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By W. J. Fene, H. B. Humphrey, J. J. Forbes

"INTRODUCTION Loss of life from coal-mine explosions in the United States in 1949 was the lowest in any year since before 1870. Although fatality reports from coal nines before 1910 were incomplete,' the explosion fatalities from single disasters or individual States exceeded the 1949 total in each year as far back as 1870, when the records become fragmentary. Since 1890, the only other year in which fewer than 35 were killed was 1946, with a total of 32. Figure 1 shows the total yearly fatalities from explosions in all coal mines and those in anthracite mines alone since 1870. The fatalities in bituminous coal mines were not completely reported before 1910, but enough reports were issued by major coal-producing States to compile reasonably representative figures back to 1885. Any corrections would be additions to these totals.The reason for the moderate total of 46 explosion fatalities in 1948 and the low total of 8 killed in 1949 is thought to be the serious and careful attention devoted to elimination of coal-mine explosion hazards after the disastrous explosions in 1947. The standards now being observed generally with respect to ventilation, rock-dusting, and inspections for gas are better than those found earlier in even the mines having the best reputations for safety. Exceptions are still numerous, but they are fewer, month by month, because of the pressure of Federal and State inspections and a changing conception of the hazards that should not be permitted underground. The prevailing precautions have not eliminated all ignitions of gas or dust, but they have limited propagation to small explosions and have prevented serious loss of life.The number of ignitions (14) reported for the year was less than the average (24) for the 5 years 1944-48 and only half the average for the fiscal years 1929-44. Another favorable factor is that Bureau of Mines representatives were probably in closer contact with both small and large mines in nearly all coal-mining districts. Inspectors now assigned to individual districts are better able to keep informed on the happenings and the progress of safety in their districts. In 1948, one-fourth of the explosions were in mines that employed fewer than 10 men; this condition was duplicated in 1949."

Jul 1, 1950

Objective To characterize the roof fall risk associated with underground limestone mining. Background During the first 5 years of this decade, more than one-fourth of the underground mining fatalities occurred as the result of fall of ground. The large openings in underground stone mines present limitations in observing ground conditions because of floor-to-roof heights ranging from 20 to 60 ft or more. Generally, the status of ground conditions in under-ground stone mines is based on observation and experience obtained during mining development. Some mines use monitoring instruments to gain information on roof conditions, but this practice is typically focused and localized to address issues in a particular area or section of the mine. The Roof Fall Risk Index (RFRI) described here provides a method of systematically characterizing the risk of roof falls to enhance the safety of mine workers. Approach As in many industries, a defective product signals the potential for failure. Similarly, defective rock or strata in an underground stone mine presents a potential risk. Assessing ground conditions relative to the concentration of defects observed provides a way to index or rate these conditions and the subsequent risk. Through observations at approximately 50 underground limestone mines in the United States, strata defects were categorized to develop a quantitative method for determining the RFRI. This method is specifically geared to underground lime-stone mines because strata defects are difficult to see and limited by the experience and knowledge of the observer. Overall, 10 defect categories were deter-mined: 3 that relate to geology, 4 that result from mine development, 2 that are indicative of the roof profile, and 1 that addresses moisture or water flow (see RFRI Chart 1). The defect categories are also weighted to reflect the conditions indicative of roof or strata movement or separation (categories 4 through 8). These weights are multiplied by the assessment value to determine the total category value. The benefit of using monitoring techniques to gain information on roof conditions is also factored into the RFRI for overall assessment of an area in the mine. Each defect category is assessed with a value of 1 to 5 based on parameters as defined in each defect category, with 5 indicating the highest degree or level of defect. The assessment value of 3 is also used when information on a parameter is unknown. The parameters for the defect categories are illustrated in RFRI Chart 2 for use in determining the assessed value. How It Works The RFRI provides a means to categorize the risk for roof falls in underground stone mines. The concept of this calculation is aimed at providing an indication of the level or degree of defect relative to the area of the mine examined. The RFRI for the calculation produces a distribution where RFRI values approaching 0 represent a stable condition and those ap-proaching 100 represent an unstable condition.

Oct 1, 2006

By Van H. Manning

Of all the war work by the Bureau of Mines none ultimately covered such a variety of processes and equipment, employed as many men, or called for as large an outlay as that started in con- nection with the solution of problems relating to the use of noxious gases in warfare. Beginning with an investigation to develop the best type of gas mask, the scope of the work extended until it included researches relating to a wide range of devices, such as different types of poisonous and irritating gases and smokes, smoke screens, gas shells and gas bombs, flame throwers, trench projectors for firing gas bombs, signal lights, and incendiary bombs. The Bureau of Mines in starting this work selected the necessary personnel, pro- cured the early equipment, and for some months, from the begin- ning to June 30, 1917, paid the cost of the work from its own funds. The Bureau of Mines built up a research staff of more than 700 chemists, including many of the most prominent chemists in the country, and obtained the cooperation of many of the universities and chemical companies. When the results obtained through this research were to be applied by the War Department, the Director of the Bureau of Mines cooperated in the selection of men to have charge of manufacture or further development, recommending chemiste who subsequently received commissions in the Army. The personal cooperation with the War Department was thus very close. The bureau can fairly claim that because it started this work on gas warfare and received the hearty support of the Department of War, the Navy Department, the National Research Council, and State, educational, and private institutions, the country was in July, 1918, months ahead of where it would otherwise have been in the production of gas masks and other devices. The production of toxic gases then far exceeded the supply of shells. In addition the later work in gas-mask manufacture by the Surgeon General's Office of the Army, which resulted in the development of the best mask produced anywhere; in gas manufacture and gas proving-ground tests by the Bureau of Ordnance, and in the chemical warfare pro- gram of the Navy, including the use of smoke screens, shells and toxic gases, were the direct results of the bureau's experimental work. The American charcoal and soda lime, developed through the research work, are the best used by any nation. The Bureau of Mines was instrumental in developing satisfactory methods of manu- facturing chlorpicrin, phosgene, mustard gas, brombenzylcyanide, cyanogen chloride, and other noxious substances on a large scale. The bureau also developed a smoke funnel for the Navy which no doubt saved many ships from submarine attacks, and devised smoke barrages, signal lights, incendiary darts, etc., for the Army. The Ordnance Department of the Army asked for incendiary bombs and were furnished with bombs better than any made previously. Perhaps the greatest single result of the research work has been the demonstration of the value of the services that the chemist and chemical engineer can render in time of need and the recogni- tion of chemical investigations as a necessary function of the Gov- ernment.

