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By Thomas V. Fame, William E. Porter

"As geological and mining conditions become more complex, and as overall mining economics become more marginal, short- and long-range decision-making regarding multiple-seam surface mining becomes more difficult. The decision-making problem involves a study of economics, cut-off grades and ratios, equipment capabilities, sequencing and selective mining practices.This paper is concerned primarily with multiple-seam mining of bituminous coal. The research has led to the development of an economic decision-making model for use as a day-to-day tool to aid mine operators and pit geologists to decide what and how to mine.The model is designed as an aid for feasibility decision-making in multiple-scam situations and for situations where selective mining is needed or desired. In effect, a simulation of the feasibility and preliminary mine planning phases has been developed. The model is divided into four separate segments: decision-making, simulated mining, cost calculations and the determination of the discounted cash flow return on investment."

Jan 1, 2014

By Joseph E. Pogue

NEW economic forces are at work in the petroleum industry.. In order to visualize these forces and clearly see their bearing on the producer, refiner and marketer, it is necessary to see in perspective the economic evolution of the business. For several decades prior to 1913 the outstanding feature of the petroleum industry was a trend toward integration, culminating in a huge combine, the Standard Oil Co. An important aspect of this integrative trend, however, was its concentration on the combination aid control of refining and marketing, leaving crude oil production, for the most part, to the exigencies. of small-unit competition. It is a noteworthy coincidence that during this era the law of oil and gas was formulated and applied, whereby these substances had to be reduced to possession to establish ownership; and the forces of competition in crude oil production were thereby intensified. It was to the interest of an industry, safeguarded in its control of manufacturing and markets, to have supply stimulated by legal convention as well as by individual initiative in order that the growing demand could be met without interruption. And so over-production of crude oil during this era was no handicap, but rather an aid, to the progress of the industry.

Jan 1, 1929

By C. L. HUNTZINGER

THE mine here described is in the Witbank district, a coal area of the Transvaal, about 100 miles north- east of Johannesburg. and is owned by the Witbank Colliery, Ltd. The plant has a capacity of 4000 tons per eight hours, and prepares five sizes of coal. The coal seam lies at a depth of about 200 ft. below the surface, and is reached by an inclined shaft sunk at an angle of 18° with the horizontal. Although the thickness of the coal seam varies from 10 to 14 ft. or more, only about a 7-ft. bench is mined. Mining is by the hord and pillar system. Bords are driven 18 ft. wide, with pillars measuring 18 ft. square. The mine is laid out into four sections, each sewed by a main haulage way from the shaft. Arc-wall machines are used for cutting the coal. but all loading is done by hand. Native labor is employed under the supervision of white miners, who do the required blasting. The workings are practically free from gas and water, and very little timber is needed.

Jan 1, 1931

By Victor Azbe

Introduction Lime enters our daily life in many ways. Our building, chemical, agricultural, sanitary, and industrial endeavours depend on it to such a great extent that it could probably be called the most important inorganic chemical, and the extent to which it is used might be considered an index of industrial development. Industrial limes vary greatly in quality, due to internal structure and other characteristics. They may be good or bad, sensitive or slow to react. While improper manufacture may not greatly alter the appearance of the lime, it may affect its properties considerably and thus its suitability in the many processes in which lime is used. In some of the processes, one kind of lime is wanted, in others another. While the nature of the stone from which it is made has much to do with whether a lime is suitable or not, its burning and hydration are the crux of the matter. Up to not so many years ago, the knowledge of lime burning was rather imperfect and it is only relatively recently that its manufacture is approaching the state of a higher industrial art. This slow development was in part due to lime manufacture being scattered among many small concerns who, independently, either lacked the inclination or could not afford to strive for a higher technical development.

