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By Paul S. Goodman

Volume II The purpose of this study is to explain reasons for the productivity differences in mining crews. The literature on group productivity is examined. Then a new approach to estimating productivity differences is proposed and estimated across seven different mines. The results indicate a fairly robust model in terms of explanatory power. Recommendations on how the model can be used as a managerial tool are presented.

Jan 1, 1985

By Gilbert A. Wray

This report presents the results of a study of the overturning Stability of Front End Loaders and the development of an Obstacle Detector to warn of Obstacles in the blind regions of the vehicle. The contributing factors have been identified, the FEL stability characteristics have been determined and six overturn warning indicators were fabricated and two were field tested in a mine operation over an extended time period. A simplified overturn indicator, based on the principle of sensing wheel load, was designed, constructed and field tested. The principle was demonstrated to be sound, however, the method of sensing wheel load must be revised. An obstacle detector capable of detecting a man sized target at ranges of two feet to one hundred feet was designed. A "Breadboard" device utilizing existing microwave devices was constructed and tested successfully.

Jan 1, 1977

By M. Shamsuddin

Information on total estimated uranium reserves and domestic requirements have been collected, A survey has been made on the possibilities of recovery of uranium from low grade and complex ore deposits, e.g., marine phosphorites, shales, coal, sea water, etc. In order to assess the potential for uranium recovery from uraniferous phosphorites, available thermodynamic data of uranium minerals, compounds and aqueous species have been collected. The existence of uranium complexes with chloride, fluoride, carbonate, phosphate, sulfate, etc., in ground waters have been evaluated at different pH's. There seems a great need to study the relative stability of these complexes in order to judge the applicability of solution mining technology for selective leaching of uranium from phosphorites. A typical flow-sheet demonstrating recovery of uranium from wet-process phosphoric acid has been included in this report. Some essential features of the economics of uranium recovery from uraniferous phosphorites have been briefly considered and recommendation have been made for further studies.

Jan 1, 1980

By David E. Van Dillen

The computer program described in this user's guide provides for the static, three-dimensional, linear and nonlinear analysis of structural and geological systems by the finite element method. The guide describes the capabilities and general features of the program and shows how input is prepared. A number of recent advances in finite element theory and computer technology are incorporated in the program. Nonlinear material properties are provided for, including isotropic, anisotropic, and time-dependent material properties, gravity loading, simulation of a sequence of excavation or construction, and a slip or joint element. The finite elements include beam, rod, axisymmetric and plane quadrilateral, hexahedron, thick shell, axisymmetric and plane joint, and a three-dimensional joint. The program also has an automatic mesh generator to minimize user input preparation for continuum finite element meshes.

Jan 1, 1981

By ALEC CROWELL

Mississippi has had oil production for only the past six years and natural gas production of minor magnitude since' 1926. The search for oil and gas commenced in 1903 and 1496 wells had been drilled in search of oil and gas up to Jan. 1, 1946. As the year 1945 ended, 659 wells were producing oil and gas from 23 separate reservoirs. The production for the year was 8,353,719,000 standard cubic feet of natural gas measured on a pressure base of 15.025 lb. per sq. in. abs., 15.316,009 bbl. of oil¬field water and 19,093,766 bbl. of crude oil and condensate. Production for the year 1944 was 2,636,067,000 standard cubic feet of gas, 14,979,793 bbl. of salt water and 16,420,346 bbl. of crude oil and condensate.