Jan 1, 1919

By Thomas L. Chapman

The San Manuel is a deposit of low-grade disseminated copper ore. It was brought to the attention of the government in October 1942 through an application to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for a development loan, supported by a report by Henry W. Nichols. Nichols' sampling of two outcrops containing copper silicate and his geologic map indicated that a minable body of copper ore might be developed. The Federal Geological Survey was requested to examine the property. The Survey mapped the geology in March 1943 and cut a few check samples, which substantially confirmed Nichols' sampling of the outcrops and a few shallow workings. The geologists of the Survey recommended some test drilling by the Bureau of Mines. The property was examined by the author and Wm. D. Hughes, associate engineer of the Bureau of Mines on March 22 and 26, 1943, and a preliminary drilling campaign was recommended. Five shallow churn-drill holes totaling 1,480 feet were put down under the supervision of Chas. A. Kumke, one of the Bureau's engineers, from November 23, 1943, to January 13, 1944. This work indicated that the deposit extended deeper than the 350-foot depth attained in the deepest hole and might have very considerable areal extent. Additional funds were allotted, and the drilling contract was extended twice to a final maximum of 17,000 feet with 2,000 feet maximum depth of hole. Drilling was continued by the Bureau of Mines until February 2, 1945, when 15,844 feet of hole had been drilled. The Magna Copper Co. took options on this and adjoining property in September 1944 and commenced drilling with two machines. It also engaged the two contract drills used by the Bureau after it stopped drilling. It exercised its options in August 1945 and organized the San Manuel Copper Corp. to operate the property. That company is continuing to explore the ore body with six churn drills. Thomas Lyon took options early in 1945 on holdings adjoining the San Manuel property on the east and is operating two churn drills. Exploration up to the completion of the last holes started by the Bureau of Mines indicated a block of ore 3,100 feet long, 400 to 800 feet wide, and 500 to 900 feet thick, and averaging about 0.8 percent copper. Subsequent drilling showed that the ore body extends considerably beyond this block. The axis of the ore body strikes about N. 61° E. Copper minerals are disseminated in hydrothermally altered quartz monzonite and monzonite porphyry. Ore outcrops in two small areas over the northeast part of the block. Elsewhere the copper-bearing rocks are capped by Gila conglomerate, which thickens toward the west and south. Drilling showed that the ore is in a thick, tabular body with a steep dip to the south. The ore body lies near the surface in the northeastern part of the block. The south side of the block is much farther below the surface than the north side. There the upper part of the copper-bearing rocks is lightly mineralized, so that the hanging wall of minable ore lies deeper than the base of the conglomerate cap, which thickens southward.

Aug 1, 1947

By Thoms L. Chapman

The San Manuel is a deposit of low-grade disseminated copper ore. It was brought to the attention of the government in October 1942 through an application to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for a development loan, supported by a report by Henry W. Nichols. Nichols’ sampling of two outcrops containing copper silicate and his geologic map indicated that a minable body of copper ore might be developed. The Federal Geological Survey was requested to examine the property. The Survey mapped the geology in March 1943 and cut a few check samples, which substantially confirmed Nichols’ sampling of the outcrops and a few shallow workings. The geologists of the Survey recommended some test drilling by the Bureau of Mines. The property was examined by the author and W. D. Hughes, associate engineer of the Bureau of Mines on March 22 and 26, 1943, and a preliminary drilling campaign was recommended. Five shallow churn-drill holes totaling 1,480 feet were put down under the supervision of Chas. A. Kumke, one of the Bureau’s engineers, from November 23, 1943 to January 15, 1944. This work indicated that the deposit extended deeper than the 350-foot depth attained in the deepest hole and might have very considerable areal extent. Additional funds were allotted, and the drilling contract was extended twice to a final maximum of 17,000 feet with 2,000 foot maximum depth of hole. Drilling was continued by the Bureau of Mines until February 2, 1945, when 15,844 feet of hole had been drilled. The Magma Copper Co. took options on this and adjoining property in September 1944 and commenced drilling with two machines. It also engaged the two contract drills used by the Bureau after it stopped drilling. It exercised its options in August 1945 and organized the San Manuel Copper Corp. to operate the property. That company is continuing to explore the ore body with six churn drills. Thomas Lyon took options early in 1945 on holdings adjoining the San Manuel property on the east and is operating two churn drills. Exploration up to the completion of the last holes started by the Bureau of Mines indicated a block of ore 5,100 feet long, 400 to 800 feet wide, and 500 to 900 feet thick, and averaging about 0.8 percent copper. Subsequent drilling showed that the ore body extends considerably beyond this block. The axis of the ore body strikes about N. 61º E. Copper minerals are disseminated in hydrothermally altered quartz monzonite and monzonite porphyry. Ore outcrops in two small areas over the northeast part of the block. Elsewhere the copper-bearing rocks are capped by Gila conglomerate, which thickens toward the west and south. Drilling showed that the ore is in a thick, tabular body with a steep dip to the south. The ore body lies near the surface in the northeastern part of the block. The south side of the block is much farther below the surface than the north side. There the upper part of the copper-bearing rocks is lightly mineralized, so that the hanging wall of minable ore lies deeper than the base of the conglomerate cap, which thickens southward.

