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By Dan Armour

Bolting solutions traditionally offered only wet drilling or dry drilling options; each with advantages and disadvantages. Joy Mining Machinery has developed a Mist Drilling System that incorporates the best of both types of drilling. Compared to wet drilling, mist drilling offers as much as a 90% reduction in water use. As a result, floor and roof conditions are tremendously improved. This offers a safer and more comfortable work environment for operators. Mist drilling can offer a significant reduction in noise levels compared to dry drilling and in recent trials, bit life has been greatly improved. Holes are cleaner and operators experience less exposure to respirable dust.

Jan 1, 2005

By Martin Herrenknecht

After the successful breakthrough at the end of 2006 of both TBMs into the multifunctional site Faido (MFS), in the middle of 2007 the two tunnel boring machines resumed the 12 km long section between Faido and Sedrun. In the roughly a 10 month interval both approximately 465 m long tunnel boring machines were partly dismantled, pushed through the 2.5 km long MFS, rebuilt for the new larger diameter of 9.5 m and reassembled to be ready for operation. In the rebuilding phase, improvements were made to the equipment, especially as a result of experience gained from the previous 14 km long drive in the section Bodio and taking into account the latest information regarding the upcoming 14 km section Faido. Both TBM drives are currently in the rock formations of the Lucomagno gneiss, which stretch over a section of 3.5 km from the MFS Faido to the predicted Piora Syncline. This section is divided into two fold axes of the Chièra Synform, where the Lucomagno gneiss pass from a sub-horizontal into vertical bedding. The drives, with current rock overburdens exceeding 1,500 m and, as known from the excavation phase of the MFS, in part highly disturbed rock formations, are characterized by the locally intense rock squeezing conditions with large convergences in the vicinity of the driving TBM as well as backwards due to the interaction of the two drives. High expenditure for the support measures, reduced driving performances together with extensive extra work associated with deadlines and increased costs are the result. In the paper the previous experience with the TBM drives in the section Faido and the challenges still awaiting us are presented and discussed.

By D. S. Choi

The paper presents the result of analysis of subsidence data collected from coal mines operating in Northern West Virginia and Southwestern Pennsylvania. A particular emphasis la placed on the measurement of the angle of draw for the protection of surface structures.

Jan 1, 1986

By Andrew E. Nevin

The government of India convened a precedent-setting meeting in New Delhi on Nov. 12, 2001.The meeting brought together regulators and the mining industry in an attempt to fix the industry’s mine development problems in that country. More than 150people attended the all-day session. Ram Vilas Paswan, Minister of Coal and Mines, chaired the meeting. Ravi Shankar Prasad, Minister of State for Coal and Mines, was also present. The secretary of the Department of Mines and the Joint Secretaries and Additional Secretary also participated. The Department of Mines’ mandate is for economic growth: to get new mine development going and to make investment in mining attractive for both domestic and foreign-owned companies.

Jan 1, 2002

By Michael Robert Hodson

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do no necessarily reflect those of CRU. The Extent of Government Involvement In 1982 national governments in the Non-Socialist world owned at least some equity share in an estimated 49 percent of the bauxite mining capacity located in their own countries.* By comparison, as Figure 1 shows, in the same year governments owned at least part of an estimated 33 per cent of primary aluminium smelting capacity. In other industries, national, or state governments in 1982 held at least part ownership of mining capacity in 42 per cent in the copper industry, 34 per cent in the tin industry, 23 per cent of the zinc industry, 15 per cent of the lead industry and 11 per cent in the nickel industry. Thus while within the aluminium industry attention has focussed on the share of government ownership in the primary aluminium sector, national government involvement through ownership is larger in the bauxite sector. Moreover, ownership by government is more widespread in the mining of bauxite than in the mining of all other principal non-ferrous base metals. Yet while the equity participation of governments in the bauxite sector is widespread, it is but one of many forms of government involvement. In addition to direct ownership or equity participation domestic government involvement has taken the form of legislation to protect the environment, controls on the level of production, insistence on the export of ore, pressure to maintain levels of employment, controls on the type of fuel used, foreign exchange *Capacity which is owned in whole or in part is included within the state sector, but capacity in one country which is owned by a wholly or partly owned government company in another company is not included in the state sector; e.g. the capacity of the Trombetas mine is included in the state sector but the capacity of Delphi bauxite would not be included.

