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By H. J. Struth

Economic law was accorded considerably more recognition by the oil industry last year than perhaps ever before. While proration was undoubtedly given added impetus in 1931, and the list of proponents of unit operation was noticeably lengthened, predominant evidence plainly shows that the functioning of economic laws dominated collective efforts to reduce the excessive above-ground supply of petroleum. Crude oil production was reduced more than 48,000,000 bbl. last year; imports from other parts of the world were substantially lower; stocks of crude were drawn upon to the extent of nearly 48,000,000 bbl.; domestic gasoline demand increased 2 per cent—and yet, prices of petroleum and its products were at the lowest levels in many years. To say that the ills of the oil industry during 1931 were due to the general depression that was felt in all other lines is tantamount to attaching an air of uncertainty to a group of commodities that have been proved to be an ever increasing necessity, even in times of depression. TO say that the potential productivity of proven oil-producing areas has been responsible for the unsatisfactory state of affairs last year, and now, is to admit failure to carry out the principles designed to control production in accordance with the limits prescribed by demand. In fact, there is no reason why a large proven potential supply of oil should not be considered a valuable asset to the industry; an assurance against future needs; a stabilizing influence in building up confidence in the ability of the industry to supply this and future generations with fuel and lubricant requirements at reasonable prices. At any rate, an assured future supply of oil should be interpreted to the public to mean that the oil industry is a legitimate, progressive industry, and not a group of prospectors madly searching for "liquid gold." There has been a great deal of romance connected with the history of the oil business—so much that the public has come to associate the word "oil" with untold riches. However, the financial statements of 1931 will furnish conclusive proof to the contrary. Too much oil, too many refineries, too many filling stations, too much capital invested; these and other "too muches" and "too manys" have perhaps been given more publicity than necessary. We seldom hear these

Jan 1, 1932

By L. F. Terry, H. K. Ihrig, D. J. Sabin, Ralph E. Davis

This paper presents the results of a study of the comparative values of the several fuels commonly used by industrial plants. It shows that the energy actually recovered from any fuel and turned into useful work is dependent upon several factors: (1) the total energy available in the fuel, (2) energy losses resulting from combustion reactions and (3) energy losses dependent upon the mechanics of the firing operation. The chemistry of combustion and the losses resulting therefrom are discussed. The Advantages and disadvantages of the several mechanical methods of firing and the resulting heat losses in each are developed. Data obtained from several typical fuel operations, where careful records have been maintained, are presented to show that the practical results in the actual operation are in harmony with the theoretical results developed in the earlier part of this paper. Water power and solid, liquid or gaseous fuels are at present the only commercial sources of energy. The economic utilization of any one of them depends, in the final analysis, on the cost of energy per unit of finished product to which the energy is applied. The location of the plant utilizing the particular fuel chosen is a large factor in the original choice. The cost per unit at its original natural source, or even in its delivered form, is not always the final measure of its worth. The use of electricity as a source of energy illustrates this to the extreme. Electric current produced from water power is very cheap in certain localities. In Norway, current is sold as low as ½0# per kw-hr., while in dry cells it costs as much as $10 per kw-hr. Yet the sale of dry cells is a large business. The selling price of gas also varies widely. In some localities natural gas for the manufacture of carbon black sells for as low as $0.02 per million British thermal units, while artificial gas for domestic purposes sells for as high as $6 per million B.t.u. Obviously the cost per unit of energy is not the final determining factor in its purchase. Any discussion of the economic utilization of fuels must include costs in relation to the units of finished material manufactured. In large central power generating stations, this is the over-all cost per kilowatt-hour, and in ceramic firing the cost per unit of finished product of a certain quality is the criterion of economic utilization.