Jan 1, 1946

By W. G. Campbell

"The region discussed comprises approximately eight million acres spreading across the Arctic Circle in Yukon and North West Territories.Encouraged by four years of surface geological and geophysical work, which strongly suggested that suit-able conditions existed for the entrapment of oil and gas, a decision was reached to drill. In due course two holes were drilled; Eagle Plains No. 1 drilled to 9589 in 1957-8 and Western Minerals Chance No. 1 spudded in 1959 is being deepened this year.Thick sections of sedimentary rocks occur on both sides of the Richardson Mountains, however, most of our activities have been concentrated to date on the west side in the Eagle Plains basin. Here are found stratigraphic units ranging from Precambrian to Tertiary age. The drilling of the two exploratory wells proved the presence of these strata at depth and have confirmed the presence of promising structures. A geological cross-section across Eagle Plains presents an interpretation of these conditions.Physical and engineering aspects of exploration in the northern Yukon and North West Territories are de-pendent largely upon seasons and transportation. Reconnaissance gravity and surface geologic mapping by air presents no serious problems. However, seismic operations on the ground are greatly affected by the season, presence of permafrost and mobility of equipment.The actual drilling of the hole may well be the simple part of a wildcat undertaking once equipment and supplies are on location. Over-all planning, assembling supplies, transporting equipment and personnel seems to be the real job. Serious consideration must be given to per-ma-frost effect in the drilling pro-gram and on surface installations as well.Programming for -the various exploration activities should be under-taken well in advance of the actual doing. Considerable extra costs may be the results of crash programs. Costs are high, and the rewards uncertain. Economic evaluation is based •on the long term outlook."

Jan 1, 1960

By Rush Greenslade

THE oil and gas lease is the basic contract of the oil and gas industry; it is the foundation stone upon which the producing industry, particularly, is based. As the industry is precarious and highly speculative, the foundation contract should be of the utmost integrity and certainty. But right there an anomaly exists; the oil and gas lease is the most obscure, most uncertain, doubtful contract in the realm of law today. That is a condition that must be considered when taking oil and gas leases, and when buying, selling, and holding them. It may fairly be asked why should this industry rest upon so insecure a foundation. Why should not the oil industry rest upon the contract that is the basis of all industry, the warranty deed? There are many contributing reasons, but the principal one is business expediency. The Anglo-Saxon idea of ownership of land is that every land owner owns from the center of the earth to the sky all that is above and all that is below-consequently the oil and gas are owned by the person who owns the surface. That idea is not exactly true with reference to oil and gas, for many states have adopted the doctrine that oil and gas are like wild animals; they are fugacious and migratory and belong to the man that traps them. But, except for that doctrine, we believe that oil and gas are owned by the owner of the surface, wherein we differ from the Latin-American countries where the mineral rights are owned by the government. The United States was settled largely by homesteading. The owners of land were, in the main, farmers, who did not have the means or the faith to drill for oil or gas. The operators or speculators did not want to buy the land on the mere possibility of finding oil; hence a compromise resulted by which the land owner gave the speculator or the operator what he called an oil and gas lease, or a right to go upon his land and drill for oil and gas. What is supposed to be the first oil lease placed on record reads as follows: Agreed this 4th day of July, A.D. 1853, with J. D. Angier of Cherrytree township in the county of Venango Pennsylvania that he shall repair up and keep in order the old oil springs on land in said Cherrytree township, or dig and make new springs, and the expense to be deducted out of the proceeds of the oil, and the balance, if any, to be

Jan 8, 1924

By M. L. Haider

Introduction I Appreciate very much the opportunity of discussing with you tonight oil developments in western Canada. These developments are of importance to all of us, first because of their great economic significance to all of Canada, and second because of the location of the new oilfields. Situated as they are in the west and northwest, they are of considerable strategic value from the standpoint of continental defence. The story of oil development in Canada covers a span of almost a century, during which time success in finding reserves of petroleum was barely sufficient to maintain interest in continuing the search. Finally, in 1947, a well of the first importance was completed in Alberta and, judging by discoveries made since then, it appears that Canada, at long last, is to become an important producer of petroleum.

