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By Charles W. Henderson

THE influence of mineral production on the development of the western United States has been profound. From 1848 to 1860, there was only gold production, the effect of silver began in 1860, and from then on both had a powerful influence. Lead production started in 1863, copper in 1863, and zinc in 1885, but was small until 1898. Gold alone was therefore the stimulus of the early settlement and exploration of the Western States.. But mineral deposits caused neither acquisition of territory nor determination of boundary lines. Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and parts of Utah, Wyoming, and Colorado were formally acquired from Mexico fourteen days after the actual date of the discovery (January 19, 1848)1.2 of gold at Sutters Mill, near the present town of Coloma, California (a discovery which, with the immediate new discoveries, aroused the world several months later) ; but the acquisition was by treaty (under negotiation for some time but signed February 2, 1848)3 in settlement of a war involving the boundaries of the grassy plains of Texas, an area at that time not known to contain any metals, and to date found to have but few metal deposits.4 The international boundary at 49º latitude for the far northwest states was determined by causes other than mineral deposits.

Jan 1, 1933

By Ligon Johnson

ONLY the acute phase of the smelter fume problem is new. The problem itself is older than the Christian era. While both lead and copper were mined and crudely smelted ; on: 3,000 years ago, it was not until the Roman occupation of the Iberian Peninsula and the British Isles, which occurred but shortly before the beginning of the Christian era, that there was any evidence of smelting operations on a scale sufficiently large to permit a fume problem. Around Huelva, Spain, are found more than 30 million tons of slag from lead smelting conducted there by the Romans. Pliny tells us that more than 20,000 slaves were employed in the Iberian mines. Extensive mining and smelting by the Romans in England and Wales were coincident with the Iberian proceedings. These metallurgical operations were upon a sufficiently large scale to produce marked results both upon the surrounding country and the smelter workers, but, as they were those of a conqueror upon conquered soil, conducted by slaves, imperial Rome failed to recognize that such a thing as a smoke problem did or could arise, and whatever fume question there may have been at that .time remained a question only to those who had no chance to answer any phase of it. The smelting operations of the Romans extended over about 400 years, and little is "recorded of lead and copper smelting from that time until the 16th century. From the revival beginning at this period up to the present century, the growth of smelting has been comparatively gradual. In Great Britain, smelting was conducted almost wholly in localities where metallurgical operations were of paramount importance, and the communities that grew up in smelter localities were due to and dependent upon the mines and smelters. This fact had much to do with the comparative freedom of British smelting from burdensome fume litigation and legislation. To a lesser degree these conditions applied to the German operations which, when coupled with the further fact that most of the early German operations were to a greater or less degree fiscal workings of Prussia, Saxony and Brunswick-Hanover; accounts for

Jan 5, 1917

THE CHAIRMAN (J. W. MALCOLMSON, Kansas City, Mo.).-Gentlemen, Dr. P. J. O'Gara, Director of the Department of Agricultural and Smelter By-Products Investigations, of the American Smelting & Refining Co., Salt Lake City, Utah, is here; he has given attention to this very important problem and I will call on him for a few remarks. P. J. O'GARA, Salt Lake City, Utah.-I have had charge of the investigations of the smoke problem for the American Smelting and Refining Co. during the past four years. One of the worst burns we ever experienced occurred shortly after we began putting all our gases through the baghouse. This occurred in 1914 after the roaster gases had been put through the baghouse; previous to that time, the greater portion of the roaster gases was not put through the baghouse. Everyone knows why a hot-air balloon goes up. The hotter the air in the balloon, the higher it will go. In other words, hot gases will rise higher than cold gases. When gases are handled in any way that will tend to lower their temperatures, these gases are going to travel less high in the atmosphere and will therefore tend to reach the ground sooner than if they are turned out very hot. So far as injury to vegetable life is concerned, sulphur dioxide is the only element in smelter smoke that need be considered. The solution of the problem will be either to take out the excess of sulphur dioxide or to diffuse it high enough, up in the atmosphere so that the concentra-

