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By C. H. Bertoni, A. Vachon

The Corner bay copper deposit is the first significan discovery on the south limb of the Dore Lake Complex, located at the eastern end of the Detour Lake-Chibougamau greenstone belt, Quebec. The deposit was discovered in March, 1981, after 26 years of intermittent work in the area. Mineralization is found in a shear zone cut ting rocks ranging in composition, from gabbroic anorthosites to anorthositic gabbros which have been intensely altered and deformed by at least two tectonometamorphic events. Both the copper-bearing shear zone and its host rocks are cut by a large NE-striking gabbro dyke. Most of the known mineralization is found east of the dyke, but two deep exploration holes have shown that the down dip extension is present to the west of the dyke. The mineralized shear varies from one to 15 metres in width, strikes around 010° and dips from 70° to 80° to the west, and has been tested for a length of 700 metres. The wall rocks are usually chloritized and silicified. Mineralization is characterized by chalcopyrite, pyrite, molybdenite, magnetite, and sphalerite occurring mainly as the matrix to quartz-carbonate breccias in the "main" shear zone. The predominant sulphides are pyrite and chalcopyri te as crystals or fragments. The brecciated mineralized shear shows evidence that there was at least one remobilization of the shear and it is suggested that copper-bearing fluids invaded the shear during its remobilization. The exact timing and source of mineralization are not known. Up to February 1984, 38 holes had been drilled to outline indicated reserves to a depth of 450 m of 1,5 million tonnes grading approximately 4% copper, 0.34 gm, gold and 13.71 gm silver per tonne. It is believed that there is considerable reserve potential in the block west of the gab bro dyke, the down dip extension of the main zone.

Jan 1, 1984

By Shular R. Scudamore

There was a time when heavy-duty apron feeders were built to last almost forever. The machines were heavy and built to maintain certain expected longevity and reliability. Increasing emphasis on return on capital leads to cost-effective designs. Costs can be increased or decreased, depending on customer specifications and the design philosophy of the feeder manufacturer. Specifiers can make important contributions to cost effectiveness. To do so, this article describes what should be known about planning with a supplier for heavy-duty apron feeders. There are several factors that should be considered, including capacity, characteristics of material carried, length, method of feeder loading, degree of lift, hopper opening, pan construction, and type of drive. Today's apron feeders are built in various sizes and with a variety of components to handle heavy, lumpy, or abrasive materials that can ruin lighter feeders. Careful feeder selection is important if it is to provide a controlled feed rate, absorb huge impacts, be used with long hopper openings, and have a relatively low power-perton capacity. Variations in systems and materials demand that each feeder be designed for its application, drawing on a wide range of components. Therefore, certain factors must be considered before final specifications are drawn. Capacity The design and application of an apron feeder is based on how material passes through a given system over the feeder into processing machinery. The processing machinery's capacity governs other equipment and productivity of the flow. From this basic information, related sizes of upstream equipment can be determined. Of these, the apron feeder acts as the "mouth and neck of the bottle." No more will pass than the mouth and neck will accommodate. Everything in the apron feeder design, from dimensions to power, is based on processing machinery. Material Considerations Are Vital Just as the nature of materials to be crushed or screened affects capacity and productivity of a crusher or a grinding mill, so does it affect capacity and performance of a feeder. Lump size must be identified closely so the pan width can be selected to accommodate the maximum lump with room to spare. For example, a lump size of 760 mm (30 in.) indicates a pan width of 1.5 m (60 in.) While two times the maximum lump is considered minimum width, if the maximum lump

Jan 12, 1983

By John W. Goth

This article, though not common feature material, should be of reader interest. Goth made this presentation as the keynote address at the 19th Annual Intermountain Minerals Conference in Vail, CO, in August. Introduction Working backward, what is an LDC? LDC stands for Less Developed Country. LDCs play a dynamic role in world supply and demand of basic materials. They occupy an equally important position in international marketing and finance. I will explain later some of my concerns with LDCs. First, I want to address an issue I think is of equal or even greater concern. Mining and High Technology Unfortunately, many people believe that America must make a decision now between being a smokestack-based economy or a high-technology-based economy. Some would have you believe that smokestack America is dead. Our only option is to turn to high technology, in a manner similar to countries such as Japan. Presumably, when we talk about high-technology industries we envision organizations that came into being within the last decade or so and incorporate microelectronics, biotechnology, and interconnected computers. The entire workforce is clad in lab coats and there are few employees in proportion to the work performed. High-technology industry is not labor-intensive work thanks to the efficient robots used. On the opposite side are smoke-stack industries, that we presume include the older, basic industries such as mining, agriculture, iron and steel manufacturing, ship-building, auto manufacturing, and nearly all forms of construction. These industries are judged to be labor intensive, requiring unsophisticated and untrained employees who succeed by the sweat of their brows rather than by advanced degrees in mathematics and physics. If these are indeed the presumptions about high technology versus smokestack industries, then I submit that those presumptions are a disaster. They are wrong and far from the truth. Smokestack industries, such as mining and the others mentioned, are indeed much older than some of the recently founded high-tech industries. But this does not mean that those smokestack industries are low-technology industries. On the contrary, American agricul¬ture is a very high-technology industry whose crop yields are the envy of the entire world. Mining uses virtually all of the advances available through modern technology. Far too many opinion leaders still envision mining as Humphrey Bogart and John Huston in the movie Treasure of the Sierra Madre. Yet there are many who hold the opinion that our basic industries are dead and that this country's future depends on specialized high-technology industries and services. That is tantamount to announcing we will continue to build space shuttle vehicles, but we no longer need launching pads and landing fields. The point is, we should not be wasting our time talking about "new" industries and "old" industries. We should devote our time and effort to industries that are effective and efficient in meeting our needs, in contrast to industries that are not effective and efficient in meeting our needs. Less Developed Countries That leads me to some of the problems I perceive with policies regarding the previously mentioned LDCs - Less Developed Countries. Far too many people do not realize that many of the smokestack industries being lauded in Less Developed Countries are being operated at a loss and to the detriment of worldwide industry. And the losses incurred