Jan 1, 1984

"Lax, misguided, and dangerous" is Rep. James Santini's description of the official US position on strategic nonfuel minerals. Santini (D-NV), chairman of the House Mines and Mining Subcommittee, criticized the Interior Department for "its long record of benign neglect" regarding the domestic minerals crisis. Santini made his remarks at a news conference at the American Mining Congress convention in San Francisco, where he released his subcommittee report "US Minerals Vulnerability: National Policy Implications." The report-said to be the first major congressional study of the minerals issue by a committee of jurisdiction is the result of a two-year inquiry. The investigation was undertaken, according to the chairman, "because no person or agency in the executive branch of government fully grasps the critical importance of nonfuel minerals to the nation's economy, defense, and quality of life." The report also urges a larger role for the Department of Defense, which has "stood passively by for many years as a consuming by-stander," according to the report. President Carter's incomplete Non-fuel Minerals Policy Review also drew the committee's ire; Santini calls it "a tragic waste that cost tax-payers $3.5 million and the loss of some 13,000 person-days." The subcommittee examined the following issues for its report: • The US minerals industry's inability to meet national raw material needs under a "hodgepodge of contradictory, restrictive, and irrational" federal regulations; • Dependency on foreign sources of strategic minerals in times of "increasing resource nationalism" and "Soviet mineral expansionism;" • National security needs for foreign mineral resources that do not have effective substitutes; • The US government's approach to national minerals policy "amid a growing realization that such a policy does not exist." The subcommittee report includes an analysis of public and private studies on nonfuel minerals and discusses a series of policy problem areas that negatively affect domestic production. Capital formation disincentives, tax policies, antitrust enforcement, environmental laws, health and safety regulations, technical problems, and restricted access to federally-controlled public lands contribute to what Santini calls a "tragic irony." "The irony is that we are a nation vastly rich in mineral resources yet our own government chooses to stifle development of these critical raw materials and thereby increase offshore reliance. The tragedy is that we also are ensuring US vulnerability to severe economic dislocations and a weakening of our national security." In just six years, from 1973-1978, the US trade deficit in nonfuel minerals rose from $2 billion per year to $8 billion, according to the report. The country imports more than 50% of 23 critical minerals, including 100% of its manganese, chromium, cobalt and platinum. The US is promoting its dependence on foreign mineral sources at the very time the security of many of those sources is becoming less certain, the report notes. Santini said the subcommittee investigation revealed a vulnerability that may be more serious and pervasive than that of foreign oil. The US may be able to develop alternate energy resources, but there are no effective substitutes for many nonfuel minerals. The report also discloses that US stockpiles of critical and strategic minerals are of inadequate supply and quality. Holdings of some vital minerals are far below present objectives, and for some there are no holdings at all, according to Santini. To resolve the current crisis, the report makes the following recommendations: • Complete immediately President Carter's Interagency Nonfuel Minerals Policy Review; • Implement (throught the Interior Department) the 1970 Mining and Minerals Policy Act; • Create an Office of Energy and Minerals with the same stature, power, and oversight responsibilities as the Council on Environmental Quality; • Ease federal restrictions on mineral exploration and development on public lands and implement a complete review of public land use policies; •Fund for and fulfill US nonfuel minerals stockpiling objectives; •Increase federal funding for non-

Jan 11, 1980

By Thomas V. Falkie

Of the various critics of federal energy and minerals policy we are hearing these days--and they are legion--few make their points more vividly than our fellow SME member and eloquent spokesman for the mineral industry. Mr. Eugene Guccione. In a moment of comparative mellowness. Mr. Guccione recently characterized Washington's time-honored legislative and bureaucratic machinery as a case of "...scientific illiterates asking the incompetents to do the unnecessary." I hope the prevailing industry view of government is not quite that harsh, and yet one cannot deny that government intervention is indeed pressing in on the mineral industry with increasing force. What is happening today in Washington and in state capitols will have enormous impact--both short and long term--on the future of coal and mineral production in the United States. Symptoms of this trend are everywhere. In the first place, there is a sentiment, widely held and still spreading, that the government must become involved-- that no matter what the problem, the solution lies in more government intervention. Free enterprise versus statist, reflex reaction organizations. When it cones to regulation in the resource field, there is too often a tendency to start out by assuming guilt on the part of the mineral industry. This can lead to laws governing mineral recovery that are more punitive than constructive...laws drawn up with little research into the scientific or economic considerations involved.