Jan 1, 1950

Delhi Australian Petroleum Ltd., acting as operator for the joint interests of Delhi and Santos Ltd., has been engaged in petroleum exploration in the western Great Artesian Basin since 1958.Extensive airborne magnetometer, gravity meter, reflection and refraction seisomograph, and surface geological surveys have been carried out. Results of the surveys have considerably altered the concepts of the geology of the area.Seven exploratory wells have been drilled in the area. Results of the drilling have established the presence in the subsurface of previously unknown Paleozoic sediments which are capable of generating hydrocarbons.Production of oil or gas has not been achieved, but each phase of the exploration programme has resulted in progressively establishing the basic conditions necessary for the discovery of commercially profitable accumulations.INTRODUCTIONDelhi Australian Petroleum Ltd. commenced operations in Australia in 1958. They have subsequently been engaged in systematic exploration for oil and gas, acting as operator for their partner, Santos Limited. The methods and techniques employed are those used throughout the petroleum industry. The results of the exploration programme contribute to a better understanding of the basic geology, and concomitantly a firmer analysis of the petroleum producing potential, of the western Great Artesian Basin.Each phase has progressively enhanced the gross geological interpretation of the area with regard to favourable conditions for the generation and accumulation of hydrocarbons, but the stage has not been reached where productive potential is definitely established.Exploration status in 1958Basin configurationIn 1958 knowledge of the pre-Jurassic stratigraphy of the geographically defined western Great Artesian Basin...

Jan 1, 1964

By Anthony G. Reid

INTRODUCTION At the time of the death of Mao Tse-tung in 1976, China was a major oil producing country with a daily oil flow in the order of 1.735 million barrels. This position had been achieved with minimal assistance from the outside world. Further, only some fifteen years had elapsed since the country's daily oil production capacity had hovered at the barely significant level of one hundred thousand barrels. Why then did the new leaders of China, after this very creditable record of success, suddenly change the direction of the country's drive for future hydrocarbon production? First, by switching much of the emphasis of exploration from onshore to the offshore continental shelf basins, and further by apparently abandoning the philosophy of self reliance calling upon the world's oil industry to share in the task of locating and developing these potential offshore energy reserves. The answer is probably only partly understood by those of us outside China, However, a number of factors exerting an important influence on this decision can be identified. THE MOVE OFFSHORE The new leadership was anxious to rapidly move China into her rightful place amongst the powerful and technologically advanced nations of the world. Modernization became the slogan, specifically modernization on four fronts, agriculture, industry, technology and military with the goal to "catch the west by the year 2000". But how to generate the capital to finance this massive modernization program? The rapid escalation of the price of crude oil following the 1973 Oil Embargo and the continuing apparently insatiable world demand for this now extremely precious primary resource was very clear to all. China, as a major producer, could export crude to help finance the ambitious development programs of the government. To do this, however, would require a very significant in¬crease in present production capacity, as the domestic demand even for China with her relatively low per capita energy consumption, is essentially equal to the current production. Trying to rapidly move the new regime's programs into actions, one can only assume that the planners looked at the success of the petroleum industry over the preceding fifteen years and quickly concluded that this well established curve could be maintained and indeed steepened with an increase in effort. The rapid discovery of a few more Daqing's (China's premier oil field, producing one million barrels a day) would have the country's ambitious modernization goals within reach. Petroleum would At the time of the death of Mao Tse-tung in 1976, China was a major oil producing country with a daily oil flow in the order of 1.735 million barrels. This position had been achieved with minimal assistance from the outside world. Further, only some fifteen years had elapsed since the country's daily oil production capacity had hovered at the barely significant level of one hundred thousand barrels. Why then did the new leaders of China, after this very creditable record of success, suddenly change the direction of the country's drive for future hydrocarbon production? First, by switching much of the emphasis of exploration from onshore to the offshore continental shelf basins, and further by apparently abandoning the philosophy of self reliance calling upon the world's oil industry to share in the task of locating and developing these potential offshore energy reserves. The answer is probably only partly understood by those of us outside China, However, a number of factors exerting an important influence on this decision can be identified. THE MOVE OFFSHORE The new leadership was anxious to rapidly move China into her rightful place amongst the powerful and technologically advanced nations of the world. Modernization became the slogan, specifically modernization on four fronts, agriculture, industry, technology and military with the goal to "catch the west by the year 2000", But how to generate the capital to finance this massive modernization program? The rapid escalation of the price of crude oil following the 1973 Oil Embargo and the continuing apparently insatiable world demand for this now extremely precious primary resource was very clear to all. China, as a major producer, could export crude to help finance the ambitious development programs of the government. To do this, however, would require a very significant increase in present production capacity, as the domestic demand even for China with her relatively low per capita energy consumption, is essentially equal to the current production. Trying to rapidly move the new regime's programs into actions, one can only assume that the planners looked at the success of the petroleum industry over the preceding fifteen years and quickly concluded that this well established curve could be maintained and indeed steepened with an increase in effort. The rapid discovery of a few more Daqing's (China's premier oil field, producing one million barrels a day) would have the country's ambitious modernization goals within reach. Petroleum would be the principal bridge to the bright future. The next decision involved the question of where to look for these vast new reserves. Chinese exploration teams had already looked at most of the onshore sedimentary basins and, while they were the first to admit that there was much yet to do, it was fairly clear to them that the potential for large new accumulations was confined to two areas: the little explored, remote, inhospitable regions of western China, principally Xinkiang Province and the equally unexplored offshore basins of the continental shelf and slope. In both cases China faced a very serious problem. The inhospitable environments were severely straining her petroleum industry's current technological ability to cope, particularly as the government needed rapid results. Thus the pragmatic and, to the foreign oil industry, unexpected decision to invite cooperation with the outside world. The reasons for the initial emphasis on the exploration of the offshore basins with the cooperation of foreign oil companies are again supposition on my part, but probably involved considerations of technical merit, ease of development and delivery to markets together with more sensitive issues such as controling the influence of foreign philosophies and values on the Chinese population by containing most foreign activity to the offshore. So within three years of the death of the great helmsman, China had developed a plan to involve foreign oil companies, both state and private, in a grand plan to rapidly increase the nations oil production. In fact, by this time, the first round of talks had been concluded and the first phase begun, and what a beginning. Some forty eight companies from thirteen countries had signed documents to participate formally in this world scale event. It was far easier to list those companies which did not participate than to list those which did. FOREIGN COMPANY INTEREST Why the rush by the world's oil industry to be involved in China? What was China offering which made everyone so anxious to join in? Again the answer is complex in detail, but principally involved a combination of factors which together caused this virtual stampede. Timing was a major element. Oil Companies, despite an ever increasing take by governments, were beginning to benefit. from the' rapid escalation of crude prices induced by OPEC and were looking for suitable areas to reinvest these funds. Producers

