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By J. O. Lewis, Carl H. Beal

The material for this paper was collected for the most part by C. H. Beal during the years 1916, 1917, and 1918. Many of the conclusions reached in regard to the life of oil wells have already been published by the Bureau of Mines 1 but those presented in this paper deal particularly with the theoretical aspects of oil production. The report discusses some of the fundamental factors governing oil production, taking up first the conditions affecting the. amount of oil in the oil sand, then those factors that control the rate of production of oil wells, and then discusses several related problems, most of which deal particularly with the effect of the production of one well on that of another.

Jan 1, 1921

By Van H. Manning

Of all the war work by the Bureau of Mines none ultimately covered such a variety of processes and equipment, employed as many men, or called for as large an outlay as that started in con- nection with the solution of problems relating to the use of noxious gases in warfare. Beginning with an investigation to develop the best type of gas mask, the scope of the work extended until it included researches relating to a wide range of devices, such as different types of poisonous and irritating gases and smokes, smoke screens, gas shells and gas bombs, flame throwers, trench projectors for firing gas bombs, signal lights, and incendiary bombs. The Bureau of Mines in starting this work selected the necessary personnel, pro- cured the early equipment, and for some months, from the begin- ning to June 30, 1917, paid the cost of the work from its own funds. The Bureau of Mines built up a research staff of more than 700 chemists, including many of the most prominent chemists in the country, and obtained the cooperation of many of the universities and chemical companies. When the results obtained through this research were to be applied by the War Department, the Director of the Bureau of Mines cooperated in the selection of men to have charge of manufacture or further development, recommending chemiste who subsequently received commissions in the Army. The personal cooperation with the War Department was thus very close. The bureau can fairly claim that because it started this work on gas warfare and received the hearty support of the Department of War, the Navy Department, the National Research Council, and State, educational, and private institutions, the country was in July, 1918, months ahead of where it would otherwise have been in the production of gas masks and other devices. The production of toxic gases then far exceeded the supply of shells. In addition the later work in gas-mask manufacture by the Surgeon General's Office of the Army, which resulted in the development of the best mask produced anywhere; in gas manufacture and gas proving-ground tests by the Bureau of Ordnance, and in the chemical warfare pro- gram of the Navy, including the use of smoke screens, shells and toxic gases, were the direct results of the bureau's experimental work. The American charcoal and soda lime, developed through the research work, are the best used by any nation. The Bureau of Mines was instrumental in developing satisfactory methods of manu- facturing chlorpicrin, phosgene, mustard gas, brombenzylcyanide, cyanogen chloride, and other noxious substances on a large scale. The bureau also developed a smoke funnel for the Navy which no doubt saved many ships from submarine attacks, and devised smoke barrages, signal lights, incendiary darts, etc., for the Army. The Ordnance Department of the Army asked for incendiary bombs and were furnished with bombs better than any made previously. Perhaps the greatest single result of the research work has been the demonstration of the value of the services that the chemist and chemical engineer can render in time of need and the recogni- tion of chemical investigations as a necessary function of the Gov- ernment.

Jan 1, 1919

By Van H. Manning

EXPLOSIVES RESEARCH. As the physical laboratories of the explosives section of the Pitts- burgh experiment station were equipped for testing the physical properties of explosives, both the Army and Navy Departments for many years had requested the Bureau of Mines to make such tests. Chemical control of the physical tests through analyses, heat tests, analyses of gaseous products of combustion, and sand tests was exer- cised through the explosives chemical laboratory. Often an investigation was cooperative between two laboratories. The explosives chemical laboratory also aided the work of the Ex- plosives Regulation both by chemical tests and investigation of acci- dents in explosives plants. COOPERATIVE WORK FOR ARMY AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS. The explosives chemical laboratory devised, at the request of the Bureau of Ordnance of the Navy, a more economical method of making hexanitrodiphenylamine. This problem was assigned to the Bureau of Mines by Dr. C. E. Munroe, chairman of the committee on explosives of the National Research Council, acting as the depart- ment of science and research of the Council of National Defense. Before the United States entered the war the following reports of investigations were submitted to the Army or the Navy: 1. Report of sensitiveness and relative efficiency of TNT and ammonium picrate, dated February 6, 1913, undertaken at the re- quest of the Chief of Ordnance. 2. Report of tests and examination of two samples of TNT and one of TNA for the Ordnance Department of the Army, dated August 5, 1915, was undertaken at the request of commanding officer, Frankford Arsenal. 3. Report of tests for sensitiveness to detonation of mercury ful- minate of 21 samples of TNT crystallized from various solvents, for the Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department, dated June 17, 1916. 4. Report of tests of two samples of mercury fulminate for Frank- ford Arsenal, dated December 2, 1916, undertaken at the request of the commanding officer, Frankford Arsenal. After the United States entered the war the following reports of investigations were submitted: 5. Report of pendulum friction and large impact tests on two samples of "sodatol" and two samples of "amatol." The final report was dated July 20, 1918; and the preliminary report, May 15, 1918. This investigation was undertaken at the request of the Ordnance

