise, driving will slow up and fragments of coke will lie inert before the tuyeres, rendered practically incombustible by their slaggy envelop. It is believed also that coke messes at cast are attributable to quantities of such coke floating unburned in the hearth. It has been correctly claimed that coke rendered small outside the oven possesses greater combustibility than that so developed in the

Jan 1, 1922

By Frank Linforth

THE object of this paper is to present a brief outline of the methods of geologic mapping employed in the Geological Department of the Anaconda Copper Mining Co., at Butte, and to show by means of a few typical examples the practical nature of the results obtained. The extremely complicated geological conditions early encountered in Butte mining led mine operators to realize the necessity of accurate detailed geologic mapping as an aid to successful development of the ore bodies. The organization of the Anaconda Geological Department was undertaken in 1900 by H. V. Winchell, who, in conjunction with D. W. Brunton, worked out the essential methods of procedure which are, in the main, followed at the present time. Since the year 1906 the geologic work has been under the direction of Reno H. Sales, and in some respects the scope of the work has been slightly enlarged. Au excellent article describing the general equipment of the geological department was presented by D. W. Brunton at the British Columbia meeting of the Institute in 1905.1 His idea, that data collected underground and recorded should be put to practical use and not remain a mere " inventory of the company's underground possessions," is the keynote to the success of applied geology in Butte. The geologic notes are taken as soon as possible after the ground is broken so that any mistake in the mining may be corrected at once, or any particularly advantageous procedure may be suggested before any useless work is done. Taking the notes underground is a comparatively simple matter, but a few necessary precautions may be pointed out. The essential to success is that the notes shall show exactly what geological facts are disclosed. The observer must discriminate carefully between important and unimportant exposures in making the record, especially as regards the relation between veins and stringers, between faults and minor slips, or between the characteristics of veins of different ages. A simple color scheme has been adopted for making this record: Red pencils are used to indicate.

Jan 11, 1913

By Wilbur A. Nelson

In 1839, Gerard Troost,1 the first State Geologist of Tennessee, reported the occurrence of zinc ores in east Tennessee, in connection with the iron ores at Embreeville; in 1844,2 he refers to the zinc deposits of east Tennessee, especially the apparently rich deposits occurring in Jefferson and Claiborne Counties, while his ninth annual report 3 s a description of the zinc deposits of Jefferson County and a description of the most improved processes by which zinc is extracted from its ores. Yet, only during the last few years have these ores been successfully worked. As far as can be learned, prior to the systematic development of the Mascot district in 1911, no large-scale or successful operation of any of the zinc deposits was carried on. But in that year, after several companies had made considerable progress in developing the Mascot area and had proved a relatively extensive body of low-grade sulfide ore, the American Zinc Co. entered the field. It introduced modern methods of prospecting and mining and from the first was successful. Too great credit cannot be given this company for its pioneer work in a previously unimportant field. Throughout the history of its operations, the American Zinc Co. has confined its efforts to underground mining of the sulfide ore, sphalerite. This company has found that successful results in zinc mining in east Tennessee can be achieved only by expending large sums in prospecting and blocking out bodies of pay ore in sufficient magnitude for large-scale operations. At Mascot are located the mines of the American Zinc Co. of Tennessee, the mines being situated along the Southern Railway in the Ilolston River Valley, Knox County, about 13 miles northeast of Knox-ville. At first only open pits, which were worked for oxidized ores, were operated and the production was small. In 1900, the Roseberry Zinc Co. was organized and sank to a depth of 187 ft. what is now known as No. 3 shaft of the American Zinc Co. The upper 30 ft. was in residual clay,

