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By Charles W. Perry

The options of enhanced oil recovery, coal syncrude, and shale syncrude are compared by approximately equivalent economics. The physical constraints for the major enhanced oil recovery processes are described, followed by new estimates of cost. The range for all three options in terms of light syncrude equivalent are $22 to $40 per barrel in 1980 dollars.

Jan 1, 1982

By James A. Deane

Strip mine reclamation Fs the process of restoring the land affected by the mining process to its most productive use. This can be timber production, pasture, crop land, wildlife and/or recreational use. The mining companies must determine, through the advice of their technicians, what the most advantageous use of the land will be. If the Company does not own the surface, the owner or owners must be contacted to determine their desires as to how the land should be reclaimed. Many times, in making the plans to restore an area with vegetative cover, the watershed and the quality of the water in the area is overlooked. The water itself must be an integral part of the reclamation plan. Many lakes and/or pits can be created with proper planning. In areas in the Midwest, where lakes are a scarcity, these strip mine lakes can become storage reservoirs for large amounts of water, They can help control runoff and low flow augmentation. The strip mining operation will affect the watershed regardless of whether a reclamation plan in made or not. It is up to the reclamation technician to see that the plan benefits the watershed instead of affecting it adversely. This can be done during the operation by intercepting the water before Pt enters the active pit. Diversion ditches above the highwall will handle the runoff water from the watershed. Water that does gain entry into the pit should be removed as quickly as possible. If the rules and regulations adopted by the Ohio River Valley Sanitation Commission in Resolution 5-60 are followed, water encountered during the operation can be handled with little or no adverse effect to the receiving watershed.

Jan 1, 1965

By Randall L. Neal

This paper discusses the impact of taxes at the state and federal level on typical on-shore oil and gas exploration economics in the USA. Taxes considered are the windfall profits excise tax, state production (or severance) taxes, state income tax, and federal income tax. Also considered will be market prices for oil and gas in the USA. The effect of government take as a percent of revenue, on rate of return, discounted Payout, and discounted cumulative cash flow is shown on the attached tables. The conclusion drawn is that tax laws, while rarely the most important factor to be considered when drilling a well, can have significant impact on the profitability of oil and gas ventures, and should be considered when determining where to drill. Hypothetical exploration wells were analyzed for the impact of tax laws on project profitability. The results of this study show that when factors other than taxes are postulated to be the same (such as producing rate, capital, operating costs, and prices), cash flow can vary by as much as 68% due to the differences in the tax laws. Other significant findings for the cases studied include: (a) that discounted payout varied by as much as 1.8 years, (b) that rate of return differed by up to 67% and (c) the total tax rate as a percentage of revenue had a maximum variance of 33%.

Jan 1, 1982

By Ulrich O. Lange

Coal is America's most abundant energy resource. Therefore, it IS logical to assume that coal must be produced in much greater quantifies in order to make the United States self-sufficient, as far as energy is concerned by 1985. However, there are a number of obstacles which have to be overcome in order to achieve such a great task. According to one of the most outspoken American Mining men, there are three major obstacles. Those are: (1 ) Mining technology (2) Public image of the coal mining industry (3) Governmental policy toward the mining industry The following will be dealing with Shortwall Mining, which is a very specific part of mining technology and which might influence the image of the coal mining industry as well as the governmental guidelines, at least to make it easier to live with those guidelines. During recent years the operation of coal mines has been more expensive than ever. Since 1970, the cost of producing coal increased by 30% and the productivity dropped by just about the same amount. Those are alarming signs.