Jan 1, 1919

By J. H. Wiggins

In 1919 the United States was threatened with a shortage of gaso- line. In spite of this well-known fact, a detailed field investigation has shown that in one stage only of handling crude oil the volume of gasoline that evaporates is equal to one-thirtieth of the country's yearly gasoline production. This loss occurs during the few days that the oil is stored on the leases before being taken by the pipe line, and in 1919, in the Mid-Continent field alone, it amounted to 122,100,000 gallons. Large as it is, it is only a part of the loss on the lease. Investigation has further shown that the gasoline in crude oil evaporates from one-half to six-tenths as rapidly as the same gaso- line after being distilled and stored, all evaporative conditions being the same. Many wastes in the oil fields are called "necessary." By this is meant that the cost of preventing the waste is greater than the gain through saving. Evaporation losses have fallen heretofore in this category, but now they must be considered unnecessary. In other words, it is no longer economical for any handler of crude oil to permit losses through evaporation. In accordance with its purpose of seeking to conserve mineral resources, the Bureau of Mines investigated the loss of gasoline by evaporation in the storage and handling of petroleum. Inasmuch as most producers had not decided that their losses justified cor- rective measures and no evidence was available on the comparative losses in various stages of handling the oil, the investigation was limited to determining by experiment and observation the nature and magnitude of evaporation losses, where the greatest losses are, and the factor controlling evaporation.

Jan 1, 1922

By W. P. DYKEMA

This report gins the results of a study conducted hy the Ilnreau of Mines for the purpose of informing the petroleum industry on the recent progress in the de,·elopment nncl application of the absorption process for recO\·ering gasoline from natural gas. The work has been undertaken entirely with regard to plant practice and for the purpose of describing the features and the operation of units of the plants now in use, the improvements that have been made, and the reasons for any ehanges eontemplated by the engineers in eharge· of the plants studied. Throughout the United States the impro,·ements in the absorption process that are under consideration by engineers not only widen practice so as to include gases at all pressures and percentages of gasoline content, but seem to be dewloping definite standards as to dimensions of towers, l"elocities of flow, saturation of oi~ areas of eooling surfaces, and quantities of menstruum to be circulated. Although perfect practice has by no means been attained, the writer belie,·es thnt a description of the current practice at ,·arious plants, including those ob,'iously more efficient features that each plant hns <le\"eloped and uses at one or another stage of treatment, will intere;; t and possibly help all persons operating or designing absorption plants.

Jan 1, 1919

By Arno C. Fieldner, J. W. Paul, WALTER A. SELVIG

Many mine samples of coal are analyzed each year in the laboratories of the Bureau of Mines. The analyses are made in connection with investigations relating to fuels belonging to or for the use of the United States Government, the causes of accidents in coal mines, the geologic relations of coal beds, and the quality and the value of the coal and lignite in the public lands. The systematic collection and analysis of such samples in connection with fuel investigations was begun in 1904 at the Government fuel-testing plant at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition. and was under the direction of the United States Geological Survey for six years. Descriptions of the coal samples collected between the beginning of this work, July 1, 1904, and the transfer of the fuel-testing and mine-accident investigations to the Bureau of Mines,July 1, 1910, were compiled and published in Bureau of Mines Bulletin 22.' Descriptions and analyses of samples collected during the fiscal years 1911 to 1913 were published in Bureau of Mines Bulletin 85.2 Descriptions and analyses of samples collected during the fiscal years 1913 to 1916 were published in Bureau of Mines Bulletin 123.3 The present bulletin presents analyses and descriptions of samples collected during the fiscal years 1916 to 1919. In order that the material in this bulletin may be used to supplement that presented in Bulletins 22, 85, and ,123, the same plan of geographical classi- fication has been followed, the analyses and descriptions of the samples being grouped in alphabetical order according to the State, county, and town near which the mines or prospects sampled are situated.