Jan 1, 1946

By Victor Azbe

Azbe System of Controlled Calcination To obtain good and cheap lime there are certain fundamental requirements that need to be satisfied. These are : (1) Proper combustion of fuel and steady supply of heat to the kiln. (2) Proper heat distribution in the kiln. (3) Uniform drawing of lime through the several shaft sections. (4) Complete cooling of the lime and recovery of the heat. (5) Temperature control of the hot zone by economical means. (6) Ample draft to obtain high capacity. (7) Arrangements to facilitate operation. Figure 17 shows diagrammatically one of the smaller kilns, intended for large stone. Such a kiln can be supplied with gas from a centrally located automatic gas producer, or, as shown, from an integral producer located snugly against the kiln. These producers make very good gas and have a gasification capacity of either 10 or 15 tons of coal a day. The producers have water-sealed ash pits, a rather thick fuel bed that is conducive to the making of high-CO gas, and are under forced draft. No steam is used. Clinkering is prevented by admixing some spent gas from the kiln with the air. Coal feeding is from a coal bunker through spouts into the hoppers over the producer. This is done, at proper intervals, by manual operation of slides, but it is planned to install mechanical feeders. Central mechanical gas producers have the advantage of requiring little labour, but the blowing of soot is a problem, as also is the proper distribution of the gas among several kilns. In the case of integral gas producers, soot from the centre burner is blown back into the producer to be burned, and the supply of gas to the kiln is controlled by regulation of air to the producer. In large plants, the mechanical producer may be preferable, but in small ones, the integral producer is cheaper, better, and more reliable. The kiln shown in Figure 17 is suitable for both systems of gas supply. It will be noticed that there are no side gas burners. All gas enters the kiln through the centre burner in a manner that permits any desired amount of gas to be directed to any of the kiln sections by the aid of regulating slides.

Jan 1, 1946

By Peter Broad

"Extracting any metal, especially specialty metals and rare earth elements, requires an in-depth analysis of the costs and potential revenue as well as a due diligence study of other stakeholder interests. Rare earth projects are generally in the billion dollar US range or above, and thus failure to accurately predict any loss of revenue caused by impurities within the product or additional effluent treatment costs can destroy an otherwise viable study. Two prime sources of input impurity are considered: impurities in the material feed and from reagents. The effect of these impurities factor on both the product (in reduced revenue) and on residual “tailings” that may incur additional unforeseen costs.INTRODUCTION“Truth passes through three stages. First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident” – Arthur SchopenhauerThe era of unscoped, unbudgeted construction ended about 150 years ago. Today’s engineer must design with confidence; but do so amidst proprietary secrets and unfamiliar pollutants, which present a myriad of interesting challenges. Is it possible to build a viable rare earth plant to a realistic budget, without destroying that which we cherish? Some see this as contradictory but in reality it is the only viable option.WHEN GOOD PROJECTS FAILWithout rare earths the Copenhagen agreement might be null and void. Running a wind turbine with a 30 tonne conventional magnet requires some hefty engineering and prohibitive investment. Despite their ‘Green metal’ applications, production of rare earths have created environmental nightmares, as Folger stated in 2011 when visiting Baotou, or has Jaing Mainheng who has been quoted by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard 6 Jan 2013. This comment is not a criticism of China; the details are from a 2012 white paper published by the Chinese Government that initiated a $6 billion environmental clean-up. Nor is China unique; other plants have had problems as well. There were toxic leaks in the 1990s from Mountain Pass, and the Mitsubishi Bukit Merah Plant (built in Malaysia in 1958) required a $100 million clean-up."

Jan 1, 2016

By John A. Church

AT a time when the treatment of gold and silver ores by fusion, in opposition to the mill-process, is attracting so much attention in this country, it may be useful to consider what is done in a well-conducted foreign work. For this purpose I will ask the reader to accompany me to Lend, in Austria, a small but thoroughly organized

Jan 1, 1873

By Bell I. F

In 1985, ZC Mines (now Pasminco South) had been unprofitable for some years due to a combination of high operating costs, low metal prices, low head grade and an aging and inadequate mining infrastructure. However, the resource of metal in the ground was still of world class, even after some 80 years of mining. A major study, which was to be of two years duration, was therefore commenced to establish a practical and profitable long term mining strategy and to cost the infrastructure options needed for its support and thus form the justification for a capital expenditure program to take the mine profitably into the 21st century and its second century of operation. This paper discusses the rationale behind the methodology adopted and the nature of the results achieved in one aspect of the study - the determination of the mineable resource and the relationship between the head grade/quantity of the economically mineable resource and the variables of cut-off grade, cost structure, annual production rate and metal prices/exchange rates. The basis of the study was the designing of some 5000 scopes to mine out the entire resource for a range of cut- off grades and the assembly of the detailed physical data thus obtained in a stope-by-stope data base for financial and other analysis. Those scopes which were shown to be economically mineable were then scheduled for two optimum annual production/cut-off grade/metal price combinations to provide life-of-mine cost and value of production cash flows.

