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By Emby Kaye

It is the purpose of this paper to outline briefly some of the considerations that enter into the economics of so-called recycling, the generic designation of the relatively recently developed process by which a condensate† is separated from gas-distillate gas at high pressure and the residual gas returned to the reservoir. This subject necessarily embraces not only a discussion of factors that should be considered in projecting a recycling operation, such as estimating reserves, investment and operating costs, but also a comparison of condensate with other types of petroleum. The place of condensate in its relation to the total supply of crude oil is pointed out as well as certain logical methods of product disposal. The cost of drilling wells and lease maintenance is not pertinent to this discussion because income and revenue are in this paper confined to that retained by the plant or plant operator for supplying processing facilities for the gas. Before the development of recycling a great many gas-distillate gas fields in Louisiana and Texas provided no income to their owners. When gas was sold from these reservoirs it was accompanied by irretrievable losses of condensate in the formation. The understanding of the func- tion of retrograde condensation resulted in the introduction of a new commercial petroleum recovery process for these hitherto unexploited fields and now permits the conditioning of this type of wet gas field for the sale of dry gas therefrom without waste. Some Economic Factors The study of a gas-distillate field for possible exploitation necessarily involves the critical appraisal of a number of elements, chief of which will be discussed here: (I) estimate of distillate in place, (2) estimate of distillate that can be brought to the surface, (3) available market, (4) costs. The considerations affecting the estimating of distillate reserves in place are in the main subject to the same errors as are involved in determining dry gas reserves. Determinable data including acreage, sand thickness, reservoir pressure, reservoir temperature, porosity and connate water provide the basis for calculating the volume of gas in place. Ample allowance must be made for connate water, which may occupy from 20 to 35 per cent of the pore space of the sand. The factor of supercom-pressibility is to a considerable extent nullified by the reservoir temperature. It has been considered well advised to allow this factor to serve as a cushion. With the gas reserves calculated, it remains only to assay the distillate content of the gas. Those familiar with the handling of "wet" gas at high pressure readily appreci-ate the variables in sampling gas from

Jan 1, 1942

By Emby Kaye

It is the purpose of this paper to outline briefly some of the considerations that enter into the economics of so-called recycling, the generic designation of the relatively recently developed process by which a condensate† is separated from gas-distillate gas at high pressure and the residual gas returned to the reservoir. This subject necessarily embraces not only a discussion of factors that should be considered in projecting a recycling operation, such as estimating reserves, investment and operating costs, but also a comparison of condensate with other types of petroleum. The place of condensate in its relation to the total supply of crude oil is pointed out as well as certain logical methods of product disposal. The cost of drilling wells and lease maintenance is not pertinent to this discussion because income and revenue are in this paper confined to that retained by the plant or plant operator for supplying processing facilities for the gas. Before the development of recycling a great many gas-distillate gas fields in Louisiana and Texas provided no income to their owners. When gas was sold from these reservoirs it was accompanied by irretrievable losses of condensate in the formation. The understanding of the func- tion of retrograde condensation resulted in the introduction of a new commercial petroleum recovery process for these hitherto unexploited fields and now permits the conditioning of this type of wet gas field for the sale of dry gas therefrom without waste. Some Economic Factors The study of a gas-distillate field for possible exploitation necessarily involves the critical appraisal of a number of elements, chief of which will be discussed here: (I) estimate of distillate in place, (2) estimate of distillate that can be brought to the surface, (3) available market, (4) costs. The considerations affecting the estimating of distillate reserves in place are in the main subject to the same errors as are involved in determining dry gas reserves. Determinable data including acreage, sand thickness, reservoir pressure, reservoir temperature, porosity and connate water provide the basis for calculating the volume of gas in place. Ample allowance must be made for connate water, which may occupy from 20 to 35 per cent of the pore space of the sand. The factor of supercom-pressibility is to a considerable extent nullified by the reservoir temperature. It has been considered well advised to allow this factor to serve as a cushion. With the gas reserves calculated, it remains only to assay the distillate content of the gas. Those familiar with the handling of "wet" gas at high pressure readily appreci-ate the variables in sampling gas from