Jan 1, 1922

By Carl H. Beal

The oil industry in the United States is further advanced than in any other country, because of American initiative and the development of industries dependent in some way on petroleum or its products. For this reason the output has constantly increased (fig. 1), and as a result this country has produced more than half of the total output of the world. Trw total past output of the world is approximately 7,000,000,000 barrels of 42 gallons each; of this the United States produced about 4,000,000,000 barrels, or about 57 per cent. The limit of production in this country is being approached, however, and although new fields undoubtedly await discovery, the yearly outpnt must inevitably decline, because the maintenance of a given output each year necessitates the drilling of an increasing number of wells. Such an increase becomes impossible after a certain point is reached, not only because of a lack of acreage to be drilled, but because of the great number of wells that will ultimately have to be drilled. According to figure 1, the daily production per well each year has increased during the last few years. However, this increase is abnormal, being caused by the new pools brought in. Although such a condition may continue for several years, the average production per well will finally begin to decrease on account of the lack of new pools to make up for the normal decline in production of the old ones.

Jan 1, 1919

By R. O. Neal, G. St. J. PERROIT

As natural gas is a waning resource in many places, increased interest has attached to the use of gas for the manufacture of carbon black. Because of a large number of requests for information on the subject, the Bureau of Mines has undertaken a detailed study of the carbon-black industry, covering the mechanical details of commercial methods, with the purpose of increasing the recovery of carbon black by such processes. A study has been undertaken of the economic factors governing the carbon-black industry, the uses and properties of carbon black, the dE)velopment of more Itccurate methods of testing carbon black, microscopic examination of different grades of black, physicochemical study of methods' of mQ.nufacture now in use, and research on new methods of manufacture. Part I of this paper covers the engineering and economic side of the industry; the other phases of the investigation which have been under the direction of G. St. J. Perrott, of the Pittsburgh station.of the United States Bureau of Mines, are discussed in Part II.

Jan 1, 1922

By A. W. Ambrose

The output or oil and gas rrom the producing fields in the United States is rapidly deelining. Coincident with this decline is a steadily increasing demand ror petroleum and its products, but at present there are no commercial substitutes ror gasoline and lubricating oil. Undoubtedly, many new fields will be discovered in this country during the next rew years. Indeed, there may be periods or temporary flush production that ror a rew months or a year or perhaps two years will afford a surplus. Such peaks are temporary and should not be given too much weight in considering the relation between petroleum supply and our national lire. In considering this problem we must regard a long period or time, and, ir we do that we shall see that domestic production will be unable to keep pace with consumption. Hence, the public good demands t~at the highest efficiency obtainable be practiced in the production or oil. To accomplish this end, the operator or to-day should so organize his rorces ror development and production that he recovers every barrel or oil that can be recovered at a profit. This necessarily involves the use or eeonomical and scientific methods or development a:nd production and the elimination or waste. The Bureau or Mines has ror years urged the conservation or petroleum and its products, and has pointed out that -such conservation should start before the oil is brought to the surface rather than arter it is in storage tanks. Losses or petroleum underground have undoubtedly been rar greater than losses in storage, in transportation, and in refining. The quantity lost usually is indeterminate, and hence difficult to express in terms or money, but by remembering that entire oil fields have been ruined by invadIng waters some idea may be gained or the importance or underground waste. The petroleum engineer is coming to be recognized as an extremely important aid in the intelligent development or oil fields. In this paper an effort is made to outline ror the engineer and producer a field or work whereby science and engineering not only can but have been applied practically. The mining engineer has been the direct- ing hand in the development of mines, and it is being recognized more and more that the petroleum engineer has a similar function in developing oil properties. Thispaper aims to show the general method of procedure in studying underground conditions in producing oil fields and how such study may not only correct but even prevent great unnecessary losses. Such work provides the company with maximum insurance for the field against loss and is accompliphed at minimum cost and minimum risk. Throughout the paper reference is made to oil wells and oil fields, but to a certain degree many of the suggestions relating to oil wells are applicable in the care and protection of gas wells and in solving gas problems.