Jan 12, 1983

By Barbara B. Newlin, Emily Rosenberg, Marianne Snedeker

Whose longwalls perform best in Eastern underground mines? What is the latest legislation affecting slurry pipelines? What are the trace element constraints on magma genesis? How can process set points be controlled more economically without affecting product quality? Where can I get a paper presented at the Australian Coal Preparation Conference? If answers to questions like these can help with your management decisions, exploration plans, or market positioning, your firm should know about Information on Demand. Information on Demand, Inc. (IOD) is a research service available to SME members to help them get the facts needed to develop business plans. IOD can function as a research staff and data bank specialist for geologists, planning specialists, production managers, and engineers in all levels of the mining industry. Just dial 415-549-3259 and ask IOD for a copy of an obscure article, a comprehensive literature search, or a background report on a company, a process, or a product. Within a short time, IOD will have the information you need delivered to your office or worksite. Information on Demand has a bank of dial-up terminals that provide access to more than 200 business and technical data bases, including Lockheed's Dialog, CompuServe, InfoLine, The New York Times Information Bank, and other systems. These data banks contain more than 95% of the world's technical literature published in the last 10 years. There is no input required from individuals or companies. The data bases are maintained by publishers and are constantly updated with abstracts of articles, reports and reviews, and other text appearing in more than 5,000 engineering publications, as well as thousands of other trade and technical publications. The data bases are organized by subject and offer a speedy comprehensive survey of world literature. One data base, called Compendex, provides worldwide coverage of engineering publications, meetings, and reports. The Metadex data base abstracts literature on the science and practice of metallurgy, and can be accessed by commercial, compositional, and numerical alloy designations. PatSearch and Claims data bases enable IOD to determine what patents have been filed by a given entity, what international patents are equivalent to a US patent, and other vital patent information. In the non-technical arena, the Commerce Business Daily has daily updates of federal procurement information. The Federal Register is abstracted on-line in a data base, and ABI/Inform is a data base full of marketing and management information for all industries. IOD offers a free pamphlet listing these and other data bases. A typical literature search from IOD will produce 60-200 references with abstracts, and can be printed out off-line and mailed or transmitted directly to an electronic mailbox. Abstracts will often give all the information needed by the reader. At times, when the complete article or technical report is needed for further study, IOD will send a photocopy of the full text for a small additional fee. Patents, books, securities exchange filings, standards, and specifications can also be supplied by means of IOD's network in major libraries, such as Harvard, MIT, and The Library of Congress. A technical translation service is available for foreign

Jan 12, 1983

By W. J. Kennedy, John D. Gardner

Introduction During the past 10 years, energy costs in mining have risen from about 4% to as much as 25% of total production cost. When combined with declining ore grades, these costs exert inordinate stress on mine productivity. Industrial engineering techniques have traditionally been aimed at improving manufacturing facilities productivity, but they have been applied to mining as pressure for productivity improvement has increased. These techniques can perform four useful functions for mining operations by improving methods, equipment selection procedures, energy use through scheduling, and managing energy costs rather than being managed by them. This article discusses some of the standard techniques for productivity improvement, and how they can be adapted to perform these four functions. Pre-Production The best time to seek high productivity is when a mine is being planned. During pre-production, when most options are still open, an optimum mine design is achievable. At this time, major equipment selections are made, the layout, material handling systems, and processes are designed, and critical energy source decisions are made. By including explicit energy cost projections, decisions can be made that will save significant amounts of money per ton of ore over the life of the mine. Attention can also be given to often overlooked details such as lighting. Some of the same tools used in new mine planning are applicable to productivity improvements at an existing plant. These tools are the charting and modeling methods that have been developed by industrial engineers over the past 75 years. Energy Consumption Before any analysis of energy consumption can be performed, preliminary work is necessary to find the kind of energy used, how much it costs the plant, and when electrical peaks occur. Past bills should be examined to determine the monthly consumption rate and the cost of each energy type. These data should be adjusted to remove effects caused by production fluctuations or weather. Knowing when electrical peak demands occur is necessary because these determine either the electrical capacity needed or the amount that must be bought. At $500-$800 per kW for construction or $5-$15 per kW per month for purchase, they represent a significant cost. By the time these data are collected, planners should be aware of the importance of energy in the total cost of mine operation, and should have the most crucial time data for electrical peak demand. Flow Process Chart Reducing costs can be accomplished by a thorough look at mine systems and how altering one system causes changes in others. By developing and exercising models of production processes outward to the transportation of the final product, otherwise obscured weaknesses may become apparent. There are tools available for analyzing the mine and its associated systems; one of the most useful is the flow process chart. The flow process chart gives a system analysis of a production procedure by classifying all actions into one of five types: operations, inspections, transportation, delays without paperwork, and delays with paperwork. Operation: In an operation, the nature of something is changed. Examples are blasting, washing coal, and processing matter. Denoted by 0. Inspection: Examining an object for identification or to measure some attribute. Examples are determining whether a drill hole is deep enough, deciding how far to cut under an unsupported roof when operating a continuous miner, or checking the lubricant level on a truck. Denoted bye. Transportation: Moving an object from one place to another. Examples are transporting overburden, moving coal on a conveyor belt, and pumping water. Denoted by =>. Delay without paperwork: A delay that is an inherent part of the system. Examples include idle time of a continuous miner while waiting for shuttle cars or for roof bolting, crushed ore in a storage area waiting for grinding and flotation, and people from one craft waiting for another craft to finish. Denoted by D. Delay with paperwork: A delay that can be terminated only by some written authorization. Examples are coal that cannot be removed until authorized by a bill of sale and transportation orders, personnel records, maintenance, or spare parts. Denoted by V. In practice, the flow process chart is completed after data collection and a detailed examination of the process. Data collection is needed to answer questions on distance, quantity, and time for each of the operations. As the analysis is being performed, each step of the process is subjected to these questions: • Why is the step necessary? • What is being moved? • When does the step take place, and why?