Jan 1, 1975

By A. L. Jones

The subject assigned to me of "The Power" Problem of the Mine" is so broad that I have decided to confine myself to the question of the power supply itself, rather than the application of electricity throughout the property. We will look over certain economic aspects of the problem, particularly in the way it affects the mine manager or executive and his attitude toward the power plant. The accepted method of power application to the mine is by electric power, and the experience of each of you is that the job is never complete as you are always undertaking some further electrification which necessitates the stiffing up the power house to care for the additional load. The mine executive, then, is wrestling almost continuously with the problem of his power plant. Either it is overloaded and must be enlarged and rebuilt; or its operating costs are excessive; or it breaks down and limits coal output; or some one wants to sell new and improved machinery, until the manager almost hates the thought of such a restless part of his property. If he purchases power, every day new uses for it seems to be found. In many ways this unrest is due to short-sighted policy toward the problem, and the tendency when the problem of extension has to be met, to dispose of it in the cheapest way and without thought as to where the future is leading. The day when each opening had its own boiler plant, steam hoist, steam driven fans, steam pumps, steam loaders, etc., seems to be far behind us. The recognized method of power distribution today is by electric power, except for rather limited applications of compressed air; most of which is electrically compressed. During fifteen years contact with mines of Colorado and Wyoming the writer has seen nearly every mine power house double or triple in capacity or abandoned in favor of purchased power, worn. out and inefficient machinery thrown out, isolated boiler plants dropped, seam pumping at great depth changed to electric drive, all resulting in greatly reduced labor and fuel costs. Power costs, which in such isolated plants were considered normal, would be unthinkable today. One property where the main power supply was by compressed air from steam driven com¬pressors used under boilers 8.35 per cent of all the coal mined. The cost of power was 12 1/2 cents per ton of coal mined. Another property of four openings, each with its own boiler plant and usual equipment of hoists, pumps, etc., had a power cost of 10.3 cents for each ton mined; and these were days when you did not get very high prices for coal. Another property operating two mines mostly by steam used 11.1 per cent of the coal output under their own boilers and the power cost was 19.45 cents for each ton mined. Each of these properties is now electrified and power costs are from 3 to 4 cents per ton, and the fuel burned runs from 1 to 2 per cent of the output. With the broadening market and high prices for slack coal and the high prices for labor in boiler and engine rooms, the cost of steam is reaching a high figure, and efforts must be made to keep this down, by more efficient steam production and by utilizing this steam in better machinery which will increase the work done by each pound of steam. It must not be overlooked either, that the plant which is very wasteful of fuel is usually a pretty old one and one far from reliable. In a general way the more efficient the plant, the greater its reliability. Ample and reliable power supply means ability to get out coal when there is a market. The increasing use of purchased power is largely due to changing conditions which are tending constantly to push up the cost of power, unless the most efficient machinery is used and large scale production possible. The

Jan 1, 1923

By Steve Leer

Pick then introduced the convention keynote speaker, Steven Leer, President and Chief Executive Officer of Arch Coal. Following the morning coffee break, Pick introduced Howard Goodman to present the Fourth Annual Safety Awards. [ ]

Jan 1, 2001

By V. D. Perry

Mineralized breccia pipes, because of their wide-spread occurrence and close structural relations to some of the world's great ore bodies, are objects of unusual interest for mining engineers and geologists. The literature contains many references to them, but it is questionable whether their genetic significance and economic importance have been sufficiently emphasized. The purpose here is to stress these features, relating them to the field facts, for the particular benefit of younger generations of geologists who, confronted with and sometimes confused by the growing flood of geochemical, geophysical, and other specialized research approaches, may be reassured that mappable field relations remain a foremost guide to a better understanding of ore deposits. A mineralized breccia pipe is a pre-mineral, breccia structure which has controlled the circulation and deposition of subsequently introduced mineralization. It is composed of relatively rotated angular or rounded rock fragments, set in a mineralized matrix. A pipe in plan outline may be circular, oval or approach polygonal form, with a steep to vertical axis proportionately much greater than its horizontal dimensions. The pipe is a steeply plunging, chimney-like mass of brecciated rock cemented with later minerals.

Jan 4, 1961

By Michael S. Koleda

Less than two years ago, the, Congress, with broad bipartisan support, passed the Energy Security Act of 1980. A decade marked by ten- fold increases in world oil prices and two major interruptions in oil flows from the Middle East had ended. An all-out national commitment to transform America's vast tar sands, oil shale and coal resources into conventional fuels had begun. The national synfuels effort was to be public-private cooperation at a scale unmatched in peace time. Private industry would own and operate the synthetic fuels facilities. Government would reduce market uncertainties to acceptable levels. The potential government commitment was substantial. Up to $88 billion would be available through the Synthetic Fuels Corporation, principally in the form of contingent financing. Billions more would be spent through Department of Energy programs. Additional incentives for alternate energy development were contained in the Energy Tax Act of 1978. The Energy Security Act clearly specified national synthetic fuels production objectives: 500,000 barrels per day by 1987 -- 2 million barrels per day by 1992. Finally, said Congress, Uncle Sam was going to do something about rapidly rising oil prices, uncertainties of energy supply, and the resulting disruption to the U. S. economy. Simply put, the purpose of the Energy Security Act of 1980 was to provide government guarantees sufficient to get synthetic fuels projects off the private sector drawing boards and into commercial production. Because of their huge cost, technological uncertainty, and lengthy pay-out period, these projects were always second place to projects of smaller size, known technology and more rapid pay-out. The Energy Security Act was the legal expression of public policy to bring the free-market synfuels timetable into line with the faster paced political timetable in the interest of national energy security.