Aug 1, 1947

By Kevin A. Rider, Bernard J. Martin

Reaching movements are planned and subsequently executed [1] using visual and somatosensory feedbacks [2], where absence of visual feedback is known to increase endpoint variability [3]. Visual occlusion decreases the ability to make rapid online compensatory movements, which results in initial radial deviations that are highly correlated with radial dispersion at the target. Perturbations of rapid, visually-guided reaches are compensated on-line and result in endpoint dispersions poorly correlated with initial deviations, emphasizing the strong effect of visual feedback in temporally-constrained reaching tasks. In control conditions (no vibration), these uncompensated, rapid reaches serve as estimates of the individual’s intended trajectory. When ride motion is present, trajectories of rapid, visually-occluded reaches provide a measure of the natural biodynamic response of the cantilevered spine-arm-hand linkage. These intended movement trajectories and the biodynamic response (vibration feedthrough) are used to predict the effect of ride motion on the performance of rapid reaching tasks. Goals of this study are to investigate the influences of vehicle motion on human reaching and pointing, and to reveal movement strategies used in visually-occluded reaching tasks. Methods A six degree of freedom human-rated Ride Motion Simulator (RMS) was used to generate a dynamic vehicle environment. Participants performed discrete, rapid pointing tasks to targets presented on three touchpanel displays under stationary and random whole-body vibration. Reach instructions included successfully reaching identical circular targets (Ø = 0.25”) with the right index fingertip as fast as possible. Targets were presented on resistive-touch displays mounted approximately 60 cm from the participant’s nasion. The touchpanel displays were located in the forward and lateral directions at eye level, and forward at 45° of elevation. These displays measured the spatial error of the reach destination. A ten-camera VICON motion capture system recorded the upper body kinematics of the participant. Reflective markers were placed on the participant’s torso, head, and arms. Initial kinematics of the fingertip (i.e. time and magnitude peak tangential velocity) and tangential velocity at target were used to estimate the planned endpoint of the reach. Results and Discussion Ride motion resulted in increased endpoint variability compared to reaches performed in the stationary condition. Reaches to the elevated touchpanel consistently resulted in the largest variability across all motion conditions, suggesting that a vehicle occupant would not be capable of accurately activating a control in that location. Principal axes of endpoint ellipses were along and perpendicular to the direction of fingertip movements. Example graphs of endpoint variability with ellipses containing 95% of the data points are shown in Figure 1. These ellipses

Jan 6, 2006

Coal miners, especially roof bolter and continuous miner operators, work in a hazardous underground environment where they are often exposed to poor roof conditions. Nearly 500 rock fall injuries are reported each year, and 99% of them are caused by rocks falling from between the roof bolts. These loose rocks that injure miners are usually just a few inches thick, but on average weigh 280 pounds. NIOSH has found that most rock fall injuries can be prevented by installing roof screen during the bolting cycle. Roof screen is a sheet made of steel wires in a grid pattern. When screen is bolted up against the mine roof, it provides far more coverage than any common surface control used in the mines today. Because more mine roof is covered, there is less chance that a rock will fall and injure a miner. The facts about roof screen are shown in the new NIOSH video entitled “Make It Safer With Roof Screen.” Using extensive underground footage, the 7-minute video shows how well screen keeps loose rock from falling in difficult roof conditions. Techniques for installing screen from both outside-controlled and walk-thru roof bolting machines are shown. The video also provides safe handling tips, best practices, and information about machine technology that can greatly improve material handling. Throughout the video, a coal mine safety manager and a shift foreman talk about the tremendous difference that roof screen has made at their mines. An instructional booklet supplements the video with additional information. It presents compelling data from mines that have practically eliminated rock fall injuries with a roof screening program. Other sections of the booklet discuss in greater detail roof screen installation, tips for manual screen handling, a material handling system for roof screen, and use of the personal bolter screen, which can be easily handled by one person. Screen specification and custom ordering are described, including the sizes of screen, grid sizes, reinforcing (indicator) wires, edge cut options, and screen strength. A list of additional sources of information is also provided. Nearly every mine eventually encounters poor roof. Screen is one of the most powerful control techniques available. This new video will help make mine managers aware of screen, and it can help them in developing a roof screen installation program. It also serves as an information source and teaching tool for safety managers and trainers. The video can easily be integrated into new miner training programs or annual refresher training.

