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By Patzen Wu, Chao-Ming Tsai, Shaw-Chii Wu, Yuan Lin

INTRODUCTION The development of nuclear industry in Taiwan requires an increasing supply of uranium. Uranium recovery from phosphate ores, becomes an important item of the R & D programs. Many countries have already started such a program. USA has set up an industrial-scale production plant; South Africa, Israel, Morocco and other countries have also engaged in the development of extraction technology of uranium from phosphate ores and started setting up the production plant. In Taiwan, a feasibility study of establishing the production plant was started in 1977. A pilot plant was completed, tested, and operated in 1979. The main source material. - phosphate ores is obtained from China Phosphate Company. The annual yield of the pilot plant has been planned to be one ton of ammonium diuranate (ADU). The Health Physics Division of Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER), Atomic Energy Council of Republic of China (ROC AEC), is responsible for the radiation safety control of the plant. The purpose of the radiation safety control is to collect radiation safety information of the plant of this type, to evaluate possible radiation hazards to the personnel, and to analyze the radiation safety of the immediate environment adjacent to the plant. Furthermore, the information and experience obtained are used as the basis for applying radiation safety control to the production plant. The main emphases of the radiation safety control are therefore the arrangement of radiation safety control areas and the collection and evaluation of the health physics data. This report includes the past one and half years' experiences of the radiation safety control of the pilot plant, the planning of the production plant with an annual yield of 10 ton ADU, and considerations given in improving the radiation safety control of the production plant. PILOT PLANT AND ITS OPERATION PROCESS The pilot plant occupies an area of 350 m2 and is a two-story rectangular building. Exits are provided by a front and a rear door. An additional small door at the central right side of the building is connected to the maintenance area located outside the main building. The interior of the building is divided into interconnected offices, laboratories and process area (Figs. 1 and 2). A stairway to the process area of the second floor is located in the central part of the first floor. The second floor offices are accessible by the additional front and rear stairways. The main process area of the first floor is furnished with plastic floor, and the second floor with poriferous iron-grid floor. The building is not furnished with centralized air-conditioning system. Individual air conditioners are, however, available to some laboratories. Because the back door of the building is frequently open, the product storage room is provided with a blower to maintain good ventilation. Natural uranium contents of phosphoric acid solution vary in the range from 0.07 to 0.11 kg/m3. The process consists mainly of the uranium concentration cycle and the purification cycle. A flow diagram of the process is shown in Fig. 3. CONSIDERATIONS GIVEN FOR RADIATION SAFETY CONTROL AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RADIATION CONTROLLED AREAS The radiation safety control of the pilot plant is carried out on the basis of the considerations listed below:1,2 1) Since the wet process is adopted, and the flow of the radioactive material is confined to closed pipes and containers, air contamination is therefore not too much of concern. 2) The concentrations of radioactive material of the whole process are mostly less than 10 ppm. An exception is the final ADU product after precipitation and centrifugal separation, which contains up to 50% natural uranium. It is therefore necessary to apply radiation safety control to the process area where

Jan 1, 1981

By R. F. Errington

"Radioactive minerals are found together with the more familiar ore minerals in veins, gossans, and pegmatites, Since they have a peculiar property, that of giving off penetrating radiation, the simplest means of field detection is by the use of some radiation detector.The two principal radioactive elements one may encounter are uranium and thorium. These may occur separately or together. At present there is very little demand for thorium and hence radioactive occurrences should be examined with some care to determine which element is present. To do this it may be necessary to have a chemical analysis made of samples from the occurrence. Uranium minerals that do not carry appreciable thorium have a conventional occurrence in quartz or carbonate veins. They are distinctive in appearance. Pitchblende, the principal ore, is hard, black, and very heavy. It weathers readily to soft, powdery minerals •brilliantly coloured orange, yellow, and sometimes green. It may be associated with familiar minerals such _as native silver, nickel-cobalt sulphides and arsenides, chalcopyrite, and hematite.It is the purpose of this paper to review very briefly the types of radiation detectors available .and to draw some general conclusions as to the types most suitable for particular applications.The highly penetrating gamma radiation is the most useful for detection of radioactive mineralization. The alpha rays have little or no penetration, and beta rays are stopped by thicknesses of a millimeter or so of material. We shall confine our remarks principally to those instruments intended to detect gamma radiation. These are of three types."