Jan 1, 1982

By Heribert F. Broicher

By the very nature of mineral deposits the quality of the raw material generally fluctuates and should be known for optimum processing. Early classification, for example, of limestone into road-metal grade or lime grade or of run-of-mine ores into high grade, low grade and waste as well as information for blending or for dosage of reagents are prerequisite for economic processing. Non-contact, real-time and on-line rock identification or assessment of quality parameters can be realised by introducing the analysis of laser-induced fluorescence (LIF) into the mining industry. LIF analysis is an optical method evaluating the basically known photoluminescence properties of matter, however, extending the application into hitherto unimagined fields by use of high-energy pulsed lasers and time-resolved analysis of fluorescence in the ultra-violet, the visible and near-infrared domains of light. LIF analysers and test work in a limestone quarry and a cement plant in Germany as well as in an iron ore mine in Sweden are described. First results of test work are available and proof this technology to be promissing.

May 1, 2002

By Ward W. Minkler

Since 1978, the titanium metals industry, throughout the non-socialist world, has experienced a period of growth and prosperity unparalleled since the late 1950s. Sponge producers, melters and mill product manufacturers have operated at capacity, record shipments have been attained, new producers have entered the industry and established producers have implemented expansion plans. However, there is now mounting evidence that the underlying elements which generated this vigorous surge have abated, at least temporarily. It now appears that in 1982, the industry will encounter overcapacity, excessive inventory accumulations and the probability of declining prices. Therefore, it does seem appropriate that we now take inventory of the present and future markets for titanium with the hope we can identify both near term opportunities as well as challenges the industry now faces. If we view the development of titanium markets as a function of time, they fit rather neatly into three sectors.

Jan 1, 1982

By George K. Burke

Underpinning of a structure has been traditionally expensive, time consuming, and, in many cases, caused as much settlement to the existing structure as it was trying to prevent. As underpinning is normally one of the initial tasks and on the critical path on a construction project, there is immense pressure on the subcontractor to speed up his operation so the new structure can proceed; this can cause an adversarial relationship to develop between the owner, engineers, general contractor and subcontractor. Since its introduction to the North American market in the late 1980's, Jet Grouting has not solved all these problems, but where utilized, has shown economical benefits, a faster and safer installation, and a minimal movement of the structures being underpinned. A history of the development of jet grouting is presented; a comparison of this technique versus other grouting methods, a description of the jet grouting system with emphasis on the triple rod systems; case histories of jet grouting used for underpinning and conclusions and references are included to follow the program's themes of: - Recognizing Solutions to Today's Problems - Defining Tomorrows Challenges - Putting America on a Solid Foundation

Jan 1, 1991

By Ricardo Castillejo M.

El propósito fundamental de la presente investigación es introducir en el proceso de minado, el uso de un agente de voladura de baja velocidad de detonación (velocity of detonation, VOD) con la finalidad de mejorar los parámetros de voladura en la producción de carbón del tipo Antracita, y por ende reducir los costos de la operación unitaria de perforación y voladura.