Jan 1, 1931

By David Donoghue

Efforts made in the year 1930 and in previous years restricted production in most of the fields of Texas to a point that was satisfactory, at the beginning of 1931, to the majority of producers and buyers. In the Panhandle, North Texas and West Central Texas districts, a few operators with refinery affiliations or contracts either ignored, or by virtue of injunction suits, did not comply with the Railroad Commission's orders, and there was some oil sold at less than posted prices, which, with the Oklahoma City difficulties, caused the first general price reduction. More could have been done perhaps to help the situation on the Gulf Coast and in the Laredo district, but natural advantages are not readily surrendered. East Texas Proration troubles in 1930 were insignificant when compared with those of 1931. In January, 1931, efforts were begun to convince the producers and citizens of East Texas of the necessity of curtailment. Opposition quickly developed and meetings were held in the towns of the region and proration denounced vigorously. Notwithstanding a strenuous campaign for additional legislation waged by many producers, the regular session of the State Legislature refused to strengthen the conservation laws and passed only the Marginal Well Bill, designed to prevent the Commission from prorating small wells. The Railroad Commission held a heated hearing on East Texas in the latter part of March. During April the Commission issued three orders based on the Yates plan for the proration of the East Texas field. Each succeeding order raised the allowable for the field. In June the opposition held more mass meetings at which a plan based on acreage was endorsed. Apparently on the theory that any plan was better than none, the Commission issued an order on July 2 embodying some of the features of the proposed plan, limiting production to 250,000 bbl. per day, and dividing the producing area into 20-acre units participating equally in the outlet. Owing to the bringing in of many wells and the many violators of the Commission's orders, production increased to such an extent that prices went as low as 5c per barrel.

Jan 1, 1932

By Armando M. Lago

Secular and cyclical patterns of postwar sources and uses of funds of the mineral sector are analyzed. A simultaneous equation behavior model of sources and uses of funds is developed for both mining firms and integrated producers, and these models were put through the task of predicting the financial and expenditure be-havior of mineral corporations in response to mergers and changes in investment tax credits and depletion allowances. Finally, the quantitative analysis methodology is applied to the analysis of optimum capital structure of mining corporations. The postwar changes that have occurred in the expenditure and financial behavior of mineral corporations are reviewed, particularly the relative importance of factors that affect the industry's supply and demand for funds. This quantitative statistical investigation of factors affecting sources and uses of funds of mineral corporations is achieved through the formulation of a simultaneous equation model of sources and uses of funds. After a description of the study sample, the postwar cyclical and secular financial behavior of mineral corporations is analyzed in detail. An econometric model of mineral corporate financial behavior is formulated. This model is then estimated and reviewed. Policy issues regarding depletion allowances, investment tax credits, and industrial organization of the mineral sector are discussed. Finally, the optimum financial structure of mining firms is discussed and the effect of corporate financial structure on the mining corporations' average cost of capital is analyzed.

Jan 1, 1971

By DeVerle P. Harris

Risk for most mineral investments is greater than that of average business ventures, because the physical and economic characteristics of the mineral deposit are never known with certainty. Inasmuch as the merits of a potential mineral investment cannot be fully appraised without consideration of the impact to the investor of the possible unfavorable events associated with the adoption of the project, methods of risk analysis are important in project evaluation and investment selection. The conceptual framework for risk analysis and the means by which some of the recommended practices might be implemented are examined. In addition to the normal business risk due to market forces, the physical and economic characteristics of the mineral deposit are never known with certainty, for only partial or indirect information is available, such as data from drill cores or surface and underground workings. Consequently, risk for most mineral investments is greater than that of average business ventures. Inasmuch as the merits of a potential mineral investment cannot be fully appraised without consideration of the impact to the investor of the possible unfavorable events associated with adoption of the project, methods of risk analysis are important in project evaluation and investment selection. This paper examines the conceptual framework for risk analysis and means by which might be implemented some of the recommended procedures. Utility Theory A discourse on risk and its impact upon investment selection quite often leads the reader into the concept of utility theory, for utility theory is a device constructed by economists to measure the satisfaction an individuai receives from a good; in the case of investment analysis, that good is the outcome of an investment. It briefly is reviewed here to describe the reaction of the individual to risk and as a stepping stone to other techniques more suited to risk analysis at the level of the firm. Utility theory proposes that an investor possess a utility map (curve), such as indicated in Fig. 1, which indicates the value in utiles of potential monetary rewards to an individual with some specific endowment of resources. Points on this map are obtained from the following relationship:

Jan 1, 1971

By A. Weiss, W. A. Coster

The search for ore is characterized by a great variety of uncertainties, each of which can be resolved by obtaining information at a cost. Three exploration stages may be distinguished in which information can be obtained, based on inherently different cost structure: 1) the reconnaissance or scanning stage, 2) the examination or screening stage and 3) the project stage. This exploration sequence would roughly coincide with replies to questions as to: where, how, why and how much. As complete information in each stage is too costly to acquire, we must assess the probability that adequate information will be furnished by a limited amount of effort and attempt to maximize the expected value of ore to be found for a given exploration expenditure. Several problems are discussed relative to the mathematical formulation and possible computer procedures for determining the optimum allocation of a total exploration effort. Based on the available literature possible solutions to this problem are indicated. When scanning through published literature on mineral exploration, it seems at first that there is little room for substantial and systematic improvements in the efficiency with which the problem of discovery of new ore deposits is presently being handled by large organizations active in exploration. It appears equally difficult to offer something relevantly new which could generate a break-through in exploration thinking and cause a marked improvement in the ratio of successful undertakings to the total exploration projects started. On the other hand, a number of experts in recent years have urged that the problems in prospecting be analyzed in a more skillful and sophisticated manner than in the past. Their thesis is based mainly on the premise that the cost of finding mineral deposits will increase with increasing technical difficulties. In present large-scale exploration ventures, especially in those regions where outcrops and immediately visible geologic evidence are scarce, older methods of prospecting are increasingly being replaced by more indirect and systematic geophysical and geochemical methods with more emphasis on correct statistical design of exploration patterns. It is perhaps the oil industry which has made the greatest strides in developing statistically, well justified patterns in its search for oil; possibly because oil seepages, as indicators of the presence of oil, left off at an earlier point in time than did outcrops as indicators of base metals. Among the pioneers in the field of statistics and operations research, as applied to mineral exploration, the excellent works of Allais, Slichter, Koop-man, Mickey, de Guhnin, Krumbein, Griffith, Sichel, Krige, de Wijs, and Matheron may be mentioned. It should, however, be pointed out that three subjects of basic importance to the allocation of exploration efforts have so far received only scant attention in published literature, even by the aforementioned authors. In the first place, a more precise definition of the object of the search, i.e., a minimum-size orebody, seems to be outstanding. Secondly, a decision model is not a widely-discussed subject. Thirdly, no concentrated attempt so far seems to have been made to establish probabilities of the occurrence of economic deposits on a regional scale and to arrive at a slightly more accurate knowledge of the probability laws governing the deposition of ore. It is not the purpose of this paper to create new order in the complexity of uncertainties in which our decision processes in exploration necessarily have to be conducted. Rather, we intend to highlight some of the outstanding, hitherto unmapped territory, where diligent compilation and a utilization of present and historic data may statistically improve our chances of success. We hope that the contribution of this paper will lie in bringing allocation problems into better focus and in increasing the mineral industry's realization of the magnitude of the factors involved. THE MINIMUM-SIZE OREBODY The concept of target specifications for what constitute a minimum-size orebody in exploration is a rather variable one and depends to some extent on