Jan 1, 1921

By D. E. FOCG, A. E. Wells

When the United States entered the World War governmental agencies found little definite knowledge available as to the exact capacity of each sulphuric acid plant in the United States to manufacture acid under the stress of a great emergency. It is true that on account of the demand for acid for the manufacture of munitions for the Allies, prior to the entrance of this country into the war, most of the acid plants near industrial centers in the Eastern and Northern States were running at or nearly their maximum capacity, but, . for various reasons, many plants in these States and plants in other districts were not. For a number of years statistics as to the production of acid by the plants of the country were compiled by the United States Geological Survey, but obviously such figures did not give information as to the maximum capacities that might be available for meeting the he.a vy war ·requirements, or as to the steps that would have to be taken to bt-ing these capacities into use. During the summer and early fall of 1917 various attempts were made to obtain the desired information, but no satisfactory or complete data were obtained. Late in 1917, under the authority granted to the Bureau of Mines by the explosives act, the Director of the Bureau of Mines directed A. E. Wells, metallurgist of the bureau, to uiake a complete survey of the situation. Mr. Wells personally conferred with officials of the acid companies and visited most of the acid plants in the North that are east of the Mississippi River. The information obtained through this personal survey, together with that obtained through the ready cooperation of the subcommittee on ncids, and the subcommittee on fertilizers of the Committee on Chemicals of the Council of National Defense, enabled the preparation of a report containing the desired data concerning the sulphuric acid industry. This report was made immediately available to the War Industries Board and to those offices in the War and Navy Depart- ments that were most directly concerned in planning the explosives program and in obtaining the necessary supplies to produce the explosives. Beginning with this survey and report, the sulphuric acid section of the war minerals investigations of the Bureau of Mines took an active part in all matters pertaining to the sulphuric acid industry during the remainder of the war. Mr. Wells, the chief of the section, was appointed an associate chief of the sulphur, pyrite, and sulphuric acid sections of the War Industries Board. .Also, by this direct contact with the War Industries Board, the data obtained by Messrs. R. R. Hornor, H. A. Buehler, a.nd 0. Lindstrom, who were in charge, for the bureau, of the investigations concerning the supplies of pyrite and sulphur, were constantly made available to all interested Government agencies. D. E. Fogg, of New York City, was appointed chemical engineer to the sulphuric acid section to make special investigations relating to the acid industry, especially the possible utilization, in an emergency, of those sources of raw material.not then being used. Mr. E. E. Corbett, of Brooklyn, N. Y., was appointed chemical engineer to make investigations concerned primarily ,vith the conservation of acid. Direct and intimate contact with the industry was had through the close cooperation with the committee on acids of the Chemical Alliance, this committee during the greater part of 1918 occupying rooms with the acid section of the bureau. With the ending of the war and the close o:f the active work of the acid section of the bureau, the suggestion was made by many interested parties that a bulletin be prepared giving some qf the fun. damental and most important facts regarding the sulphuric acid industry, including a discussion of the technical :features of the manufacture of acid. During the war the bureau received -a vast number of inquiries in regard to various phases of the industry, a.nd this fact also made such a bulletin seem desirable. Therefore, the present bulletin was prepared to cover the main facts in regard to the industry in this country, including a discussion of the supplies of sulphur-bearing raw materials, the situation of the acid plants, the principal points in regard to manufacturing processes, and the uses of the acid. No attempt has been ma.de to discuss at length the manufacturing processes, as details differ more or less at the different plants and in general are carefully guarded by the acid ·companies. A great deal of the data given in this bulletin may be found in various pub]ications, but this is the first publication in which such data have been assembled and made readily available. Most of the data were obtained directly from observation and from cooperating acid companies or from individuals who had been or are now engaged in acid manufacturing and were liberal and generous in making their information available for publication. Care has been exercised to publish no data that were obtained as confidential by the bureau's representatives. The average acid manufacturer may be already more or less acquainted with most of the information presented in this bulletin, yet it is believed that the bulletin will be of value to those who wish to obtain a. general review of the present condition, both the economic and technical, of the sulphuric acid industry in the United States.

