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By Sidney A. Swensrud

The 24-in. crude-oil line. and- the 20-in. petroleum-products line, built as a war emergency by the United States Government and running from points in Texas to the New York-New Jersey-Philadelphia area, were constructed only because of the inability during the war to continue nor-inal ocean tanker movements from the Gulf Coast to the East Coast. The postwar disposition of these lines may be considered as one of the important problems of the postwar readjustments in the oil industry, if not the most important one. In the first place there appear to be many complications in keeping the lines in crude-oil or petroleum-products service. This conclusion was reached also in a study by T. E. Swigart, President of Shell Pipeline Corporation.' Since the lines are too largc for any one company to utilize, and since it appears likely that a surplus rather than a deficiency of tankers will exist after the war, most companies probably will feel that they can achieve lower costs and more satisfactoiy results from the resumption of tanker movements to the East Coast rather than by endeavoring to take over or utilize the capacity in the large pipe lines under some tariff-rate structure. As for using the lines for making deliveries to the middle west or central eastern areas, it would appear that when the war is over and normal transportation arrangements can be resumed, there will be no need of any extra capacity for such deliveries. Therefore, the War Emergency lines could be utilized for this purpose only if privately owned pipe lines and other transportation facilities were to be displaced. Against this rather unprepossessing prospect for use in petroleum or product service is the fact that at or near the source of the lines lie the greatest developed gas reserves in the world, for much of which there is at present no satisfactory market outlet; and at the other end of the lines lies one of the greatest concentrations of population in the world, which is not now served by natural gas. These who have been fortunate enough to use natural gas can have little doubt of its desirability as a domestic fuel. An analysis of the market potentialities and comparison with other areas where natural gas is being distributed, and where it has displaced manufactured gas, makes it seem clear beyond question that the full capacity of both of the large-diameter lines could be fully utilized in this service, and this without creating any undue drain upon the gas reserves of the nation. On the basis of an estimated capacity of roo to 120 billion cubic feet per year, the gas that might be marketed through these lines would amount to only 3 to 4 per cent of the total con-

Jan 1, 1944

By Howard S. Bryant

The year 1928 has recently.passed from the picture and it is at this time that the various divisions of the oil industry are giving thought to plans for the present year. The outstanding characteristic of the industry in 1928 was the successful curtailment of oil production to the market's needs. It has been thought advisable to look ahead and endeavor to anticipate the oil demand for the coming year, and thus determine the volume of oil that can be safely produced without causing major additions to surface stocks. The year has been one of smaller additions to stocks than in 1927, a record demand for oil products, and a further developed spirit of cooperation among oil producers, as well as various other achievements. It is well to pause and take stock of ourselves. Present Status of Crude Oil Supply and Demand The total daily new supply of oil is at this time1 about 2,960,000 bbl. per day, made up of 2,585,000 bbl. domestic crude production, 125,000 bbl. casinghead gasoline, and 250,000 bbl. of imports. With the present low consumption, due to the falling off in the winter season demand, it is estimated that about 150,000 bbl. a day are now being run to storage, and that the first three months in 1929 will see large-sized additions to storage. Consumption plus exports of oil have increased at a regular rate from year to year, and although oil production in 1928 passed the 1,000,000,-000 bbl. mark for the second time in the history of the United States, with a production of 25,000,000 bbl. more than in 1927, only 30,000,000 bbl. were added to storage during 1928. This is compared to an addition of 65,500,000 bbl. in 1927.

Jan 1, 1929

By John Nelson

AN OUTLINE survey of the economic outlook for the United States export trade in petroleum products resolves itself broadly into two general divisions; first, a consideration of our present position in this trade, and second, a discussion of the visible factors which promise to affect appreciable changes in the immediate future in that trade. The UNITED STATES PETROLEUM EXPORTS OF MAJOR PETROLEUM PRODUCTS 1925, 1926 and 1927 Gasoline, Naphtha, and Other Light Products 1925 1926 1927* Quantity (gal.) 1,286,787,796 1,784,154,802 1,851,494,190 Value $197,491,588 $263,199,938 $214,721,652 'Illuminating Oil, Kerosene 1925 1926 1927* Quantity (gal.) 885;136,041 924,680,979 827,162,280 Value $84,699,724 $100,352,877 $80,358,082 Gas and Fuel Oil 1925 1926 I 1927 Quantity (gal.) 1,365,358,988 1,449,688,394 1,815,130,464 Value.... ? $49,040,024 $45,354,108. .. $50,343,031 Lubricating. Oil 1925... ....1926 .. 1927 Quantity .(gal.) 402,572,584 388,767,055 403,369,512 Value $90,596,671 $86,414,621 $88,926,815