Jan 1, 1975

By Arne Paus-Jenssen

The potash industry in Saskatchewan has recently been the focus of much new legislation at the provincial level and, along with other mining industries in Canada, also subject to changes in tax legislation at the federal level. As a result, the industry presently operates under (a) provincial production controls, a prorationing scheme; (b) a new provincial reserve tax on potash only and; (c) a new federal income tax applicable to all mineral industries. The prorating scheme dates back to 1970 and emerged as public policy because of the excess supply situation faced by the international potash industry towards the end of the sixties. This caused special problems for new mines in Saskatchewan and the provincial government decided to intervene. The new tax legislation at provincial and federal levels, both introduced within the last four years, reflects a belief that insufficient revenues accrue to the public sector from natural resources. All mining industries in Canada, including the potash industry, have had their tax positions completely reversed during these four years. Traditionally the mining sector in Canada has been a recipient of substantial tax incentives and has enjoyed low tax rates. This has changed and the mining sector is now one of the most heavily taxed sectors in the economy. In addition, the mining sector has moved from a situation where its rapid development was favoured by governments to a situation where this is no longer the case.

Jan 1, 1976

By C. Y. Chen

In order to put an end to the uneven environmental standards and enforcement established by various coal mining States in the United States, the Congress passed and the President signed the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (Public Law 95-87 or the Act) on August 3, 1977. Within one year after passage, the Secretary of the Interior was directed to promulgate permanent program regulations implementing Title V provisions of the Act. These regulations were to form the basis for State regulatory programs under the Act and to allow States to assume primary regulatory responsibility. In order to implement the underground mining provision of the Act, the Secretary is directed in section 516(a) of the Act to promulgate rules, but ones which take into consideration the distinct differences between surface coal mining and underground coal mining. The regulations developed by the Secretary and promulgated on March 13, 1979, with respect to subsidence control, included (1) a subsidence control plan as part of the permitting process, (2) substantive provisions establishing performance standards for subsidence control, and (3) provisions providing for the prohibition of mining under perennial streams, impoundments larger than 20 acre feet, and certain public facilities and urban areas.

Jan 1, 1985

By Thomas V. Falkie

In bygone days, the mineral engineer spent most of his/her time on the technical aspects of designing, building, and managing mineral operations. In the last few decades, mostly since the 1960s, increasing amounts of engineering man power and time are spent dealing with federal, state, and local government agencies, laws, and regulations. It is not possible to plan, design, build, or operate mines, mills, smelters, or even office buildings without detailed consideration of government regulations and permitting requirements dealing with environment, worker health and safety, etc. The four chapters of this section provide an overview of the social, legal, political, environmental, and health and safety aspects of mineral enterprise. The section sets the stage for the working engineer/geologist in industry, government, consulting, or academe and points the direction for more detailed study in each of these areas.

Jan 1, 2008

In spite of our deep conviction that it would be wrong for the United States to enter World War II, when, after Pearl Harbor, we were actually in it, I felt that I must do all I could to help. The country had been so good to me that I could not decently stay on the sidelines. My first thought was that I might help with supply and administration in the Air Force, as in World War I. So on the evening of Pearl Harbor I wired the chief of our Air Force in Washington saying that I had been on Gen. William Mitchell's staff in World War I and was offering my services again. I received a noncommital answer, but after a couple of weeks was told to take my physical examination. I passed it, but nothing further happened. After helping to make plans for the wartime operations of Summit King and Desert Silver, Dorothy and I went to New York to spend Christmas with Molly and Peter, both of whom were in college in the East. I had to complete a report on the Argonaut mine in California first, though the war made my recommendations of dubious validity. Before Christmas I received wires from Temple Bridgeman, Phil Wilson, and other friends who had taken positions with government agencies responsible for securing mineral products needed for war use. They urged me to join them. It was evidently a case of not whether but how I could be most useful. After six uncertain days with the family in New York I took the night train to Washington on the 28th of December. I had a hectic day there. First I saw Arthur Bunker and Phil Wilson at what became the Aluminum and Magnesium Division of the War Production Board. Their office was in an old converted barracks. They asked me to examine magnesium deposits in Nevada at once, and then to look at other magnesium and aluminum properties. After leaving

Jan 1, 1976

By A. Eftimie, M. Stanley

The World Bank Group (WBG) believes that extractive industries can make significant contribution to sustainable development and poverty reduction, providing that environmental, social, and corporate governance issues are properly managed. The WBG recognizes that stakeholders have legitimate concerns about the impact of extractive industries, and management proposals are built around the central theme that investments and policy advice in the extractive industries should lead to poverty reduction. To help governments create appropriate policy and regulatory frameworks, this paper focuses on the linkages between overarching policies and laws and the management / governance of extractive industries at the local communities. It encourages the use of new instruments designed to help ensure that local communities benefit from extractive industries.