Jan 1, 1925

By Walter W. Bradley

Mining by hydraulic process of the important gold-bearing gravels of the Sacramento Valley in the basins of the Yuba, Bear and American rivers began in 1853, and continued at an ever-increasing rate for 30 years. In its most active days it reached an annual production of $15,000,000, and averaged $10,000,000 per year over the 30 years. During that period no provisions were made to prevent the debris from being discharged into the water courses, and ultimately large quantities of silt, sand and gravel were washed down to the lower valleys; filling channels, causing overflow of agricultural lands and difficulty in maintaining navigable depths in the Sacramento River. Agitation and suits filed because of these damages finally resulted in the injunction decision of Judge L. B. Sawyer,' in the U.S. Circuit Court, Jan. 23, 1884, which closed down practically all hydraulic mining operations not having means to restrain their debris. In 1893 (approved March 1, 1893), Congress passed the act introduced by Representative Anthony Caminetti, of California, creating the California Debris Commission, composed of three officers assigned from the Engineer Corps of the U.S. Army, and since that time it has been legal and possible within the drainage systems of Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers to conduct hydraulic mining of gold-bearing gravels behind dams built under this commission's permit and supervision. In the watersheds of the Trinity and Klamath rivers, which flow directly to the Pacific Ocean and do not affect navigation or agriculture, operating permits from the California Debris Commission are not required. There is a measure of restriction there, however, through what is known as the Trinity and Klamath River Fish and Game District. Chap. 215, Stat. 1931, in order to secure relatively clear water for the fishing season, provides that between July 15 and October 15 each year there must not be discharged into these rivers debris that will cause a turbidity greater than a content of 50 parts per million in the

Jan 1, 1937

By B. E. Fernow

MINING interests in the Western mountains are very seriously affected by the danger to property and life from destructive snowslides and avalanches. This is a danger which the miner has largely brought upon himself by an improvident stripping of the timber from the mountain slopes, and, therefore, he might be expected to take an interest in the reforestation of the areas thus devastated. A canvass was lately undertaken by the writer to ascertain approximately the extent of the damage suffered from this source, but the difficulty of obtaining reliable data has proved too great to permit, as yet, even an approximation. So much, however, is certain : that the loss of life is considerable, and that much property is destroyed almost every winter. True, neither the number of avalanches, nor their destructiveness, nor the amount of loss compares with what Switzerland experiences. This is due not only to the greater precipitousness of the Alps and to different climatic conditions, but also to the fact that in Switzerland a larger number of settlements is exposed to these dangers. A very complete and interesting official report on the very numerous and destructive avalanches occurring in Switzerland during the season of 1887-1888 has just been published as a contribution to the inquiry, whether and how these dangers can be averted. Peculiar weather-conditions, in addition to heavy falls of snow, were the reasons for the frequency of the phenomenon during that winter. This report records 1094 avalauches, by which 850 houses were destroyed or severely damaged; 84 persons and 752 cattle were buried; traffic on railroads and on highways was greatly interrupted, and the damage to personal property alone was valued at over $100,000. One of these snow-masses covered about half an acre, with a cone 250 feet in height. During the same year in Tyrol the number of avalanches was 3647. Of these 1355 run over permanent beds; that is, they recur annually, so that they are

Jan 1, 1890

By John A. Garcia

A standard set of coal mining laws for the entire United States is hardly practicsble, yet the numerous variations in the state laws for almost every item seems entirely unnecessary. The same useless variations appear in almost every comparable section with no apparent reason except that no attempt has ever been made to codify them, and as they were developed over a long period of time by innumerable individuals and legislatures, the present situation is the logical outcome of lack of cooperation between states. The ventilation of a mine is affected indirectly by many provisions not listed specifically under this heading, so that it would be necessary to tabulate the major portion of all the laws to secure a complete comparable digest; therefore only a few of the more important have been set down here. This point is well illustrated in the section providing for clearance between car and rib, which is intended as a safety measure against personal injury, but is very important from the standpoint of ventilation because of choked airways in mines on two-entry system. Confusing Phraseology Misinterpretation and confusion may be expected from the phraseology alone; one state provides that the scale of the mine map shall be "not more than 100 ft. to 1 in.;'' another state demands "not less than 100 ft. to 1 in." Both probably mean the same thing and seek to prevent the operator from furnishing a map on which the workings will appear SO small that the detail is illegible. Legislation is certainly indefinite that specifies structures must be fireproof when "near" a mine opening, and just what is a "dusty" or "gaseous" mine is open to argument in most of the states. The variation in spacing crosscuts and break-throughs and the limited number of men on a split seem entirely unnecessary, as the distance is not reduced in gaseous fields, excepting in Arkansas and Tennessee, which states produce a comparatively small amount of coal, and the number of men differs 100 per cent. and more for no apparent reason.