Jan 1, 1963

By W. A. Riggs

In a single year the total transportation cost equals nearly 30 pct of the value of mineral commodities, the largest single cost from the deposit to consumer. The magnitude of this economic factor calls for more complete understanding of cost and operational problems between producer and carrier than now exists. Details are given of the costs of providing transportation as well as freight rates for selling transportation. In 1958, transportation of mineral commodities in the United States required 600 billion ton-miles to move 1 3/4 billion tons of products of mines comprising solid fuels, crude oil, industrial minerals and rocks, and ores. Possibly 17 pct was handled by more than one mode of transport, since combinations of several modes of transport may, at times, achieve better service/cost results than any single mode. Total transportation cost of nearly $5 billion equaled roughly 30 pct of the value of the mineral commodities, the largest single cost from the mineral deposit to the consumer. The tremendous magnitude of this transportation undertaking demands much more complete understanding than now exists between mineral producers and carriers about the economic and operational problems of each other. A substantial portion of the daily work of the writer is spent in trying to act as a combination interpreter and catalyst between potential shippers and carriers, hoping to direct both to points of mutual understanding and advantage. For the purpose of this paper, it is necessary to ask mining people to accept some terminology and to try to appreciate the mental approach of the freight rate making people of the carriers. This paper will consider costs of providing transportation as well as freight rates for selling transportation—although these are fields of limited certainty. There are no accurate statistical breakdowns for all modes of transport and types of carriers indicating commodities, volume of traffic, distances, costs, and rates. Much information is available for railroads, and some for the regulated portions of air, motor, pipeline, and water transportation. Unregulated carriers, handling about half of the transportation of products of mines, are not required to report, and very little is known of their activities. Figures used herein are national in scope, unless otherwise indicated, and have generally been derived from Interstate Commerce Commission reports and files. Tonnage figures have been reduced to net tons of 2000 lb. The very generalized comparison of average mileage freight rate levels for various modes of transport provided by Fig. 1 affords advantageous perspective for the entire field of transportation costs. Dashed guide lines show cents per ton-mile, and dotted guide lines show percentage of first class railroad freight rate. While costs of other than railroad transportation more nearly follow constant cents per ton-mile functions, costs of railroad transportation show characteristic taper, or decrease in cents per-ton mile with increasing length of haul. This fundamental difference in cost is due largely to the fact that railroads and pipelines provide their own fully taxed roadway facilities while highway, waterway, and air carriers use government-provided tax-free roadway at no cost other than fuel, license, and certain excise taxes. Thus railroad and pipeline transportation might be said to carry heavy threshold costs in addition to those transportation costs which are directly variable with ton miles of transportation produced. The original basis of railroad freight rate structures lies in the classification of all articles of commerce into railroad class ralings ranging from 7 to 40 pct of first class (100 pct) rate level, dependent on value, hazard, loading characteristics, service requirements, and whether carload or less than carload. Classification tables and mileage-based (but arbitrarily grouped), rate scales are published as tariffs subject to approval by regulatory bodies. Used together, these determine class rates in cents per 100 lb between points in the U. S. Where local commercial or operating conditions render it advantageous for carriers to depart from

Jan 1, 1961

By Francis Cameron

Gloomy predictions that domestic mineral reserves are approaching exhaustion are unwarranted and may be harmful, this author contends. Specific mineral forecasting errors in the Paley Report are cited to support this contention, and steps that can be taken to insure a progressive mineral industry capable of keeping pace with the major raw material needs of the nation through advancing technology are suggested. Mining is both exciting and rewarding —although at times somewhat frustrating— and we all can have real pride in our industry, in its people, and in its accomplishments. It is, however, with concern that I have noted a deterioration in this Country in what might be called mining's stature and in the growth of a belief in many quarters that our mineral reserves are rapidly approaching exhaustion. In other words, there is a popular image that we are fast becoming a "have not" nation in many respects and that the domestic mining industry can no longer be considered, in the vernacular of Wall Street to offer much in the way of "growth potential." I do not subscribe to this hypothesis, nor do I be-li4ve that the record of the mining industry bears this out. However, let me add that we can, in time, talk ourselves into this frame of mind and we can hasten the day when this very well might come about by unnecessary and unwise legislation or regulation. My remarks today are basically designed to give my reasons for refuting this negative philosophy and to review our record. With your help, I know we can improve our image, and the public's recognition of our industry's peculiar problems. The progress of our civilization over the centuries has been fundamentally based upon proper use of raw materials, both agricultural and mineral, and upon energy, human or otherwise. As the standard of living has progressed century by century, the demands for mineral raw materials have increased in an irregular, but steadily rising progression. Fortunately, those minerals on which we depend most, i.e., iron, coal, petroleum, copper, aluminum, lead, and zinc have been neither too difficult to find nor to process into useful form. Iron, the most useful of all metals, is present in various amounts in most rock types and soils. Gold, seemingly the most generally desired (but certainly not the most useful of all metals), occurs in sea water in a far greater total tonnage than has been won from all of the world's known gold mines. If the latter is true, then why do we not see large installations treating sea water for the recovery of its gold content? The answer, of course, is that even the French, who seem, from their recent actions, to value gold above all else, have not devised a way of doing this at a profit. Theoretically, it is possible, but not with today's technology at a cost which would justify the effort. Man has exploited only those mineral concentrations which accidents of nature have placed within his so far limited means of finding and utilizing. What we geologists and engineers refer to as an orebody is nothing more than a concentration of minerals, exploitable with available knowledge, that will yield a value greater than the value attached to the energy and capital required to produce it. What is "ore" and what is not "ore" is, in the end, a matter of economics. The economic problem stems from the physical and chemical character of mineral deposits. The good Lord stacked the cards heavily in favor of rising costs by limiting the amount of the higher grade ores easily available. As the best and most accessible ores are depleted, it becomes necessary to work harder and with greater ingenuity to produce more from less accessible and lower grade resources. The quantity of mineral raw materials we can have in the future will be determined largely by what we can afford to pay for them in terms of human effort, capital outlay and production energies. We will always have the problem of cost with us and our only real means of keeping ahead of rising costs is by continually improving our technical abilities. We, in this country at least, no longer have open to us large and unexplored virgin wildernesses in which a pick-and-shovel prospector might uncover an untouched mineral bonanza. The rest of the world also has few conventional frontiers left in which the explorer-prospector is free to roam. We do, however, have enormous land areas unexplored, and untouched po-