Jan 1, 2005

By S. Rideout

As Assistant Director for Program Support for the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM), a bureau of the U.S. Department of the Interior, I am responsible for the regulatory and abandoned mine land programs under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, which governs the environmental impacts of coal mining. My perspective is influenced by my current position and my previous positions in government and private industry. Sustainability is a cooperative effort of many parties and can only be achieved if each assumes their responsibilities for making it happen. I will highlight some of my thoughts on the role of government in achieving sustainability in the mining arena.

Jan 1, 2007

The administration came on as a strong supporter of the mining industry in April of 1982 when President Reagan delivered his long-awaited minerals policy statement. He promised to reduce America's minerals vulnerability, and called for spending billions on meeting stockpile goals for strategic minerals, opening up federal lands for mineral exploration, elimination of barriers to deep sea mining, and regulatory relief. He defended the favorable tax incentives in the Economic Recovery Act as a stimulus to private research and development that would ensure the availability of materials essential to the nation's economy and national defense. But the administration just didn't seem to get anywhere. Congress, environmentalists, and even foreign governments fought White House-proposed legislation on all fronts, delivering the ultimate coup in forcing Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Anne Burford's resignation and the subsequent EPA staff house cleaning in early 1983. Anti-Reaganites scored victory after victory against Reagan's efforts to stimulate the minerals industry. Congress was stalemated on so many mining-related issues that not much was done either for or against the industry. And the US was not to get its way on the issue of sea mining either. Most of Reagan's mineral policy objectives failed to be met. Three months after the National Materials and Minerals Program Plan was presented and the Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and the Environment was made its coordinator, the head of the Cabinet Council James Watt blamed lack of progress in reviving the mining industry and creating a better strategic stockpile on the weak economy and the House of Representatives, which repeatedly thwarted efforts to open wilderness lands to mining. Congress The 97th Congress spent much of its time saying no in 1982-to the Reagan administration's deep cuts in energy and environment programs, to major changes in clean air and water laws, to oil and gas leasing in wilderness, and to killing the Department of Energy. Most of 1982 (and 1981) was spent in heated budget disputes. Some things that did not happen: • The administration and industry failed to get changes in controls of hazardous air pollutants and sulfur dioxide emissions that are implicated in the phenomenon known as acid rain. Industry had wanted to relax requirements for new industries building in clean air regions where the air act demands prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) of air quality, and to relax requirements tightening up the regulation of emissions of hazardous air pollutants. The air battle is expected to continue on five major fronts-acid rain, hazardous air pollutants, PSD, automobile pollution, and nonattainment. • Regulatory reform legislation to overhaul the way government carries out the law died a slow death last year. Business groups and the administration said federal agencies should be required to consider cost-effective measures of reaching regulatory objectives of protecting public health, safety, and the environment. Opponents, including environmentalists, feared such action would delay, weaken, or scuttle important regulations. • Congress turned thumbs down several times on proposals for oil and gas leasing in wilderness but could not agree on any new wilderness recommendations (see The Wilderness Battle). • Congress refused to open the door to the Reagan administration's plan to raise up to $4 billion a year from sales of federal lands. The administration identified surplus and excess federal lands, mostly obsolete buildings or isolated tracts of land, that could be sold by the General Services Administration (GSA) to help out the federal budget deficit. Congress took no action. Some things that did happen: • Congress extended the Defense Production Act (DPA) for six months through March 1983 without changing the 32-year-old law. That came after it failed to resolve sharp differences over proposals for critical minerals programs. Differences concerned both the amount of funds and the scope of programs that would be authorized under the DPA's Title III. Some proponents pressed for $5 billion in funding for loan guarantees or purchase commitments to spur domestic production of minerals such as cobalt. Other members of Congress wanted smaller amounts of funding, and the Reagan administration, until about November, had opposed any use of federal funds for strategic mineral programs. These measures were certain to come up again before the DPA extension expired in March. • House supporters of the Critical Materials Act of 1982 were unable to come up with the twothirds majority needed to pass the bill, so it died on the House floor in December. The bill proposed that a council be established with responsibility for coordinating federal materials research and development. The administration opposed the council creation contending that the Cabinet Council