Jan 1, 1928

By John D. Gill

The purpose of this paper is to invite attention away from the obvious. direct monetary costs of oil-field overdevelopment (as distinguished from "social costs") to a consideration of the role played by the exercise of freedom to create even allegedly excessive1 plant facilities in contributing to the maintenance of equilibrium in the wholc economy and in promoting material progress. The obvious and most commonly discussed effect of overdevelopment of oil fields is illustrated by the allegation that already the excessive development of the East Texas field has cost upward of $162,000,000;2 in other words, the drilling of 12,500 wells more than the number estimated as the requirement for economical recovery of the reserve has unnecessarily raised the total cost of development that amount. Many other illustrations of so-called excessive development of oil pools could be presented. Some of them, like Cushing, Powell and Long Beach, might be drawn from the era antedating widespread discussion in the trade of such matters as optimum well spacing, reservoir energy, the conservation rate of depletion of reserves, etc. Numerous other cases can he found in the records of the current era, which began with the introduction of rationalized restriction of production. Besides East Texas, there may be mentioned Oklahoma City, Centralia and. more recently, the town-lot development of Bloomingdale, Michigan.

Jan 1, 1940

By John D. Gill

The purpose of this paper is to invite attention away from the obvious. direct monetary costs of oil-field overdevelopment (as distinguished from "social costs") to a consideration of the role played by the exercise of freedom to create even allegedly excessive1 plant facilities in contributing to the maintenance of equilibrium in the wholc economy and in promoting material progress. The obvious and most commonly discussed effect of overdevelopment of oil fields is illustrated by the allegation that already the excessive development of the East Texas field has cost upward of $162,000,000;2 in other words, the drilling of 12,500 wells more than the number estimated as the requirement for economical recovery of the reserve has unnecessarily raised the total cost of development that amount. Many other illustrations of so-called excessive development of oil pools could be presented. Some of them, like Cushing, Powell and Long Beach, might be drawn from the era antedating widespread discussion in the trade of such matters as optimum well spacing, reservoir energy, the conservation rate of depletion of reserves, etc. Numerous other cases can he found in the records of the current era, which began with the introduction of rationalized restriction of production. Besides East Texas, there may be mentioned Oklahoma City, Centralia and. more recently, the town-lot development of Bloomingdale, Michigan.

Jan 1, 1940

By J. Ehner Thomas, M. D. Gould

Until four years ago the market price of oil securities moved directly and immediately with the general list. This point, was first developed by the senior author in 1924 while making a statistical study of the relative movement of oil securities and the general market. Plotting the monthly averages of 17 oils against 233 industrials disclosed the sur- prising relationship shown in Fig. 1. The traditional vagaries of the oil business, the wide fluctuations in current supply and resulting abrupt changes in crude prices nevertheless produced no movements in the market price of oil securities as a group, which departed notably from the movements of the general market. Obviously general business conditions did not always change when and as conditions in the oil industry changed; clearly the fluctuations of

Jan 1, 1929

By Joseph Pogue

THE past year in the petroleum industry was one of overproduction, rising inventories, low prices, and meagre to vanishing profits. This outcome was the result of a long period of intensive and uncompensated effort on the part of both financial and industrial interests, to stimulate supply on the theory that the primary problem facing the petroleum industry was the development of an adequate reserve of raw material to protect a large and ever-growing investment. The stimulus was applied in various forms and through diverse channels: capital had, long flowed into the industry in excessive amounts under the attraction of large expected profits; the price level for crude petroleum had persistently been influenced -by speculative considerations, with the result that prices declined slowly in periods of flush production and were quick to advance in anticipation of statistical improvement, thus maintaining a superfluous degree of stimulus on wildcatting and on drilling; speculation in inventories had led to the unsound, or at least unusual, business practice of accumulating huge stocks of oil; and, above all, the industry had directed the potent force of technology to the expansion of supply and achieved radical results in accelerating oil discovery, speeding up the rate of oil extraction, and enlarging the recovery of gasoline and lubricating oils from the raw material. In short, the economic conditions of 1927 were exactly those to which the objectively driven enterprise of the petroleum industry had long been directed; and the undesirable financial consequences arising. therefrom reflected no lack of success in what had been set out to be achieved, but rather the failure to have established concurrently the necessary means of economic control to prevent the immediate conversion of reserves into current supply, and likewise the oversight in neglecting to apply the technological force to the enlargement and diversification of the market for petroleum products. Perhaps, when viewed in its longer perspective, 1927 will stand out as the turning point in the economic policy of the petroleum industry, when the technique of rationalizing production made its, initial claim for recognition.