Jan 1, 1992

By J. E. Pogue

It is the purpose of this paper to attempt to establish three theses which may be stated in advance as follows: 1. The crude oil potential is the accumulation of surplus initial production. 2. The crude oil potential is a semi-inventory and therefore is a causal factor in the price of crude petroleum. 3. The price of crude petroleum no longer correlates with above-ground inventories but does correlate with corrected inventories (i. e., above-ground storage plus the inventory equivalent of the crude oil potential). The factors and principles set forth in this study are thought to yield an approximate answer to a number of questions of active interest in the petroleum industry today, to wit: (a) How long would be required to eliminate the potential if all drilling ceased? (b) What would be the indicated crude oil production of the United States in 1931 if proration were abandoned? (c) What economic change would be necessary to warrant a higher price for crude oil? Definitions For the purposes of this study the following definitions may be stated: The crude oil potential in the United States is the quantity of oil that all the oil wells would make the first 24 hr. if permitted to flow unrestricted. The surplus potential is the above-mentioned quantity minus the volume currently produced. Initial production is the first day's unrestricted flow of an oil well. Aggregate initial production is the sum of the initials of all wells completed during a year. Surplus initial is the initial not needed to bring production into balance with demand. The surplus initial is equal to the crude oil potential minus the current rate of production. The annual production-equivalent of the crude oil potential is the volume of oil that would be produced in one year if all wells were permitted

Jan 1, 1931

By A. B. Bowman

The 1963 Jackling Award lecturer describes the founding of Banner Mining Co. and its trials and tribulations before becoming an established firm. Such aspects as geological description of Banner mining areas, history of exploration and production, areas of present interest to the company and research work conducted by the company are included. Several years ago a wealthy Chinese business friend of mine purchased an interest in a proposed oil well to be drilled a great distance from his home. A few months later it came in as a producer and proved to be a huge success and materially added to his resources. I asked him why a man of his wealth should be so lucky in a venture outside his sphere of knowledge when most people of modest means never seemed to get ahead. His answer was, "Fat Hoy takes a chance." Even though this was his answer, I knew from my association with him that there were other tempering considerations which Mr. Hoy applied before making up his mind to enter any transaction. First, he was a cautious individual. He was also a great believer in details and insisted on knowing everything possible about a situation, and finally, he was what we call a very solid individual with good basic instincts and judgment. This philosophy of Mr. Hoy may be applied to most any business but especially to those engaged in a search for natural resources such as mining where great risks are involved. This article concerns events in the history and growth of Banner Mining Co., with which I have been associated for 27 years in capacities from mine surveyor to vice president. Mr. Hoy's philosophy has played a significant role in the exploration projects of this company over the years, but what is more important, the officers, directors, and controlling interests in Banner have been aggressive in their search for ore reserves. THE BIRTH OF BANNER Banner Mining Company was incorporated in September 1935 by a group of Oklahoma and Texas oil men for the purpose of exploring and developing the Bonney-Manilla mines at Lordsburg, N.M. These properties had a history of intermittent production since the first ore discoveries as far back as 1870. Most of the production from the district has come from four mines, namely, the Eighty-Five, the Atwood, the Bonney-Manilla, and the Misers Chest. The last two are now owned by Banner Mining. The Eighty-Five mine operated between 1885 and 1931, and production totalled 1,494,287 tons averaging 0.11 oz of gold per ton, 1.23 oz of silver per ton, and 2.80% copper. The vein extended for a distance of about 3000 ft northeast and was mined to a depth of 1650 ft. The Atwood mine, adjoining the Eighty-Five mine, to date has been of lesser importance as a producer, but it has been operating for several years producing high silica flux ores for a smelter. Production totalled 352,828 tons up to January 1, 1962 From the Bonney-Manilla and Misers Chest mines, owned by Banner, production through 1961 totalled 2,006,343 tons with an average grade as mined of 0.0192 oz of gold per ton, 0.760 oz of silver per ton and 2.63% copper. Banner built a 150-tpd flotation mill in 1936 after almost a year of development on the 600 level of the Bonney mine. After less than one year's operation, it became apparent that the 150-tpd rate was not sufficient to make a reasonable profit due to the marginal grade ores. The low tenor of the ore, mainly chalco-pyrite in a highly siliceous gangue, made mandatory the close control of costs in order to make ends meet. A 300-tpd unit was added to the mill in 1937, and it is still the operating unit today. The clean sulfides presented no problems in milling. A metallurgist doing research on it at the time stated that the copper minerals seemed to have a built-in desire to float. Mill recovery of copper throughout the 27 years of operation has averaged 96.23%. A PERIOD OF FORCED GROWTH World War II brought many hardships to Banner. Labor and supply shortages caused drastic curtailment in development work. Rapidly rising costs far outdistanced any relief from pegged prices which we received from Government agencies. Finally, a branch of the Government asked us to stop all devel-

