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By M. B. Kahle, A. D. Pernichele

Four types of slope failures in waste dumps are recognized debris flow, foundation failure, edge slump, and blowout. The first three types, although at times causing considerable damage to property and interfering with mine operations, are not usually dangerous to personnel because of their slow rate of movement. The fourth type, the blowout, is the most dangerous because of its explosive mode of failure and lack of forewarning. The December 1969 failure at Verona dump is presented as an example of a blowout. Data from piezometer holes indicate that the blowout was due to perched leach solutions near the face of the dump. The level of water in this zone is very closely related to the rate of leach water application on the dump. A detailed analysis of core samples indicates that the impounded water was perched on a zonal accumulation of jarosite which is associated with a buried dump surface. Drain holes proved successful in controlling perched leach solutions in the critical zone near the face of the dump. Monitoring of the water level in the perched zone is considered essential in preventing blowouts. The use of drain and piezometer holes has allowed an increase in the rate of water application on the dump while preventing additional failure.

Jan 1, 1972

By D. R. Brox, J. Levell

The Montana Tunnels Mine was mined out to a depth of 900 feet at the end of 1999. The first signs of instability were recognized in 1996 along the upper slope area of the northwest sector when the pit was mined out to a depth of approximately 500 feet. To extend the life of mining operations, it has been proposed to extend and steepen the northwest highwall to a depth of 1000 feet. Slope stability analyses were carried out using the UDEC software program to assess the stability and deformation of the proposed highwall design. Back analysis of an instability in 1997 along the upper slope section and highwall deformation to date has indicated reasonable agreement with the observed mode of failure and displacement monitoring results. The results of detailed analyses of the proposed highwall design have indicated very limited additional deformation, further development of tension cracks is unlikely and large-scale instability is not expected to occur. A total of 40% of additional mining has been completed and ongoing displacement monitoring to date has confirmed very limited additional movement and no further tension crack development.

Jan 1, 2001

By Bjørn Nilsen, Brian J. Ballou

The Tellnes open pit mine in Southwestern Norway has been operating since 1960. The maximum height of pit walls is currently about 150 meters with the current mine plan extending this distance to 400 meters with slope stability being a major controlling factor. As a result of unfavorable combinations of directions of major joints and faults, local stability problems have occurred several places in the pits walls. Stability problems have affected the reliability of main transport roads on several occasions. Most of such incidents have occurred during heavy rainstorms and during periods of repeated freezing/thawing. This paper reviews some of the stability problems and the measures taken to deal with such stability problems.

Jan 1, 2006

By Eldridge B. J

During recent years, Central Queensland has experienced a boom in its coal mining industry. This has involved many companies in projects requiring large capital expenditure. As with most projects of this size, many operating problems are now being experienced which were unforseen at the feasibility stage. One of these problems is the failure of pit slopes and spoil piles at some of the strip mining operations. There have been serious stability problems associated with Utah Development Company's strip mining operations in Central Queensland, in particular the Goonyella Mine. A field investigation programme was under- taken to determine the cause of highwall and spoilpile slope failures. Spoilpile failures were found to result from weakness near the spoil/floor contact zone. Highwall failures were found to result from a combination of unfavourable bedding plane dips and weakness, and the presence of joints in weak o~erburdep; Satisfactory solutions fa the staiity, problems are difficult to formulate, and-field stability experimentation is still at an early Stage.