Jan 11, 1983

By William L. Meyer

With high expectations and promises, computers were introduced to the mining industry in the late 1950s and 1960s. Applications spread in the 1970s when capabilities began to catch up to early promises, and people within the industry began to see the benefits of using computers in business and engineering. The 1980s have seen a wide acceptance of computers, both large and small, and the use of computers is accelerating throughout the industry. Computers have changed dramatically over the last 25 years. The power of some microcomputers matches the capabilities of main frame computers from less than 10 years ago. The variety of software on these micros exceeds what is available on many larger computers today. Changes over the next 10 years are likely to be greater than those of the last 10 years. Making use of available computer technology while trying to cope with the rapid changes in this industry will take much effort within mining. To take advantage of existing computers, consider and evaluate: project needs and applications; professional, administrative, and support personnel; computer software and technology; and computer and related hardware. Note that this list is in the order of decreasing importance. These categories are also presented in the order for which organization and solutions should be provided to get the most out of computers. To start with a computer and go up the list has cost many mining companies needless expenditures, wear and tear on personnel, and frustration. It is assumed for this article that the need for computer tools is self evident. You can do without a computer by using the appropriate techniques (manual methods) with any required shortcuts plus a lot of personnel time. Indeed, several companies are doing that as a "solution" to what to do with their excess engineering personnel in these lean times. However, the future may be better served if some of these people could be prepared to handle the applications and technology presently available. People and Problems To present the factors related to turning the computer into a productivity aide, it may be enlightening to examine some common people problems that reduce productivity. The most valuable resource any mining company has is its mining professionals. And, particularly with computers, people either make the successes or create the barriers, not the machines. The following list of people problems (syndromes and complexes) has been amply observed during some 23 years of the author's experience with computers and their applications in mining. Home Grown Syndrome - "Nobody else can really understand my problem or provide `exactly' what I need to solve it." While there may be some truth to this syndrome, it would be an unusual project that cannot be handled with existing solutions for at least 75-80% of the needs. Having a base to build on will also speed the development of any remaining needs. It does not seem justified to start all over for a new application, even if "our problem is unique." Not Invented Here Syndrome - This "justification" for the continued existence and budgets of some groups has various forms: "It wasn't done here so it obviously can't do the project the way I think it should be done"; and, "If it wasn't invented here, it obviously

Jan 11, 1983

By I. S. Parrish

Locating and defining an ore body with minerals or metals that can be recovered at a profit is the objective of minerals exploration. Direct exploration involves examining and sampling rocks either in outcrop, underground exposure, drill core, or cuttings. Indirect exploration infers the measurement of some physical, chemical, or biological factor that reflects the possible presence of the metal or mineral of interest, or a structure that may act to collect, concentrate, or otherwise favor the presence of the desired commodity. Included here are all forms of geophysical, geochemical, or geotech-nical prospecting. In recent years, indirect exploration has given rise to an impressive number of specialists and a variety of techniques. Less impressive is the success rate or productivity of the modern explorationist. Exploration Productivity Losing Ground Judging from the low number of mine openings or mine discoveries in recent years, the exploration industry is not as productive as it once was. Many will take umbrage at this judgment, but a review of the literature will support this statement. In Canada, from 1951 through 1960, there was an average of 5.6 discoveries a year. From 1961 through 1976 there were only four a year. This nearly 30% reduction occurred despite a massive increase in exploration funding. From 1950 to 1955, the Canadian mining industry spent $5 million (1975 dollars) for each minable deposit found. During the period 1970 to 1975, the cost was $25 million for each one found. The industry was spending five times as much and finding 30% less than a generation earlier. This is not indicative of a productive endeavor. The loss in productivity is even more apparent to explorationists who wander the western US, and are awed by the thoroughness and discovery rate of those early prospectors who explored from 1850-1920. The "old-timers" missed very little. They used pans and crude chemical tests in place of plasma or X-ray fluorescent assay techniques. But, they found ore bodies that led to mines. Today, the best prospecting areas are pockmarked by the hand dug pits, trenches, and shafts left by our predecessors. The success or productivity of the old-timers may be attributed to any or all of several factors. Granted, they were looking at virgin ground and at deposits that in many places were exposed. The factor most critical is, however, that they employed direct exploration methods. They walked over areas of interest, traversed swamps and mountains, and followed "colors" in stream gravels to their source. They also chipped rocks, dug pits, trenched along structures, and followed the "leads." Many of today's explorationists, on the other hand, adopt a more sophisticated approach. A geologic model is conjured up so the exploration team "knows" models, but the model should be applied at a later stage in the exploration effort. J. D. Ridge has written an excellent article on the role and timing of models. Geologists should collect and assemble data, facts, and observations and fit these into a model and not conceive a model and seek data to prove their vision. Further, many exploration managers are adept and talented at devising exploration programs. They can program and use modern exploration techniques and tools. They can apply these and their modeling capacity to assemble a glittering array of targets. It would appear that in all too many instances, creating targets has been equated with and is considered being productive. As noted, finding ore bodies is being productive in exploration. Creating targets may or may not lead to ore bodies. As an end result, locating targets is not productive exploration. How then does one foster productivity in exploration? Some suggestions are to increase the use of direct methods, follow the methods and philosophies of old-timers, look at more rocks, do more field work, use foot traverses, and do more drilling. It may be argued that this is what the old-timers have done and we would then be hoping to find

Jan 11, 1983

By A. Fred Gelding

Introduction In preparing this paper considerable time was spent attempting to find some upbeat data about the mining industry, so those of us in the field could feel somewhat better about future prospects. Much to my regret, I failed to uncover substantial evidence that our near-term or, for that matter, our long-term opportunities appear all that bright in North America. That is certainly not the kind of assessment anyone likes to hear or accept as even a possibility. Those remarks may, on the surface, appear far too pessimistic. This industry will experience a recovery and most likely will see conditions begin to improve later this year or early next. The kind and degree of recovery, however, will more than likely differ from those experienced in the past. Fundamental Changes Clearly, the fundamentals on a world scale of our business have undergone important changes. In recognizing these fundamental changes, mining authorities believe productivity advances are needed to change the direction mining has taken in recent years. The really tough question is whether increases in productivity will be enough to change the course of events that has dominated the mining sector for the past decade. Before one can provide an honest answer, an appraisal of what has and is happening now is necessary. Here are some changes and events that have taken place that effect domestic mining and will probably continue: • Mineral-rich lesser developed countries (LDCs) in Africa, South America, and Asia-Pacific have reached a point where they have developed the needed mining infrastructure to not only produce at a high rate, but in many instances, at a lower cost than fully developed countries. Just as importantly, these countries, even if they do not enjoy lower costs, will produce for world export with government subsidies because min¬ing products are key in obtaining badly needed foreign exchange. • These producing countries also have the distance advantage of lower labor, environmental, and other important regulatory costs. If that were not enough, these same countries have minerals with considerably higher grade ore and, in some cases, much lower cost accessibility. • Exporting North American commodities is impaired by a dollar that continues to strengthen against other important currencies around the world. There are other impediments to overcome, but these represent some of the realities our industry faces. Can those obstacles be overcome through improving productivity? In the past, this industry has offset the impact of these events to a sizeable degree through innovations of mining techniques, equipment and processes, and by increasing the size of its individual operations to reduce costs. Will further enhancements along these lines be enough to alter this changing balance in the future? While there is no answer, it is apparent that if we do not mount a full-scale assault in some key areas, our prospects will not be encouraging. Productivity improvements throughout the entire chain of the mining industry most certainly rates as a high priority. Every link in that chain from mine planning, equipment selections, and transportation considerations needs to be examined and reexamined to assure the lowest effective cost is developed. Quality, while oftentimes costing a little more initially, is still the most cost effective purchasing decision to make. Regulations Another area of concern is regulations, be they environmental or those that dictate what must or must not be done in running our business. Certainly, I do not suggest that we not protect our environment. However, there is an acceptable balance that has, over