Jan 5, 1983

By Ken A. Pfaff, Ray Daigh

This paper will discuss state-of-the-art applications of GPS automation in mobile conveying systems. Robotic mobile conveying systems increase profitability, optimize stacking and reclaiming operations, and control complex interfaces more accurately than other systems. We will also discuss the application process in machine-to-machine coordination, selection of the appropriate GPS system, and Ethernet considerations. As the leading supplier of GPS-controlled mobile conveying systems, we'll draw on our experience at Morenci, Radomiro Tomic, Zaldivar, El Abra (Figure 1), and El Tesoro mines in the US and South America to demonstrate system reliability and the lessons we've learned through analysis of these projects.

Jan 1, 2002

U.S. Borax’s mine in California’s Mojave Desert is the source of nearly half the world’s supply of refined borates. These minerals are used in hundreds of products, including essential plant nutrients that increase crop yield and quality, and safe building products that protect homes from insects and the elements. Borax’s workforce is also safe. In fact, it is among the safest in the nation. In 2003, the company was recognized by the U.S. Mine, Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) for achieving the best safety record among large U.S. mining operations. It was also recognized by its parent company, Rio Tinto, for achieving the best record among its nearly 80 worldwide mining operations. Borax’s safety performance is five times better than the national average. And its workforce recently achieved more than two million hours without a lost-time injury.

Jan 1, 2004

By C. Waddell

PDMI mines five different grades of ore. Shovel operators were experiencing problems differentiating one material type from another. In 1997 PDMI decided to try GPS ore control to aid operators in identifying material boundaries. Computer generated ore control maps and GPS data defining the shovels' position is fed to a computer on board the shovel. A monitor, located near the shovel operator, displays material types, their boundaries, and the shovels' position and movement in relation to the mining face. This information has reduced errors in material identification by 50%.

Jan 1, 1998

By D. E. Cameron

"INTRODUCTION Grade control requirements for base and precious metal projects are an important input to both conceptual and feasibility mine plans. It’s the author’s experience that grade control input is insufficient at these critical stages. The few exceptions are a stimulus for this paper. A significant portion of CRC’s practice has involved assisting operations to solve grade control issues which were finally recognized as contributing to negative production variances. Even in operations perceived to be successful, deficiencies in grade control are often masked by measures taken by an operation to compensate a deficiency in one area with outperformance in another. The advantages in having a realistic and adequate grade control plan developed at an early project stage by a geologist(s) with considerable operations experience are manifold. It’s important for the geologist to prepare clear inputs into the mine plan backed by detailed supporting information in usable, flexible formats. When the decision is made to advance a project, the exploration team passes its model to a mine planner. The team doesn’t usually provide a detailed grade control plan with the block model, thus the planner tends to treat grade control as an activity to be rolled into a broader operating category. The consequences of highly compartmentalized mine planning can be severe in the long run. Once a plan is tabled, and especially once production begins, it is very difficult to improve grade control outside the fixed parameters of the operation. Major fixes tend to be costly in terms of time and dollars. Implementing needed changes to the grade control practices and culture in an established mine can present almost insurmountable difficulties. Hypothetical examples of grade control planning are presented to illustrate the author’s points. The diagrams are conceptual and schematic; any resemblance to actual deposits is coincidental. BEYOND 50¢/TON In more than a few cases, grade control cost is buried in a subcategory of mining cost with little more consideration than a plugged number. It is possible to do a word search in 43-101 Technical Reports on advanced projects and without finding reference to “ore control” or “grade control”. The idea is to reach the orebody by the shortest and least expensive means, achieving production and investor payback at the earliest possible occasion. This entails a low stripping ratio pit or a decline ramp with sills on ore to prepare the first stopes. The processes to achieve the target production, one of which is grade control, will fit into this framework. After all, there is a block model and the planner can see the grade and tons in each block. The exploration geologist whose responsibility was to bring a large percentage of the deposit into mineral resource owns the model and has released it to planning. Now comes the planning stage. Mine geologists haven’t been hired yet and they will be phased in with production. What could go wrong? Larger companies may have the geologists with operating depth who will be inserted into the mine planning discussions, but it’s not a given. Junior companies must often delegate the conceptual and detailed planning tasks to consultant groups. Is a senior-level grade control review part of the scope of work for the mine planning? If a good grade control plan is in place before the mine geology team is staffed, a key element of success is assured."