Jan 1, 1942

By Sidney A. Swensrud

The 24-in. crude-oil line. and- the 20-in. petroleum-products line, built as a war emergency by the United States Government and running from points in Texas to the New York-New Jersey-Philadelphia area, were constructed only because of the inability during the war to continue nor-inal ocean tanker movements from the Gulf Coast to the East Coast. The postwar disposition of these lines may be considered as one of the important problems of the postwar readjustments in the oil industry, if not the most important one. In the first place there appear to be many complications in keeping the lines in crude-oil or petroleum-products service. This conclusion was reached also in a study by T. E. Swigart, President of Shell Pipeline Corporation.' Since the lines are too largc for any one company to utilize, and since it appears likely that a surplus rather than a deficiency of tankers will exist after the war, most companies probably will feel that they can achieve lower costs and more satisfactoiy results from the resumption of tanker movements to the East Coast rather than by endeavoring to take over or utilize the capacity in the large pipe lines under some tariff-rate structure. As for using the lines for making deliveries to the middle west or central eastern areas, it would appear that when the war is over and normal transportation arrangements can be resumed, there will be no need of any extra capacity for such deliveries. Therefore, the War Emergency lines could be utilized for this purpose only if privately owned pipe lines and other transportation facilities were to be displaced. Against this rather unprepossessing prospect for use in petroleum or product service is the fact that at or near the source of the lines lie the greatest developed gas reserves in the world, for much of which there is at present no satisfactory market outlet; and at the other end of the lines lies one of the greatest concentrations of population in the world, which is not now served by natural gas. These who have been fortunate enough to use natural gas can have little doubt of its desirability as a domestic fuel. An analysis of the market potentialities and comparison with other areas where natural gas is being distributed, and where it has displaced manufactured gas, makes it seem clear beyond question that the full capacity of both of the large-diameter lines could be fully utilized in this service, and this without creating any undue drain upon the gas reserves of the nation. On the basis of an estimated capacity of roo to 120 billion cubic feet per year, the gas that might be marketed through these lines would amount to only 3 to 4 per cent of the total con-

Jan 1, 1944

By Sidney A. Swensrud

The 24-in. crude-oil line. and- the 20-in. petroleum-products line, built as a war emergency by the United States Government and running from points in Texas to the New York-New Jersey-Philadelphia area, were constructed only because of the inability during the war to continue nor-inal ocean tanker movements from the Gulf Coast to the East Coast. The postwar disposition of these lines may be considered as one of the important problems of the postwar readjustments in the oil industry, if not the most important one. In the first place there appear to be many complications in keeping the lines in crude-oil or petroleum-products service. This conclusion was reached also in a study by T. E. Swigart, President of Shell Pipeline Corporation.' Since the lines are too largc for any one company to utilize, and since it appears likely that a surplus rather than a deficiency of tankers will exist after the war, most companies probably will feel that they can achieve lower costs and more satisfactoiy results from the resumption of tanker movements to the East Coast rather than by endeavoring to take over or utilize the capacity in the large pipe lines under some tariff-rate structure. As for using the lines for making deliveries to the middle west or central eastern areas, it would appear that when the war is over and normal transportation arrangements can be resumed, there will be no need of any extra capacity for such deliveries. Therefore, the War Emergency lines could be utilized for this purpose only if privately owned pipe lines and other transportation facilities were to be displaced. Against this rather unprepossessing prospect for use in petroleum or product service is the fact that at or near the source of the lines lie the greatest developed gas reserves in the world, for much of which there is at present no satisfactory market outlet; and at the other end of the lines lies one of the greatest concentrations of population in the world, which is not now served by natural gas. These who have been fortunate enough to use natural gas can have little doubt of its desirability as a domestic fuel. An analysis of the market potentialities and comparison with other areas where natural gas is being distributed, and where it has displaced manufactured gas, makes it seem clear beyond question that the full capacity of both of the large-diameter lines could be fully utilized in this service, and this without creating any undue drain upon the gas reserves of the nation. On the basis of an estimated capacity of roo to 120 billion cubic feet per year, the gas that might be marketed through these lines would amount to only 3 to 4 per cent of the total con-