Mar 1, 2005

1. COAL PRODUCTION: Under Section 402 of Public Law 95-87 (SMCRA), coal operators are required to pay a fee when coal is sold, used, or transferred. These fees are deposited in the U.S. treasury as the Abandoned Mine Land Fund. Information about the type of coal (bituminous, lignite, or underground) and tonnage are tabulated on Form OSM-1 and submitted with the fee, which is paid quarterly to the Office of Surface Mining. The coal production data presented in this report was compiled from information stored in the Office of Surface Mining Fee Collection System computer data base. Collection of the fee began with the last quarter of 1977; therefore, 1978 data includes the last quarter of 1977 and the first three quarters of 1978. Information for each successive year follows the same tabulation pattern. Surface production includes both bituminous and lignite coal; underground includes tonnage reported as underground mined. In New Mexico and Montana, coal production on Indian land is listed under the Crow, Hopi, and Navajo Tribes. 2. HISTORIC COAL PRODUCTION: Federal Government agencies have published coal production data since 1807, the date of the earliest record. The source of coal production data used to compile this graph was: 1891-1895, U.S. Geological Survey, Division of Mineral Resources; 1896-1977, U.S. Bureau of Mines annual Minerals Yearbook; 1978- 1991, Office of Surface Mining data described in footnote 1 above. 3. NUMBER OF MINES: The number of mines was compiled from Office of Surface Mining Fee Collection System data described in footnote 1 above. Annual totals were calculated by adding together the number of operations with the same Mine Safety and Health Administration numbers reported each quarter and dividing by four to give an annual number in each state. 4. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: Enforcement action data was compiled from annual reports developed by Office of Surface Mining field offices and historical field office records. The data presented are all actions taken by both the state regulatory authority and the Office of Surface Mining. Citations issued are the sum of Notice of Violations (NOVs) and Cessation Orders (COs). Because the Hopi and Navajo jurisdictions overlap in Arizona and New Mexico, enforcement actions data for the tribes have been combined in annual reports prepared by the Albuquerque Field Office; therefore, they are combined for this report and listed under Navajo Tribe. 5. ACREAGE PERMITTED: Acreage permitted data was compiled from annual reports developed by Office of Surface Mining field offices and historical field office records. The acreage listed was permitted during the year shown and is not the total acreage under permit during that year. 6. BONDS RELEASED: Acreage of reclamation bonds released was compiled from annual reports developed by Office of Surface Mining field offices and historical field office records. The sum of final Interim Regulatory Program bonds and Phase 111 (or final release) bonds shows only the land area where reclamation is complete and has been released by the regulatory authority.

Jan 1, 1992

By Perry D. Teitelbaum

In two earlier studies the Federal Bureau of Mines undertook to explore comprehensively the dimensions of the Nation's energy balance. The first of these studies, published in 1950 as Bureau of Mines Information Circular 7582, by Harold J, Barnett, was primarily concerned with projections of future domestic energy requirements and supplies, because these related to projected growth in major fuel-consuming sectors of the economy, changing rates of energy-use efficiency, and interfuel substitution patterns. But, to provide the essential background for these projections, it was first necessary to assemble and examine in some detail the quantitative information on the size and shape of the current United States fuel economy. Among other things, Barnett's path-breaking study indicated the need to consider energy as an entity, particularly for public and private policy makers, industry and commodity analysts, economists, and others concerned with long range questions of domestic and international energy supply and demand. The study also spotlighted a gap in the fabric of current economic intelligence; no comprehensive collation and reconcilation in any single report of available published statistical information covering the origin -a disposition of all energy materials existed. In response to this latter need, the Bureau of Mines prepared the second of the two studies referred t3 above. This was published in 1951 as Report of Investigations 4805, by W, H, Lyon and D, S. Colby, and it consisted of statistical information on the production and use of each of the various fuels and electric energy in the United States for 1929, 1939, and 1947; all were presented in tabular form and on a uniform basis. The three years selected were chosen largely on the basis of data availability.

Jan 1, 1961

By D. Harrington, M. W. Von Bernewitz

"The erection of barricades by men who are shut off from escape in mines at time of fire or after an explosion has been consistently advocated by the United States Bureau of Mines. Largely through the publicity given by the bureau to this excellent type of emergency safety endeavor, several hundred lives have been saved during the past 20 years. One of the earliest instances of barricading in the United States of which there is fairly complete record was in connection with the Cherry mine fire in Illinois in 1909; in this fire 259 lives were lost, but 20 men were saved by two barricades and were brought safely to the surface after seven days. In another coal-mine fire, followed later. on by an explosion, at Delagua, Colo., in 1910, 79 lives were lost, but 18 men saved themselves by erecting canvas brattices or barricades; the miners in one barricade were removed safely after five hours and those in another after 21 hours. In 1911, after an explosion in a coal mine at Briceville, Tenn., in which 84 lives were lost, five persons were brought out alive after 58 hours behind a barricade. Twenty hours after an explosion in which 73 were killed at McCurtain, Okla., in 1912, 13 men were taken out alive and one dead from behind a barricade or partition constructed of canvas. In 1914, after an explosion at Eccles, W. Va., in which 181 were killed, 35 men barricaded themselves in one place and after four hours were brought to the surface alive; this barricade was also of canvas. In 1915, 112 men were killed in an explosion at Layland, W. Va., but two groups of men, 47 in all, were able to barricade themselves; after four days 46 men were rescued alive, but one man was dead. In 1915, an explosion at Boomer, W. Va., killed 23, but 27 others barricaded themselves in one place and after seven hours came out alive. All of the foregoing instances of barricading were in coal mines. In 1917 there were three cases of barricading in a Montana metal-mine fire (the North Butte) during which 163 lives were lost. One of the barricades, sheltering 19 men, failed because the region barricaded was in porous broken ground through which the poisonous gases seeped and killed the entire group. From another of the barricades, engineered by an assistant foreman, 8 men were taken out, 6 uncon¬scious and 2 dead, 50 hours after the fire started. The 6 unconscious men lived, out the assistant foreman who directed the men was one of the 2 who had died. In the third case of barricading in this metal-mine fire,,men, also led by an assistant foreman, kept themselves closed in for about b6 hours and then broke barricade or bulkhead, 25 oing in one direction to safety, and 4, including the assistant foreman, going in another direction to death from poisonous gases. There have been a number of other cases of barricading, some successful and others a failure. Probably the worst failure was that in the argonaut (gold) mine fire in California in 1922; all of a group of 46 miners behind a barricade were found dead when reached after 21 days."