Jan 1, 1920

By W. A. Dunkley, W. W. Odell

About two-thirds of the manufactured gas supplied to the public by the gas plants in the Illinois district is cnrbureted water gas. The leading generator fuel is coke, ma.de in by-product c.oke ovens or in retorts, chiefly from eastern gas coals. During the fall and winter of 1917-18, when the demand for coke by war industries and the restrictions of the Fuel Administration in connection with the transportation of coke from eastern States made it almost impossible for many gas companies to obtain their coke requireml'nts, several water-gas plants had to use bituminous coal as generator fud. Many operating difficulties were encountered, some of which were solved more or less satisfactorily in different plants. A number of plants attacked the problem rather blindly because facilities for making tests were lacking and because technical men were too busy with labor and supply problems to study thoroughly the conditions involved or to ascertain what other plants had done with this fuel. It was therefore with the hope of assisting the gas industry during this critical period, and of promoting the use of Central District coals for gas making, that the Illinois Mining Investigations, a joint agency of the U. S. Bureau of Mines, the University of Illinois, and the Illinois Geological Survey Division undertook the, tests discussed in this paper. • This report was compiled under the auspices of a technical committee appointed by Gov. Frank 0. Lowden to promote the use of Central District coals in gas manufacture as a war measure. This committee included the following representatives of the various agencies concerned: U. S. Bureau of Mines, E. A. Holbrook and W. W. Odell; Illinois Gas Association, C. W. Bradley and R. B. Harper; University of Illinois, Dean C. R. Richards, Prof. S. W. Parr, and Prof. H. H. Stoek; State Geological Survey Division, F. W. De Wolf, G. H. Cady, a.nd W. A. Dunkley. F. W. De Wolf was chairxnan of the committee and E. A. Holbrook was secretary.

Jan 1, 1924

By Daniel Harrington

On the night of June 8, 1917, the flame of a carbide lamp accidentally set fire to the uncovered and frayed insulation of an armored power cable near the 2,400-foot level of the North Butte Mining CO.'s Granite Mountain shaft. How this, insulation accidentally became exposed is explained on page 15. The highly flammable oiled fabric set fire to the shaft timbers, and as this is a downcast shaft the fire spread with great rapidity, soon filling the mine workings with smoke and gas. At the time 410 men were working underground, 247 of whom escaped by various means, but most of the 163 remaining were probably overcome soon after the fire started, and perished. Only two men were actually burned. The cause of the disaster was purely accidental. The immediate effect was the unexpected reversal of normal conditions; the ultimate effect was great loss of life and the destruction of the main hoisting shaft, putting it temporarily out of service. The work of rescue and fire fighting continued eight days. The following pages present an attempt to draw some practical conclusions and suggestions from this disaster. The property of the North Butte Mining Co. consists of about 220 acres in the northeastern part of the Butte district, Montana. Next to the Anaconda Copper Mining Co. it is the largest producer of the district. In 1916, the year before the disaster, there were 1,160 men employed. The output was 560,947 tons of ore, which yielded 24,498,181 pounds of copper, 1,047,063 ounces of silver, 1,712 ounces of gold, and 412,953 pounds of zinc. The profit was $2,479,595. The total development work for that year was 21,694 feet. During the first half of 1917, the year of the accident, the daily tonnage of ore averaged 2,000, an increase of 400 tons over that of the year 1916.

Jan 1, 1922

By Richard E. Thill

The Bureau of Mines&apos; Oil Shale Data Bank (OSDB) was created in 1976 to serve as a centralized source for the storage, retrieval, and dissemination of technical literature, patents, and information on research projects in oil shale. Thousands of bibliographic references, patents, and research projects relating to the mining of oil shale have been identified, abstracted, and indexed according to selected keyword topics. The resulting data bank listings are contained in three sections, each with a separate keyword breakdown for use in rapidly identifying references pertaining to a specific subject. All references cited in the OSDB were published prior to an established cut-off date of May 1, 1981, when a redirection of Bureau of Mines programs resulted in the loss of project funds and the subsequent phasing-out of data bank operations. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The oil shale data bank listings are the result of a team effort of the project staff. The contributions of Jimaleen Jansma for keypunching, information acquisition, and data entry, and John Brandenburg and Sandra Brake for keywording and information acquisition are gratefully acknowledged. Appreciation is expressed to the staff members of the Smithsonian Science Information Exchange, Washington D.C. for their cooperation in supplying data on recent research projects in oil shale for inclusion in the OSDB listings. Appreciation is extended also to the staff of the Gallegos Research Group for assisting with computer services to obtain the final printouts and transfer of files onto magnetic tape.