Jan 1, 1927

By William P. Blake

The occurrence and distribution of phosphorus is one of the most important questions with which the steel-maker has to do. Large sums are invested in processes for the removal of this element from ores before they come to the blast-furnace, and much greater sums in freeing the pig-iron from it. Mechanical engineers are becoming more and more critical of the amount of total phosphorus left in structural steel, the tendency being to require that it be reduced to the lowest possible figure. The old maximum of 0.1 per cent. is now considered much too high for first-class structural steel, and demands for 0.03 to 0.01 per cent. are by no means unheard of. The first to speak, in a scientific way, of the harmful effect of phosphorus on iron and steel appears to have been Meyer, who, in 1781, made mention of what we now term "cold-shortness," ascribing it to the presence of this metalloid, but not suggesting any remedy. It is, however, doubtful if a clear idea of this subject was possessed by the scientific world until after the invention of the pneumatic or Bessemer process, in 1855-56. One of the chief obstacles in the way of this renowned metallurgist,—one, indeed, the removal of which was the sine qua non of success,—was the phosphorus in the iron blown. The effect of the phosphorus does not seem to have been apprehended until many and costly experiments had been made, and then the required minimum percentage of it in the iron was secured only by the use of low-phosphorus ores. It was not until '1879-80 that practical success was reached, by the Thomas process, in the actual removal of the phosphorus from the iron. We now know something of the effect of the total amount of phosphorus on iron and steel, but very little as to the effect of the condition of the phosphorus. The state of combination in which

Jan 1, 1893

By M. Van Siclen

THE outstanding fact in connection with dust disease in the United States at present is the growing recognition of its seriousness by state officials and by the more progressive operators of mining, metallurgical and allied industrial plants. The same may perhaps be said of labor in some of its better organized centers, but the average independent non-union workman continues, as of yore, to suffer the toll of disability and even of death from dust inhalation without realization of the source of his ill-being. Progress in the betterment of the handling of sufferers from dust disease and of the conditions creating dust hazards in mining and allied industries is pursuing a course similar to that of the now widespread campaign against accidents, in which the risk is more obvious, more severe, and was naturally recognized. sooner. The coming on of dust disease is generally relatively slow and its immediate effects not infre-quently masked by or attributed to other diseases. Marked exceptions to this general rule have occurred in districts where the dust is particularly pernicious, such as the Rand and Joplin; yet such exceptions, unhappy in themselves, opened the eyes of medical men, and of those in other localities charged with the responsibility for the welfare of industry, to the much more widespread if less spectacular hazard existing from the inhalation of dust in all rock-excavating operations and all industrial operations creating inorganic dust, whether it be crushing and grinding, sand-blast-ing, granite-cutting, or what not. Advancement to date in the United States in prevention and treat-ment has been slow, yet the record shows that quantitative methods for determining the degree of hazard and means for decreasing it were being developed as far back as 25 years ago; and that more rapid progress may be looked for from now on. In 1908, in this country, F. L Hoffman?(1) discussed the mortality from consumption in dusty trades, especially brass foundries; and in 1913 E. R. Hayhurst(2) described the effects of inhalation