Apr 1, 1933

By E. H. Denny

"Reduction of mine accidents appears to depend upon essentially the same fundamentals, whether considered from the viewpoint of the mine operator, miner, State mine inspector, or safety engineer. Conditions of mine operation with respect to safety are governed in most States by a mining law, usually somewhat general in its provisions but more specific than laws dealing with other industries, Methods of mining development and practice evolved through experience have been handed down from generation to generation; many of these are intended to avoid injury to men and also loss of property. To carry out the intent of these bases of law and experience relating to safety supplemental measures and conditions are necessary. Among these may be: (1) Planned safety rules adapted to the mine and compliance by both officials and Miners with such of these rules as pertain to their work; (2) a supervisory force adequate and competent to ¬administer the mining laws and safety rules; (3) discipline adequate to secure compliance with safety measures; (4) safeguards against mechanical, electrical, falling, and other hazards; (5) mining operations planned with respect to safety of workers; (6) an active safety organization of officials and employees; (7) education of officials and employees in safety practices; and (8) an active sustained interest in safety by management and employees.This paper presents the viewpoint of the safety engineer, though a safety engineer connected with a specific mine or group of mines would be in a better position than the writer to present the industrial engineer's thought. The application of the mine safety fundamentals just outlined will be given consideration from observations of methods used by safety engineers and supervisors.The term ""safety engineer"" includes men of various duties, various degrees of experience, and various authority. Depending upon the size of the operation or the interest of the management in safety, the safety engineer may have accident prevention as his sole duty; he may be the head of a sizable safety organization; or he may be in part a claim agent; a statistician compiling figures for the enlightenment of the company, the public, or a mining institute meeting; a surveyor who must convince the miner that his scale of 10/10 equals 1 foot does not defraud the miner of 6 inches to every yard measured; or he may be by heaven¬ly gift an orator capable of assuring the employees that ""all's right with the world""; he may be a young engineer gaining, experience while checking the observance of company rules and investigating accidents; or he may have the physical ills frequently resulting from several decades of mining experience and instead of a pension, the position of safety engineer has fallen to his lot. He may have mine-operating authority to correct immediately a dangerous condition or practice or he may have his recommendations officially disregarded at the monthly meeting or when the bottom of the desk basket is reached. He is likely to find that his viewpoint on accident reduction is considered unsound today because of youth and inexperience and unsound later because of old age and senility. He is likely to find the easiest course to be that of attributing to Providence and the carelessness of the worker the mishaps that result in the removal of a man to the hospital or the morgue."

Dec 1, 1936

Various aspects of judgment and decision-making are key themes in this book. The model presented here serves as a loose structure for the chapters that follow this one. The notion of a model is introduced because growing research interest in the subjective aspects of group and individual behavior has led to a debate over whether judgment is a skill that can be understood scientifically. A related point of contention is whether such an understanding could lead to the development of methods for estimating people's ability to make good decisions during an emergency. There is some literature that supports the potential usefulness of this approach. However, little agreement seems to have been reached on how to define and operationalize even those basic concepts necessary to assess the soundness of decisions from within their environmental and group contexts [Jensen and Benel 1977; Godden and Baddeley 1979; Baumann and Bourbonnais 1982; Brecke 1982; Stone et al. 1985]. A look at the real-world process is clearly needed. The need to attempt a better understanding of judgment and decision-making properties stems from those occasions in the existence of an organization when there is a lot at stake. The process of decision-making (which is part of the exercise of judgment) has been analyzed in situations such as corporate takeovers [Janis and Mann1977], military combat [Begland1979], clinical emergencies [Baumann and Bourbonnais 1982], and aviation events [Billings and Reynard1984]. The fundamental assumption of these analyses is that, while there are untold successes, there are also notable numbers of failures resulting from decisions that can be ascribed to one or more errors in judgment. From a cognitive perspective, any person engaged in decision-making (either alone or in a group) is actively involved in a process characterized by certain elements. These were mentioned in chapter 1, but are reiterated briefly at this point: (1) detection of a problem, (2) definition or diagnosis, (3) consideration of available options, (4) choice of what is perceived as the best option given recognized needs, and (5) execution of the choice based on what has transpired [Flathers et al. 1982; Baumann and Bourbonnais 1982]. At any moment in this process, there are factors at play that have a large impact on one's ability to solve complex problems in a limited time: (1) an internal state [Hedge and Lawson 1979] is the sum of a person's psychomotor skills, knowledge, attitudes, etc.; (2) uncertainty [Brecke 1982] is caused by faulty or incomplete information received from the external environment; (3) stress [Biggs 1968; Jensen and Benel 1977] is generated both by the problem at hand and any background problem that may exist; and (4) complexity, as it is used here, refers to the number of elements involved that must be attended to. These variables are depicted in figure 5.1, and their relationship to each other and to an outcome is indicated. This schema is designed to suggest interaction, because while the judgment and decision-making process may be conceptualized as discrete stages, experience tells us that this is not the way people function in real-world situations.