Jan 1, 2018

By J. Trimble, B. M. Davis, D. McClure

During initial mining operations at the Colosseum gold mine, discrepancies between the average blasthole grades and mill-head grades were quite large. In December 1987, mill-head grades averaged 39% lower than corre¬sponding estimates from the blastholes. The correlation between average blasthole grade and mill-head grade had an r-value of 0.015. The magnitude of the discrepancy and the lack of correspondence between estimated and actual grades led to a series of investigations of the sampling system, the effect of blast movement of the ore, and the estimation methodology. The discrepancy between blasthole grades and mill-head grades had been reduced by about half on a percentage basis at the conclusion of these studies. Ongoing studies have produced changes that reduced this discrepancy to its present level of less than 10%. Geology The Colosseum mine is within the Clark Mountain mining district about 68 km (42 miles) southwest of Las Vegas, NV in San Bernardino County, CA. Gold mineralization at the deposit is hosted in two 152 m x 213 m (500 ft x 700 ft) interconnected, rhyolitic intrusive breccia pipes that intruded Pre¬cambrian crystalline basement rocks and overlying Paleozoic marine sedimentary rocks. Subsequent erosion (deroofing) of all of the Paleozoic section and a portion of the Precambrian section has exposed the pipes to the present level (probably a significant depth in the original breccia pipe system). Lithologies exhibited within the breccia pipe complexes include rhyolitic felsite, and breccias of felsite and wall/ country rock. Breccia types grade from felsite plus Precambrian granite-gneiss fragments in an aphanitic felsite matrix to crosscutting breccias of felsite, Precambrian granite-gneiss, and Paleozoic sedimentary rocks in a matrix of finely comminuted material of the same composition. All the lithologies in and around the breccia pipes exhibit moderate to intense quartz-sericite-pyrite alteration, with sericite and pyrite the dominant visual alteration minerals. Gold at the Colosseum mine is generally submicroscopic and associated with sulfide mineralization, chiefly pyrite. It occurs as free gold, with minor alloyed silver. It is primarily in contact with pyrite in fractures or along pyrite grain edges. Secondarily, it appears as isolated particles in quartz and other gangue minerals but spatially always close to pyrite, and rarely as particles encased in euhedral pyrite. The pyrite mineralization and minor base metal sulfides occur in three distinct styles: as disseminations, as open space or vein/fracture filling, and in breccia clasts replacing dolomite. The pyrite megascopically ranges from absent to 30% of rock volume within the breccia pipes. Although the gold at Colosseum is apparently spatially and geochemically associated with pyrite, there is only a general proportional relationship between pyrite content and gold content. Sometimes, a high volume percentage of pyrite has only geochemically anomalous gold. This makes visual pyrite only a general grade control tool and not a specific tool. This further makes the ore control process at Colosseum all the more difficult. Initial grade control procedure Initial grade control was based on blasthole samples collected in two stages by an "automatic" sample collection device (rocket sampler). A sample was collected for the top 3 m (10 ft) in a hole. The bag was then changed so that a sample was collected for the lower 3 m (10 ft). Each sample was prepared and fire assayed to determine the grade. Large discrepancies were sometimes noted in the assays of top and bottom samples. The samples were averaged together and a plot was made showing the blasthole locations and their associated grades. Discrimination between ore and waste was based on as-

Jan 1, 1989

By B. M. Davis

The Colosseum Mine is within the Clark Mountain mining district located approximately 72 km (42 miles) southwest of Las Vegas. Nevada in San Bernardino County, California. Gold mineralization at the Colosseum Mine is hosted in two 150 m by 210 m (500 ft X 700 ft) interconnected. rhyolitic intrusive breccia pipes that intruded Precambrian crystalline basement rocks and over-lying Paleozoic marine sedimentary rocks. Sub-sequent erosion (de-roofing) of all of the Paleozoic section and a portion of the Precambrian section has exposed the pipes to the present level (probably a significant depth in the original breccia pipe system).

Jan 1, 1989