Jan 1, 1950

By L. Max Scott

[INTRODUCTION] The significance of gamma exposure to uranium miners has been recognized only in the last few years. Most ore deposits which have been underground mined, were 1% or less U308. Full-time mining of this grade ore can result in exposure exceeding 1 Rem per year. Several companies in Saskatchewan are planning to mine recently discovered ore bodies which contain ore pods in excess of 10% U308. The purpose of this paper is to present dose data which can be used to estimate gamma exposure from high-grade ore deposits, and to present mining techniques which will minimize miner exposure. [Dose Estimates] When one has a point source of radiation, the conventional laws of isotropic emission and the fall of dose with square of the distance, make dose calculations relatively easy. However, if one has an area source of infinite thickness, the assumption must be made that a uniform gamma flux is being emitted from all faces of the source (Figure 1). Dose from gamma emission would fall off only due to air attenuation up to such a distance at which the source can be considered to be a point source (usually 10 times the largest dimension of the source). For short distances, such as to the cab of ore-moving equipment, the dose reduction would be negligible. Assumptions: 1) Radium and gamma-emitting daughters are in secular equilibrium with uranium. 2) All gamma radiation is emitted from radium and its daughters. 3) Average gamma energy of 0.8 MeV. 4) Uranium ore has a linear attenuation coefficient of 0.212 cm-1, similar to that of Si02(sand). 5) Uranium ore density of 3.0 gm/cm3. 6) One curie of radium emits 6.84 x 1010 photon/sec(l). 7) One percent uranium ore contains 1 x 10-8 Ci/cm3 of radium. 8) Each MeV of 0.8 MeV photon results in a dose of 2.10[ ]10-3 mRem/hr. per MeV/cm2 -sec. 1) 9) Minimum ore depth 100 cm. 10) Linear attenuation coefficient instant for radium gamma of 0.374 cm -1 [ ] The photon flux from a radioactive slab is computed as follows: [Flux = photon/cm3 3(1) 2u S] [where, us is the linear absorption coefficient of s the source (uranium ore).] Thus, 1% uranium ore, in the form of an infinite slab, emits 1613 photon/cm2-sec, which results in a dose rate of 2.71 mRem/hr. Since the dose from an infinite slab is the same as a dose from an infinite radius right circular cylinder, the only correction needed from the above dose rate is for finite radius and point of dose above the end of the cylinder (Figure 2) [Dose = mRem/hr. {E2(bl) - E2(b3) - [(E2(b1sec[E] -E2(b3sec[E]]cos[O](1)]

Jan 1, 1981

By Toussaint LF

A brief history of the mineral sands industry is given from a radiation protection standpoint, with gamma radiation and inhalation of radioactive dust being identified as the main sources of radiation exposure of persons working in the plants. The principal sources of gamma radiation exposure are identified and the history of early bagging methods is discussed. The concept of ALARA is introduced and the impact of the "bulka bags" (and more effective monazite storage facilities) are detailed as illustrative examples of dose minimization, together with the requirements for the transport of monazite. The dose from radiation received from inhaled dust is dependent on a number of parameters of the dust, some of which are not well known. ICRP 30 (1978) makes recommendations relating to the intake of radionuclides by workers. These recommendations are discussed with respect to the inhalation of dust containing thorium. The possible pathways of radioactive material throughout the body are also described. The effect of having parameters that differ from ICRP 30 is discussed and suggestions are made relating to measurements that can be carried out to more accurately determine these parameters. Since in some instances the exposures to dust yield personal doses which may exceed the annual ICRP 30 based limits, it is necessary to define more accurately parameters of the dust so as to determine more accurately personal Doses.