Jan 1, 1944

By J. Ehner Thomas, M. D. Gould

Until four years ago the market price of oil securities moved directly and immediately with the general list. This point, was first developed by the senior author in 1924 while making a statistical study of the relative movement of oil securities and the general market. Plotting the monthly averages of 17 oils against 233 industrials disclosed the sur- prising relationship shown in Fig. 1. The traditional vagaries of the oil business, the wide fluctuations in current supply and resulting abrupt changes in crude prices nevertheless produced no movements in the market price of oil securities as a group, which departed notably from the movements of the general market. Obviously general business conditions did not always change when and as conditions in the oil industry changed; clearly the fluctuations of

Jan 1, 1929

By Joseph Pogue

THE past year in the petroleum industry was one of overproduction, rising inventories, low prices, and meagre to vanishing profits. This outcome was the result of a long period of intensive and uncompensated effort on the part of both financial and industrial interests, to stimulate supply on the theory that the primary problem facing the petroleum industry was the development of an adequate reserve of raw material to protect a large and ever-growing investment. The stimulus was applied in various forms and through diverse channels: capital had, long flowed into the industry in excessive amounts under the attraction of large expected profits; the price level for crude petroleum had persistently been influenced -by speculative considerations, with the result that prices declined slowly in periods of flush production and were quick to advance in anticipation of statistical improvement, thus maintaining a superfluous degree of stimulus on wildcatting and on drilling; speculation in inventories had led to the unsound, or at least unusual, business practice of accumulating huge stocks of oil; and, above all, the industry had directed the potent force of technology to the expansion of supply and achieved radical results in accelerating oil discovery, speeding up the rate of oil extraction, and enlarging the recovery of gasoline and lubricating oils from the raw material. In short, the economic conditions of 1927 were exactly those to which the objectively driven enterprise of the petroleum industry had long been directed; and the undesirable financial consequences arising. therefrom reflected no lack of success in what had been set out to be achieved, but rather the failure to have established concurrently the necessary means of economic control to prevent the immediate conversion of reserves into current supply, and likewise the oversight in neglecting to apply the technological force to the enlargement and diversification of the market for petroleum products. Perhaps, when viewed in its longer perspective, 1927 will stand out as the turning point in the economic policy of the petroleum industry, when the technique of rationalizing production made its, initial claim for recognition.

Jan 1, 1928

By Joseph E. Pogue

The past year in the petroleum industry was one of overproduction, rising inventories, low prices, and meagre to vanishing profits. This outcome was the result of a long period of intensive and uncompensated effort on the part of both financial and industrial interests, to stimulate supply on the theory that the primary problem facing the petroleum industry was the development of an adequate reserve of raw material to protect a large and ever-growing investment. The stimulus was applied in various forms and through diverse channels: capital had long flowed into the industry in excessive amounts under the attraction of large expected profits; the price level for crude petroleum had persistently been influenced by speculative considerations, with the result that prices declined slowly in periods of flush production and were quick to advance in anticipation of statistical improvement, thus maintaining a superfluous degree of stimulus on wildcatting and on drilling; speculation in inventories had led to the unsound, or at least unusual, business practice of accumulating huge stocks of oil; and, above all, the industry had directed the potent force of technology to the expansion of supply and achieved radical results in accelerating oil discovery, speeding up the rate of oil extraction, and enlarging the recovery of gasoline and lubricating oils from the raw material. In short, the economic conditions of 1927 were exactly those to which the objectively driven enterprise of the petroleum industry had long been directed; and the undesirable financial consequences arising therefrom reflected no lack of success in what had been set out to be achieved, but rather the failure to have established concurrently the necessary means of economic control to prevent the immediate conversion of reserves into current supply, and likewise the oversight in neglecting to apply the technological force to the enlargement and diversification of the market for petroleum products. Perhaps, when viewed in its longer perspective, 1927 will stand out as the turning point in the economic policy of the petroleum industry, when the technique of rationalizing production made its initial claim for recognition.