Jan 1, 2000

By John S. Corsentino

This Bureau of Mines study is a listing of fuels -related projects that are presently under construction, planned, or proposed by various companies and organizations in the Western United States. The future facilities covered in this report fall into the following categories: coal mines and expansions to existing mines, electric powerplants and expansions to existing plants, coal conversion plants, waste-to-fuel conversion plants, oil shale projects, tar sands projects, potential geothermal facilities, coal slurry pipelines, railroads related to fuels development, uranium mines and expansions to existing mines, uranium mills and enrichment facilities, oil refineries, and natural gas processing plants. The projects are listed by state. Data concerning the company, location, planned markets, process type, initial operating date, capacity, water requirements, employment, current status, and other relevant information are included. Each project has been plotted on an accompanying state map. Due to present uncertainties concerning the fuels industry, some of the listed projects may never he constructed. No attempt has been made to determine the degree of certainty or viability of each project.

Jan 1, 1976

Objective As mines become safer and disasters fewer, a time may come when no employees in the mining industry have any practical experience in managing a mine emergency. To fill an emerging gap in mine emergency response training, a multidisciplinary team of researchers and computer programmers from the NIOSH Pittsburgh Research Laboratory has developed an intervention for mining personnel who would be in leadership positions in the command center during emergencies. It is called MERITS, a computer-based emergency simulation exercise. MERITS is short for "Mine Emergency Response Interactive Training Simulation." It provides trainees an opportunity to gain command center experience during a simulated underground coal mine emergency. MERITS allows trainees to practice information gathering, situation assessment, decision-making, and coordination skills without risk to personnel or property. Individuals representing mine emergency response personnel, various State safety officials, and private mine management from three States have participated in MERITS training. What Is MERITS? MERITS is an extension of previous work that compiled a knowledge base relevant to mine disaster management via interviews, analysis of literature, reviews of past events, and observations of mock mine disasters. Findings from prior research found a need for an alternative method of command center training. This new computer simulation is being used to train emergency command center personnel to effectively manage an underground mine fire. Modeled after training simulations developed for other industries (e.g., to address nuclear accidents, chemical spills, evacuations, etc.), MERITS simulates underground and surface events related to the disaster. It exposes the user to events that typically occur during a mine emergency, such as lack of information and miscommunication. It also presents trainees with issues that must be addressed, such as making provisions for briefing news media and victims' families, ordering needed supplies, interfacing with Government enforcement agencies, and housing mine rescue teams. The outcome of the scenario is determined by the users' decisions and their emergency response plans. Field Results Field testing of MERITS was conducted with eight full-day training sessions at four different locations in Colorado, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. These field tests benefited from the knowledge and experience of State of Pennsylvania inspection officials, representatives of the United Mine Workers of America(UMWA), and private mine management who served as trainees for the MERITS training sessions. Trainees self-reported an average of20 years of work experience in the mining industry. All trainees had participated in Mine Emergency Response Development (MERD) training exercises, and many had been involved in real mine emergencies. Trainee evaluation of the MERITS program is summarized below: •Twenty-six of the 27 trainees believed that the MERITS simulation helped them know how to prepare for a real emergency. •Twenty-five of the 27 trainees believed that the storyline for the MERITS simulation was either "very realistic" or "realistic." •All 27 trainees believed that the MERITS simulation helped them learn how to better handle a real emergency. •None of the 27 trainees stated that they were bored during the simulation. After the initial field tests, MERITS was refined and retested during training sessions for individuals from State agencies, the UMWA, and private industry. Mining personnel from underground coal and underground stone mines participated and responded positively to the learning experience. Technology Transfer Industry introduction to the MERITS program will occur throughout 2002. MERITS presentations at the Joseph A. Holmes Safety Association National Meeting in Virginia Beach, VA, in June.