Jan 11, 1983

By J. Duncan Wilkins

Introduction In difficult times such as these, there is a strong reaction to the current way of doing things. Typical reactions that we have all heard are "There has to be a better way," "We're pricing ourselves out of business," "We have to improve our productivity," and "We have to have more cooperation," between union and management and employees and management. All of these comments have at their roots one common factor - getting the maximum amount for your dollar. The other factor inherent in these statements is productivity. I have not yet met a person in our industry who has not expressed the opinion that we should, and that we can, improve our productivity. Reducing Labor Costs In light of these factors I suspect we have all spent a fair amount of time examining our labor costs. For some of us, labor costs are a high proportion of our total cost of doing business. To alleviate the impact of these costs, we have generally done four things. We have reduced our number of employees, shut down operations for appropriate periods, sought concessions from union employees, and placed freezes on wages, salaries, and other benefits on nonunion employees. These approaches have been made to improve current shortfalls in our cash positions - to tide us over, as it were - or to provide us with a chance for survival. These are short-term measures that help to bring immediate relief, but can pose significant problems (or challenges), for the longer term. For instance, what do we do when times improve? How much do things have to improve before we do anything? By seeking concessions from unions in bad times, what do we do when unions come to us in good times? It is a rather sad and critical fact that we have grown too fat during the good times and too thin during the bad. In the first case, we have failed to optimize our earnings. In the second, we have cut ourselves too far. Consequently, when good or better times have arrived, we have had to bulk up our requirements to meet production commitments. In mining, for example, when times become tough, we tend to reduce our development plans so that when times improve we have to really "sock it to 'em," so that we can maintain productive capacities. We should plan ahead a little more to reduce the amplitude of our cyclical wavelength, so that in good times profits are optimized and in bad time we are better able to take the strain. Of course, forecasting cycles is not a refined art, but if we properly control our work force levels and costs at all times, and therefore optimize our productivity, we would be more able to withstand the problems we face today. Unfortunately, it appears that it takes bad times to bring us to a realistic appraisal of our way of managing our businesses. Labor Practices Not all of the problems now faced are due to low metal prices. Inflation has played a major role in bringing costs to a frightening level. Trade unions alone can not be blamed for high inflation levels over the past several years, popular though that notion is. Contract negotiations, after all, require two parties. Indeed, our current levels of labor cost are due to two factors: • We have felt obliged to keep our employees whole, relative to the cost of living. • We have felt obliged to maintain our competitive position relative to our peers, in order to maintain our ability to attract and retain a skilled, efficient work force. In the first case, our felt obligation has been applied without due recognition of the factor of performance, either in individuals or groups. Average, even mediocre performers, have been amply rewarded for their average work and mediocrity, while the good performers, no doubt receiving more for their good work and effort, have not perhaps appreciated the slight premium for their effectiveness. The rather predictable result of this practice has been that the average and mediocre stay that way (why change?), while some (certainly not all) of the good performers have said "It's not worth it," and slipped into the warm, cosy pool of the average and mediocre. In the second case, that of maintaining competitiveness with other companies' employees, we have compounded an already serious problem of lack of skilled tradesmen by paying higher and higher prices for the existing pool to maintain comparability without improving the flow of more skilled people through sound and sufficient training programs. We have the rather dubious pleasure of paying more and more for the same problems. Compensation is either mutually agreed, as with unions, or it is unilaterally applied, as with nonunion employees. Generally, there is more flexibility available to the employer when dealing with nonunionized groups than there is with unionized groups. Sometimes that flexibility has not been used well, most often be-

Jan 11, 1983

By M. Lonoff

G. Campbell The paper by M. Lonoff looks at the importance of byproduct prices on copper production. The paper develops several interesting points on this topic, but there are some points in the theoretical discussion that could use further development. A couple of these theoretical topics will be considered here using the paper's framework of assumptions without concern about how realistic the assumptions are for the copper industry. Lonoff's theoretical model is based on a static, homogenous world where all copper/byproduct deposits are identical, and these deposits are the main source of these metals. Due to the importance of the byproducts to the production decision, the term coproducts will be substituted for the term byproducts to reflect more accurately this condition. The conclusion is drawn that a rise in coproduct prices necessitates a decrease in copper prices because copper production is increased as a consequence of increased coproduct production. The observation that real world behavior does not always follow this pattern is dismissed as "speculation." However, it can be easily shown that within this simple framework market forces might create the observed behavior. The key question to be answered is what causes coproduct prices to rise. Three possible cases will be used as illustrations. The first case is the one implicity assumed by Lonoff. Here, the demand for coproducts increases at all prices (an outward parallel shift of the demand curve) with the demand for copper remaining constant. As reported in the paper, the results are higher coproduct prices, an increase in coproduct production, and lower copper prices due to the resulting increase in copper production. The second case is when the supply of coproducts are constrained-leading to higher market prices. Copper production, as required by the simple model, is also reduced which Reply by M. Lonoff Campbell's comments give me an opportunity to clarify a few points in "Copper and Its Byproducts." That paper examined the affect of byproducts on the copper market and considered the relative riskiness of multi-metal deposits from an investment standpoint. That brief note made no attempt to be exhaustive. Nevertheless, Campbell's comments miss the point of the paper and necessitate a response. My "theoretical model" was static and I freely conceded after introducing the assumption of identical deposits that "none of the assumptions hold." These simplifying assumptions allowed me to bound the possible effects of higher byproduct prices on the copper price by assuming identical deposits and computing average price effects. I took great pains to subsequently explain that since deposits are not identical the identity of the marginal deposit might change due to byproduct price changes. In this case, average price affects will overstate the affect of byproducts on copper prices. According to Campbell, I dismiss as speculation any "real world behavior that does not always follow this pattern" (of metals prices moving in opposite directions). In the byproducts paper I noted that gold, copper, and silver price movements often parallel each other on an intra-day or day-to-day basis. Such movements are largely due to market anticipation of or reaction to changes in interest rates that affect carrying costs of metals stocks. Other movements may be due to anticipated changes in available supply or physical requirements. I loosely grouped these effects as speculative. To distinguish this statement from the main thrust of the paper, I contined "In the long run if gold and silver prices remain high the equilibrium copper price will be lower." The paper set out long run equilibrium conditions rather than attempting to explain price movements on a daily basis or on a year-to-year basis.