Jan 1, 1933

By Dorsey Hager

DORSEY HAGER, Tulsa, Okla.-I have been asked why the Dexter region is dry. I would like to know myself. I drilled two dry wells on that same anticline which has production to, the east and west and south and north. That same anticline has seven domes that have been drilled and only three have proven productive out of the seven. In other words, you have one well-defined anticline with seven domes along its length, all mappable, all checked carefully, and only three of those seven have produced. Now why the others did not produce, I do not know. L. L. HUTCHISON, Tulsa, Okla.-There is no appreciable difference in the character or structure of the sands? DORSEY HAGER.-NO, I have never .been able to see any appreciable difference in the sands where we got production and Where we did not get it. I will say that the deepest wells we drilled, in the vicinity of Dexter, had no sands at the point where they got the production farther north. I. N. -KNAPP, Ardmore, Pa.-I first went to the Kansas-Oklahoma field in 1895 and occasionally thereafter until 1899, when I began drilling; for oil. I started close to wells that were producing gas and which, when drilling, lead made good oil showings in a sand above the gas. I thought these showings were good enough evidence of an oil pool for me without looking for any anticline and I made a paying development in what' I was afterward told by geologists was probably a synclinal trough. If I remember correctly Dr. Orton's report on the lola gas pool (about 1898) he distinctly said that he found no evidence of anticlinal structure and concluded from the records of a large number of wells that there, was a terraced structure of the productive gas sands, of which there were no surface indications.

Jan 4, 1917

By John P. Harmon

This paper was written with two objects in view: (1) To describe in detail what has been done toward the ventilation of the main unit of the Portovelo mines and the results; (2) to give information that may be useful to anyone who may have to make a preliminary mine ventilation survey, with recommendations for the improvement of the existing system and finally the maintenance of the improved system. General Description The mining operations of the South American Development Co. at Portovelo, Province of El oro, Ecuador, are described here only briefly, as a full discussion does not fall within the scope of this paper. The orebodies are of the steeply dipping, gold quartz vein type, averaging about 2.0 meters wide. As shown in Fig. 1, the ore chutes are relatively far apart, making considerable development work necessary before connecting raises can be driven between the levels. Faulting' on a large scale and a parallel vein system have made long dead-end drifts and many crosscuts necessary in the exploration of veins. The ventilation of these dead ends is described under Auxiliary Ventilation. The method of mining2 is the filled rill stope method, similar to the method that is largely employed at the Butte mines. The main shaft of the mine is in the Amarillo Valley, on either side of which mountains rise abruptly to a height of several hundred feet above the collar of the shaft. Entrance is made to the mine: (1) Through the American shaft, which extends vertically from the surface to a depth of 1100 ft., of which only the first 700 ft. are in active use at the present time; (2) levels are driven from the American shaft at intervals of 30 m. (100 ft.), of which only the third, fifth and seventh levels need be considered in the ventilation problem; (3) adits at intervals of 30 m. (100 ft.), with a few exceptions, above the collar of the American shaft.

Jan 1, 1931

By M. Van Siclen

THE outstanding fact in connection with dust disease in the United States at present is the growing recognition of its seriousness by state officials and by the more progressive operators of mining, metallurgical and allied industrial plants. The same may perhaps be said of labor in some of its better organized centers, but the average independent non-union workman continues, .as of yore, to suffer the toll of disability and even of death from dust inhalation without realization of the source of his ill-being. Progress in the betterment of the handling of sufferers from dust disease and of the conditions creating dust hazards in mining and allied industries is pursuing a course similar to that of the now widespread campaign against accidents, in which the risk is more obvious, more severe, and was naturally recognized sooner. The coming on of dust disease is generally relatively slow and its immediate effects not infre-quently masked by or attributed to other diseases. Marked exceptions to this general rule have occurred in districts where the dust is particularly pernicious, such as the Rand and Joplin; yet such exceptions, unhappy in themselves, opened the eyes of medical men, and of those in other localities charged with the responsibility for the welfare of industry, to the much more widespread if less spectacular hazard existing from the inhalation of dust in all rock-excavating operations and all industrial operations creating inorganic dust, whether it be crushing and grinding, sand-blast-ing, granite-cutting, or what not. Advancement to date in the United States in prevention and treat-ment has been slow, yet the record shows that quantitative methods for determining the degree of hazard and means for decreasing it were being developed as far back as 25 years ago; and that more rapid progress may be looked for from now on. In 1908, in this country; F. L Hoffman?(1) discussed the mortality from consumption in dusty trades, especially brass foundries; and in 1913 E. R. Hayhurst(2) described the effects of inhalation

Jan 1, 1933