Jan 1, 1974

By T. L. Brekke, T. R. Howard

Stability of an underground opening can be defined in several ways. To geologists and engineers that are used to working in geological environments where the major parts of the works after careful scaling can be left unsupported during the construction period as well as during operation, any rock mass behavior that requires reinforcement, support or lining may be regarded as a stability problem. To colleagues excavating underground openings in geological environments that require continuous use of reinforcement or support and lining "stability problems" are often associated only with those parts of the work where "standard" construction procedure and method of reinforcement or support and lining is inadequate, and special measures therefore needed. In either case, a major objective is to assess the stability problems correctly -as far as possible at the planning stage -- and choose methods for excavation and reinforcement or support that will bring the opening safely and as economical as possible through the problem areas. INTRODUCTION It is not uncommon that stability problems associated with faults or seams have been described as "unexpected." This term has unfortunately been used to indicate that no one knew that the fault or seam existed prior to excavation. A careful review of documented cases where serious stability problems have occurred revealed that the existence of these zones most often was known, but that their behavior was incorrectly assessed prior to or during construction. Miscalculations have been made in terms of the type and magnitude of loads that developed, and in particular in terms of the time-dependant behavior.

Jan 1, 1997

By Michel Aubertin

Les digues de retenue de résidus miniers devraient être conçues de façon à supporter les charges les plus défavorables qui puissent être anticipées. Les nombreux incidents survenus au cours des dernières années à travers le monde montrent toutefois que la stabilité de ces ouvrages reste encore problématique. Les cas de rupture les plus courants sont reliés aux glissements le long des pentes, à la liquéfaction des rejets, au débordement des bassins, ainsi qu?à l'érosion régressive et de surface. Après avoir rappelé la nature et l?importance des certains incidents récents, l?origine de ces problèmes est brièvement présentée. On aborde ensuite le lien entre les critères à adopter pour la conception des ouvrages et les risques associés à leur rupture. De nouvelles avenues pour aider à contrôler certains problèmes sont enfin discutées, en mettant l?emphase sur la codisposition des roches stériles dans le parc à résidus miniers.

Nov 1, 2002

By Ljiljana Solujic

The need for the removal of mercury from the precious metals extraction circuits may be influenced by process, environmental, as well as by occupational hazard reasons. In these circuits mercury is mainly present as cyanide complexes. The effectiveness of any stabilization method will be influenced by the high thermodynamic stability mercury-cyano species exhibit in an aqueous solution. In this study, we have investigated the utility of the trisodium salt of trimmercapto-s-triazine (TMT) for precipitation of mercury from the corresponding cyano-complexes. The influence of pH molar ratio of TMT to Hg, coagulant and flocculant additions, excess of free cyanide, as well as the presence of other metal-cyano species on the effectiveness of mercury precipitation were investigated in detail. Also, a "teal world" precious metals mill effluent initially containing ~7 ug/mL (ppm) of Hg was treated and A was found that greater than 99.8% of the mercury was removed from the solution as am insoluble Hg/TMT complex.

Jan 1, 1996

By Eugene A. Stephenson

The writer apologizes for presenting this very elementary analysis of one aspect of proration, but a search of the literature failed to disclose any concrete illustrations of the effect of various proration formulas upon the allowable oil produced by tracts of different sizes. Many engineers have doubtless made somewhat similar calculations and are fully acquainted with the results. The various allocation formulas that are in use are based on one or more of the following factors: (1) wide-open well potential, (2) potential through an orifice, (3) uniform well allowable, (4) acreage, (5) sand thickness, (6) bottom-hole pressure, (7) productivity index, and (8) volumetric displacement. Of these, the unrestricted potential formula, or open-flow test, and the uniform well allowable are commonly regarded by engineers as those least likely to give each producer his proportionate share of the oil or gas, as represented either by acreage or by sand thickness, or both, except when the wells are located on tracts of large size. Unless the mechanical equipment that may be used during the potential test and the method of taking the test are both specified, the net result of the potential formula is to practically force the operators to use special equipment and adopt special procedures prior to and during the potential test, so as to secure the largest possible allowables. Much ingenuity and skill have been devoted to this,problem, but the general effect is to permit excessive allowables for very small tracts, and stimulate unnecessary drilling. It is interesting to compare some of the high yields from the Wilcox horizon at Oklahoma City with each other, as an illustration of the effect of an allocation factor based solely on potential (Table 5). One of the glaring instances is a well on a ½-acre lease, which had produced, as of September 1936, at the rate of almost 3,000,000 bbl. per acre. This is at least twice as many barrels as could have been present under the property if the reservoir had consisted of a tank of oil 200 ft, deep and 56 acre in area. Numerous combinations of acreage, potential, bottom-hole pressure, sand thickness, etc., have been proposed and are in use in various fields.