Jan 1, 1928

By Joseph E. Pogue

The past year in the petroleum industry was one of overproduction, rising inventories, low prices, and meagre to vanishing profits. This outcome was the result of a long period of intensive and uncompensated effort on the part of both financial and industrial interests, to stimulate supply on the theory that the primary problem facing the petroleum industry was the development of an adequate reserve of raw material to protect a large and ever-growing investment. The stimulus was applied in various forms and through diverse channels: capital had long flowed into the industry in excessive amounts under the attraction of large expected profits; the price level for crude petroleum had persistently been influenced by speculative considerations, with the result that prices declined slowly in periods of flush production and were quick to advance in anticipation of statistical improvement, thus maintaining a superfluous degree of stimulus on wildcatting and on drilling; speculation in inventories had led to the unsound, or at least unusual, business practice of accumulating huge stocks of oil; and, above all, the industry had directed the potent force of technology to the expansion of supply and achieved radical results in accelerating oil discovery, speeding up the rate of oil extraction, and enlarging the recovery of gasoline and lubricating oils from the raw material. In short, the economic conditions of 1927 were exactly those to which the objectively driven enterprise of the petroleum industry had long been directed; and the undesirable financial consequences arising therefrom reflected no lack of success in what had been set out to be achieved, but rather the failure to have established concurrently the necessary means of economic control to prevent the immediate conversion of reserves into current supply, and likewise the oversight in neglecting to apply the technological force to the enlargement and diversification of the market for petroleum products. Perhaps, when viewed in its longer perspective, 1927 will stand out as the turning point in the economic policy of the petroleum industry, when the technique of rationalizing production made its initial claim for recognition.

Jan 1, 1928

By George W. Doffing

Numerous contradictory statements have been made in the past regarding the importance of the seasonal influence of demand for motor fuel on prices of oil securities. It has often been said that the time to buy oil securities is in the spring, or just prior to the heavy consuming season for gasoline. The fallacy of this argument is brought out in the following paragraphs. Seasonality of Oil-security Prices The indexes used in this paper as indicators of prices of oil securities and general industrials are those compiled by Standard Statistics Co. The oil producing and refining stock index includes 14 representative petroleum companies, while the all-industrials index is made up of 347 issues. All figures are stated as relatives, with 1926 = 100. The primary basis of the index, and one that gives a good weighting of the relative importance of the company within the industry, is the total market value of the stock issue outstanding; i.e., the market price times the number of shares outstanding. Adjustments are made for the addition or elimination of issues from the group index, for stock dividends, split-ups, stock rights, et cetera. At the present time the oil producing and refining index includes the following companies: Atlantic Refining Co., Consolidated Oil Corporation, Continental Oil Co., Gulf Oil Corporation, Humble Oil & Refining Co., Ohio Oil Co., Royal Dutch Co., Shell Union Oil Corporation, Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Standard Oil Company of California, Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey), Texas Corporation, Union Oil Company of California. In calculating the seasonal for oil-security prices several periods have been selected as indicat,ive of major changes in the industry, as follows: 1. 1918 through 1936. This gives an over-all picture of the industry during the motor-vehicle, motor-fuel era. 2. 1927 through 1936. This period includes the control stages, both voluntary and coercive. 3. 1927 to September, 1933. This is the pre-code period of control.

Jan 1, 1937

By R. V. Whetsel, V. R. Gargias, J. W. Ristori

WoRld consumption of petroleum and its substitutes in 1941, the amount of which obviously is largely conjectural, is estimated at 2,066,653,000 bbl. This is 48,689,000 bbl. more than the previous year and is an all-time high. Except for the United States, this figure does not include consumption for military purposes. Consumption in the United States also reached an all-time high during 1941, totaling 1,492,000,000 bbl., or 158,230,000 bbl. more than the previous peak year of 1940. On the other hand, it is estimated that civil consumption in countries outside of the United States decreased 109,541,ooo bbl. as compared with the previous year. Demand for military purposes and/or additions to stocks in countries outside of the United States is estimated at 304,507,000 bbl. during 1941, compared with 209,635,000 bbl. in 1940. This increase was due largely to blitzkrieg warfare on several fronts. especially Russia; entailing large expenditures of petroleum by both sides because of the immense area covered by the fighting forces, the long supply lines necessary and the intensity of the fighting. It is interesting to note in this connection that Axis-controlled countries, excluding Japan, had an estimated production of approximately 89,000,000 bbl. of petroleum and its substitutes in 1941. The peacetime consumption of these countries in 1938, for example, was about 183,000,000 bbl. It is believed that the minimum to which civil consumption could possibly be re-duced in wartime is 20 per cent of that of peacetime, which would call for a minimum consumption of 37,000,000 bbl. in these countries in 1941 for civil purposes. This