Jan 1, 1986

By Ademar B. Lugão, Sandra R. Scagliusi, Elizabeth C. L. Cardoso

When butyl rubbers are subjected to high energy radiation, they form easy free radicals that initiate various chemical reactions. These reactions alter the molecular distribution of irradiated rubbers by crosslinking or scission affect their physical and mechanical properties. This work aims to the analysis of effect induced by γ-exposure on the crosslinking density in butyl rubbers by swelling measurements accomplished before and after irradiation at 25, 50, 100 and 200 kGy, with further evaluation of crosslinking density accomplished by Flory-Rehner equation; this is a proper procedure for the qualification of radiation resistance. It can be noticed that changes in material structure was due to build-up of new three-dimensional network in studied rubbers. Changes in crosslinking density of butyl rubber compounds emphasize that degradation mechanism is strongly influenced by gamma-radiation doses higher than 50 kGy, since chain scission process predominates over crosslinking reaction.

Mar 1, 2017

By Kathleen Kreiss, A. James Ruttenber

INTRODUCTION Early in the morning of July 16, 1979, there was a breach in the earthen retaining dam of a tailings pond at the United Nuclear Corporation's (UNC's) Church Rock uranium mill. The acidified liquid and tailings slurry spilled through the damaged portion of the retaining wall into an arroyo that is a tributary to the Rio Puerco river system. The Rio Puerco runs through Gallup, New Mexico, and eventually crosses the New Mexico-Arizona border (Fig. 1). On its way to Gallup, the Rio Puerco and its tributaries pass through land with a checkerboard pattern of ownership, with portions owned or leased by the Navajos, individuals, the Bureau of Land Management, and the State. In terms of tailings liquid volume (3.6 x 108L; 94 million gal), the UNC spill ranks as one of the largest. The mass of solids released in the slurry (10.0 x 105 kg; 1 100 tons) appears to be close to the median for accidents of this kind, however [U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 1979]. The UNC first opened its Church Rock uranium mill in 1977 on land adjacent to acreage belonging to the Navajo tribe. The mill, which is next to the UNC Church Rock mine, is located approximately 16 km (10 miles) northeast of Gallup, New Mexico (Fig. 1). Gallup, a town of 18 000 people, is the closest population center. The region surrounding the plant site is sparsely populated by Navajos, at a density of approximately 5.8 persons/km2 (15 persons/sq mile). The UNC mill and mines employ approximately 650 persons, and the adjacent Kerr-McGee uranium mine employs about 300. The UNC mill normally processes 3.2 x 106kg/day (3 500 tons/day) of uranium ore, depositing the acidified tailings slurry in a series of three earthen holding ponds. The tailings ponds are located east of the pipeline arroyo that feeds into the Rio Puerco approximately 2.4 km (1.5 miles) from the southernmost tailings dam. The liquid portion of the tailings slurry evaporates in the ponds; hence, under normal conditions, there is no surface flow from the holding ponds to the arroyo. Both runoff from the plant site after heavy rains and possible seepage from the tailings ponds may deliver radionuclides to the arroyo-river system, however. The dam across the southernmost tailings pond was considered to be in keeping with the state of the art. However, the New Mexico Environmental Improvement Division (NMEID) had warned UNC about dangers of locating the pond over a heterogeneous geological formation. The state Engineer's Office approved of the site only after UNC agreed to strict design criteria. Others have pointed to dangers of constructing earthen dams for impoundment of uranium mill tailings (Carter, 1978). Causes of the dam break were multiple: the UNC mill filled the tailings pond to a level that exceeded permit criteria; the tailings pond was lined improperly; the dam was constructed using clay that was compacted excessively, resulting in cracking and subsequent seepage; and the unstable substrate beneath the dam permitted differential settling. The UNC Church Rock mine has continuously released dewatering effluent into the pipeline arroyo at a rate of 88.3 L/sec (1 400 gal/min) since 1968. Before 1975 this effluent was not treated; after 1975 it received precipitation treatment for removal of Ra-226. Radionuclides are also released into the river system through the dewatering of the Kerr-McGee uranium mine 1.6 km (1.0 mile) north of the UNC mill. During usual mining operations, approximately 227 L/sec (3 600 gal/min) are released into the pipeline arroyo and subsequently into the Rio Puerco. The Kerr-McGee mine began continuous release of dewatering effluent in January 1972. In 1974 Kerr-McGee began Ra-226 precipitation treatment of its dewatering releases, but NMEID data indicate that treatment has often been incomplete. The effluent from both mines has been responsible for transforming the downstream portion of the Rio Puerco from a sporadically dry riverbed into a continuously flowing stream and has contributed to the current levels of background radiation along the river system (Table 1). This paper will summarize the postspill monitoring efforts and relate the assessment of this spill to the general question of evaluating the health effects of nuclear fuel-cycle wastes. The data pertaining to the measurement of radionuclides in the Church Rock environment and the radionuclide concentrations in animals will appear in forthcoming reports. CHURCH ROCK HEALTH EFFECTS ASSESSMENT APPROACH The initial health effects evaluation involved identifying the radionuclides that were released into the river system from the tailings pond. Table 1 lists the State of New Mexico maximum permissible radionuclide concentrations for liquids released to unrestricted areas, the typical tailings liquid concentrations, and postspill river water concentrations. The tailings liquid contained comparatively high levels of Th-230, Ra-226, Pb-210, and Po-210--all of which, according to postspill river water samples, had exceeded the state maximum permissible concentrations (MPC) at one time or another. After the radionuclides in the tailings were identified, pathways through which humans could be exposed were clarified. Environmental monitoring data were then used to quantify the important pathways of human exposure. Water samples were collected from the river, from test wells dug near