Jan 1, 1969

By William C. Cassun

The important role of pit slope design in the overall economics of open-pit mining ventures has long been recognized and well documented.1 2 Any economic analysis of a pit slope design must reflect the trade-off between the benefits and the increased risk of slope failure inherent in steeper slope angles. The conventional practice in pit slope design is based on the factor of safety analysis.' The approach uses average values to arrive at a deterministic solution to slope stability. Past analyses based on this approach generally have had several drawbacks: 1. The risk from slope failure could not be quantified. 2. Only relatively simple pit wall geometries were considered. 3. The analyses were performed solely for the benefits of steeper slopes, seldom discussing the potential costs of slope failures. 4. Analyses were seldom considered in a year-by-year mine planning context. Recognizing that average values do not reflect the uncertainty in geomechanical parameters, a probabilistic philosophy to slope design has evolved. 4,5 However, this approach had not been fully developed to include complex slope geometries and mine planning consideration. In order to develop an integrated, pit slope design procedure, a research project was initiated at the University of Arizona during 1973 in conjunction with the Canada Center for Mineral and Energy Teleology. This research resulted in the development of a probabilistic design procedure. The remainder of this paper gives an overview of the probabilistic design procedure and a discussion of the requirements for the benefit-cost analysis of a pit slope design. Finally, the results of a case study undertaken at an operating mine are given.

Jan 1, 1977

By S. Zekovic

"The paper gives an overview of the economics condition and strategic business challanges of the mining&metallurgy sector and their possible impact on the future development of the Bor basin of copper in Serbian part of Danube Region. Economics and strategic challanges in the mining& metallurgy complex are emphasized by world economic and financial crisis. An analysis of strategic challanges is undertaken by application of a comprehensive development framework approach. Paper indicates that an economics and evaluation of possible impacts of constraints and challenges for the development of Bor basin shows that it must be included in corporative decision, local and regional plans.INTRODUCTIONRisks are characteristic of every strategic development and business decision-making, so their successful management should be a part of the development strategy of the corporation, especially longterm. Due to the growing uncertainty in the general socio-economic environment, “risk management”, risk insurance, risk control, risk culture, risk optimization are frequently talked about. Among the key risks at a corporate level are the financial risks and risks of the regulative framework, especially in the field of environment and land use. In both cases, it is a question of external risks, which the companies need to relativize and successfully manage. Some companies pay more attention to production risks and search for better solutions in that domain which is not enough (Ernst&Young, 2008). Strategic business risks appear mostly on the macro-economic level, from where they should be” transferred” onto the level of sector economics and action level in corporations. Risk management include transferring the risk to other parts, avoiding the risk, preventing hazard, reducing the negative effect or probability of the risk, accepting some or all of the consequences of a particular risk.The research has included perspective and the general market trend and market positioning of the production and copper processing complex in the world; the impact of the requirements and strategic goals of the EU Directive and Kyoto Protocol on the institutional and other adjustments important for business in this sector; the impact assessment of the regulations important for business in the mining and metals sector, and case study of economics and challenges for the development of mining and metallurgy sector in the Bor basin of copper in Serbian part of Danube region. The analysis has included the identification and assessment of the global challenges on the future development of the copper complex in the miningsmelting basin Bor. Presented results in the paper are part of the research project “Sustainable spatial development of the Danube area in Serbia"" (No. 036036), financed by Ministry of Education and science of Republic Serbia."