Jan 1, 1982

By C. M. McKinney

The Bureau of Mines analyzed 626 crude oils from 546 oilfields in the United States that produced 2,500 BOPD or more during at least 1 of the last 3 years. Included also are crude oil analyses from eight fields that produced less but which were located in areas having few or no fields that produced 2,500 BOPD. The tables show the geographical and geological source, general characteristics. and determined and computed analytical data for each sample. The analyses were made according to the Bureau of Mines routine method and are directly comparable to other previously published analyses.

Jan 1, 1966

By Dennis R. Dolinar

The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health?s Pittsburgh Research Laboratory conducted a full-scale test of a composite polyurethane-aggregate seal in a hydrostatic chamber at the Lake Lynn Experimental Mine. This composite seal consisted of a polyurethane and limestone aggregate core that was formed between two concrete block walls. In the hydro-static chamber test, water is used to pressurize the seal. During the test, the maximum average water pressure the seal was able to withstand was 18.9 psi. Further, the seal began to yield at an average water pressure of only 17 psi. At the time of the test, the minimum seal design requirement was 20 psi under 30 CFR4 75.335 (2005). Therefore, based on this test, the seal did not meet the regulatory minimum design requirement. Uniaxial compressive tests conducted on samples from the polyurethane-aggregate core revealed that both the compressive strength and the elastic modulus of the material were much less than that for polyurethane only with a density of 10.0?12.0 lb/ft3. The significant reduction in the strength and stiffness of the polyurethane-aggregate mixture results from the formation of a soft polyurethane foam around each piece of aggregate. The formation of the soft foam seems to be caused by residual moisture from the aggregate. The moisture also caused the density of the polyurethane in the polyurethane-aggregate mixture to be less than the design requirements. The lower density of the polyurethane in the mixture, along with the formation of zones of pure polyurethane only, resulted in the overall seal density being less than the design requirements. During seal construction, steps were taken to control the moisture, but were not successful. An analysis of the seal failure showed that the calculated shear stresses at failure and the estimated shear strength of the polyurethane-aggregate mixture are fairly close. This suggests that the strength properties of the polyurethane-aggregate mixture along with a weak zone of poorly bonded aggregate controlled the maximum pressure the seal could withstand. At the time of the seal testing, the minimum design requirement was 20 psi, as specified at 30 CFR 75.335 (2005). New emergency temporary standards for seal designs were promulgated on May 22, 2007, with a minimum requirement of 50 psi under specified conditions. However, it will be shown that the evaluation of the polyurethane seal performance as designed to meet the older 20-psi criterion can be relevant to the design requirements under the new standards.

Jan 1, 2008

By Eric S. Weiss

The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) conducted joint research to evaluate explosion blast effects on typical U.S. mine ventilation stoppings in the NIOSH Pittsburgh Research Laboratory?s (PRL) Lake Lynn Experimental Mine (LLEM). An innovative Australian-designed brattice stop-ping was also evaluated. After mine explosion accidents, MSHA conducts investigations to determine the cause(s) as a means to prevent future occurrences. As part of these postexplosion investigations, the condition of underground stoppings, including the debris from damaged stoppings, is documented as evidence of the approximate strength and the direction of the explosion forces. The LLEM data showed that a typical dry-stacked and coated solid-concrete-block stopping survived a total explosion pressure of ~6.7 psi (~46 kPa) and was destroyed at a total explosion pressure of ~7.6 psi (~52 kPa). In comparison, a typical dry-stacked and coated hollow-core concrete block stopping survived a total explosion pressure of ~3.4?4.3 psi (~23?30 kPa) and was destroyed at a total explosion pressure of ~3.6?5.2 psi (~25?36 kPa), depending on the length of the pressure pulse and the value of the pressure-time integral. A typical steel panel stopping design survived a total explosion pressure of 0.8 psi (5.5 kPa) and failed at a total explosion pressure of 1.3 psi (9 kPa). The LLEM data also showed that an obstacle blocking the path of a pressure wave resulted in a higher reflected pressure at the obstacle. An 8-in (20-cm) thick wet-laid solid-concrete-block stopping coated on one side survived a total explosion pressure of ~26 psi (~180 kPa); this stopping was not tested to failure. A 6-in (15-cm) thick wet-laid solid-concrete-block stopping coated on one side survived a total explosion pressure of ~14 psi (~97 kPa) and was destroyed at a total explosion pressure of ~25 psi (~172 kPa). An innovative Australian woven cloth stopping survived an explosion pressure of 4.0 psi (27 kPa) and was destroyed at an explosion pressure of ~6.1 psi (~42 kPa). These results will help investigators determine the approximate explosion forces that destroy or damage stoppings during actual coal mine explosions.