Jan 1, 1928

By V. R. Garfias, R. V. Whetzel, J. W. Ristori

Since the entry of the United States into global war, virtually all data and information necessary for compiling figures on world petroleum consumption have become unavailable. This situation undoubtedly will continue until the world petroleum industry can return to a peacetime basis. During the past 10 years, the authors, by publishing annual estimates of .world consumption, have attempted to emphasize the importance of a yearly world-wide survey of petroleum supply and demand. It is beconling more and more evident that statistics for the United States alone can no longer give a comprehensive idea of the state of the petroleum industry, even within the United States itself. Therefore, when conditions in the industry again become normal, it is the hope of the authors that those bureaus equipped to do so will carry forward the study of petroleum supply and demand on a world-wide basis. Enough data and information are available, however, to attempt a rough estimate of world output of crude petroleum and petroleum substitutes for 1942, which to some extent may reflect the trend of world consumption. This estimate by countries, as compared with the output in 1941, is shown in Table I. The world production of crude petroleum and petroleum substitutes for 1942 is estimated at 2,208,000,000 bbl., or a decrease of 171,000,000 bbl. under 1941. Crude production is believed to have decreased by about 200,000,000 bbl., (about 9 per cent); while petroleum substitutes increased by 28,500,000 bbl., (nearly 20 per cent). The decline of crude output in the United States is estimated at 19,000,000 bb1.—less than 2 per cent; while that in foreign countries is estimated at 180,000,000 bbl., or more than 20 per cent. The marked decline abroad is due largely to losses in Venezuela and Colombia, where the lack of ocean transportation became the controlling factor, and in the East Indies and Burma, where military invasion brought about the destruction of the fields. The production of petroleum substitutes in 1942 apparently reached a new high figure of 7.5 per cent of the total world petroleum output. The important features of petroleum production outside of the United States are the changes that have taken place during the year in the supply of the Axis countries. In Japan the output for 1941 was estimated at 8,800,000 bbl., 5,500,000 of which were petroleum substitutes. It is believed that the output of synthetic oils during 1942 substantially increased, raising the total interior production of Japan to nearly 10,-ooo,ooo bbl. Also, during 1942 Japanese armed forces gained possession of oil fields having a normal peacetime output of about 78,000,000 bbl. per year. The production of these areas for 1942 is estimated at some 23,000,000 bbl., which indicates that Japan is now getting at least 33,000,000 bbl. a year, which exceeds by 8,000,000 bbl. Its