Jan 1, 1942

By V. R. Gargias, J. W. Ristori, R. V. Whetsel

WoRld consumption of petroleum and its substitutes in 1941, the amount of which obviously is largely conjectural, is estimated at 2,066,653,000 bbl. This is 48,689,000 bbl. more than the previous year and is an all-time high. Except for the United States, this figure does not include consumption for military purposes. Consumption in the United States also reached an all-time high during 1941, totaling 1,492,000,000 bbl., or 158,230,000 bbl. more than the previous peak year of 1940. On the other hand, it is estimated that civil consumption in countries outside of the United States decreased 109,541,ooo bbl. as compared with the previous year. Demand for military purposes and/or additions to stocks in countries outside of the United States is estimated at 304,507,000 bbl. during 1941, compared with 209,635,000 bbl. in 1940. This increase was due largely to blitzkrieg warfare on several fronts. especially Russia; entailing large expenditures of petroleum by both sides because of the immense area covered by the fighting forces, the long supply lines necessary and the intensity of the fighting. It is interesting to note in this connection that Axis-controlled countries, excluding Japan, had an estimated production of approximately 89,000,000 bbl. of petroleum and its substitutes in 1941. The peacetime consumption of these countries in 1938, for example, was about 183,000,000 bbl. It is believed that the minimum to which civil consumption could possibly be re-duced in wartime is 20 per cent of that of peacetime, which would call for a minimum consumption of 37,000,000 bbl. in these countries in 1941 for civil purposes. This

Jan 1, 1942

By V. R. Garfias, R. V. Whetzel, J. W. Ristori

Since the entry of the United States into global war, virtually all data and information necessary for compiling figures on world petroleum consumption have become unavailable. This situation undoubtedly will continue until the world petroleum industry can return to a peacetime basis. During the past 10 years, the authors, by publishing annual estimates of .world consumption, have attempted to emphasize the importance of a yearly world-wide survey of petroleum supply and demand. It is beconling more and more evident that statistics for the United States alone can no longer give a comprehensive idea of the state of the petroleum industry, even within the United States itself. Therefore, when conditions in the industry again become normal, it is the hope of the authors that those bureaus equipped to do so will carry forward the study of petroleum supply and demand on a world-wide basis. Enough data and information are available, however, to attempt a rough estimate of world output of crude petroleum and petroleum substitutes for 1942, which to some extent may reflect the trend of world consumption. This estimate by countries, as compared with the output in 1941, is shown in Table I. The world production of crude petroleum and petroleum substitutes for 1942 is estimated at 2,208,000,000 bbl., or a decrease of 171,000,000 bbl. under 1941. Crude production is believed to have decreased by about 200,000,000 bbl., (about 9 per cent); while petroleum substitutes increased by 28,500,000 bbl., (nearly 20 per cent). The decline of crude output in the United States is estimated at 19,000,000 bb1.—less than 2 per cent; while that in foreign countries is estimated at 180,000,000 bbl., or more than 20 per cent. The marked decline abroad is due largely to losses in Venezuela and Colombia, where the lack of ocean transportation became the controlling factor, and in the East Indies and Burma, where military invasion brought about the destruction of the fields. The production of petroleum substitutes in 1942 apparently reached a new high figure of 7.5 per cent of the total world petroleum output. The important features of petroleum production outside of the United States are the changes that have taken place during the year in the supply of the Axis countries. In Japan the output for 1941 was estimated at 8,800,000 bbl., 5,500,000 of which were petroleum substitutes. It is believed that the output of synthetic oils during 1942 substantially increased, raising the total interior production of Japan to nearly 10,-ooo,ooo bbl. Also, during 1942 Japanese armed forces gained possession of oil fields having a normal peacetime output of about 78,000,000 bbl. per year. The production of these areas for 1942 is estimated at some 23,000,000 bbl., which indicates that Japan is now getting at least 33,000,000 bbl. a year, which exceeds by 8,000,000 bbl. Its