Jan 11, 1983

By Kenneth L. Clifford

We have heard a lot during the recession about the mining industry now competing in a world market for sales of such commodities as copper, lead, zinc, molybdenum, iron ore, and phosphate. If the US mining industry is to survive, do we not have to reduce direct operating costs to a minimum? How significant is labor cost compared to consumables, electricity, fuel, maintenance, materials, and transportation? Ore grade is ultimately the dominant factor; but can we offset its dominance by improving productivity? Is the US mining industry perhaps only 25-30% as productive as it might be? What prevents the industry from being more productive? Can we retrofit older plants to be more productive or does it take a new plant with the largest equipment available for each unit operation? Present Productivity A copper industry study a few years ago covering 13 US copper concentrators ranging from about 10-45 kt/d (11,000-50,000 stpd) showed that productivity did not vary with capacity above 18 kt/d (20,000 stpd). Operating productivity varied significantly, however, from about 180-635 t/d (200-700 stpd) per operating hourly worker in most units, but one operation had 900 kt/d (1,000 stpd). Concentrators with more than 545 t/d (600 stpd) per hourly worker were in the 23 kt/d (25,000 stpd) or more category. Maintenance productivity covered about the same range, but most concentrators were in the 270¬635 t/d (300-700 stpd) per hourly maintenance worker. Again, one company stood well above others by exceeding 1 kt/d (1,100 stpd). Total hourly productivity ranged from 125-280 t/d (140-310 stpd) per hourly worker for most concentrators. The company with the most productive operation, however, was above 455 t/d (500 stpd). Salaried worker productivity for most operations was in the 725 t/d to 1.2 kt/d (800-1,300 stpd) per salaried worker range. The best operation was 2.2 kt/d (2,400 stpd). The end result is, of course, tons per day per total personnel. Most operations fell in the 110-220 t/d (120-240 stpd) range with the best operation at 400 t/d (440 stpd). This is the productivity definition that is most directly related to unit costs. Many of these operations have made some productivity progress

Jan 11, 1983

The US Bureau of Mines' dictionary of mining terms defines productivity as "the efficiency with which economic resources (men, material, and machines) are employed to produce goods and services." Or, the relationship between the physical outputs and the physical inputs used to produce those outputs. As demand for mine materials dropped, mining companies and equipment manufacturers discovered that ratios between the inputs and the final products were disproportionate to the profits realized. Some companies are fighting for survival. The US, while still the most productive country in the world in absolute terms, is looking over its shoulder as other industrialized nations continue to exceed its yearly productive growth rate. According to John Belcher, Jr., of the American Productivity Center in Houston, TX, the US has seen a steady decrease in productivity growth since the mid-1960s. During the post World War II period, the US labor productivity growth rate was 3.2% annually. The slowdown began in 1965 and by the mid-1970s, the country's annual growth rate was 1%. By 1978, labor productivity growth ceased to gain at all and from 1978 to 1980 a 2% decline occurred. Solutions to the productivity decrease are increasing product prices or improving productivity. By increasing prices, though, the producer runs the risk of pricing himself out of the competitive market. To maintain an acceptable profit level, prices must increase proportionately higher than required to offset production cost increases, Belcher says. Many companies are turning to in-house productivity improvement programs as an answer to increased costs and declining profits. These programs are geared toward management commitment and employee awareness of what productivity means. Companies are finding ways of measuring productivity levels in financial reporting, budgeting, and planning. Organizational teams have been formed to coordinate activities and oversee product management, and improve productivity of materials and capital investments. This special issue of Mining Engineering examines productivity in the mining industry. First, there are articles about various, and different, factors that affect productivity in each of ME's five main readership areas - exploration, mining, processing, coal, and industrial minerals. There is also a look at mining industry productivity from the manufacturer's view. The next section of this special issue is devoted to some topics that affect all areas and sectors of mining: research, management practices, computers, maintenance, and energy management. Then follows case studies in exploration, coal, and iron and steel. These studies provide examples of practices and strategies used by companies and operations to boost productivity.

Jan 11, 1983

Ten years ago, only 3% of Consol's underground coal production resulted from using the longwall mining method. Today, that figure has grown to 45% and has helped the Pittsburgh-based concern fuel an upswing in productivity. The company reported that productivity at its underground mines, excluding labor strike periods, increased 24% between 1978 and 1981. Last year, an additional 8% increase was achieved. Efforts such as improved safety, training, engineering, and maintenance programs as well as the closing of unproductive mines has contributed to these gains, according to Joseph M. Richards, Consol's executive vice president of operations. But, Richards adds, a great part of the credit goes to longwall mining. What is Longwall Mining? To fully appreciate the advantages of longwall, one needs an understanding of how mining is done by other methods. For instance, in both conventional and continuous mining, rooms or tunnels are dug in the coal seam. Pillars of coal are left standing to support the roof as mining moves forward in the seam. In conventional mining, a slot is cut in the base of the seam and holes for blasting are drilled. After blasting, the coal is loaded. A more efficient method - continuous mining - uses a machine that combines cutting and loading. Longwall mining, by contrast, works backwards from the end of a panel. Two parallel sets of tunnels (development panels) are cut into a seam with continuous mining machines, then connected with a set of crosscuts at the far end. Min¬ing then proceeds back toward the entrance. Longwall mining employs some very productive machines. Large drum shearers, for example, run on a track along the length of the coal face for some 150-180 m (500-600 ft). The shearers cut the coal which falls onto a conveyor system or pan that also runs the entire length of the face. The longwall crew works under a roof of heavy steel supports called shields. As the coal is removed, shearers, pans, and shields are moved forward by hydraulic rams. The roof is allowed to collapse behind the shields. In addition to increasing production, longwall mining is considered to be safer because the miners work under strong steel shields. New designs have made them more rugged and maintenance free, as well as more stable on soft mine floors. Early roof supports, called chocks, had gaps in the roof canopies. The new roof shields now cover the entire working area and are better able to prevent roof material from falling into the working area, thereby improving safety and productivity. Longwall mining also results in a cleaner product in many mines. If the first layer of rock over the coal seam is thin, it might have to be removed with the coal in a room-and-pillar operation so a