Jan 1, 1963

By Barnabas Bryan

During the boom period of 1928 and 1929, several oil companies took advantage of high security prices to sell stocks, thereby securing money for the company very cheaply. Few if any of those companies realized that the money received was not at all cheap in view of the fact that it was for investment in fixed assets at inflated prices. Suppose a company borrowed twenty millions of dollars to expand its marketing facilities during the boom. It diluted its capital and acquired fixed property which could not earn its interest requirements during the following deflation and therefore consumed income from other company activities. The company also had to stand the deflation in the capital value of all the property it bought. Since the mistaken expansion during the boom accelerated the decline in net income during deflation, the financial position of the company was harmed in proportion to the amount of that expansion. Thus the company was unable to get money to buy fixed assets in the depression when all property is cheap. The same condition holds for the company that sold common stock for the purpose of developing potential production in a newly discovered oil field. Regardless of what the ultimate value of the new field may be, potential production does not increase the net income of the company. The difficulty of meeting the enlarged dividend requirements due to the increased number of shares outstanding impairs the financial position of the company during deflation in some relation to the probability of decreased dividends. This company also is not in a position to expand during the depression when properties and companies can be bought for a fraction of their real value. Expansion of fixed assets during boom times has been the ruin of many otherwise good companies. Some of those which most extensively bought property during the post-war boom have not yet recovered. A number of cases could be cited in sugar, leather, fertilizer and wool. This does not seem to be governed by the quality of the property bought, for examination shows the assets to have been of individual high quality in many cases. When recovery is long deferred it is likely to be true, as in sugar or textiles, that the industry has a large "potential" capacity for overproduction.

Jan 1, 1931

By L. D. Clark

Pay-out, the ratio of capital expenditure to annual cash return can be very revealing when employed to gage the merits of a proposed mining venture. It is a quantity, numerically but not physically equal to a factor, by which cash return may be discounted to equal required investment. The fewer the pay-out years, the greater the average annual earning power of the project. Considerable material has been written in the past about the most important and difficult problem mining management faces in evaluation of a property: the optimum production rate for the venture. What daily capacity should be adopted for the proposed operation that it may be the most rewarding to those underwriting it? H.C. Hoover has said, "The most important objective is the least cost per ton mined; and minimum working costs can only be gained by the most intensive production." Theoretically and practically, the quicker the ore is removed, the more profitable should be the venture because of the saving in fixed charges, the consequent lower unit costs and the interest unearned by the profit from the unmined ore. Yet, such performance will be tempered by policy and a restraint imposed by the ratio of capital expenditure to annual cash return. * The 'Annual net profit after taxes but including depreciation and depletion allowances. former will be based upon an analysis of the economic climate anticipated, with its many ramifications including the demand for the product, prices, tax laws, the conduct of labor and related wage scales. The variables and intangibles involved in estimating the optimum production rate for a mine do not readily lend themselves to mathematical relationships or equations and the problem can become complex indeed. The more readily applicable and relatively faster appraisal method will be used which, in addition to being reasonably adequate in most cases, will serve as a guide, should a more expanded and detailed estimate be desired. The first question is what is company policy with respect to the rate of investment return? This will depend on that significant period of time referred to as the pay-out, which can be defined as the estimated interval during which capital investment is returned through application of annual cash return to its recovery. Expressed another way, it is the ratio of capital expenditure to the annual cash return. For example, if the capital investment is $C and the annual cash return is $A (after Federal tax), then $C/$A = the pay-out period in years. That is to say, if $C = $1,500,000 and $A = $214,000, then which is the mathematical expression for the period of time it takes to recover the funds originally invested in a mining enterprise. The relationship yp = $C/$A can be useful — an expression which requires only the significant tern yp to be fixed; in other words, the long range investment policy. For what is the pay-out period but an expression of that policy in terms of the speed, within practical limits, with which an individual or company may want to recover capital expenditure? A policy by which pay-out will be fixed is imperative. This ratio must lie within relatively narrow limits governed by what is economically feasible. It cannot be too low, rendering the ratio impractical or absurd, nor too great, delaying the return of capital for reinvestment beyond a commensurate interval. What pay-out will govern this policy? Federal corporate taxes would seem to present the best measure. Consider mining in Canada where new mines are exempt from Federal income tax for 3½ yr from date of first production. This exemption expressly allows The Act states: "A corporation . . . i s not required to include the profits . . . for the period of 36 months commencing with the day on which the mine came into production in reasonable commercial quantites." a company to recover capital expenditure during the early stages of production. With such an incentive, it is logical to strive for as much capital redemption as possible during this period. Thus, 3½ yr would be a major contribution to the pay-out in Canada. Furthermore, it generally takes from 1½ to 3 yr to develop