Sep 1, 2017

By Maral Papazian Bedian

Construction contracts in the USA contain the clause "Value Engineering" ? an interesting and curious clause allowing contractor initiated design changes. Misleading is the interpretation of value engineering implying cost saving and sharing with the owner, and curious is the timing, just before beginning of actual construction. It is not surprising that such a clause would simply be ignored, because it involves change, often major design changes in very short time; and change is feared, moreover, it is vehemently resisted by all parties, owner, designer, contractor. The problem in the USA may lie in the divergence and separation of the two entities: Designer/Engineer and Builder/Contractor, assigned to the "one" engineering project. The priorities and incentives of these two groups are very different. The Engineer spends years, even decades, in design and prepares contract drawings often without a deep understanding of construction methods. Worse, with all the time available to him and in our era of tremendous advances in computational methods and speed, the designer turns in plans that are inexcusably exaggerated code-based design with excessive safety factors. As to the Contractor, he builds, often without appreciation of design principles or regard for design engineers. Redesign to apply a new technology or optimization of an inferior design just before construction becomes unthinkable. It is not surprising that adverse and hostile relationship between the designer and the contractor is a norm with extended disputes and claims, not to mention the cost these entail. Surprisingly, "Value Engineering" was successfully implemented in record speed on several very large projects in the metropolitan New York area. The process of change was unconventional, painful, and even comical. Four case studies are presented: two Design/Build: the 1.2 billion dollars Hudson-Bergen Light Rail Transit System in New Jersey and the 90 million dollars MTA Bus Depot in Manhattan, and two Conventional Design/Bid/Build: the 90 million dollars Queens Boulevard Bridge and the 150 million dollars Long Island Expressway.

Jan 1, 2002

By S. M. J. Mirazimi, F. Rashchi

Recovery of vanadium from LD (Linz-Donawits) converter slag was evaluated by means of microbial leaching. Vanadium leaching was performed in two stages. In the first stage, the bacteria were grown in a culture medium and in the second stage; vanadium containing slag was added to the metabolites produced by bacteria. Bioleaching was performed using heterotrophic bacteria Pseudomonas Putída. Control tests without bacteria inoculation were also performed and the results were compared with bioleaching outcomes. Optimal conditions for the bioleaching of vanadium containing slag were determined.

Jan 1, 2011

By Rusty Mchenry, Craig Dickerson, Robin L. Oldham

"It has been proven that longwall faces can be moved safely and efficiently. However, abutment pressures and poor ground control conditions can halt operations and be hazardous to coal miners. Recently at a mine in Southwestern Pennsylvania, roof material collapsed above shields that created two large voids and caused major challenges for shield recovery. A unique, engineering solution was developed that utilized a modified concrete material to fill the voids, creating stability in the affected area. The many phases of this project included the construction phase, void pumping, cutting out, and bolting of the concrete material. This project eliminated the hazards associated with bolting the recovery face and removing shields in adverse conditions, making it possible for the mine operator to safely complete the longwall move.INTRODUCTIONFrequently in the mining process, especially during the recovery phase, voids above the longwall supports have occurred. These voids are simply roof cavities caused by falling rock strata above the longwall face. Most often, this condition slows down or halts mining operations and creates hazardous work conditions for coal miners. Numerous methods of supporting void areas on longwall faces have been attempted and utilized throughout the mining industry since the advent of the longwall mining system. These methods have utilized many different materials and processes and have included the installation of steel or wooden beams, crib blocks, and various types of roof bolts. However, these methods can be dangerous due to exposure of personnel to the mine voids, falling roof material, and the necessity to handle large amounts of heavy support materials.This paper describes a unique case study in Southwestern Pennsylvania where longwall recovery methods, through two void fills, were successfully completed, eliminating exposure of coal miners to the rock voids above. At the start of this endeavor, normal recovery operations were halted, and hazardous conditions became a concern when the voids were encountered. However, in the interest of safety, the decision was made to try a unique method to completely fill the void from the bottom of the coal seam to the top of the void with a cementitious material and then mine through it. This is in contrast to traditional methods where beams and support materials are used to stabilize the area above and in front of the mine shields, which can expose miners to the void above."

Jan 1, 2015

For $100 a month plus expenses, Thomas A. Edison in 1879 hired a colorful adventurer named Frank McLaughlin to go west as a prospector. A few months later, McLaughlin triumphantly returned to the inventor's laboratory in Menlo Park, N. J. "On his shirt bosom and fingers sparkled glittering stones," recalled one of Edison's associates. These were only the tangible parts of his new trappings. In addition, McLaughlin "now wore the title of major which he acquired somewhere west of Omaha."