Jun 1, 2002

Surface mining of coal involves removing soil and rock that overlay coal beds in order to expose the coal. Compared to underground coal mining, surface mining generally costs less, is safer for miners, and usually results in more complete recovery of the coal. However, it also results in much more extensive, though temporary, disturbance of the land surface, which can cause serious environmental problems unless the mined land is carefully reclaimed. The earliest commercial U.S. coal production was in the anthracite region of Pennsylvania. Beginning in 1807, mining became important enough for the federal government to begin keeping statistics on annual production. During those early years of coal mining, reclamation of mine sites and Support facilities was not required by law; however, in the 1930's, as surface mining became more widespread, the idea of mandatory environmental protection and reclamation started to grow. In 1939 West Virginia enacted the first law to regulate the coal mining industry. Similar laws were enacted by Indiana in 1941, Illinois in 1943, and Pennsylvania in 1945. During that period, coal production accelerated greatly and the surface mining of coal became much more prevalent. During World War 11, the demand for coal took priority over environmental concerns, with little consideration for reclaiming the land after mining. Mining pits were not backfilled. Dangerous highwalls were left exposed. Trees and other vegetation were buried by waste material that was simply dumped down the slopes below mines. Topsoil was buried or allowed to wash away. Landslides formed on unstable hillsides. Slopes eroded rapidly because of the lack of vegetation. Polluted water collected in mine pits. Streams became clogged with sediment. Streams and rivers were frequently polluted by acid mine drainage. This vivid image of surface coal mining remains indelible in the minds of most Americans, who remain unfamiliar with modem surface coal mining methods and the changes brought about by the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. After 1945, more coal-producing states instituted regulatory pro- grams. Many required permits for mining. Some included inspections. A few made operators post performance bonds to guarantee reclamation when mining was completed. However, due to the variations in those individual programs, it cost less to produce coal in states with less stringent reclamation requirements, giving operators in those states an economic advantage, generally at the expense of environmental quality. With the 1970's came a surge in the demand for coal resulting from the nation's need for increasing electric power generation and the uncertain supply and increased cost of imported petroleum-based fuels. The resulting increased coal production prompted a series of state laws, primarily in the West, aimed at controlling the environ- mental effects of surface mining. During the late 1960's and early 1970's, North Dakota, Wyoming, Colorado, and Montana passed laws to regulate mining and reclamation. The continuing lack of uniformity among the state surface mining programs and the increase in unreclaimed land and associated pollution of water and other resources caused a growing demand for nationwide regulation of surface coal mining, both to remove the economic inequities and to is sure an acceptable standard of reclamation. After many years of debate, Congress passed the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), which was signed into law August 3, 1977. The Act established a coordinated effort between the states and the federal government to prevent the abuses that had characterized surface coal mining in the past. The law also applied to surface disturbances created by underground coal mining.

Jan 1, 1992

By David Cooper, Susan Robertson, William Wiehagen, Launa Mallett, Charles Vaught, Joan Dickerson, Richard Conkle, ROBERT PETERS, Mike Brnich, Charles Urban

This trainer’s guide is designed as a reference manual. The purpose is to offer information and examples to skills trainers to assist them in structuring training for new operators of Walk-Thru roof bolting machines. Trainers can use this manual as a resource for helping trainees learn, understand, and apply knowledge and skills. In this sense, the guide is not prescriptive. It is designed to offer information and trigger ideas on what might be done to accelerate learning to those who are new to the roof-bolting task. On-site trainers can modify this guide to fit their conditions, machines and equipment, and work procedures. They can integrate roof control plans, company policies and procedures, and operators’ manuals from the manufacturers of the original equipment into this guide. Every trainee is different and will come to the job with varying levels of relevant knowledge and skills. The trainer’s decisions on where to start, how to organize the on-the-job and classroom training portions, and when and how to offer different aspects of the training will be based on (1) a pretraining assessment of the trainee’s knowledge and skills and (2) the trainer’s experience in conducting skills training. The “Skill Check” section might be useful for deciding where training should start among miners who have underground experience but limited knowledge of roof-bolting techniques. Every job carries a learning curve and likely has a number of “teachable moments” where significantly new knowledge and skills can be learned. The videos on the DVD that accompany this guide can be shown at the beginning of training to give trainees an idea of what the job entails and related requirements. They can also be used within the training cycle (after the trainee has some experience in the job) to reinforce key points or as a trigger for eliciting questions about particularly difficult parts of the job. The video segments are meant to be visual models of good performance. They are designed to elicit discussion on good (lower risk) ways to do the job. In this context, they can be used very creatively at different times within the training cycle. The section on “Talking Points” offers a number of questions that can be used in the classroom to support and elaborate on certain aspects of the job duties. If the trainee has a fair amount of underground experience, some of the questions can also be used to support the pretraining assessment (i.e., skill check) of knowledge and skills. Likewise, some of the questions can also be used while teaching on the job to reinforce key points affecting safety, production, or maintenance. The section dealing with a mine’s roof control plan should be used at various times in the training cycle to make sure the trainee understands the plan and knows how to apply it in performing the job. The supplemental materials offer additional resources that can be used to support initial job training or follow-up. Learning continues well after an individual has been trained. The supplemental materials can help reinforce good operating skills and provide an opportunity for further discussion on better ways to do the job.

Jan 8, 2006

By W. L. Heidenreich

This report describes the methods and results of field investigations conducted by the Bureau of Mines between December 1956 and December 1957 on seven deposits of nickel-cobalt-iron-bearing laterite and weathered serpentine near the west coast of Puerto Rico east and south of Mayaguez. These deposits were named, for purposes of identification, Guanajibo, Punta Guanajibo, Las Mesas, north and south deposits of the Rosario Southeast group, and the west and east deposits of the Maricao Southwest group. In addition, the lower 17 miles of the Guanajibo River Valley was tested at widely spaced intervals for possible concentrations of magnetite and chromite in the alluvial sands. The objective of the investigations was to appraise, by drilling and sampling, the two largest deposits--the Guanajibo and Las Mesas. Testing of the smaller deposits was much more restricted. Field investigations consisted of mapping, drilling with power auger, sampling drill-hole sections, and pre-paring samples for chemical analyses, mineralogical studies, and metallurgical tests. The work was financed jointly under a cooperative agreement by the Bureau of Mines and the Economic Development Administration, an agency of the Puerto Rican Commonwealth.