Jan 1, 1963

By H. J. Wasson, L. W. Mayer

The existing large stocks of raw materials have induced misgivings in the minds of many as to near-view prospects for a return to higher commodity price levels. Until stocks are materially reduced—and this operation will probably extend over a protracted period—a buyers' market will continue. Meanwhile the matter of production cost becomes more and more a factor of consequence to industrial management, finance and the investing public. With many commodities a general level of costs exists with which the public has been made familiar. Certain conditions surround these industries which, at the outset, determine whether there is a basis for sound commercial results. In other words, it can generally be determined in advance whether or not the cost of production is sufficiently below the normal average price to return a reasonable profit over the years. With all domestic agricultural products there are available exhaustive Government studies in the field of production costs. Such figures as the average cost of wheat, cotton, sugar, etc., are reiterated constantly. There are many products of foreign origin such as coffee, rubber, raw silk, etc., the production costs of which are to most of us matters of deep mystery. Forest products also are so diversified that few but specialists know what a thousand feet of lumber really cost at the mill, especially where remotely located. However, with respect to products of mines, production cost information has been widely disseminated. The literature is replete with such data. Here we find that without any special help from outside agencies the industry itself has given publicity to a large variety of cost figures. For example, we know, or know where we can ascertain, the cost of producing a pound of copper from Chile, Arizona or the Lake Superior district. In many cases we can secure from the company reports a vast amount of detail leading up to the cost per ton of ore and the cost per unit of the metal yield. These records are of great assistance to the mining industry as a means of estimating on new exploitations. This industry has been production-cost-minded almost from the beginning.

Jan 1, 1931

By Howard N. Eavenson

One who has been trained in belief in the law of supply and demand and its effect upon prices finds it difficult to adjust himself to the minute regulations imposed by the New Deal, and also to the bewildering changes of government policy as expressed within a short period of time between the antitrust laws and the N.R.A., and later by the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935. A survey of the coal industry since the World War, both in this country and Great Britain, however, shows that regulation of some sort is needed if any stabilization is to be achieved and if the wage structure and economic welfare of the many communities dependent solely upon coal are to be maintained. Let us look at what has happened to the industry since 1920, which can be considered as the end of the period affected by the war influence. This discussion will be confined solely to bituminous coal, although many of the general conditions are equally applicable to anthracite, the position of which now is at least as bad as that of the softer variety. Since 1920—to the end of 1934—the production of coal has decreased from 568.7 million to 358.4 million tons, or 37 per cent; the number of mines from 14,766 to 6,258, or 58 per cent; the average annual production per mine has changed from 38,512 to 57,425 tons, or 50 per cent. The number of large mines has increased considerably, and the number of men employed has decreased from 639,547 to 458,011, a reduction of 28 per cent, while the average output per employee has changed from 4.0 to 4.4 tons, or an increase of 10 per cent. The average price per ton of coal at the mine has varied from $3.75 to $1.75. During that time wages decreased largely until 1933 and since that time have increased, until now the rates paid are considerably above those in other occupations, although the actual yearly earnings are low, because of part-time work. From 1920 to the signing of the Jacksonville wage agreement in 1924, about two-thirds of the men were union members and practically all of the nonunion mines were south of the Ohio River; with the fixing of the high wage scale of that agreement, which soon proved to be an uneconomic one, many of the mines found that they could not retain their business, so gradually changed to nonunion. By 1928 the proportion