Jan 1, 1943

By J. W. Ristori, V. R. Garfias, R. V. Whetzel

Since the entry of the United States into global war, virtually all data and information necessary for compiling figures on world petroleum consumption have become unavailable. This situation undoubtedly will continue until the world petroleum industry can return to a peacetime basis. During the past 10 years, the authors, by publishing annual estimates of .world consumption, have attempted to emphasize the importance of a yearly world-wide survey of petroleum supply and demand. It is beconling more and more evident that statistics for the United States alone can no longer give a comprehensive idea of the state of the petroleum industry, even within the United States itself. Therefore, when conditions in the industry again become normal, it is the hope of the authors that those bureaus equipped to do so will carry forward the study of petroleum supply and demand on a world-wide basis. Enough data and information are available, however, to attempt a rough estimate of world output of crude petroleum and petroleum substitutes for 1942, which to some extent may reflect the trend of world consumption. This estimate by countries, as compared with the output in 1941, is shown in Table I. The world production of crude petroleum and petroleum substitutes for 1942 is estimated at 2,208,000,000 bbl., or a decrease of 171,000,000 bbl. under 1941. Crude production is believed to have decreased by about 200,000,000 bbl., (about 9 per cent); while petroleum substitutes increased by 28,500,000 bbl., (nearly 20 per cent). The decline of crude output in the United States is estimated at 19,000,000 bb1.—less than 2 per cent; while that in foreign countries is estimated at 180,000,000 bbl., or more than 20 per cent. The marked decline abroad is due largely to losses in Venezuela and Colombia, where the lack of ocean transportation became the controlling factor, and in the East Indies and Burma, where military invasion brought about the destruction of the fields. The production of petroleum substitutes in 1942 apparently reached a new high figure of 7.5 per cent of the total world petroleum output. The important features of petroleum production outside of the United States are the changes that have taken place during the year in the supply of the Axis countries. In Japan the output for 1941 was estimated at 8,800,000 bbl., 5,500,000 of which were petroleum substitutes. It is believed that the output of synthetic oils during 1942 substantially increased, raising the total interior production of Japan to nearly 10,-ooo,ooo bbl. Also, during 1942 Japanese armed forces gained possession of oil fields having a normal peacetime output of about 78,000,000 bbl. per year. The production of these areas for 1942 is estimated at some 23,000,000 bbl., which indicates that Japan is now getting at least 33,000,000 bbl. a year, which exceeds by 8,000,000 bbl. Its

Jan 1, 1943

By V. R. Garfias, R. V. Whetsel, J. W. Ristori

Preliminary estimates indicate that world consumption of petroleum and related fuels in 1938 will be close to 1,908,000,000 bbl., or approximately 7,000,000 bbl. less than in 1937. This total does not include military consumption in foreign countries, which for obvious reasons is not made public. Foreign military consumption in any one year, however, is approximately represented by the difference between the total production of petroleum and related fuels and the "partial total" consumption above noted, after adding any decrease, or subtracting any increase in stocks in the United States. Fig. 1 illustrates this "difference" and shows that in 1937 and 1938, owing to the wars in China and Spain and the possibility of armed conflict in Central Europe, foreign military consumption—and possibly additions to foreign stocks—increased nearly 70,000,000 bbl. in 1937 over 1936 and remained at this high rate throughout 1938. No official information on foreign oil stocks is available to the writers. Table 1, recently published, purports to give the oil in storage in some of the European countries, but it is not known whether the figures include oil stocks for military purposes. It should be noted that with the annexation by Germany of Austria and part of Czechoslovakia the consumption of the country has increased to 53,000,000 bbl., which is about 36,000,000 short of the German produc-

Jan 1, 1939

By J. W. Ristori, R. V. Whetsel, V. R. Garfias

Preliminary estimates indicate that world consumption of petroleum and related fuels in 1938 will be close to 1,908,000,000 bbl., or approximately 7,000,000 bbl. less than in 1937. This total does not include military consumption in foreign countries, which for obvious reasons is not made public. Foreign military consumption in any one year, however, is approximately represented by the difference between the total production of petroleum and related fuels and the "partial total" consumption above noted, after adding any decrease, or subtracting any increase in stocks in the United States. Fig. 1 illustrates this "difference" and shows that in 1937 and 1938, owing to the wars in China and Spain and the possibility of armed conflict in Central Europe, foreign military consumption—and possibly additions to foreign stocks—increased nearly 70,000,000 bbl. in 1937 over 1936 and remained at this high rate throughout 1938. No official information on foreign oil stocks is available to the writers. Table 1, recently published, purports to give the oil in storage in some of the European countries, but it is not known whether the figures include oil stocks for military purposes. It should be noted that with the annexation by Germany of Austria and part of Czechoslovakia the consumption of the country has increased to 53,000,000 bbl., which is about 36,000,000 short of the German produc-