Jan 1, 1982

By Joseph Chalmers, J. S. Desmond, R. Van A. Mills

[Because of the limited space in this volume and the fact that a description covering the oil recovery buildings and equipment (see page 4, Technical Publication No. 144) will be given in a forthcomnig U. S. Bureau of Mines publication, and because the paper was published in detail as Technical Publication No. 144, and is available as a separate at the Institute, it is impossible to include here more than the following brief extract.] Problems Being Studied The selection of the first problems to be studied was based largely upon the following very practical questions asked by several of the largest operators in the Mid-Continent field. 1. What are the causes for the formation of excessive amounts of bad thick oil on properties that are being repressured with compressed air and how can this trouble be prevented? 2. Why, in some areas, does the oxygen in the air injected into an oil sand during repressuring operations apparently change to carbon dioxide? Is carbon dioxide formed by the oxidation of some of the oil in the sand'? How can the formation of inert or low B.t.u. casinghead gas, loaded with nitrogen, carbon dioxide and oxygen, be prevented? 3. What percentage of the oil originally present in an oil sand can be recovered by the ordinary methods of operation when the gas originally dissolved in the oil is the main propulsive agent? 4. What percentage of the amount of oil produced by ordinary methods can be recovered under average conditions by repressuring a so-called depleted oil sand? 5. What are the relative propulsive efficiencies of compressed air and natural gas in repressuring operations? 6. What are the practical advantages of pressure maintenance and early repressuring as compared with late repressuring?

Jan 1, 1929

By Harry Perry

A technology for producing liquid fuels from oil shale at prices competitive with crude oil prices is a necessary but not exclusive prerequisite for the development of a shale oil industry. Many other factors will affect the timing and the rate at which oil shale is commercially developed. Among the more important are: governmental policy concerning oil shale and oil resources (including the Outer Continental Shelf) that are under Federal control; oil import policy; Federal taxation of shale oil production including depletion allowances; regulatory practices; competition from other energy sources, both synthetic and natural; Federal treatment of factors affecting competing energy resources; and present legislation under which the public resources must be leased. Significant changes in any of the foregoing factors could have a controlling effect on the timing and rate of oil shale development. The effect of changes in each of these factors is evaluated.