Jan 1, 1936

By Howard N. Eavenson

One who has been trained in belief in the law of supply and demand and its effect upon prices finds it difficult to adjust himself to the minute regulations imposed by the New Deal, and also to the bewildering changes of government policy as expressed within a short period of time between the antitrust laws and the N.R.A., and later by the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935. A survey of the coal industry since the World War, both in this country and Great Britain, however, shows that regulation of some sort is needed if any stabilization is to be achieved and if the wage structure and economic welfare of the many communities dependent solely upon coal are to be maintained. Let us look at what has happened to the industry since 1920, which can be considered as the end of the period affected by the war influence. This discussion will be confined solely to bituminous coal, although many of the general conditions are equally applicable to anthracite, the position of which now is at least as bad as that of the softer variety. Since 1920—to the end of 1934—the production of coal has decreased from 568.7 million to 358.4 million tons, or 37 per cent; the number of mines from 14,766 to 6,258, or 58 per cent; the average annual production per mine has changed from 38,512 to 57,425 tons, or 50 per cent. The number of large mines has increased considerably, and the number of men employed has decreased from 639,547 to 458,011, a reduction of 28 per cent, while the average output per employee has changed from 4.0 to 4.4 tons, or an increase of 10 per cent. The average price per ton of coal at the mine has varied from $3.75 to $1.75. During that time wages decreased largely until 1933 and since that time have increased, until now the rates paid are considerably above those in other occupations, although the actual yearly earnings are low, because of part-time work. From 1920 to the signing of the Jacksonville wage agreement in 1924, about two-thirds of the men were union members and practically all of the nonunion mines were south of the Ohio River; with the fixing of the high wage scale of that agreement, which soon proved to be an uneconomic one, many of the mines found that they could not retain their business, so gradually changed to nonunion. By 1928 the proportion

Jan 1, 1936

By A. Weiss, W. A. Coster

The search for ore is characterized by a great variety of uncertainties, each of which can be resolved by obtaining information at a cost. Three exploration stages may be distinguished in which information can be obtained, based on inherently different cost structure: 1) the reconnaissance or scanning stage, 2) the examination or screening stage and 3) the project stage. This exploration sequence would roughly coincide with replies to questions as to: where, how, why and how much. As complete information in each stage is too costly to acquire, we must assess the probability that adequate information will be furnished by a limited amount of effort and attempt to maximize the expected value of ore to be found for a given exploration expenditure. Several problems are discussed relative to the mathematical formulation and possible computer procedures for determining the optimum allocation of a total exploration effort. Based on the available literature possible solutions to this problem are indicated. When scanning through published literature on mineral exploration, it seems at first that there is little room for substantial and systematic improvements in the efficiency with which the problem of discovery of new ore deposits is presently being handled by large organizations active in exploration. It appears equally difficult to offer something relevantly new which could generate a break-through in exploration thinking and cause a marked improvement in the ratio of successful undertakings to the total exploration projects started. On the other hand, a number of experts in recent years have urged that the problems in prospecting be analyzed in a more skillful and sophisticated manner than in the past. Their thesis is based mainly on the premise that the cost of finding mineral deposits will increase with increasing technical difficulties. In present large-scale exploration ventures, especially in those regions where outcrops and immediately visible geologic evidence are scarce, older methods of prospecting are increasingly being replaced by more indirect and systematic geophysical and geochemical methods with more emphasis on correct statistical design of exploration patterns. It is perhaps the oil industry which has made the greatest strides in developing statistically, well justified patterns in its search for oil; possibly because oil seepages, as indicators of the presence of oil, left off at an earlier point in time than did outcrops as indicators of base metals. Among the pioneers in the field of statistics and operations research, as applied to mineral exploration, the excellent works of Allais, Slichter, Koop-man, Mickey, de Guhnin, Krumbein, Griffith, Sichel, Krige, de Wijs, and Matheron may be mentioned. It should, however, be pointed out that three subjects of basic importance to the allocation of exploration efforts have so far received only scant attention in published literature, even by the aforementioned authors. In the first place, a more precise definition of the object of the search, i.e., a minimum-size orebody, seems to be outstanding. Secondly, a decision model is not a widely-discussed subject. Thirdly, no concentrated attempt so far seems to have been made to establish probabilities of the occurrence of economic deposits on a regional scale and to arrive at a slightly more accurate knowledge of the probability laws governing the deposition of ore. It is not the purpose of this paper to create new order in the complexity of uncertainties in which our decision processes in exploration necessarily have to be conducted. Rather, we intend to highlight some of the outstanding, hitherto unmapped territory, where diligent compilation and a utilization of present and historic data may statistically improve our chances of success. We hope that the contribution of this paper will lie in bringing allocation problems into better focus and in increasing the mineral industry's realization of the magnitude of the factors involved. THE MINIMUM-SIZE OREBODY The concept of target specifications for what constitute a minimum-size orebody in exploration is a rather variable one and depends to some extent on