Jan 1, 1943

By J. W. Ristori, V. R. Garfias, R. V. Whetzel

Since the entry of the United States into global war, virtually all data and information necessary for compiling figures on world petroleum consumption have become unavailable. This situation undoubtedly will continue until the world petroleum industry can return to a peacetime basis. During the past 10 years, the authors, by publishing annual estimates of .world consumption, have attempted to emphasize the importance of a yearly world-wide survey of petroleum supply and demand. It is beconling more and more evident that statistics for the United States alone can no longer give a comprehensive idea of the state of the petroleum industry, even within the United States itself. Therefore, when conditions in the industry again become normal, it is the hope of the authors that those bureaus equipped to do so will carry forward the study of petroleum supply and demand on a world-wide basis. Enough data and information are available, however, to attempt a rough estimate of world output of crude petroleum and petroleum substitutes for 1942, which to some extent may reflect the trend of world consumption. This estimate by countries, as compared with the output in 1941, is shown in Table I. The world production of crude petroleum and petroleum substitutes for 1942 is estimated at 2,208,000,000 bbl., or a decrease of 171,000,000 bbl. under 1941. Crude production is believed to have decreased by about 200,000,000 bbl., (about 9 per cent); while petroleum substitutes increased by 28,500,000 bbl., (nearly 20 per cent). The decline of crude output in the United States is estimated at 19,000,000 bb1.—less than 2 per cent; while that in foreign countries is estimated at 180,000,000 bbl., or more than 20 per cent. The marked decline abroad is due largely to losses in Venezuela and Colombia, where the lack of ocean transportation became the controlling factor, and in the East Indies and Burma, where military invasion brought about the destruction of the fields. The production of petroleum substitutes in 1942 apparently reached a new high figure of 7.5 per cent of the total world petroleum output. The important features of petroleum production outside of the United States are the changes that have taken place during the year in the supply of the Axis countries. In Japan the output for 1941 was estimated at 8,800,000 bbl., 5,500,000 of which were petroleum substitutes. It is believed that the output of synthetic oils during 1942 substantially increased, raising the total interior production of Japan to nearly 10,-ooo,ooo bbl. Also, during 1942 Japanese armed forces gained possession of oil fields having a normal peacetime output of about 78,000,000 bbl. per year. The production of these areas for 1942 is estimated at some 23,000,000 bbl., which indicates that Japan is now getting at least 33,000,000 bbl. a year, which exceeds by 8,000,000 bbl. Its

Jan 1, 1943

By Ernest R. Lilley

THOSE acquainted with the fundamental differences between the, educational .systems of Great Britain and. the United States would hardly expect .the training of men for the petroleum industry to proceed along the same lines- in the two countries. The youth entering an English university is, except in the case of-the student from some of the British colonies or from foreign countries, almost invariably a product of the English "public school." This is in no sense comparable .with the American public school. It is a private institution, frequently of considerable age and heavily endowed. In many aspects it seems to be comparable with the American preparatory school. Yet to some extent its activities remind one of the first years of the undergraduate: course in the American college. Certainly it takes to-itself many of the social, functions of the American college.

Jan 1, 1931

By H. H. Kaveler

Education is for the purpose of developing citizenship, and, if it is pursued for the additional purpose of preparing for a professional career, such as engineering, it is also directed to developing a knowledge of essential science, aptitude for the application of science to practical situations, and a knowledge of the industrial art in which the engineer will be engaged. The process of education required for engineering must of necessity extend beyond the classroom into industry. For that reason, the education of engineers should be divided as between the university and industry. Specialization in engineering should logically come as a result of experience in an industry. The student cannot take the time in a university, and, the university cannot teach the skills required to develop a specialist without sacrifice to the more essential broad purposes of formal education. In addition to talent in science, aptitude in the application of scientific fact, and knowledge of the industrial art, the engineer should possess certain personal qualities which are helpful in the pursuit of a professional career. Those personal qualities are: the ability to work as a partner in an enterprise, the ability to do jobs in a way whereby job performance is a means of gaining experience and increased responsibility, the capacity to write and speak in an understandable manner, and, a Proper regard for the "significance of answers." These pcrsOnal qualities may be of almost equal importance to acabemic accomplishments in the field of science. Development of such personal qualities are an essential part of the student's training in the university and in industry. They can be developed effectively through the leadership of instructors. Compulsory Education Nature played a mean trick On the human race when the evolutionary Process failed to develop in the individual a capacity to inherit knowledge. Were knowledge transmissible in a cumulative manner from generation to generation, mankind would be by inheritance wise beyond measure within a few generations. Then there would be little if any need for a "system of education." As matters stand, however, all must suffer the burden of starting life at the "zero " level of learning from which station each rises depending upon individual capacity to assimilate knowledge left of record by our predecessors and the individual effort exerted to compensate for Nature's failure to endow the offspring with intelligence. In the United States some degree of education is generally regarded as essential and necessary. Therefore, all citizens are subjected by law to an educational process covering the primary school age from six to sixteen years. Beyond the schooling required by law, many attend secondary schools, and beyond that, schools of higher learning. Our standard of living is at a level that permits an increasingly large fraction of the population the opportunity to go through all of the formal educational process. As a result, education in the colleges and universities has almost reached a mass production level. In spite of the high