Jan 1, 1937

By Earl Oliver

Page A.I.M.E. Stabilization Committee Activity................. 133 Definition of Capture Rule: Robert E. Hardwicke.......................... 134 Westmoreland Natural Gas Co. vs. DeWitt................ 135 Kelly vs. Ohio Oil Co......................... 135 Bernard vs. Monongahela Gas Co.................... 136 Definition of Ownership in Place..................... 137 Prospective Stabilization Remedies.................... 137 Dean Roscoe Pound's Four Teats of Practicability.............. 137 I. Mechanically Feasible....................... 138 Capture Rule.......................... 138 Ownership in Place....................... 140 Mechanical Separatio.7 Method................. 140 Engineering Appraisal Method................. 141 II. Economically Advisable...................... 143 Capture Rule.......................... 144 Ownership in Place....................... 144 III. Politically Wise.......................... 144 Capture Rule..........................144 Ownership in Place.......................147 IV. Legally Sound..........................148 Capture Rule..........................148 Ownership in Place.......................149 Dean Henry M. Bates' Analysis......................149 Raumé................................152 The A.I.M.E. Stabilization Committee was named in 1932 to ascertain whether some practical substitute could be devised for the Rule of Capture, which was generally credited with being the major cause of instability in the Petroleum Industry. After considerable intercommittee correspondence a letter was received from E. DeGolyer under date of Jan. 25. 1935. in which he discussed the possibility of modifying rather than discarding the Rule of Capture. He summarized his proposal as follows:

Jan 1, 1937

By J. B. Umpleby

The function of gas in the development and production of oil has far-reaching consequences that should be emphasized. The technical aspects of the subject have recently had a great deal of attention but less thought has been given to fundamental concepts underlying oil and gas law and the many customs and practices that have grown up in the industry. I shall review briefly the advance in knowledge of the subject and attempt to relate these concepts to legislative, judicial and operating problems. Early writers on oil and gas in Pennsylvania noted their close association in oil pools and their contemporaneous decline in output; also, that as gas pressure decreases so does production, that new offset wells reduce the output of existing wells, and even that tubing a well lengthens its flowing life. Expanding gas was deduced as the principal expulsive force. These fundamental observations had been made at least as early as 1880.1 They were treated, however, as academic considerations and did not greatly influence law or practice for many years except to instill into all operators an urgent desire to hasten offset drilling in order to obtain as much of the flush as possible. The most noteworthy later advance in knowledge came in 1926 when Beecher and Parkhurst published their paper on Effects of Dissolved Gas upon the Viscosity and Surface Tension of OiL.² This paper added to the old idea of an expelling force the concept of a modifying agent that actually changes the physical characteristics of the oil and facilitates its movement through the pore spaces of the reservoir rock. Largely since the publication of this paper, intensive study and concerted effort have been given to means of using to a maximum, in producing oil, these combined properties of gas. This is shown clearly by the number of papers dealing with the subject, and the new and revived terms now widely used to express thought, such as the expressions gas energy, reservoir pressure, reservoir energy, gas-oil ratio, bottom-hole pressure, beaning, tapered tubing and back-pressure. These terms, some of which are