Jan 1, 1963

By Albert J. McIntosh

In discussing the petroleum products situation the first thing that comes to mind is "what is happening to gasoline." Is the consumption increasing? How is the export market? What about imports? Are stocks on hand too high? Have we produced too much? This paper will attempt to answer these questions. Consumption of gasoline (motor fuel) in the United States in spite of the depression and the chaotic conditions of many industries has increased during 1931 about 2 per cent over 1930. This favorable factor was offset by a severe contraction in exports, which fell off about 30 per cent from 1930. This drop in exports was so large that very little more export business was done than in 1926 or 1927. Taking all demand combined, there was a decrease from the peak year of 1930 of nearly 11,000,000 bbl., amounting to slightly over 2 per cent. The units of the industry, though, should have expected some decrease and governed themselves accordingly. Let us see what they did. They reduced imports over 3,000,000 bbl., which helped. Production was cut 3,000,000 bbl., but this was not enough, so that stocks increased 1,800,000 bbl. whereas during the previous year stocks were reduced 2,500,000 bbl. It is apparent, therefore, that something was done to keep the industry in balance in regard to gasoline, but not enough. If the year had ended on Sept. 30, we could have said that production had been cut 19,000,000 bbl. and stocks had been reduced from the previous year, but the excessive production during the last three months of the year changed everything. It is a strange thing and worthy of note that the price of gasoline fell to its lowest levels when apparently the greatest improvement was being made, and that during the last quarter of the year prices started to improve, when, in spite of an improvement in total demand which approximated 1930, an excessive production caused an uneconomic condition to set in. Stocks on hand on Dec. 31 were unquestionably too high, possibly 10,000,000 bbl. more than was needed for a strong condition to obtain. It seems almost unbelievable that the industry would continue to produce

Jan 1, 1932

By Francis Cameron

Gloomy predictions that domestic mineral reserves are approaching exhaustion are unwarranted and may be harmful, this author contends. Specific mineral forecasting errors in the Paley Report are cited to support this contention, and steps that can be taken to insure a progressive mineral industry capable of keeping pace with the major raw material needs of the nation through advancing technology are suggested. Mining is both exciting and rewarding —although at times somewhat frustrating— and we all can have real pride in our industry, in its people, and in its accomplishments. It is, however, with concern that I have noted a deterioration in this Country in what might be called mining's stature and in the growth of a belief in many quarters that our mineral reserves are rapidly approaching exhaustion. In other words, there is a popular image that we are fast becoming a "have not" nation in many respects and that the domestic mining industry can no longer be considered, in the vernacular of Wall Street to offer much in the way of "growth potential." I do not subscribe to this hypothesis, nor do I be-li4ve that the record of the mining industry bears this out. However, let me add that we can, in time, talk ourselves into this frame of mind and we can hasten the day when this very well might come about by unnecessary and unwise legislation or regulation. My remarks today are basically designed to give my reasons for refuting this negative philosophy and to review our record. With your help, I know we can improve our image, and the public's recognition of our industry's peculiar problems. The progress of our civilization over the centuries has been fundamentally based upon proper use of raw materials, both agricultural and mineral, and upon energy, human or otherwise. As the standard of living has progressed century by century, the demands for mineral raw materials have increased in an irregular, but steadily rising progression. Fortunately, those minerals on which we depend most, i.e., iron, coal, petroleum, copper, aluminum, lead, and zinc have been neither too difficult to find nor to process into useful form. Iron, the most useful of all metals, is present in various amounts in most rock types and soils. Gold, seemingly the most generally desired (but certainly not the most useful of all metals), occurs in sea water in a far greater total tonnage than has been won from all of the world's known gold mines. If the latter is true, then why do we not see large installations treating sea water for the recovery of its gold content? The answer, of course, is that even the French, who seem, from their recent actions, to value gold above all else, have not devised a way of doing this at a profit. Theoretically, it is possible, but not with today's technology at a cost which would justify the effort. Man has exploited only those mineral concentrations which accidents of nature have placed within his so far limited means of finding and utilizing. What we geologists and engineers refer to as an orebody is nothing more than a concentration of minerals, exploitable with available knowledge, that will yield a value greater than the value attached to the energy and capital required to produce it. What is "ore" and what is not "ore" is, in the end, a matter of economics. The economic problem stems from the physical and chemical character of mineral deposits. The good Lord stacked the cards heavily in favor of rising costs by limiting the amount of the higher grade ores easily available. As the best and most accessible ores are depleted, it becomes necessary to work harder and with greater ingenuity to produce more from less accessible and lower grade resources. The quantity of mineral raw materials we can have in the future will be determined largely by what we can afford to pay for them in terms of human effort, capital outlay and production energies. We will always have the problem of cost with us and our only real means of keeping ahead of rising costs is by continually improving our technical abilities. We, in this country at least, no longer have open to us large and unexplored virgin wildernesses in which a pick-and-shovel prospector might uncover an untouched mineral bonanza. The rest of the world also has few conventional frontiers left in which the explorer-prospector is free to roam. We do, however, have enormous land areas unexplored, and untouched po-