Jan 10, 1961

By Jeff Friedman

This paper addresses certain problems to be encountered when a blasting contractor agrees to provide indemnification. Nearly 100% of all blasting work is performed pursuant to a contractual agreement. Whether the explosives engineering firm works directly for the property owner, or for a general contractor by way of subcontract, indemnification agreements are generally required to protect owners, operators, general contractors, and other interested parties in the event there is subsequent litigation. These contractual requirements are typically referred to as indemnification and “additional insured” agreements. We will address the ramifications of contractual indemnification as well as “additional insured” agreements in this presentation. Some of the aspects of this paper will include:

Jan 1, 2004

By J Araya, O Leiva

The mine evaluation process, composed of the designing, planning and valuation of a mine project, is, among other variables, based on an estimated orebody model. However, as the information from the drill holes is limited, it is impossible to know with certainty the mineral content in each block within the estimated block model. Consequently, uncertainty about the value of metal grades, or other geological attributes, arises because of the lack of information at unsampled locations. This is one of the reasons why, in any mine operation, there will always exist a divergence between estimated and real values. Cut-off grade optimisation is the process used to determine the operating mining strategy (long-term production scheduling) that will maximise the total profit value (normally referred as the net present value (NPV)) of a mine operation. This is done by defining a dynamic cut-off grade policy which is constrained by the production capacity of the mining, mill and refining.Real options is a type of contract, written on real assets such as mining, oil and other natural resource industries, that gives you the right but not the obligation to exercise the contract. It is based on operational and managerial flexibility, which allow mine decision makers to react to either good or bad operational and economic events in the future. But, what do geostatistics and cut-off grade optimisation have to do with the application of real options in a mine project evaluation process? The objective of this paper is to answer the previous question by showing how geostatistics combined with cut-off grade optimisation are key tools for corporate/managerial decision makers, which allow them not only to analyse the resource/reserves of their projects, but also to generate operational strategies that can maximise project value by minimising the downside risk due to ore tonnes and grade uncertainties, while achieving operational and physical constraints such as mining and processing capacities. A real copper grade open pit mine project is used as a case study.

Sep 26, 2011

By K. L. Marshall

A facetious title was purposely given this talk, so that a formal paper would not be expected. TWO or three days ago, while discussing with Mr. Dickinson some of the details of the dust explosion demonstrations we are planning for this coming Saturday, I remarked that we would like to have as many people as possible see some samples of 20 and 200 mesh dust, so they would more fully understand just what was causing the explosions. Mr. Dickinson requested that I bring samples and screens and in this informal manner, give you all a ".close-up" of coal dust which is considered in Explosion Hazard reports. While sampling mines, for road, rib, and roof dust, in connection with safety service and hazard reports which the Bureau of Mines Engineers make at the request of coal operators, I have often been assisted by under- ground mine officials or other men of many years experience and on almost every occasion, while we were carefully brushing the very fine dust from timbers or coal surfaces, they would make some remark such as: "never had noticed this kind of dust, didn't know it was here", or "well, that's the first time I really understood what all 'this dust talk was about." Such experience makes me believe that the much published terms, 20 mesh and 200 mesh are just numbers to the great majority of both miners and operators. We are now going to have lesson one in the primer of coal dust explosions and I want to say, in all sincerity that a complete course in the hazards of mining is deserving of a place in the curriculum of the best mining schools of this country. Sample No. 1 is fine coal and dust and is a fair sample of what can be found every where in rooms and entries of a mine, as it is too small to be gathered up with a shovel and is left in the ordinary mining at the faces and is spilled along the entries in haulage. In this you will see some quarter inch coal, much eighth and sixteenth inch coal, in fact those are the sizes I find many people have in mind when they are asked about the dust made in mining. Although the sizes mentioned are the ones which seem to almost entirely make up this sample, such is not the case, for from 10 to 20% of such a sample will usually pass this 20 mesh screen and in Sample No. 2 we have 20 mesh dust. Result of many tests, supports .the statement of the coal mining division of the Bureau, that it is quite probable that coal over 20 mesh does not take part in any but the most violent of explosions and that all dust under 20 mesh may take part in any explosion. The largest particles in this sample will not be over .03 inches in their largest dimension and a pound of dust to a foot of average heading is very easily found in most every mine I have visited and usually a great deal more can be readily gathered up. It was .found early that the finer the dust the more dangerous it was for a given coal. So for the early explosion tests conducted by the Bureau a commercial pulverizer was used and it turned out a 20 mesh dust of which about 75% would pass 200 mesh. Some men question whether the ordinary mining methods made such a dust and so doubted the explosibility of the dust in their own mines. The question was well taken, and hundreds of dust samples were taken by the field men of the Bureau to determine the kind of dust being made in all methods of mining and all classes of coal. The result of such sampling showed some coals. resisted breakage more than others and that actual mine road dust, through 20 mesh, would show from 10 to 20% through 200 mesh, and for actual rib and roof dust through 20 mesh, they would get from 20 to 40% of 200 mesh dust. In testing the

Jan 1, 1924

By Reaves. M. J.