Jan 1, 1932

By C. M. Nickerson

The possibility of deeper production in the Buena Vista Hills was first considered in 1933. At that time, however, the heavy state curtailment program served to deter any operator from drilling test wells, which, if successful, might upset the proration schedules. Because most of the acreage was held by several major operators and the remainder by substantial independents, the adoption of a plan of cooperative development was considered desirable. Such a plan was formulated for the development of any deeper oil and gas horizons that may be found to exist. This plan, which was signed by the Secretaries of the Navy and of the Interior on behalf of the United States on July 9,1936, is now effective for the development of lands within the area shown on Fig. 1. Unlike most unit plans, the present cooperative development plan permits each operator to drill and produce his own wells. For the purpose of this plan the Buena Vista Hills field is divided into two pools. The present production is classed as the " old pool,"' while any future production below a certain marker which roughly coincides with the bottom of the Santa Margarita formation is included in the "pool" to which the provisions particularly apply. Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 2 lies within the area and constitutes the major portion of the Federal leases subject to the plan. There are 39,040 acres and 27 operators within the area. Twenty-six operators controlling 99.5 per cent of the acreage have signed the agreement. Geology oF the Buena Vista Hills The Buena Vista Hills consist of a low range in the southern portion of the San Joaquin Valley, and are roughly parallel to the adjacent Temblor range to the south. The Elk Hills oil field parallels the Buena Vista Hills a few miles to the north. The subsurface structure is a re-entrant anticline upon the major Midway-Sunset monocline. This anticline is divided into two minor

Jan 1, 1937

By William E. Hubbard

During the last decade the known reserves of petroleum in the United States have increased from about five billion to over thirteen billion barrels. From the standpoint of public welfare the existence of these known reserves presents an undeniably favorable picture, but viewed from the position of many a harassed operator the blessing has not always been considered an unmixed one. Along with this increase in excess reserves, curtailment of production has come into being as a matter of necessity and the principle of proration as a matter of equity. As a practical matter it has been considered necessary to curtail the production of old wells as well as that of new wells in a pool. The right of new pools to produce has been recognized, and the allowable for them has come partly from increased market demand and largely from the allowables already enjoyed by the developed pools. The natural result—a downward trend in daily per-well allowables—has been especially felt by Texas operators. This trend may be illustrated by Table 1, which comprises the five active areas in Texas, and from which may be noted the following: 1. The average daily allowable per well has decreased about 53 per cent in three years. 2. Of the 184,000-bbl. increase in total allowable for the five areas, 29,000 bbl. came from the increase in state demand and 165,000 from the combined allowables of the remaining pools in the state.

Jan 1, 1937

By Northcutt Ely

The subject of this paper implies three questions: whether regulation is necessary; if so, what sort of regulation is wise; and, finally, by what government the power to regulate is to be exercised. In the year 1937 emphasis falls on the third of those questions. This contrasts with the situation prevailing a dozen years ago, when the question was whether regulation was necessary at all; and with the situation a few months ago, when the third question seemed answered by the Supreme Court decisions on the National Recovery Act, Agricultural Adjustment Act and Guffey Coal Control Act, and by the ratification of the Interstate Oil Compact. It then appeared settled that the State and not the Federal Government possessed the regulatory powers and, granting that conservation measures are a recognized necessity, the problem seemed to be to develop the wisest kind of regulation that the Constitution would permit. Today, by virtue of developments during the first months of 1937, the oil industry is faced again by the question of whether the Federal Government is to have power to control its operations, along with those of the other basic industries. Developments in Governmental Control There have been three recent developments. The dominating one is the President's proposal that he be authorized to increase the size of the Supreme Court to 15 members. The implications of that plan ought to be perfectly plain to the oil industry. This suggestion is made in lieu of offering an amendment to the Constitution, to reverse the Supreme Court decisions mentioned. In those decisions the Court held that production does not constitute commerce, and hence that the Federal power to regulate interstate commerce does not extend to the regulation of production. These holdings were contrary to the Government's contention that the stream of commerce begins in the factory and ends with the consumer and may be regulated at any point from beginning to end. That position was urged in the Government briefs in Amazon Petroleum Co. v. Ryan, defending the petroleum code, and repeated as late as Feb. 10, 1937, in the case of National Labor Relations