Jan 1, 1969

By Clifford B. Farris

Introduction Shale Mining Problems The mining problems an oil shale operator will face are largely determined by the process. Candidate oil recovery processes are surface (above ground processing of mined oil shale), modified in situ (underground with some shale removed), and true in situ (completely underground with no shale removed). The shale removed for modified in situ (MIS) is generally processed by surface techniques. The mining problems are different for each category. Fig. 1 depicts the diversity of western shale deposits. Mining for surface operations will employ underground mining techniques in common use but the scale will be larger. A typical oil shale operation is expected to require 75,000 to 250,000 st (68 000 to 226 800 tons) a stream day of crushed oil shale. This is above the upper limit of current mining operations. Major problems in¬clude: (1) lack of good engineering design properties for oil shale, especially when interbedded with saline minerals at depths below 1,000 ft (305 m); (2) presence of water, hydrogen sulfide, and methane in some areas; (3) necessity for mine disposal of as much retorted oil shale waste as possible; and (4) control of en¬vironmental impacts of mining. Portions of the oil shale deposits in Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah and significant portions of the Devonian shales in the eastern U.S. are adapted to surface mining. No major technological problems are apparent outside overburden thicknesses up to 1,000 ft in the West. However, numerous political and environmental dif¬ficulties have arisen. One major oil shale developer cancelled a planned surface mining operation and currently is pursuing a modified in-situ plan. The eastern shales are closer to the surface than the western, but suffer from many of the same environmental and political problems. Modified in-situ operations face much more severe mining problems than surface efforts. Because the mined stope (called an in-situ "retort" by processors) acts as a retorting process vessel subject to gas flow, combustion, and temperatures between 1,500° and 2,000°F, mining is under highly restrictive limitations. This processing method involves removing between 20 and 40% of the shale deposit and then blasting the roof and walls into the mined space, where the oil is recovered by retorting. Major problems are: (1) swell factor severely limited; (2) need for consistent size distribution of blasted shale; (3) even filling of stope (in-situ retort) by blasted shale with consistent permeability throughout; (4) scaleup of blasting techniques, after optimization; (5) protection of retort pillars and roof during and after retorting; (6) prevention of groundwater percolation; (7)use of ANFO explosive in wet holes; (8) disposing of surface-retorted shale waste in stope; and (9) restoration of site. True in-situ operations are less well developed than surface or MIS processes. No actual mining is done, as the true in-situ processes generate permeability in the highly

Jan 1, 1980

By Clifford B. Farris

Introduction Shale Mining Problems The mining problems an oil shale operator will face are largely determined by the process. Candidate oil recovery processes are surface (above ground processing of mined oil shale), modified in situ (underground with some shale removed), and true in situ (completely underground with no shale removed). The shale removed for modified in situ (MIS) is generally processed by surface techniques. The mining problems are different for each category. Fig. 1 depicts the diversity of western shale deposits. Mining for surface operations will employ underground mining techniques in common use but the scale will be larger. A typical oil shale operation is expected to require 75,000 to 250,000 st (68 000 to 226 800 tons) a stream day of crushed oil shale. This is above the upper limit of current mining operations. Major problems include: (1) lack of good engineering design properties for oil shale, especially when interbedded with saline minerals at depths below 1,000 ft (305 m); (2) presence of water, hydrogen sulfide, and methane in some areas; (3) necessity for mine disposal of as much retorted oil shale waste as possible; and (4) control of environmental impacts of mining. Portions of the oil shale deposits in Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah and significant portions of the Devonian shales in the eastern U.S. are adapted to surface mining. No major technological problems are apparent outside overburden thicknesses up to 1,000 ft in the West. However, numerous political and environmental difficulties have arisen. One major oil shale developer cancelled a planned surface mining operation and currently is pursuing a modified in-situ plan. The eastern shales are closer to the surface than the western, but suffer from many of the same environmental and political problems. Modified in-situ operations face much more severe mining problems than surface efforts. Because the mined stope (called an in-situ "retort" by processors) acts as a retorting process vessel subject to gas flow, combustion, and temperatures between 1,500° and 2,000°F, mining is under highly restrictive limitations. This processing method involves removing between 20 and 40% of the shale deposit and then blasting the roof and walls into the mined space, where the oil is recovered by retorting. Major problems are: (1) swell factor severely limited; (2) need for consistent size distribution of blasted shale; (3) even filling of stope (in-situ retort) by blasted shale with consistent permeability throughout; (4) scaleup of blasting techniques, after optimization; (5) protection of retort pillars and roof during and after retorting; (6) prevention of groundwater percolation; (7)use of ANFO explosive in wet holes; (8) disposing of surface-retorted shale waste in stope; and (9) restoration of site. True in-situ operations are less well developed than surface or MIS processes. No actual mining is done, as the true in-situ processes generate permeability in the highly