Jan 1, 1981

By H. T. Miller, L. M. Scott

Radiation exposures in Uranium operations may result from external beta-gamma radiation emitted by Uranium and its progeny, internal exposure to alpha and beta radiation due to the inhalation and ingestion of Uranium ores, Radon gas, and Radon progeny in mine, mill, and laboratory atmospheres and from the contamination of environmental working surfaces and clothing by Uranium-bearing compounds and ore. This paper summarizes occupational experience with reference to the exploration, surface mining, underground mining, milling and transport of Uranium by one company in the U.S. and Canada.

Jan 1, 1981

By G. Shore

Radiation grafted structures my be fabricated to contain ion exchange groups selective to an ion complex. Proper choice of substrate and monomer will provide selective ion exchange with differing physico and chemical properties. Grafting a selected monomer to the proper polymer will provide selective ion exchange with assured chemical protection of the substrate. Ion exchange systems utilizing radiation grafted structures have been fabricated to ''capture'' gold, silver and palladium from dilute solutions. Other ion exchange systems can feasibly be produced to remove other precious metals. Rotating Cathode Technology is used to recover the metals from their regenerating solutions are pure metal foil.

Jan 1, 1985

By K. D. Weverstad, J. E. Cleveland, J. C. Franklin, J. W. Black

A mined-out stope being backfilled with classified mill tailings was continuously monitored, both upstream and downstream, to determine the radon concentration associated with the mill tailings. The radon monitoring was done before, during, and after the backfill operation. Data taken during weekends when no mining activities were influencing the radon concentration showed a 90 percent reduction in radon discharge from the stope after being backfilled. Water used to mix with the classified sands showed an increase in the heavy metals concentration immediately after seeping from the inplace sand. However, the water used in backfilling is less than ½ of 1 percent of total mine water discharged. The change in contamination is not measurable at the pumping station.

Jan 1, 1982

By Bruce C. Smart

"Very little attention was given to the regulation of uranium mills by the Atomic Energy Control Board prior to 1974. The ore grade treated by Canadian mills in the past was in the order of 0.08 - 0.3% U and it was not difficult to keep the exposure of workers well below regulatory limits. Furthermore, uranium milling has also been substantially free of occupational illness because environmental control has been generally satisfactory (l).The discovery of higher grade ore bodies in Canada has resulted in higher radiation levels in one mill and this has partly contributed to a need for increased radiation monitoring in the mill. In addition, as greater insight is gained on the effects of radiation, the implementation of the ALARA principle is being stressed at all mills.The concept of ALARA was emphasized by the ICRP (International Committee for Radiological Protection) in 1977 and stands for '""as low as reasonably achievable'"". It is based on the premise that no proven threshold for potential effects of radiation exists and that the actual individual exposure should therefore be kept as far below the regulatory limit as possible, economic and social factors being taken into account."