Jan 1, 1959

This report provides the results of an industrial engineering study that assessed the safety and efficiency of underground ore handling in U.S. metal mines. One of the primary findings of the study was the improvement needed in controlling muck size in the ore handling stream. Oversize ore causes much additional labor, creating work stoppages and is a principal cause of accidents in metal mines. This report includes data on block caving, back cut and fill room and pillar, shrinkage stoping, and sublevel stoping.

Jan 1, 1974

By R. Karl Zipf, Christopher Mark

Highwall mining continues to grow in importance as a coal production method from U.S. surface mines. It may account for as much as 4% of the total U.S. coal production, according to one recent estimate. Analysis of Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) accident and injury statistics shows that, overall, highwall mining has maintained an admirable safety record. Its fatality and injury rates are comparable to those for other surface mining methods, and are significantly lower than those for underground mining. No mining method is risk free, however. Highwall mining injuries have been associated with handling materials, slips and falls, machinery, powered haulage, and other types of incidents. But perhaps the greatest risk, to both personnel and equipment, is from ground control. The two most significant ground control hazards are rock falls from the highwall and equipment entrapment underground. Highwall Stability Ensuring highwall stability through proper ground control engineering is of paramount importance to safe highwall mining operations. The only fatality to occur during the last five years at a highwall mining operation was due to highwall collapse. There have also been numerous near-misses, several of which have involved extensive damage to equipment. In the central Appalachians, where the majority of highwall mining occurs in the U.S., hillseams are the most prominent geologic structures that affect highwall stability. Hillseams (or mountain cracks) are near vertical fractures in the rock that are formed in response to natural weathering and erosion of hillsides. They extend hundreds of feet down from the surface. They typically run parallel to the hillside, but they can also extend across narrow points or ridge lines. The hazard arises when rock slabs that form along the hillseams detach and fall away from the highwall face (See Figure 1). [ ] Unfortunately, it is impossible to control the location of hillseams or reliably detect their presence within a highwall. There are, however, a number of measures that can be taken to minimize the risk of failure associated with hillseams: Planning-Most operators choose to skip those areas of the highwall where a prominent hillseam daylights (See Figure 2). Existence of such areas is known for several weeks in advance of highwall mining; therefore, planning engineers can adjust the layout of highwall mining panels to locate barrier pillars within areas of questionable highwall stability. [ ] Inspection and monitoring-Daily inspection of the benches above the active highwall mining area is a prudent precautionary measure. A crack in a bench immediately above a highwall miner is shown in Figure 3. Simple displacement monitors may be useful for detecting movement along cracks that may precede a significant life-threatening failure. New tools, such as slope monitoring radar, may also prove useful in detecting motion of the rock slopes above active highwall mining operations. Good blasting practice-Most surface coal miners in the central Appalachians use pre-splitting and the familiar halfbarrels are routinely seen throughout the pits. Shorter delays along the face and longer delays between rows can direct more of the blast force parallel to the face, potentially doing less damage to the wall rock. In addition to pre-splitting, decreasing the burden, spacing and charge weight in drill holes close to the highwall will also decrease damage to the wall rock. Decreasing the highwall slope angle-Decreasing the highwall slope angle from 90° (vertical) to 70°-80°, especially in areas of known hillseam concentration, could eliminate the hillseam hazard (See Figure 4). Angled highwalls are routinely employed in many Midwestern surface mines and in some

By Launa G. Mallett, Kathleen Kowalski-Trakofler, Robert H. Peters, Charles PH. D. Vaught, Peter Keating, William J. Wiehagen

On-the-job training is a common means of training or retraining workers and the practice may seem simple and straightforward. Doing it effectively however requires more thought and preparation than simply having someone follow an experienced worker around and watch what they're doing. Over the years, various techniques and practices have evolved that pass on the skills and knowledge of a trainer or coach in a manner that leads an inexperienced trainee to really absorb the information being taught. On-the-job training thus becomes less a haphazard show-and-tell and more a real transfer of information. The goal of this document is to describe how to develop or manage an on-the-job training program so that information is passed on from trainer/coach to trainee efficiently and effectively. By efficient is meant the best use of time and resources of all those involved in the training process, and by effective is meant that the trainee truly learns the skills and internalizes the knowledge needed to perform the job well. The first part of the document discusses topics to think about when developing a formal on- the-job training program. A structure based on coaching is suggested. Then a workshop designed to prepare trainers as coaches is described. Workshop materials include an instructor’s guide and trainee workbook. These materials can be used to train coaches and to assist trainees as they go through the learning process. Content related to specific jobs can be added to these materials to create targeted on-the job-training manuals. Structuring a formal on-the-job training program It is likely that some form of on-the-job training (OJT) is being conducted at your workplace. The formality of that training can range from a structured program to an informal “follow Joe around” method. If your program is completely unstructured, it may not be meeting current training needs. Worse, it may perpetuate bad habits and create “trained” employees who are not given the same information or evaluated to the same standards. Wiehagen et al. comment that, “Success in using unplanned OJT is usually dependent on the luck of the draw, that is, whether the informal trainer is competent at the task he or she is teaching, is motivated to teach, can organize the job into logical components, and knows something about good practices in teaching and evaluating” (2002, p. 27). It is only through planning a structured OJT program that consistency can be created and maintained. At the least, all trainees who have successfully completed such a program can be expected to perform at an established level—they will know what they must do to be successful.

Jan 7, 2005