Jan 1, 1937

By Earl Oliver

Superficial observation of the petroleum stabilization movement in 1932 is disappointing. Threatened overproduction persisted; waste continued; proration was violated; gasoline taxes were evaded; and, as a consequence, chaos threatened the industry as the year drew to a close. However, comparison of the movement in 1932 with its beginning a few years ago, and analyses of those influences that promote its growth as well as those which retard it, disclose some reasons for encouragement. Stabilization, as we see it, is not merely a mechanical engineering problem. It involves social engineering. By which we do not mean it is possible, or even desirable, to change the nature of men, but rather that it is possible to set up procedure that will avoid causing them to clash. It comprehends consideration of physical objects that is clearly within the field of the engineer, but it considers them only in relation to their distribution, utilization and control in harmony with philosophies that motivate men and shape current conceptions of right and wrong, or of justice and injustice if those terms be deemed more acceptable. Stabilization cannot be effected without utilizing the knowledge of the engineer, but neither can it be effected without utilizing more than comes within his traditional field of activity. In discussing the problem herein we shall endeavor to treat it briefly from that consolidated viewpoint. Rapid fluctuations in supply have characterized the oil industry from its beginning; yet only within the past ten years has an understanding begun to develop regarding the extent of waste—the degree of dissipation of natural resources—that attends the operation of the industry under the practices and laws which control it in the United States. The extent and regrettable consequences of those wastes, their underlying causes and the ease with which they could be prevented are not yet generally understood even within the industry. Producing TomoRRow' s Oil Today The interests detrimentally affected by these economic evils are vastly greater than the mere welfare of the oil industry. The problem involves the nation's supply of gasoline and other petroleum products at

Jan 1, 1933

By L. C. Snider

All important industries have certain basic principles in common which govern them and give them a family resemblance. In addition, each industry has a certain individuality due to some principle or principles which govern, or are accepted as governing, that industry and which is not effective in others. The customs and practices of an industry depend on these basic principles much as the corollaries follow a proposition in geometry. After the proposition is proved or is accepted as proved, the corollaries are seen to be true almost without additional evidence or proof. In many cases, the corollaries are more important in practical affairs than the proposition on which they depend. By continued application the corollaries may come to be accepted as law and the fact that their truth depends on the correctness of the fundamental proposition is forgotten or ignored. If it is discovered that an error was made in demonstrating the proposition and that the proposition is untrue, the corollaries are, in most cases at least, equally untrue. Considerable time may be required, however, to realize the fact that the corollaries have failed, particularly if they have been embodied in custom and law. For example, in the business of government the proposition that women are intellectually inferior to men was formerly considered, by most men at least, to be duly proved if not axiomatic. This propositiot was never embodied in law, but its corollaries—that the rights of the wife in property and even in her own children were inferior to the rights of the husband, and that women had no place in governmental affairs—were duly incorporated in law or so completely approved by custom that they had the effect of law. Developments of the past few decades have proved, to the satisfaction of the majority, that woman's intellectual inferiority to man had not been satisfactorily demonstrated, and that the proposition that she was inferior, although accepted for many generations, was untrue. It was not so great a shock to men to discover that this proposition was wrong as it was to find out that its corollaries were also untrue and that the laws embodying them were not good laws and were subject to repeal. The adjustments which give women equal rights with men