Jan 11, 1983

By Robert F. Reeves, Stephens A. Avary

Introduction People, systems, methods, and organization make up maintenance productivity. Methods promote efficiency in operations, systems ensure consistency and continuity, and organization maintains direction and control. The common denominator in these techniques, though, is people. Management systems can be technically correct, but fail to work because management systems do not work by themselves - people make them work. Therefore, the foundation for mine maintenance productivity must begin with the people involved. Traditionally, the emphasis placed on mine maintenance, as opposed to production, is not proportional to the impact that maintenance has on a mining operation. The performance and productivity of mine maintenance substantially affects the operating costs, revenues, and profits of the mine. The mining industry has recently experienced a period of economic depression. While it has created financial problems in all segments of the industry, it has caused the industry to focus on the need for improved productivity. Mining companies that have made investments in productivity during this period will have a competitive edge during the recovery, and mine maintenance may be the best place to put that investment. Future lost production and maintenance cost problems can be avoided if mine management has the foresight to seize the opportunities that now exist. Background Technological improvements over the last 30 years have been dramatic in the industry. Before these changes, mining equipment was not very sophisticated. So maintenance needs were not very sophisticated. Maintenance people were not required to have any formal training in mechanical or electrical skills. At many mines there was no formal maintenance organization. The mechanic was a part of the section crew and received direction from the face boss. Mine maintenance was not a function, it was a task. Technological change in mining came about in response to an expanding economy and greater demand for mined products. The past 20 years brought about a change in the kind of individual needed to mine ore and coal, and an even greater change in the person needed to maintain equipment. Equipment went from mechanical and pneumatic to complicated electrical and hydraulic. Maintenance progressed from being a task to being a function. Types of Mechanics Mine maintenance workers can be grouped into three categories based on experience: mechanics with more than 20 years, five- to 10-years, and less then five years. These groupings have influenced mine maintenance productivity. The 20-plus mechanic has been the foundation of the maintenance force. He had no formal training and his skills were acquired on the job. As new equipment was introduced, he learned to repair it by trial and error. Not all of what he learned was correct. Personal initiative and conscientiousness are characteristics of this group. They have experienced the bad times and the good, and appreciate the opportunity to work. The five- to 10-year group worked with the older, more experienced mechanics to acquire maintenance skills. These mechanics came in during industry boom times, and many progressed quickly by being in the right place at the right time. Many in this group have difficulty with diagnostic trouble-shooting, and depend on changing out parts to identify problems. This group is generally more mobile and less apt to have a strong work ethic. Mechanics with about five years experience have vocational training, some formal education or basic skills training. Like the five- to 10-year group, these miners are mobile and tend to move readily to satisfy their changing needs. These two younger groups are less apt to feel any loyalty to the employer or obligation to be productive. Their attitudes and abilities reflect the influence of their general age groups, and has a definite impact on mining productivity. Past Requirements In the 1960s, the basic requirements for a maintenance supervisor was that he be a top mechanic, get along well with the men, and be a hustler and improviser. He learned the details of new equipment as repairs were needed. Oftentimes, this individual would be the only person on the property with the ability to read prints, use diagnostic testing equipment, and troubleshoot using an analytical approach. This approach to maintenance is sufficient when the equipment design is reasonably uncomplicated. Management Changes As technology progressed, organized labor gained strength, government regulation increased, and the job of supervising and managing people had to change. The environment has changed and

Jan 11, 1983

By Bruce A. McKinstry

Introduction For many major mining projects the time frame from initial planning to production can be measured in decades. Hecla's Silver Shaft project, scheduled to go into production by the end of this year, includes a complete surface facility, shaft with an ultimate depth of 2.4 km (7,700 ft), complete ore pass and loading pocket system, and 610 m (2,000 ft) of development drifting and stope preparation. The project was conceived in the fall of 1979, and the duration of a mere four years from conceptual engineering to production is testimony to what can be accomplished when a mining company and a contractor work as a team rather than developing into two warring camps, as often happens. Engineering In 1979, Hecla Mining Co. awarded a contract to J. S. Redpath Corp. to perform feasibility investigations and design engineering related to a proposed new shaft facility at the Lucky Friday Mine. The Lucky Friday, in Mullan, ID, is a major producer of silver, as well as significant quantities of lead and some zinc. In late 1979, stoping was in prog-

Jan 10, 1983

By V. Rajaram, S. Bhattacharya, M. F. Dunn

During a mine fire or other emergency, it may be desirable to reverse the airflow in order to provide an escapeway or to isolate a fire. Also, (in colder areas, the airflow may be reversed to prevent ice buildup. When reversing main mine fans, the mine operator usually does not know what operating characteristics of flow and pressure to expect. Laboratory a field tests of vane axial main mine fans in the 7- to 9-ft diameter size range were conducted to establish forward and reverse performance characteristics under controlled conditions and at typical mine installations. The data obtained suggest that reverse performance characteristics are dependent upon the blade angle and the hub to tip ratio. There is also evidence that reverse performance can be predicted for a family of blade angles and a given hub to tip ratio. Generally, quantity of air is 30% to 65% less in reverse than when operating in the normal forward mode.