Jan 1, 1949

By Harry H. Power

WORK of the Committee on Education of the Petroleum Division has been under way for approximately-one year. Although some progress has been made, further activities of the Committee are necessary in order to discuss mutual problems more thoroughly by a unified group interested primarily in this field of specialization.

Jan 1, 1944

By Harry H. Power

INDUSTRY has the right to expect the petroleum engineering schools to supply more than the minimum technical qualifications necessary to obtain or discharge the responsibilities of a particular job. The basic training, social and economic orientation, should go far beyond these minimum requirements. Petroleum engineering students should also be well grounded in the history of the oil business so that they may understand the industry's progress since the advent of the Drake well. Furthermore, according to P. H. Bohart, the schools "have a definite duty to help the students form a workable philosophy of life, which includes an appreciation of the service of science to mankind, and a belief in the obligation of the individual who enters a profession to exalt himself by continuing his studies and growth so that he may never cease making contributions to the advancement of science and industry."

Jan 1, 1948

By E. DeGolyer

WAR has wrought sharp and sudden changes in the pattern of the oil industry. The most obvious and most striking of such changes have been in the fields of transportation and refining. A third of the world's total oil production formerly started to market, tanker-borne, over the waters of the Gulf and Caribbean. Most of this oil went to our North Atlantic ports, supply points for the world's greatest consuming center. This tremendous traffic, disrupted by the loss of tankers as a result of requisition for military purposes and by the activity of enemy submarines, has had to be substituted largely by such lines of supply as could be improvised without loss of too much time. No single solution for this gigantic problem has been found nor is it likely to be entirely solved for some time to come. It has been solved in part, however, by rearrangement, reversals, and patching up of existing pipe-line systems; by overland transport of crude and products in tank cars on a scale never before attempted; by barging over inland waterways; and through the construction at long last of the "big-inch" line, the first leg of which is just being put into operation as far as Norris City, III. The tank-car traffic alone, reaching a peak of deliveries of 856,710 barrels per day into District 1 during the week ending Sept. 19, 1942, and accomplished at an expense of millions of dollars in extraordinary transportation costs, defrayed by the Defense Supply Corp. and by the mobilization of tank cars from all over the nation, is a story worth the telling but by some of those who directed it.

Jan 1, 1943

By F. G. Clapp

IT is to be hoped that no casual reader will erroneously refer to the latest publication' of the Division of Public Relations of the American Petroleum Institute, as being "Petroleum Facts and Fancies." The facts are so faithfully derived and the figures are so authentically sponsored by the highest sources that no person can read this valuable volume (287 pages and numerous tables) without being convinced that every- thing therein set forth is "the truth and nothing but the truth." Yet, having read the volume from the perspective of the world's petroleum industry and with a critical attitude that comes from years of study of the subjects discussed, I find myself tempted to cogitate and to envisage a few of the fancies that come to mind as a fitting sequel.

Jan 1, 1929

By B. R. T. Simoneit

The formation of petroleum is normally thought of as a geologically lengthy process, involving the accumulation of organic matter, its gradual burial, diagenetic breakdown via geochemical reactions, maturation, heating within a 75-150'C "oil window" induced by normal geothermal gradients in the subsiding basin, and slow product migration into structural traps (Tissot and Welte, 1984, Hunt, 1979). The entire process can take millions of years and, indeed, most oil reservoirs probably formed in this manner. How-ever, today in sedimented, submarine rift basins (Fig. 1), Cl to >C40 hydrocarbons with the chemical and physical properties of crude oil are forming in demonstrably much shorter time by rapid thermal maturation of immature organic matter in hydrothermal regimes that are unusually high for sedimentary basins (Brault and Simoneit, 1988a, b; Didyk and Simoneit, 1988; Kawka and Simoneit, 1987; Peter et al., 1988; Simoneit, 1983; 1984; 1985a,b; 1988; Simoneit et al., 1984; 1987; 1988).