Jan 1, 1932

By E. Baker, David Donoghue

Legal and legislative matters constituted the outstanding features of proration in Texas in 1932. From East Texas emanated most of the political, legal, technical and industrial activity. Conroe and Thompson developed into fields of major importance. Proration orders were issued by the Railroad Commission on many of the producing fields of the Gulf Coast and West Texas not covered in previous years. In Yates, Penn Pool, Winkler, Van, the Panhandle, North Texas and West Central Texas there were 110 changes of importance, except in allowables. New proration schemes were introduced in East Texas, Conroe, Thompson, Saranosa, Government Wells, Tuleta and Howard-Glasscock. Little progress was made in administration or technical development. Legal and Legislative Matters Proration first began in Texas in 1927 as a voluntary attempt to divide the market outlet of a field on an equitable basis. The statutes then in existence were considered somewhat archaic and the Railroad Commission's authority was limited. Subsequent efforts to strengthen the laws were not wholly successful. The 1929 Conservation Act made no mention of market demand but declared that the term "waste" did not mean " economic waste." With the passage of the Pipc Line Act of 1930, providing for ratable purchasing, it was the opinion of many lawyere that a legal means of proration had been found. The 1931 law had ths same provision as that of 1929 with respect to economic waste but specifically prohibited limiting of production to market demand. The law passed Nov. 12, 1932, omitted reference to economic waste and specifically provided for limitation of production to reasonable market demand. Vigorous attacks were being made in State and Federal Courts on the constitutionality of the laws and the validity of the Commission's orders. In Peoples Petroleum Producers, Inc. et al. vs. Lon A. Smith et al., which had been heard before a three-judge U. S. District Court in Houston on May 28, 1932 and again on Sept. 19, the Court's decision for plaintiffs, released Oct. 2, influenced in a large measure the calling of the Legislature and the passage of the Market Demand Law on Nov. 12.

Jan 1, 1933

By E. H. Griswold

The many complexities arising from our present oil pool proration systems emphasize the need for a suitable standard of property rights. Attempts at conservation and unitization agreements have frequently failed because of the lack of such a standard. The necessity of reducing production to consumption has caused umpires, committees, commissions and other governing bodies to allocate the production of flush fields among the respective owners. The methods of allocation vary widely and conservation of underground reserves is frequently neglected or misused. Critical economic conditions increase, rather than modify, competitive methods. In some fields we have irregular and uneconomically close well spacing. Many operators drill unreasonably large holes, take excessive sand penetrations or leave their wells untubed in order to secure higher potential open-flow tests than their offsets. All of these practices result in economic waste and frequently damage to the pool. Regardless of our agreement with the fundamental principles of proration or unitization, both are actual necessities in many of our present economic situations, and we are in urgent need of a suitable standard of rights to facilitate and simplify their operation. The problems pertinent to unit management are simple and of daily use in many partnership enterprises, but the problems of fair and proper division of production under either proration or unitization are, as yet, subject to controversy. The rights of respective owners must be ascertained and standardized before we can eliminate wasteful practices and still preserve constructive competition in our industry. Valuation of Tracts In a recent unitization conference it was found that each participant had a different basis for calculating the relative values of tracts. Some of these assumptions were as follows: 1. Unrestricted open-flow operation to abandonment. 2. Current proration system to abandonment.

Jan 1, 1933

By Joseph B. Umpleby

The oil industry is at the parting of the ways in relating fundamental engineering concepts to legal interpretations and field practices. The old concept, based on an erroneous analogy to wild game, that oil and gas are migratory substances and belong to him who reduces them to possession regardless of their point of origin in the reservoir, has come to be quite generally recognized as the basis of many of the serious ills and extravagances of the industry. The chain of consequences resulting from this erroneous conception has been traced elsewhere and need not be recounted here. The important problem at this stage in the development of the industry, when laws are being revised by legislative action and modified by court decisions; when added powers are being exercised by voluntary committees and official regulatory bodies; and when the need for control of output has forced itself to the forefront, is to see to it that new law and action are based on sound engineering concepts. Reservoir Energy Common Property Since the study of gas instituted by the Marland committee of the American Petroleum Institute in 1927, a great mass of information has accumulated concerning the function of gas in the development and production of oil. This wealth of data leads to the conclusion that every oil pool contains three resources: Oil, gas and reservoir energy. I take it that the central problem of this symposium is the ownership of these three resources and that "source" and "utilization" are involved because of their bearing on ownership through the demands of equity and conservation. In order to facilitate the discussion, permit me to state categorically, that: The oil and gas in a particular tract should belong to the owners of the mineral rights in that particular tract, but the reservoir energy should be common property of all owners of mineral rights in the pool I take it that apportionment of oil and gas among owners according to the relative amounts that exist in place in their respective tracts is