Jan 1, 2012

By Donald M. Duncan

An acceptable source of concrete aggregate is available in Kansas City in a continuous, medium bedded, slightly dipping limestone unit. Removal is accomplished in shallow depth, 12 feet to 17 feet high, room and pillar mines. The accepted empirical design spaces 20 foot pillars 60 feet on center. A portion of the 20 foot unit is left in place for roof support. Rock and soil cover is variable to 100± feet maximum. Long-term stability of these mines is affected by numerous factors, including the above mine-rock profile, ground water conditions and mining practice. Crusher-run aggregate sells at the mine for $2.20 per ton, yielding a gross income of $2.00 to $2.80 per square foot of mine. Use of mine space for real estate development requires a new perspective in mine development. Mining practices to obtain long term stabile structures can become an over-riding factor as compared with minimum production costs and maximum extraction ratios. Poorly mined areas are unusuable for secondary purposes. Development cost for lease space in less desirable mines is substantially greater than those planned for a secondary use. Real estate development in mine space involves unique engineering problems. Properly engineered developments offer singular advantages. Warehouse lease space sells for $.50 to $1.00 per square foot per year; fully developed office areas may double these values.

Jan 1, 1968

By Alexander Karim

This paper reviews the growth pattern in bauxite and alumina production, and primary aluminum smelting through 1980. Because the alumina and primary metal are intermediate products of the major integrated aluminum companies, it is not possible to determine their production costs. The costs indicated in this paper are order of magnitude costs based on published figures and the market price of these products. The conclusions in this paper indicate the general pattern of growth in the aluminum industry and are not meant to be a substitute for the feasibility and economic studies that are needed for individual bauxite mining, alumina refining and aluminum smelting projects.

Jan 1, 1968

By Michael Arriagada, Ivan Arriagada

"As mines return to shafts to economically exploit deeper reserves, two methods mine owners use to minimize short term costs are: sinking shafts in phases and refurbishing old, existing shafts. While there may appear to be benefits to utilizing existing infrastructure, often this is not the case, resulting in missed deadlines and added costs. Similarly, if proper long term planning is not executed when sinking a shaft in phases, additional costs and downtime will be accrued. This paper will take an in depth look at both of these options with an eye towards optimizing costs, minimizing downtime, and facilitating construction. INTRODUCTION With the onset of mechanized mining and large capacity trucks, many mines turned away from shafts and began to use ramps to haul ore to surface. However, continual exploitation of mineral reserves located closer to surface, combined with the subsequent unearthing of additional resources at greater depths, forced mines to go deeper and deeper to extend the life and keep the operation running. In shallow mines, hauling ore by truck was an economical option. However, as mines get deeper, driving ramps takes additional time, and hauling over longer and longer distances becomes less economic, both in terms of cost and time. For this reason Mexico, in particular, has seen a jump in the number of shafts which have been put into production, as well as having a number of shafts in different stages of development and still more in the conceptual stages. Many of the shaft projects in Mexico are being designed in phases, with the hoist and equipment purchased capable of reaching the ultimate planned depth of the shaft, but with sinking operations stopping short at an intermediate depth. A loading pocket is then installed to start exploiting mineral at this depth sooner, with subsequent phases planned for a later date using either a rock pentice or bulkhead to separate the sinking operations from the active shaft above. Currently, we are directly involved in two such projects which are actively being deepened, as well as having seen various others already reach completion. If done properly with the long-term plan in mind, sinking in phases can be a very viable option, allowing for faster production while fully utilizing the equipment at various depths. However, there are many issues which can arise when sinking a shaft in phases that if not properly examined and planned for from the outset, have the potential to eliminate the gains hoped for when it was decided to sink in this manner."