Jan 1, 1918

By Anthony Tuke

Members of the Society of Mining Engineers may well regard it as rather unusual that a paper on this subject is being presented by someone whose first taste of mining came at the age of 60 or so - someone who last heard of cathodes and anodes in 1938. On the other hand, the title does refer to the financing of a mine and at least I can claim to have spent all my business life since the war until 1981 in the world of banking, though this inevitably means that I have been used to looking at these and other problems through what you might regard as the wrong end of the telescope. The lending of money, and more particularly the provision of finance for commerce and industry, is the central job of a banker and I have been involved in this in various ways over many years, but regrettably only very marginally in the world of mining. As you will see from what follows, the rather specialised form of finance which RTZ required was, to my regret, not provided by the British banking community since the great majority of the finance came from American banks and, to a lesser extent, from German banks. I am most indebted to Mr. Roy Wright for a great deal of the nuts and bolts in this paper. He was one of the three central figures in the growth and expansion of RTZ during the 1950's and 1960's and was right at the centre of the negotiations with bankers, with governments and with many others. The going, as you will see, was far from easy. The essential basis for the financing of each of the RTZ group's mining projects was a firm long-term sales contract for sufficient of the output of the particular mine to produce the cash flow necessary to service the loans. Wherever possible, loans were raised in the same currency as the sales contracts were made. Each sales contract was designed to give the customer the product he wanted with a long-term assurance of supply and at the same time to give the bankers the protection they required. Thus the marketing concept and the financing concept for a particular mine formed one overall plan, and talks with the customers and the bankers were conducted in parallel until a satisfactory marketing/financial package was agreed in principle. Preliminary talks were begun soon after the discovery of a potentially viable orebody. As confidence about a discovery increased, customers were persuaded to enter into contingent sales contracts before the very detailed and costly business of the economic and technical feasibility study of the mine was launched; such a study might cost 10% or more of the estimated total capital cost. At the same time provisional understandings were reached with the bankers. The contingent sales contracts usually gave a period of grace of eighteen months to two years, during which time the decision whether or not to continue with the mine had to be made. This decision rested mainly on the result of the feasibility study and also on coming to a firm agreement with the bankers. If all went well and the mine went ahead, then the contingent sales contracts became firm, but they fell away if the decision was negative. The Company was fortunate that during the whole period when its major mines were being developed, world trade was increasing rapidly and Japan was becoming a dominant industrial power. The Japanese supported many of the mines, including Hamersley Iron Ore, Lornex Copper, Bougainville Copper to name a few, with the basic long-term sales contracts that enabled their development. The Germans supported Palabora and to a lesser extent Bougainville. The mines were financed as individual projects generally with a loan/equity ratio of about 65/35, without legal recourse to RTZ for the loans. RTZ was, however, responsible for providing any capital overruns required to bring the mines into commercial operations. Nevertheless, the RTZ management regarded itself as morally responsible to the lenders because, Palabora aside, the sales contracts had either a fixed selling price (like Hamersley), an indexed price (like the Elliot Lake Uranium Mines and Mary Kathleen), or a floor price (as in Lornex, Bougainville and Rossing). Thus the Company believed that any financial failure would have been due to poor management or technical

Jan 1, 1985

By Rossiter W. Raymond

Being a portion of the President's Address at New Haven, February 23d, 1875. As I have attempted briefly to show you, gentlemen, the present position of the mining and metallurgical industries of this country offers in several respects most important indications of radical change. This is an epoch for more than one branch of these industries. We are commencing again to export copper; we have shifted the main production of lead from the Mississippi Valley to the far West, besides developing a new production of that metal in Missouri; we have seen the price of quicksilver go up, and the price of iron go down to such an extent as to affect profoundly, on the one hand, the great business of extracting silver by amalgamation, through the Washoe process in this country and the patio process in Mexico, and, on the other hand, the various manufactures employing iron as a raw material ; above all, the manufacture of steel. But the epoch which has occurred in the relative value of gold and silver, in consequence of causes which I shall attempt to explain, and among which the extraordinary increase in the silver product of Nevada is not the least ; this epoch is, perhaps, the most striking feature in the review of our situation. Since my official duties in connection with the mining industry of the Pacific slope and the Great Interior Basin have led me to pay particular attention to this subject, I have thought it not inappropriate to lay before you a somewhat extended account of its history. It is a topic of peculiar interest, because of the general use of these two metals as standards of value in the exchange of commodities. Neither of them is suitable to be, for the political economist, a real standard of value. That standard is rather to be sought in some more universal product of labor, such as wheat-the relation