Jan 1, 1982

By R. W. Thompkins

"PREFACEThis paper will be published in three parts. Part 1, in this issue, will cover the occurrence of uranium, radiation from uranium ores, the uranium series, radioactive theory, radioactive equilibrium and application to the radon series, the working level, the theory of emanation and diffusion, transport by thermal diffusion of radon emanating from porous rocks, and definitions.Part 2, to appear in the October issue, will deal with radiation theory applied to uranium ores, other radon migration factors , fact ors affecting the radon gas release rate, measurement of radon gas emanation rates, the tunnel concept, variation of emanation rate with grade, and estimating radioactivity from grade analysis.The series will conclude with Part 3, in the November issue, which will discuss the techniques for controlling radiation and give some example calculations.1.0. Occurrence of Uranium1.0.1. Uranium is widely distributed in nature. Sedimentary rocks contain less than igneous or metamorphic rock s and as the outer 10 miles of the earth's crust is composed of 95 per cent igneous and 5 per cent sedimentary rock, it has been estimated that about 1.3 x 1014 tons of uranium exist in the earth's crust.1.0.2. It is not surprising, therefore, that radiation has existed naturally in the ear h ever since the beginning of time. It is found in such places as:(1) non-uranium mines;(2) houses not close to or connected to uranium mines;(3) ground-water tables supplying drinking water to large populations.1.0.3. All mines do not necessarily have abnormal radiation in them, but it is possible for many mines to have abnormal levels of radiation. Therefore, all underground mining operations should be tested for radiation."

Jan 1, 1982

By R. W. Thompkins

"PREFACEPart 1 of this paper, published in the September issue, covered the occurrence of uranium, radiation from uranium ores, the uranium series, radioactive theory, radioactive equilibrium and application to the radon series, the working level, the theory of emanation and diffusion, transport by thermal diffusion of radon emanating from porous rocks, and definitions.The October issue carried Part 2, which dealt with radiation theory applied to uranium ores, other radon migration factors, factors affecting the radon gas release rate, the measurement of radon gas emanation rates, the tunnel concept, variation of emanation rate with grade and estimating radioactivity from grade analysis.Part 3, in this issue, concludes the series by discussing the techniques for controlling radiation and providing some example calculations.17.0. Techniques for Controlling Radiation17.1. Altering the Factors In the Diffusion EquationIt has been noted that radon gas emanates from the surfaces of exposed ore to the mine atmosphere. The diffusion laws establish the rate of this flow. The fundamental relationship is that the rate of flow (J) is a function of the pore concentration and the distance from the surface. It is expressed as: []If any of these terms is varied, either naturally or artificially, the rate of gas emanation will be altered.Altering the Diffusion CoefficientThe literature describes many ways to lower the radon gas emanation rates which are dependent on changing the diffusion coefficient:1. A layer of ice on top of a tailings dam or on a soil.2. Humid clayey materials and swamped soils over a radon source."