Jan 1, 2019

By E. De Souza

Two comprehensive surveys, which focus upon backfill practices and the economics of backfilling in underground mines in Canada, have been conducted. The two surveys were designed to assess operational practices and costs associated with the wide scope of filling operations that must be met by individual mines, ranging from raw material feed to the preparation plant, through underground backfill transportation, to in-stope product placement. This paper presents the current state of backfill usage in Canada, identifies trends in minefill practices and provides mine operators with an updated database of information upon which they might compare their own practices and costs with present trends throughout the industry.

May 1, 2003

By Marco V. Ginatta

Current world production, 60'000 ton/y, is exceedingly too small for titanium's extraordinary combination of favorable properties; it should be 1,000,000 ton/y (7% of stainless-steel). Prices that competitively sustain that sales volume are achievable only with electrolytic production, as it is for all other commercial nonferrous metals. But titanium does not have its commercial electrolytic plants yet, because of producers decisions and strategies, scientists works, industrial problems with chloride process, lack of consumers sponsors. Fluoride high temperature process has the advantages of aluminum electrolysis, plus other favorable characteristics specific to titanium and its feed material. One electrolytic titanium potroom replaces several different plants used for sponge production. Production of titanium ingots with zero defect is achieved. The solidified cathode rectangular slabs are suitable for direct rolling.

Jan 1, 2001

By Gary H. Higgins

The paper by Lewis and Braun l presents experimental and calculational evidence that primary chalcopyrite ores are rapidly oxidized by warm oxygen-bearing water. Resulting solutions contained copper sulfate products of the matrix rock decomposition such as magnesium sulfate and sulphuric acid. Iron was oxidized to insoluble hematite and hydrous iron sulfates. Oxygen injection near the base of a broken and permeable flooded ore deposit was calculated to cause circulation of oxidizing solutions to the entire permeable region. The rate of dissolution of copper and degree of oxygen saturation for given oxygen injection rates were presented. Their work suggests that in-situ recovery of deep, disseminate primary copper deposits is technically feasible. The actual feasibility depends on economics and environmental safety as well, and it is the purpose of this paper to address these two aspects.

Jan 1, 1972

By B. Arvidson

Computer-controlled machine sorting may, if properly applied, have a dramatic effect on overall economics of a mine operation. Radiometric and photometric sorters have been used for many years and new developments will be reported, such as a sorter for fine particles and a conductivity/magnetic sorter. Application examples with emphasis on precious metals will be given. Economics for some of the projects will be reviewed and discussed. Sorting underground is shown to be particularly attractive, but machine sorting would be profitable in most cases based on savings in transportation and milling/beneficiation costs only.

Jan 1, 1987

By R. H. Derammelaere

With renewed interest in coal slurry pipelines in China, Indonesia, Australia and Canada for electric generation, it appears worthwhile to update the relative economics of transporting coal by slurry pipeline. Three slurry pipeline technologies are evaluated for the commercial transportation of 3.0, 6.0, and 9.0 million tonnes per year (MMT A) example cases, over distances of 250 km, 500 km and 1000 km.

Jan 1, 1998

By S. Lähteenmäki, P. Koivistoinen, J. Levanaho

Semi Autogenous Grinding (SAG) circuit is the most common grinding circuit to day. In Europe and South Africa fully autogenous (AG) circuits are also popular. SAG circuit has a lower capital cost and simple operation. SAG circuit requires the use of grinding balls, which increases operating costs and decreases availability. An AG circuit may produce a higher Net Present Value to the investment. The AG circuit is more complex to design and operate. However, operating experience from AG circuits illustrates that an AG circuit can be as trouble free as a SAG circuit with the benefit of lower operating cost.

Jan 1, 2001

By Trevor Howie, Mal Edwards

"Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd. designed and operate the Mt Owen Mine in the Hunter Valley of NewSouth Wales, Australia on behalf of the owners of the mine, BHP Coal Pty Ltd. The mine is a multiseam open cut coal operation. Mining by Thiess commenced in September 1996 following thecompletion of the coal preparation plant. The location of the mine is shown below on Figure Al."

Jan 1, 1997