The title of my talk, "What Happened to the Uranium Boom?" is old news. Certainly it is for this group. All of us that make our living in uranium know that the boom of the last half of the 1970's is over. U.S. production has been exceeding consumption by more than two to one. Mines and mills are closing and yellowcake prices have been dropping for over 20 months. The gloomy outlook for the industry in the near term has been well documented by soothsayers of various descriptions, your daily newspapers, and in the Nuexco Monthly Reports. I'd like to attempt to describe the next upturn in the market (speculate, really) based upon the clues we're seeing now. In order to do that, I'd first like to go over briefly, some of the market factors that contributed to the recent price drop and resultant production cutbacks, and then hypothesize on the way these factors are changing and will change. Market prices are greatly affected (maybe even entirely determined) by buyer perceptions. This is particularly true with uranium, because of the long lead times associated with nuclear plant construction and also with conventional mine/mill development. Before the price rise (say, 1975) utility uranium buyers believed that: 1) U.S. producers would have difficulty expanding to meet U.S. demand. 2) Australian and Canadian production was essential to avoid shortages in the early 1980's. 3) Uranlum prices would continue to rise as demand exceeded supply. 4) Enrichment capacity would become inadequate. It was thought necessary, therefore, to build enriched inventory in the early 1980's for use in the late 1980's. Artificially accelerated expansion of the uranium producer industry was necessary to accommodate anticipated enrichment demand. Current perceptions are largely the opposite. These are the beliefs that were held most of this year and late last year as prices dropped. 1) U.S. production is far in excess of domestic need. Contraction of the U.S. production lndustry is necessary. 2) Canadian and Australian supply is optional and not essential. Producers in those countries are expanding mainly by displacing higher cost production and not because they fill a void, 3) Prices may be essentially stable for some time. 4) Enriched uranium is in excess supply. That is 1981. 1982 is shaping up to look like this: 1) Prices will have bottomed out. (That is not Nuexco's opinion necessarily, by the way, but it is my opinion.) 2) There will still be substantial utility inventories, but fewer spot sales. 3) Canadian and perhaps Australian sellers will have made substantial sales in the U.S. and will be aggressively seeking more. 4) U.S. production will have been dramatically curtailed. U.S. utilities that wish to con- tract long term will have difficulty in finding domestic sellers. Concern will develop about the availability of U.S. production capability. Virtually all long term con- tracts signed will be with non-U.S. sellers. 5) An awareness will begin to develop among U.S. buyers that we are approaching a period of dependence upon foreign uranium (which will be true). The history of the uranium market has been one of dramatic changes and overreaction to those changes. The rapid price rise of a few years ago generated excess U.S. production capacity and the rapid price drop of the last two years will almost certainly result in too little capacity. It will soon be difficult for U.S. buyers to buy domestic material except on the spot market. The question is, "will they care?" The lack of demand, of course, is the underlying reason for the current poor health of the uranium industry. In 1972, 1973 and 1974 collectively, there were 105 nuclear reactors ordered in the U.S. That ordering rate was expected to continue and accelerate throughout this century. In 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, and 1980 altogether, there were 56 more reactors cancelled than ordered. The net growth of our only customer since 1974 has been a negative 56. TO put this in perspective, if these 56 reactors were operating now it would more than double present U.S. uranium consumption. Underlying lack of demand is something that is simply not going to change in this decade. Time is going to be required. The NRC indicates that the maximum feasible number of new reactors that can be licensed each year is six. That would increase uranium consumption by only 10% per year. New reactors, if ordered tomorrow, would not generate new uranium demand until after 1990. Even so, United States' consumption of uranium will rise from the 1980 level of 18 million pounds per year, to

Jan 1, 1982