Jan 1, 1982

By R. W. Thompkins

"PREFACEPart 1 of this paper, published in the September issue, covered the occurrence of uranium, radiation from uranium ores, the uranium series, radioactive theory, radioactive equilibrium and application to the radon series, the working level, the theory of emanation and diffusion, transport by thermal diffusion of radon emanating from porous rocks, and definitions.This Part 2, which follows, deals with radiation theory applied to uranium ores, other radon migration factors, factors affecting the radon gas release rate, the measurement of radon gas emanation rates, the tunnel concept, variation of emanation rate with grade and estimating radioactivity from grade analysis.The series will conclude with Part 3, in the November issue, which will discuss the techniques for controlling radiation and provide some example calculations.10.0. Radiation Theory Applied to Uranium Ores10.0.1. The processes of diffusion transport of radon gas, through rock from the fundamental physics is a function o f the radon gas concentration in the interstitial pore spaces and the distance from the surface. Expressed by Fick's first law of diffusion, it is expressed: [ ]10.0.2. The maximum concentration is a function of the emanating power (ß), thus the above equation may be expressed: [ ]10.1. The Effect of Porosity10.1.1. If a constant emanating power is assumed (ß), a family of curves can be obtained for concentrations at varying distances and rock porosities. The curves as originally plotted assumed a constant emanating power of 5 x 10-4 pico curies/litre/sec and show the maximum expected concentrations in the pores in pico curies per litre. Because these concentrations are proportioned to the emanating power, this set of curves can be structured to show the fraction of maximum concentrations possible at various porosities of the rock.10.1.2. Notice that at 10, 20 and 30% porosities a 5-cm sample (hand-sized and drill-sized pieces) has no practical increase in pore concentration. Thus, by measuring the emanating power of hand-sized pieces of ore, the actual radon gas production into any pile of broken ore could be estimated readily."

Jan 1, 1982

By E. Viet Howard

During the recent expansion of precipitate copper production at the Chino Mines Division of Kennecott Copper Corporation, Santa Rita, New Mexico, local studies of the dump leaching process were intensified. As these studies progressed it became apparent that a reliable method for locating leach solutions within the dump was required, since the contact between leach solutions and the copper-bearing material would determine, in great part, the recovery of values. In the past, the problem of determining leach solution contact has been attacked by various methods, including destructive testing (dump dissection), indirect observation (such as chloride or dye tracers), and mathematical or laboratory model studies. These methods have not proved completely satisfactory for the studies now being developed. Investigation of methods for in situ observation of leach solutions led to consideration of radiation logging in drill holes, which are petro¬leum exploration and development techniques for locating fluids and measuring porosity in the subsurface. Standard oil field logging equipment was leased, modified, and tested. After successful testing, the equipment was purchased for additional studies. Applications and results of the methods are described in this paper.