Jan 1, 1933

By C. P. Watson, R. E. Collom

Various chapters already written in the history of development of the North Dome of Kettleman Hills are monotonoysly identical in the one underlying' theme of conservation of oil and gas. Discovered on Oct. 4, 1928, by Milham Exploration Co. with its wildcat Elliot No. 1, the field has been subjected to practically every modern form of production restraint in the name of conservation. The record thus far developed shows that conservation was had for a time, at a price; and that unitiza-tion must be blessed by single ownership or 100 per cent participation to be effective. In fact, incomplete unitization places a heavy handicap upon its participants in the competitive development that follows. Shut-in Agreement of July 25, 1929 Not long after discovery at Kettleman but after the Continental Oil Co. and the Standard Oil Co. had completed several producing wells in the discovery group, came the so-called Shut-in Agreement negotiated at the instance of the Department of the Interior. This agreement became effective July 25, 1929. The fundamental purpose of the agreement was to prevent bringing on production of some 30 wells then being drilled and forestall a flood of Kettleman oil on the market. A cooperative scheme was developed whereby wells in the discovery group would continue to produce. Two of them could not be shut in. Drilling wells would be completed to a water shutoff in top of Temblor and operations suspended. Producing wells would contribute the value of 10 to 25 per cent of their production to the owners of suspended qualifying wells. The percentage rate of drainage contribution was left to a committee or umpire. Some acreage was not placed under the agreement. This same acreage later did not come into the Kettleman Unit Agreement. Several wells on this acreage did not contribute to the drainage fund. The total amount of oil produced during the 17 months of the shut-in agreement, by Milham, Continental and Standard from wells in the discovery group, was 5,297,262.22 bbl. The total amount paid out in "drainage" contributions was $2,046,048.18, representing sales value of 1,266,044.06 bbl. of oil.

Jan 1, 1937

By Earl Oliver

This paper is based on the formula that the petroleum industry is sick—find the cause, eliminate it, and the industry will get well. There is perhaps no difference of opinion that the cause is overproduction, actual or potential. But that, again, is a result rather than a cause. The problem is to study the influences that serve to keep production and consumption out of balance. Production control is a popular theme and a natural one at this time when the whole world is unstable; but production control in its popular sense means little more than the application of emergency measures while danger threatens. Economists differ as to the effectiveness of these, most of which are designed to alleviate and not to cure, but we assume there are none who question the wisdom of promoting conditions under which economic forces are permitted to operate freely in bringing about stable conditions. The petroleum industry suffers from two classes of economic ills that serve to promote overproduction; namely, those which are common to all industries and those which are peculiar to this industry. It is of the latter I wish to speak. Strange to say, government is responsible in large part for this latter class of ills that affect the petroleum industry and we are coming to recognize that only through the assistance of government can they be corrected. Instability of the petroleunl industry, in so far as human agency was involved, had its inception in 1875 when a Pennsylvania jurist, called upon to make a decision for which there was no precedent and fancying he noted some resemblance between the so-called fugitive nature of oil and gas and that of wild game, made mention of that resemblance. Other courts being impressed by the analogy enlarged upon it, and gradually fixed upon oil and gas a legal status in certain important respects similar to that of wild game. Although later the courts abandoned this analogy, certain practices that developed out of that early concept have continued to this day and are largely responsible for the industry's present plight. Thus, instead of ownership in place that is characteristic of private property generally, the law of capture was applied to oil and gas. Now, the rapid and wasteful depletion of game

Jan 1, 1932