Jan 1, 1875

By David L. Riley

Organization The Foundling Years - 1901-1921 Two events that occurred in the decade of the 1870's have had far- reaching effects upon the petroleum industry in the U. S. and formed a basis for the birth and growth of the petroleum engineering profession. In 187 1 a group of mining engineers banded together to form the American Institute of Mining Engineers "to promote the arts and sciences connected with the economic production of the useful minerals and metals and the welfare of those employed in these industries by all lawful means". Although it was to be 30 years before an event in Jefferson County, Tex., would cause petroleum to come into prominence as the world's principal source of energy, the founding of AIME provided an organization through which the application of engineering to the recovery of petroleum and natural gas could be developed. In 1875, a Pennsylvania judge who was called upon to make a decision for which there was no precedent reasoned that oil and gas were like wild game - they belong to the man who can reduce them to possession. His decision sired the "rule of capture", which stated that a landowner possesses the oil produced from his well, even though it might have come from beneath his neighbor's land. This interpretation prevailed for more than half a century, during which time gold-rush tactics were employed in the drilling and production of many oil fields in the U. S. The resulting overproduction and tremendous waste led to a virtual economic collapse of the U. S. petroleum industry by the early 1930's. To bring these malpractices under orderly control, proration and conservation policies were developed, and petroleum engineering became the medium through which they were devised and implemented. At the turn of the 20th Century, more than 90 percent of this country's oil production came from the East, but the picture changed with dramatic suddenness on Jan. 10, 1901. Captain Anthony F. Lucas, an Austrian mining engineer, had noticed concentrations of oil and gas near salt domes during mining operations on the Louisiana Gulf Coast. In 1899 he leased a low mound near Beaumont, Tex., began drilling, and after almost 2 years of intermittent operations, brought in the famous "Lucas Gusher"

Jan 1, 1971

By Ole Singstad

THE legislatures of New York and New Jersey, determined in 1919 that a vehicular tunnel should be built under the Hudson River. On July 1, 1919, an engineering staff was organized with the late Clifford M. Holland as chief engineer, and this staff was given a number of problems to solve, such as location, size, type of tunnel, method of construction, method of ventilation and cost. After a period of preliminary investigations and studies it was decided to build the tunnel at Canal St., New York, connecting 12th St., Jersey City. This is the center of the heaviest traffic across the Hudson River. It was also decided to build two tunnels-one for west-bound traffic and one for east-bound traffic-the tunnels to be of cast iron, built up of segments and bolted together, each tunnel to have a roadway 20 ft. wide and a clear heat room of 13 ft., 6 in. This is to provide for two lines of vehicles in each direction. The tunnels have an exterior diameter of 29 ft., 6 in. The interior lining is of concrete, the sidewalls tiled with a vitreous white tile and the roadways paved with granite block. The entrances and exits at both ends are separated by two blocks so as to reduce traffic congestion.

Jan 8, 1926

By Ole Singstad

THE legislatures of New York and New Jersey, determined in 1919 that a vehicular tunnel should be built under the Hudson River. On July 1, 1919, an engineering staff was organized with the late Clifford M. Holland as chief engineer, and this staff was given a number of problems to solve, such as location, size, type of tunnel, method of construction, method of ventilation and cost. After a period of preliminary investigations and studies it was decided to build the tunnel at Canal St., New York, connecting 12th St., Jersey City. This is the center of the heaviest traffic across the Hudson River. It was also decided to build two tunnels-one for west-bound traffic and one for east-bound traffic-the tunnels to be of cast iron, built up of segments and bolted together, each tunnel to have a roadway 20 ft. wide and a clear heat room of 13 ft., 6 in. This is to provide for two lines of vehicles in each direction. The tunnels have an exterior diameter of 29 ft., 6 in. The interior lining is of concrete, the sidewalls tiled with a vitreous white tile and the roadways paved with granite block. The entrances and exits at both ends are separated by two blocks so as to reduce traffic congestion. BASIS OF VENTILATION It was recognized very early that one of the most important problems confronting the engineers was a proper ventilation system. It was estimated that each tunnel as planned would have a traffic capacity of 1900 vehicles per hr. The tunnels are 8500 ft. long between portals, and it was considered that the ventilation should be based on all of these vehicles being operated by gasoline engines. That presented a problem in ventilation unlike any other either in magnitude or character.

Jan 8, 1926

By John Henry Harden

THIS shaft, located in the northern anthracite coal-field about 2300 feet southwest from the court-house at Wilkes-Barre, in the County of Luzerne, Pa., is the property of the Lehigh & Wilkes¬Barre Coal Company. The sinking and cribbing to the solid rock (see isometrical view on Plate IX) was conducted by Mr. W. W. Kenrick. Dimensions of the earthwork to the foundation of the cribbing, 51' 1/2" long, 17' 4" wide, 31' deep. Total amount of excavation in cubic yards, 998.5. Dimensions within the permanent cribbing, 45' 4" long, 11' 16" wide, 31' deep, divided into six parts by buttons 8" x 12", each division, 7' x 11’ 16". Permanent cribbing 12" x 12"; temporary cribbing 8" x 10"; backing, 3" thick ; clay puddle to ex¬clude surface water, 12" thick; conductors, 8" x 5"; lining, 1" thick from top to bottom of the shaft. In the latter part of the year 1871, Mr. H. Murray & Son contracted with the company for the continuation of the work at the rate of four hundred dollars per yard in depth, to a point 100 feet below the Hillman seam of coal ; for the succeeding 100 feet the price to be increased twenty-five dollars per yard, and so on until the bottom rock of the Baltimore seam of coal was found. The size of the shaft within the cribbing timbers is 45 feet 4 inches by 11 feet 6 inches, having six divisions of equal dimensions, 7 feet by 11 feet 6 inches, giving room for what is known as the" standard diamond" car, whose capacity when level full is 100 cubic feet, but when loaded by the miner 4 inches above the top contains 112 cubic feet.* Two divisions of this shaft are intended for hoisting coal from the Hillman seam, two from the Baltimore seam, one for ventilation, and one for pumps. The works were planned for two pairs of direct-acting, high-pres¬sure engines, twenty-four boilers, and for an estimated output of 2500 tons of coal per day from the two seams. * Size of the "standard diamond" car, 8' 10” x 4' 3" x 2’ 8” = 100.1.4; loaded 4 inches above the top, 8' 10” x 4’ 3” x 3’ “0"= 112.7.6.