Jan 1, 1969

By S. Zekovic

"The paper gives an overview of the economics condition and strategic business challanges of the mining&metallurgy sector and their possible impact on the future development of the Bor basin of copper in Serbian part of Danube Region. Economics and strategic challanges in the mining& metallurgy complex are emphasized by world economic and financial crisis. An analysis of strategic challanges is undertaken by application of a comprehensive development framework approach. Paper indicates that an economics and evaluation of possible impacts of constraints and challenges for the development of Bor basin shows that it must be included in corporative decision, local and regional plans.INTRODUCTIONRisks are characteristic of every strategic development and business decision-making, so their successful management should be a part of the development strategy of the corporation, especially longterm. Due to the growing uncertainty in the general socio-economic environment, “risk management”, risk insurance, risk control, risk culture, risk optimization are frequently talked about. Among the key risks at a corporate level are the financial risks and risks of the regulative framework, especially in the field of environment and land use. In both cases, it is a question of external risks, which the companies need to relativize and successfully manage. Some companies pay more attention to production risks and search for better solutions in that domain which is not enough (Ernst&Young, 2008). Strategic business risks appear mostly on the macro-economic level, from where they should be” transferred” onto the level of sector economics and action level in corporations. Risk management include transferring the risk to other parts, avoiding the risk, preventing hazard, reducing the negative effect or probability of the risk, accepting some or all of the consequences of a particular risk.The research has included perspective and the general market trend and market positioning of the production and copper processing complex in the world; the impact of the requirements and strategic goals of the EU Directive and Kyoto Protocol on the institutional and other adjustments important for business in this sector; the impact assessment of the regulations important for business in the mining and metals sector, and case study of economics and challenges for the development of mining and metallurgy sector in the Bor basin of copper in Serbian part of Danube region. The analysis has included the identification and assessment of the global challenges on the future development of the copper complex in the miningsmelting basin Bor. Presented results in the paper are part of the research project “Sustainable spatial development of the Danube area in Serbia"" (No. 036036), financed by Ministry of Education and science of Republic Serbia."

Jan 1, 2012

By Michael Arriagada, Ivan Arriagada

"As mines return to shafts to economically exploit deeper reserves, two methods mine owners use to minimize short term costs are: sinking shafts in phases and refurbishing old, existing shafts. While there may appear to be benefits to utilizing existing infrastructure, often this is not the case, resulting in missed deadlines and added costs. Similarly, if proper long term planning is not executed when sinking a shaft in phases, additional costs and downtime will be accrued. This paper will take an in depth look at both of these options with an eye towards optimizing costs, minimizing downtime, and facilitating construction. INTRODUCTION With the onset of mechanized mining and large capacity trucks, many mines turned away from shafts and began to use ramps to haul ore to surface. However, continual exploitation of mineral reserves located closer to surface, combined with the subsequent unearthing of additional resources at greater depths, forced mines to go deeper and deeper to extend the life and keep the operation running. In shallow mines, hauling ore by truck was an economical option. However, as mines get deeper, driving ramps takes additional time, and hauling over longer and longer distances becomes less economic, both in terms of cost and time. For this reason Mexico, in particular, has seen a jump in the number of shafts which have been put into production, as well as having a number of shafts in different stages of development and still more in the conceptual stages. Many of the shaft projects in Mexico are being designed in phases, with the hoist and equipment purchased capable of reaching the ultimate planned depth of the shaft, but with sinking operations stopping short at an intermediate depth. A loading pocket is then installed to start exploiting mineral at this depth sooner, with subsequent phases planned for a later date using either a rock pentice or bulkhead to separate the sinking operations from the active shaft above. Currently, we are directly involved in two such projects which are actively being deepened, as well as having seen various others already reach completion. If done properly with the long-term plan in mind, sinking in phases can be a very viable option, allowing for faster production while fully utilizing the equipment at various depths. However, there are many issues which can arise when sinking a shaft in phases that if not properly examined and planned for from the outset, have the potential to eliminate the gains hoped for when it was decided to sink in this manner."

Jan 1, 2019