Jan 1, 2008

By John A. Organiscak

Enclosed cabs are a primary means of reducing equipment operators? silica dust exposure at surface mines. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health experimentally investigated various factor effects on cab air filtration system performance. The factors investi­gated were intake filter efficiency, intake air leakage, intake filter loading (filter flow resistance), recirculation filter use, and wind effects on cab particulate penetration. Adding an intake pressurizer fan to the filtration system was also investigated. Results indicate that intake filter efficiency and recirculation filter use were the two most influential factors on cab penetration performance. Use of the recirculation filter reduced cab penetration by usually an order of magnitude over the intake air filter alone because of the multi­plicative filtration of the cab interior air. Intake air leakage and filter loading affected the cab penetration to a lesser extent, while wind had the least impact on cab penetration between the calm and 10-mph wind velocities tested. Adding an intake pressurizer fan notably increased intake airflow and cab pressure with only minor changes to cab penetration. A mathematical model was developed that describes cab penetration in terms of intake filter efficiency, intake air quantity, intake air leakage, recirculation filter efficiency, recirculation filter quantity, and wind penetration.

Jan 1, 2008

By J. J. Forbes

Problems connected with the incidence, effects, determination, and control of dusts are still much before the public, although more information is available to the layman than when Bulletin 400, of which this publication is a revision,5 was issued in 1937. Bulletin 400 attempted to assemble information in convenient form on various phases of the dust problem, largely in the mining and allied industries. This revision includes data that have accumulated since 1937 and some that appeared previous thereto but were not available to the authors at that time. The literature on this subject is so voluminous that no attempt has been made to include all published material or all types of dust diseases, but only to assemble some of the more outstanding data on several aspects of the subject.

Jan 1, 1950

By D. Harrington

Dust diseases are much before the public at present, but little reliable information on the subject is readily available to the layman; even those rated as experts usually have a more or less theoretical conception of these diseases, their causes, remedies, and prevention. Until recently little attention has been given to prevention, and the usual attitude of the engineer, upon whom the main reliance for prevention ultimately must devolve, has been to let "sleeping dogs lie" or, more definitely, to "let well enough alone." However, the "laissez faire" attitude no longer is tenable; in the past few years numerous conditions have caused those engaged in industry, including mining, to study the subject with a view to ascertaining the facts upon which to formulate remedial measures, primarily preventive. This bulletin is an attempt to assemble information in convenient form on effects of breathing dusts, largely in the mining and allied industries. The literature on this subject is so extensive that no attempt has been made to include all published material or all types of dust diseases but only to assemble some of the more outstanding data on several aspects of the subject, especially with reference to silicosis.

Jan 1, 1937

By C. M. McKinney

This report contains Bureau of Mines routine analyses of 492 samples of crude petroleum from 470 United States oilfields, each of which produced 2,500 barrels a day or more during at least 1 of the years 1946-56. The fields are listed alphabetically by State and field names in table 1, with information on the geographical and geological sources of the samples. Table 2 summarizes the general characteristics of the crude oils and analytical and computed data determined from the analyses. A previous report 4 contains similar analyses of 283 important United States oilfields; some of them are repeated in this report. Many fields for which analyses previously were published are represented by new analyses, which include data not previously reported. Refractive index nu and specific dispersion, ng minus nD divided by the density, for some of the distillate fractions are included in the analyses of 316 of the crude-oil samples. This is the first Bureau of Mines report on analysis of crude oils to contain such data, and their use in calculating hydrocarbon-type composition of the fractions is explained.

Jan 1, 1957