Jan 9, 1980

By Jerry M. Whiting

Greater awareness of the increasing need to develop supplementary energy sources is accelerating us towards many basic decisions regarding future utilization of mined energy materials -- uranium, coal, oil sands and oil shale. The latter material comprises a major potential source of oil which will require creation of unusually large and low-cost underground mining systems. In this paper, the author briefly outlines and analyzes several of the factors which continue to provide the somewhat unique character of oil shale nine planning and mine operation.

Jan 1, 1974

By Robert B. Crookston

This paper presents a resume and status report: of mining technology appropriate to commercial oil shale development in the United States today. The nature and extent of oil shale in Colorado and Utah are discussed. A look at most of the prominent activities now underway emphasizes the questions "where are we now?" and "where are we going?" Various alternate mining methods are reviewed and a bibliography of oil shale mining is included.

Jan 1, 1980

By J. H. East

THE RIFLE, COLO., oil-shale project of the Bureau of Mines was a facet of the re-search and development activities conducted under the Synthetic Liquid Fuels Act (Public Law 78-290) of April 5, 1944. The principal objectives were to devise efficient methods to mine and retort oil shale and to refine shale oil into usable products, at a total cost low enough that shale oil could supplement the domestic supply of petroleum at competitive prices. The Rifle project included three major divisions: (1) Mining, (2) retorting, and (3) refining. The major functions of the mining program were to supply oil shale to the retorts, to devise mining procedures, and to develop an under-ground-mining method by which oil shale could be produced safely at an unusually low cost per ton. The selected mining procedures and direct mining costs were demonstrated by sustained test runs.

Jan 1, 1964

By Colin C. Brooks

The Ok Tedi gold/copper deposit of almost 800 million tonnes was found in I968 because at that time technology had just developed sufficiently to enable exploration of such an area, world markets and prices for copper encouraged exploration for large deposits of low grade ore, Papua New Guinea law encouraged exploration by groups with men, money, management and expertise necessary for successful prosecution of such a search and such groups were already operating in the country.

Jan 1, 1990

By Roger J. Higgins

Papua New Guinea is a country on the cusp of development, struggling to find a balance between the demands of national and regional growth, landowner expectations and the maintenance of cultural identity. Ok Tedi Mining Limited is the single largest contributor to PNG?s economy, representing about 10 percent of the country?s GDP. OTML is demonstrating that business and country risk can be managed through effective, respectful partnerships with local communities. OTML?s relationships with the communities of PNG?s Western Province are multifaceted. Communities have borne the brunt of the mine?s environmental impact, yet have benefited enormously from the development that the mine has brought. Importantly, the PNG economy is now the ultimate beneficiary of more than four-fifths of the dividends from the mine, the majority of which are held in trust for long-term sustainable development projects. The paper describes how OTML works with the Western Province communities to create a secure operating environment that recognizes the people?s aspirations for development and self-determination.

May 1, 2002

Old Copper Flotation Tailings Waste Reprocessing

Sep 13, 2010