Jan 1, 1989

By B. R. T. Simoneit

The conversion of organic matter to petroleum by hydrothermal activity is an easy process, occurring in nature in many types of environments. Geologically immature organic matter of marine sediments is being altered by this process in Guaymas Basin (Gulf of California), Escanaba Trough and Middle Valley (northeast Pacific), Bransfield Strait (Antarctica), and Atlantis 11 and Kebrit Deeps (Red Sea). Contemporary organic detritus and viable microorganisms are also converted in part to petroleum-like products by the same process when present to become entrained, as for example on the East Pacific Rise at 13o N and 21o N and on the mid-Atlantic Ridge at 26oN. The hydrocarbon products (methane to asphalt) generated in all these areas have been elucidated in terms of composition, organic matter sources, and analogy to reservoir petroleum. This petroleum represents a major input of carbon to the primary chemosynthetic productivity of hydrothermal vent systems and may be important to interactions with metals in hydrothermal ore formation.

Jan 1, 1991

G. SHERBURNE ROGERS,* Washington, D. C. (written discussion ?).- Mr. Neal's paper on the petroleum hydrology of the Mid-Continent district is a welcome contribution on a subject concerning which none too much is known; it is, I think, the first published description of the chemical character of the oil-field waters of the great Mid-Continent area. When studying the oil-field waters of the California fields several years ago, the differences in chemical composition between waters occurring at various horizons seemed to be sufficient to enable the operators to use water analyses as a basis for determining the source of the water flooding a well; and it is gratifying to find that, Mr. Neal has arrived at a similar conclusion. As Mr. Neal points out, the Mid-Continent waters are very different in character from those of the California fields, and casual. inspection

Jan 3, 1919

By H. F. Beardmore

PETROLEUM consumption during 1946 broke all previous records and further increases are expected during 1947. U. S. consumption amounted to an average of 5,280,000 bbl a day, of which 4,745,000 bbl was domestic crude oil, with the rest from natural gasoline production and crude oil imports. World consumption during the past year, excluding Russia, is estimated at 7,200,000 bbl daily. Forecasts for 1947 indicate a U. S. consumption of 5,425,000 bbl daily of petroleum products. This is expected to be made up of 4,655,000 bbl of domestic crude oil production, 340,000 bbl of natural gasoline production, 400,000 bbl of crude oil imports, and the rest from stocks. Petroleum's principal use is still as a fuel. The field remains highly competitive, but petroleum has been continuously progressing. Less than fifty years ago, oil supplied only one twentieth as much of the nation's total energy as coal, but today it supplies over half as much.

Jan 1, 1947

By Joseph B. Umpleby

PROGRESS in the petroleum industry in 1929 has been characterized by outstanding accomplishments in the fields of new discovery of supply, economic control of production, increased efficiency and reduced costs of recovery, and lowered costs and greater flexibility in manufacture. Resources have been developed in an outstanding degree in the Kettleman Hills. California, the Oklahoma City field (which adds a large potential area in central Oklahoma), the discovery of Woodbine sand production in East Texas, and the discovery of Wilcox sand production in west-central Kansas. Engineering technique has progressed both along the lines of development and production, with a net result that costs have been reduced and extraction increased in notable degree, although it is impossible to give a close measure of either. In the field of re- fining crude oils variations to the end of promoting reduced cost and greater flexibility has been more important than genera! acceptance of innovations in practice.

Jan 1, 1930