Jan 1, 1939

By V. R. Garfias, R. V. Whetsel, J. W. Ristori

World consumption of petroleum and related fuels for civil purposes in 1939 was close to 2,024,000,000 bbl., or approximately 110,000,000 bbl. more than in 1938, the United States accounting for 96,000,000 bbl. of the increased amount. With the annexation of Czechoslovakia and part of Poland, civil consurnption in Germany during 1939, notwithstanding sevre rationing in the last four months of the year, was 54,000,000 bbl., or only 1,600,000 bbl. less than in 1938, and domestic production of pctroleum and related fuels was some 34,000,000 bbl. short of civil consumption. The mounting petroleum requirements of the military forces of greater Germany are, of course, not included in these figures of civil consumption. To supply this deficiency Germany now must rely almost exclusively on the Rumanian fields, which in 1939 produced about 35,000,000 bbl in ewes, of the Rumanian civil consumption. However, these fields arc supplying and have supplied for years the oil requirements of the neighboring

Jan 1, 1940

By J. W. Ristori, R. V. Whetsel, V. R. Garfias

World consumption of petroleum and related fuels for civil purposes in 1939 was close to 2,024,000,000 bbl., or approximately 110,000,000 bbl. more than in 1938, the United States accounting for 96,000,000 bbl. of the increased amount. With the annexation of Czechoslovakia and part of Poland, civil consurnption in Germany during 1939, notwithstanding sevre rationing in the last four months of the year, was 54,000,000 bbl., or only 1,600,000 bbl. less than in 1938, and domestic production of pctroleum and related fuels was some 34,000,000 bbl. short of civil consumption. The mounting petroleum requirements of the military forces of greater Germany are, of course, not included in these figures of civil consumption. To supply this deficiency Germany now must rely almost exclusively on the Rumanian fields, which in 1939 produced about 35,000,000 bbl in ewes, of the Rumanian civil consumption. However, these fields arc supplying and have supplied for years the oil requirements of the neighboring

Jan 1, 1940

By R. V. Whetsel, V. R. Garfias

It is estimated that during 1936 world consumption of petroleum, its products and related fuels reached an all-time peak of 1,757,778,000 bbl., an increase of 143,000,000 bbl. over 1935. As indicated in Table 1, world output of petroleum and related fuels exceeded demand by 92,510,000 bbl. during the year, as compared to an excess output of 88,000,000 bbl. during 1935. Production within the United States exceeded domestic demand by approximately 51,000,-000 bbl. in 1936, as compared to an excess output of 53,000,000 bbl. in the previous year. Outside the United States, production exceeded demand by 41,510,000 bbl. in 1936 and by 35,000,000 bbl. in 1935, indicating that foreign output is making no progress toward curtailment in line with demand. Table 1 also combines excess production in the United States with the favorable balance of exports over imports, showing that stocks in the United States were reduced by 23,400,000 bbl. in 1936, as compared to 22,447,000 bbl. in the previous year. In the rest of the world, excess output over demand combined with the excess of imports over exports from the United States indicates an unfavorable balance of approximately

Jan 1, 1937

By Ernest R. Lilley

THOSE acquainted with the fundamental differences between the, educational .systems of Great Britain and. the United States would hardly expect .the training of men for the petroleum industry to proceed along the same lines- in the two countries. The youth entering an English university is, except in the case of-the student from some of the British colonies or from foreign countries, almost invariably a product of the English "public school." This is in no sense comparable .with the American public school. It is a private institution, frequently of considerable age and heavily endowed. In many aspects it seems to be comparable with the American preparatory school. Yet to some extent its activities remind one of the first years of the undergraduate: course in the American college. Certainly it takes to-itself many of the social, functions of the American college.

Jan 1, 1931

By AIME AIME

ON March 14, the University of Tulsa was accepted as a member of the North Central Association of Colleges, which ranks Tulsa among the leading universities of the country. A. G. OIiphant recently donated to the new school of petroleum engineering a splendid collection of books on geology, valued at $25,000. Waite Phillips, an oil producer and chairman of directors of The Independent Oil & Gas Co., donated $150,000 for a petroleum engineering building

Jan 1, 1929