Jan 8, 1983

By Fred Leighton

Miners have long known that rock noise, or the popping and cracking of the rock commonly heard during mining, can indicate instability of the mine structure. For many years, miners have "listened" to the rock talk and many times have interpreted changes in rock noise activity to be a warning of failure and have retreated from the potential failure area. Microseismics, or the study of rock noises, was begun in the early 1940s partly because of this historical fact. Microseismics is based on using geophysical equipment to detect and analyze rock noises on audible and subaudible levels. Thus, these systems are much more sensitive than the human ear and "hear" even more of the rock "talk" than do miners. Research has shown that micro-seismics can be used to precisely locate portions of a working area that are generating rock noise, and that rock noise release rate information from each area can be used to analyze its stability. On the basis of research results, microseismic systems are now commercially available and have been purchased and installed in many mines around the world. Introduction When a rock mass is subjected to changing stress conditions, such as those caused by mining, small-scale adjustments occur within the rock that release seismic energy. When this energy is in the audible range it is called rock noise. Those areas where stress changes occur are also the areas of the structure most likely to fail. Individual rock noises can be detected and analyzed to determine their precise location relative to the mine structure. Over a period of time plots of this data provide a pictorial representation of where stress changes are occurring. This is because rock noise activity tends to concentrate in those structure areas most actively adjusting to the changing stresses. Since these areas are the most likely to fail, they can be pinpointed and mapped relative to the structure. Rock noise rates, or the number of rock noises occurring per unit of time, also tend to vary dramatically before failure. Thus, the ability to locate the source of individual rock noises provides a means of determining where failure may occur, and rate counting within each area offers a means of assessing when failure may occur. This information, properly treated, can be used to avoid, control, or warn of impending failure. Successful applications of this technique have provided recent impetus to the effort of developing microseismics into a practical, reliable, and economically feasible tool. The phenomenon of naturally occurring rock noise was discovered in 1938 by Obert and Duvall (1939) who were measuring seismic velocities in mine pillars. Seismic energy other than what they were generating continually registered on their recording equipment. Further study by these researchers showed that the extraneous seismic energy being recorded was from rock noises that were being generated within the rock in highly stressed areas. Pursuing this interesting phenomena both in the laboratory and in the field, Obert and Duvall documented the dramatic change in rock noise rate before failure (Obert, 1941). They also established the fact that, in many instances, rock burst failures could be predicted by monitoring and listening to the rock noise activity in rock-burst-prone areas (Obert and Duvall, 1945). These early efforts clearly showed that microseismics had great potential as a tool for measuring or estimating mine structure stability. Extended testing, however, showed that sometimes rock bursts occurred with no apparent microseismic warning, and that at other times sharp increases in microseismic data were not accompanied by failure. Also, because precise location of individual rock noises was not possible at that time, one never knew where the failure was going to occur, only that failure near the observation point was likely. Thus, while the technique clearly offered promise, it was not considered practical then. In the mid-1960s, the Bureau of Mines undertook a new research effort to improve the microseismic technique. Major improvements were judged possible mainly because new and vastly improved electronic and system components had become available as an offshoot of space program instrument development. Thus, in 1967, development of a multichannel, broad band, microseismic system began (Blake and Leighton, 1970). Application of this system in rock-burst-prone mines showed it worked well and provided the incentive to develop methods whereby the source location of individual rock noises could be easily and directly calculated (Leighton and Blake, 1970; Leighton and Duvall, 1972; Redfern and Munson, 1982). The improved system and the ability to locate rock noises quickly showed that the microseismic technique offered new and increased poten-

Jan 8, 1983

By R. W. Carn, D. Vincent

During the next 15 years, US coal production is expected to double, with the increased production evenly divided between the East and the West. Along with greater production, coal export markets should increase dramatically from East, West, and Gulf Coast ports. The annual overseas export capacity of US coal-loading terminals is expected to rise from 147.1 Mt (162.1 million st) in 1981 to a minimum of 278.1 Mt (306.6 million st) in 1985, according to the US Maritime Administration. Increased coal production and use will lead to more development of import and export terminals, a vital link in the coal transportation chain. With continually escalating capital costs and the competitive markets that the terminals will serve, a well designed and efficient terminal is necessary. This article begins a two-part series that presents concepts presently used in coal export terminal design. Part I looks at site selection factors and equipment needs, while Part II will examine environmental considerations in building a terminal as well as typical capital and operating costs. The world is nearing the end of the oil era. In a few years oil will not be available to sustain the growth rate and increasing standard of living we have known in our lifetime. The big question is what energy era are we moving into? With the decline of readily available oil reserves and rapidly increasing prices, many countries are trying to switch to alternate energy forms. While intensive efforts to find new oil reserves continue, alternate energy sources such as natural gas, coal, synthetic fuels, nuclear, hydroelectric, solar, and wind power are being developed. Recent indications are that coal is expected to bridge the energy gap over the next 25-30 years until the technology and economics of the alternate energy forms reach satisfactory levels. Use of coal for energy is receiving strong attention due to its long-term availability (200-300 years minimum), relative ease of development, and its low cost per unit of power produced. By the year 2000, it is expected that 25% of world energy supply will be met by direct coal combustion and possibly another 5-10% by synthetic fuel from coal. Coal's expanding share in the world energy market, along with an increase in coking coal requirements, will result in a large increase in the world's seaborne coal trade. Recent statistics and projections for the future are shown in Table 1. This phenomenal development rate includes increases in both coking and thermal coal requirements. Because of the rapid increase of seaborne coal trade during the last 10 years and the even greater projected increase of trade to 2000, various sectors of the coal industry are faced with enormous technical challenges and huge investments in equipment, land, transportation systems, and port facilities. Very large bulk terminals are under development throughout the world. Latest surveys indicate that there are about 30 new coal export and import terminals under consideration and at least 30 existing terminals have expansion programs planned or underway. With the high cost of borrowed capital and rapid inflation rates there is great emphasis on new planning and design techniques to minimize capital and operating costs of coal transportation systems. Terminals A total coal supply system can be considered to consist of one or more mines; a train, barge, truck, or other haulage system; an export terminal; a fleet of bulk carriers; a receiving terminal; and possibly, local inland distribution networks that include barges and railways. Terminals, though only a small link in the total transportation system, play a key role in overall system efficiency. At ports or inland distribution centers, terminals act as transportation links bringing trains, ships, barges, or trucks together for cargo transfer and temporary storage. A well-designed terminal can provide maximum independence between two modes of transportation and optimum freedom for intermodal interference. A terminal acts as a buffer between the two transportation modes by providing sufficient storage capacity so a ship need not wait for its cargo on, for example, a train-by-train basis, but can load immediately from the ready stock. Similarly, a train need not wait for a ship to unload its contents but can dump immediately into storage. A terminal also can be used to properly mix various types of coal to satisfy a buyer's requirements. Consider the relative value of various production and transport segments for a typical steam coal