Jan 1, 1877

By Cornelius Kelley

I HAVE been asked to pay a tribute to the mining industry. It is appropriate to this occasion that a word upon this subject should be spoken to this assemblage; but to pay a tribute to the mining indus-try, one that would be worthy of its traditions and its accomplishment and that would outline what it has meant to the economic and social development of this nation, would carry me far beyond what must be the brief confines of this address. I wonder how many there are who have ever paused to reflect how different might have been the current history of the world had it not been that for nearly eighty years a never-interrupted stream of wealth has flowed from the storehouse of treasure in the mines of the West into the commercial and economic life not only of this nation but of the world. Truly it was a historic day that Marshall discovered in the runway at Sutter's mill the glistening particles that proved to be gold. That event was one of the most momentous events in its consequences that ever happened in the history of mankind. Without its occurrence this nation undoubtedly would have grown; it would have reached a position; of economic and social soundness; but certainly it could not have achieved the splendid and immediate results that have become our proudest heritage and established our unrivaled posi-tion in the industrial world. As the primal cause that led to one of the great migratory movements of man it stands alone, unequaled, without any precedent in the annals of history, comparable in its effect on the imagination, on the movement, and on the devlop-ment of a people. Nearly three-quarters of a century had passed since the banners of the Revolution had been furled and a new nation had come into existence. Beyond the boun-daries of the original colonies, and through the passes of the Alleghanies, hardy frontiersmen had cut their way, and the process of establishing what have become -great states in the Valley of the Mississippi was under way. An empire of virgin land beckoned to the home-seekers of the world; but scarcely had its occupation been begun when, true to the instinctive urge that meant the ultimate destiny of the nation, there began the movement to carry the Stars and Stripes westward to the Pacific. Within the boundaries of what was then Mexico, Americans fought and died in the Alamo, and the banner of the Texan had been raised in eager ex-pectancy that its Lone Star might be added to the grow-ing constellation on the American banner.

Jan 5, 1928

By G. Ansel, J. O. Betteron

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER is to give a brief picture of present day magnesium rolling practice, to elaborate on laboratory and development rolling experiments; and finally, to discuss the possible Future rolling of magnesium. The present production practice is so varied between various mills that it can only he concluded that no single producer is now using a process that is outstandingly superior to others. In view of this, only the general features of present day production practice have been presented and attention is focussed on the results of laboratory find development rolling of magnesium-base alloys as indications of the Future trend of magnesium rolling. MAGNESIUM ROLLING LITERATURE The literature relating to magnesium rolling is divided into three groups: the deformation mechanisms of the hexagonal magnesium crystals, the metallurgical aspects and laboratory type experiments in rolling, and finally, the articles on production rolling methods. This literature was reviewed and is summarized below. In the first group of references, the existence of basal slip in magnesium single crystals was shown by Schiebold and Siebel1 and of {102} twinning by Mathewson and Phillips2, Schmid3 predicted and partially established {101} slip at hot working temperatures. Bakarian and Mathewson4 confirmed the above and eliminated {101} twinning as a probable deformation mechan-

Jan 1, 1948

By W. A. Longacre

IN the geophysical exploration program of the Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. on the Marquette Range of Northern Michigan, the vertical intensity magnetometer has been used to obtain magnetic anomaly maps of large areas. A network of magnetic base stations has been established and the relative vertical intensity at each station measured carefully with respect to a prime base. In the search for the relatively nonmagnetic soft red hematite ore, the magnetic exploration is indirect, involving the study of dikes, faults, contacts, and other structural features. It was found that the, magnetometer, adjusted to a scale value of approximately 40 y per scale division, was satisfactory for this type of exploration, although many magnetic anomalies were encountered that required the use of auxiliary magnets.

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