Jan 1, 1968

By Thomas B. Borak, Keith J. Schiager, Janet A. Johnson

OBJECTIVES OF RADIATION MONITORING Monitoring is a tool used in the practice of radiation protection. The primary reasons for monitoring are to reduce radiation exposures to levels that are as low as reasonably achievable and to assure that no individual receives a dose exceeding the maximum individual dose limit. The documentation of radiation doses for legal, medical, or epidemiological reasons is a subordinate function of any monitoring program. The investment in radiation monitoring programs should be guided by four criteria: (1) the detection and avoidance of unnecessary exposures, (2) the magnitude of potential health risks, (3) the determination of combined doses and risks with adequate confidence, and (4) the verification of compliance with established limits. FIRST CRITERION: DOSE REDUCTION - DETECT AND CORRECT UNNECESSARY EXPOSURES The system of dose limitation advocated by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP, 1977), and subscribed to in a broad sense by various regulatory agencies, is comprised of three essential ingredients: (1) [justification] of any practice that produces radiation doses by some commensurate net benefit, (2) [optimization] of radiation control measures by reducing doses to levels that are as low as reasonably achievable, and (3) [limitation] of individual doses to preclude inequities and [moldistribution] of risks. All too often, only the third criterion - the limitation of individual doses to prescribed regulatory limits - is explicitly addressed in everyday radiation protection programs. The emphasis of most exposure control and monitoring efforts appears to be directed toward limiting and documenting individual doses that might approach the legal limit. The first two criteria, i.e. justification and optimization, should contribute to a rationale for allocating monitoring efforts. When applied to individuals, these criteria mean the detection and elimination of unnecessary exposures. This should be a high priority of any monitoring program. Measurements should be directed toward detecting inoperative or ineffective control measures, whether or not there is a risk of exceeding the individual dose limits. The ICRP recommends a procedure that can be used effectively to reduce unnecessary exposures. A n investigation level should be established at an exposure rate substantially lower than the regulatory limit, e.g. 30% of the limit (ICRP 26, 1977, p.33). Measurements obtained during routine monitoring that exceed the investigation level are evaluated with respect to cause and potential reduction. To be effective, the evaluation results should be formally recorded and conveyed both to management and to the workers involved. Although the investigation level recommended by the ICRP is based on a fixed exposure rate or derived air concentration, an equally effective evaluation program may be based on the investigation of a percentage of all measurements. For example, one might investigate the highest 5% or a random selection of all measurements. In any case, the objective is to detect and correct situations that are producing unnecessary exposures. SECOND CRITERION: MONITOR IN PROPORTION TO THE MAGNITUDE OF RISK The ICRP criteria apply generally to all radiation exposures. However, a second priority for monitoring programs should be established on the basis of the nature of the exposures and the magnitude of the health risks involved. Current practices in radiation protection are based on dose limits to specific organs and assessment of individual exposure pathways, with little consideration of the combined doses from various pathways. Although the intent of the ICRP recommendations was to limit the total dose to each critical organ, combined doses from external and internal sources are rarely determined. The recent recommendations of the ICRP (Publ. 26, 1977) are based on the limitation of total health risk from occupational radiation exposures. Implementation of this concept would necessarily require the measurement, calculation and summation of doses and concomitant risks to all organs of the body from all exposure pathways. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has taken the first step toward translating the ICRP recommendations into regulations. The proposed recommendations for Federal Radiation Protection Guidance for Occupational Exposures (USEPA, 1981) include provisions for summing the risk-weighted organ doses to determine compliance with an effective whole-body dose equivalent limit. Whether or not the proposed guidance is modified before final adoption, it seems clear that some version of dose summation and combined risk limitation will be included in future regulations. With this

Jan 1, 1981

By Trent Hamilton

Cameco ? McArthur River Operation is a high-grade uranium mine in northern Saskatchewan. Average grades mined are nearly 20%, more than 20 times higher than other operating uranium mines in the world. The significant risks involved with mining this grade has been effectively mitigated using innovative and unique controls, implemented from development and production mining through to ore processing. The types and sources of radiation are presented and protection measures are discussed. McArthur River?s strong radiation culture is evidenced by continually low radiation exposures while transitioning to new mining zones.