Jan 6, 1983

By Andrew N. Peterson

US mine operators frequently fail to investigate more cost effective and productive bulk material handling systems because surface mines seem to lend themselves to truck ore haulage. In this country, as a result, use of conveyors to move heavy loads from mine to process facilities has been minimized, if not actually neglected. In contrast, there are more than 50 conveyorized surface mines in successful operation around the world. These mine operators have learned that properly applied conveyorized systems can offer major savings in capital and operating costs, which contribute to improved profits when combined with other proven mining technologies. Growing acceptance and application of conveyorized bulk material handling in surface mines also points up how unique each mine is and how careful planning contributes to maximum mine effectiveness. Because of these differences, mining executives and technical and operating staffs need to develop an understanding of three factors in applying conveyorized bulk material handling in surface mines: • Why each mine will benefit from the type of automation permitted by conveyorized operation, •What kind of equipment is available, and • What applications most effectively demonstrate the first two factors in action - hauling either ore or waste. The conveyorized systems considered in this presentation have production rates from 0.5-2.7 kt/h (500-3,000 stph). Worldwide, these systems have been operating since the early 1960s. Advantages of Conveyors Why do you want conveyorized bulk material handling? First, it almost always provides lower operating and maintenance costs. Second, it frequently requires lower initial capital costs and almost always requires lower capital costs over the life of the surface mine. Third, it provides comparable operating availability, and finally, it frequently gives comparable operating flexibility - depending on the mine plan. Cost avoidance can be accomplished with modern production methods. These, in turn, permit increased productivity and reduced operating costs such as those for energy, maintenance, and manpower. It has been demonstrated in European surface mines and elsewhere, that conveyor systems frequently require lower initial costs than does truck haulage. Almost always such operations require lower capital costs over the mine life. Those costs include the continual addition of haulage trucks to both accommodate the increasingly difficult haulage routes and fulfill replacement requirements when trucks wear out. Conveyor systems handling ore in numerous large crushing and port facilities, which have operated since the early 1950s, have clearly demonstrated a useful conveyor life of more than 25 years. In contrast, off-highway trucks have life spans of six to eight years. The following examples illustrate comparative capital costs to purchase conveyor systems and comparable truck haulage units. Example 1 The ore haulage route from point A to point B is level and 610m (2,000 ft) long. The material weighs 1.8 t/m3 (110 lbs per cu ft) and must be transported at a rate of 1.8 kt/h (2,000 stph). The installed capital costs to provide a properly designed conveyor that will transport the described material from point A to B is about $450,000. The capital cost to purchase three 77-t (85-st) off-highway trucks and one spare truck - which would provide equivalent capacity - would be about $1.2 million. The truck cost estimate is based on a 6 min. or 771 kt/h (850 stph) truck cycle time. Truck efficiency is estimated at 0.8. Each 77-t (85-st) truck would have an actual haulage rate of 617 kt/h (680 stph). Therefore, three trucks would be necessary to transport the designated tonnage of 1.8 kt/h (2,000 stph). A movable crushing plant would be located at point A for the conveyors and a permanent crushing plant at point B for the truck haulage system. Capital costs for these primary crushing plants were not included in the calculations for either system because the capital costs are frequently comparable. Example 2 The transport route from point A to point B is 610 m (2,000 ft) horizontally and 122 m (400 ft) vertically - on a 20% grade (Fig. 1). The material weighs 1.8 t/m3 (110 lbs per cu ft) and must be moved at a rate of 1.8 kt/h (2,000 stph).

Jan 6, 1983

By Simon D. Strauss

The recession that began in late 1980 has proved to be not only prolonged and severe, but in certain ways unique in its effect on the mineral industries among the periods of economic slowdown experienced in the Western world since the end of World War II. This time almost all minerals have been affected. In previous business turndowns, by contrast, some mineral sectors have with-stood economic adversity well. They experienced little or no adverse effect-thanks either to a strong secular expansion in the markets for their particular product or to specific factors that caused demand to be well maintained. For example, aluminum, molybdenum, and nickel are three metals that enjoyed extraordinary growth in applications during the years 1946-1973. These metals were little affected during the recessions that occurred in that era. Similarly, coal did not suffer a pronounced drop in sales in the 1974-75 turndown because, with the price of oil rising sharply, a switch away from oil and back to coal was clearly indicated for some energy-intensive applications. Oil itself was largely impervious to the ups and downs of the business cycle until very recently. And the precious metals, gold and silver, have often been regarded as benefiting from reduced economic activity because labor becomes more available, productivity rises, and operating costs diminish. In the current recession, however, no major mineral has escaped the broad trend. The secular growth factors that were previously so evident for aluminum, molybdenum, and nickel have disappeared, at least temporarily. The stable pricing behavior that previously characterized all three of these commodities has been replaced by extreme price weakness and apparent inability of the major producers to continue their roles as market leaders. Coal and oil both have suffered from a sharp drop in energy requirements. There are those who now anticipate a collapse of the market control over oil prices so clearly exercised by OPEC since 1973. If oil prices are no longer effectively controlled by the governments of the exporting countries, then coal prices are also certain to be affected. And the combination of high interest rates, tight money, and a change in public perceptions of precious metals put the skid under gold and silver quotations in 1981 and early 1982. Although inflation has been viewed as the scourge of most Western countries ever since the oil crises of 1973-74, prices-in constant dollars-of most minerals have not risen. On the contrary, with the exception of the precious metals and oil, for most minerals the prices that prevailed at the end of 1982 were close to the levels of the Great Depression of the 1930s in constant dollar terms. Table 1 compares prices for copper, lead, zinc, and aluminum at the end of 1982 with the average prices in 1934, stated in constant 1967 dollars. This emphasis on prices for mineral commodities reflects the fact that profits of mining enterprises vary directly with the level of prices. Manufacturing and retailing enterprises march to a different tune. They establish sales prices based on costs. Their profits tend to vary with volume. Commodities are for all practical purposes fungible, that is the advantages of known brands in marketing manufactured goods have little application in a commodity market. Thus the individual seller of minerals is unable to establish his sales prices. Except where a monopoly is present, he must sell at the going market. His option is to abstain from selling if he finds the price unremunerative. In past recessions, some mineral producers chose to do precisely that-either accumulating a substantial share of their output in inventory or, in prolonged downturns, abstaining from production. During the current recession, however, private-sector mining companies did not have the option of accumulating inventories to any great extent. Capital costs for new mineral projects or for expansion of existing facilities have escalated at an alarming rate since the early 1970s. Added to this has been the heavy cost of installing pollution control or safety equipment to comply with the regulations adopted in most industrialized countries (and particularly the United States) since 1968. The consequence has been that the financial position of most major mineral enterprises in mid-1980 was already strained. To finance increased inventories meant incurring additional funded debt at high interest costs, thus impairing the concern's credit rating. Management Choices Private-sector managements have had to face up to the alternative of either continuing to produce at an unchanged rate and marketing output at unremunerative prices or reducing output. The latter has meant either operating at a curtailed rate, with con-

Jan 3, 1983