Aug 1, 2010

By Hans Ehdwall

INTRODUCTION Investigations of radon and radon daughter concentrations in Swedish [non-uranium] mines started in the late 1960's. The first screening measurements showed that the average annual exposure to radon and radon daughter products was 4.7 WLM. The main reason for high radon and radon daughter concentrations was inefficient ventilation and radonrich water entering the mine. In the radon regulations worked out later it was stated that no miner should be exposed to more than 60 000 pCi h/1 equilibrium equivalent concentration of radon annual exposure, corresponding to 3.6 WLM. Now, 1981 the situation has changed considerably. From the average annual exposure of 4.7 WLM in 1970 it is now only 0.7 WLM. Sweden has up to now had only one [uranium] mine and the work there has only been investigative. However, there are plans for a commercial uranium mine in another part of Sweden. The radon problems in these mines are widely different depending on the mineralogy. NON-URANIUM MINES The radiation problems in Swedish mines were not recognised until the late 60's. The first radon and radon daughter measurements were made in some sulphide ore mines in 1967 (1). The radon and radon daughter concentrations were surprisingly high for non-uranium mines. In order to have a complete picture of the radon situation in Swedish mines the National Institute of Radiation Protection (NIRP) decided to make measurements in all, at that time about 60 mines (2). To get results as fast as possible measurements on radon gas seemed most appropriate to start with. Sampling was made by mailing a number of evacuated 4.8 litre conventional propane containers from NIRP to each mine. The containers were then opened at the place of interest. After sampling the containers were sealed and then mailed back to the institute for measurement. The measurements were made in ionization chambers. This method only gave the radon concentration and the radon daughter concentration was estimated by multiplying the radon concentration by an assumed equilibrium factor. The equilibrium factor is defined as the ratio of the total potential alpha energy for the given daughter concentration to the total potential alpha energy of the daughters if they are in equilibrium with the given radon concentration. The results of this first preliminary survey indicated that a great many of the Swedish miners probably had an annual radon daughter exposure of more than 3.6 WLM. As the radiation exposure in non-uranium mines was not regulated in either the Swedish Radiation Protection Act or the Swedish Labour Protection Act work was started on special radon regulations. A lung cancer mortality study was also started. To check the results of the first survey and to get experience and knowledge of radon problems in mines, it was decided that personnel from the NIRP should visit each mine for a detailed investigation of radon and radon daughter concentrations starting with the ones with the highest radon concentrations. The main reasons for these so-called "basic measurements" were: 1. To estimate the doses received by Swedish miners 2. To find the sources of the high radon and radon daughter concentrations 3. To find appropriate counter-measures 4. To determine the most typical equilibrium factor for each mine. Unlike most uranium mines the reason for high radon concentrations in non-uranium mines is seldom the occurrence of highly radioactive minerals. The main sources were found to be waste-rock and radon-rich water. In order to filter and warm up the inlet air, especially in winter time, it was very common at that time to suck the air through broken wasterock. By doing so the air was contaminated with radon from the waste-rock and radon-rich water in it. It is noteworthy that the radium and uranium concentration in the waste-rock is relatively low. The uranium concentration is only of the order of 15 - 20 ppm. The action to prevent this contamination of the inlet air was to change the direction of the ventilation and in the case of radon-rich water entering the mine the action was to prevent the air coming into contact with the water. The first calculation of the radon daughter exposure of Swedish miners was based on radon gas measurements. The radon daughter concentration was estimated by using an assumed equilibrium factor of 0.5. Later when the mines were visited by institute staff it was possible to compare the assumed equilibrium factor with the measured ones. It was found that the factor varied from 0.15 at the air inlet to 1.0 at the air outlet and the average equilibrium factor on workplaces for almost all mines was between 0.4 and 0.6. The result of the exposure calculation in 1970 showed that more than 40 % of the miners had an annual radon daughter exposure of more than 3.6 WLM. The overall average was 4.7 WLM and the maximum annual expo-

Jan 1, 1981

By L. H. Munson, E. H. Carbaugh, D. E. Hadlock, L. F. Munson, R. L. Gilchrist

As a result of the Three Mile Accident and because of evidence indicating radiation protection problems, the U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) undertook a major effort, with the assistance of the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL), to analyze radiation protection programs at 47 commercially operated nuclear power plants. This effort, the health physics appraisal program (HPAP), using a modified management oversite and risk tree analytical logic methodology (MORT) which consisted of analytical trees with applicable questions for each tree, was subsequently extended to include USNRC licensed uranium mills. In the uranium mill appraisal, a team of four senior radiation safety professionals spent a week at each mill evaluating the total health physics program. Prior to the HPAP, the USNRC inspection efforts were designed to determine if the licensees were fulfilling the requirements of the code of federal regulations and the mills source material license. The HPAP, however, was designed and structured to facilitate an integrated look at the total program. It is also directed into areas for which explicit NRC regulatory requirements may not currently exist. The latitude of the HPAP was designed to allow professional judgement in the evaluation of program adequacy, because merely meeting the explicit regulatory requirements does not necessarily ensure an adequate and effective health physics program. The results of the first eight site visits and the generic health physics problems identified within the uranium milling industry will be identified in this paper.

Jan 1, 1981

By R W. Thomas

"This paper explores the possibilities of generating radical improvements in the drihing costs andproductivity of blastholes through the efforts of integrated teams as opposed to traditionalcustomer/vendor relationships."

Jan 1, 1996

By R W. Thomas

This paper explores the possibilities of generating radical improvements in the drilling costs and productivity of blastholes through the efforts of integrated teams as opposed to traditional customer/vendor relationships.

Jan 1, 1996