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By D. W. Loughridge

INTRODUCTION Raising capital in the 1990s is a timely subject. However, many of us thought why should raising capital in the 1990s prove to be unlike it was in the 19805, the 1970s, the 1%0s, or earlier? There are a lot of creative people in banking and in corporate treasury departments. New tools and techniques are continuing to emerge, many of which are discussed in other papers in this book. While we have new financing tools at our disposal, the underlying issue has not changed. Projects and investments must be judged on their own merits. If they cannot be justified by conventional financial analysis, they should not be built. If they can be justified, it is likely that the financing will be available. The challenges faced in raising capital in this decade will persist to the next. The issues of the 1980s -- currency fluctuation, disruptive merger and acquisition activity, commodity price volatility, political risk, and debt crisis -- will all persist in an increasingly international business environment. I will focus on the financing we have just completed for the Escondida Copper Project in Chile. The Escondida financing is structured along the classic project financing model developed in the late 1970s, but it deals with issues of the 1980s and the 1990s. The financing was intriguing, not just because of the technical issues involved, but also the challenge of reaching an agreement in a large and diverse group. Escondida had the one essential feature that made its financing possible. It was commercially very attractive. It would produce at low cost a commodity (copper concentrates) that direct consumers felt would be in tight supply. The project had the direct support not only of its sponsors, but also its customers, and, very importantly, its host government. The non- recourse financing of Escondida would not have been possible without the support of these parties, and without the robust economics that made this effort worthwhile. The issue was more complicated. Operations in all parts of the world entail some political exposure. This project is in Chile, where there was a constitutional requirement that a plebescite be held when the project would be in its early stages. This plebescite would determine the fate of a 15 year old military dictatorship. The project is copper, a commodity generally deemed to be in surplus. Copper has a history of price volatility (whose price has varied from $.58 to $1.53 per pound over the past two years). It is politically sensitive, not only in Chile, but in the United States, Canada and other developed countries. The project is international, with all the problems of dealing with a variety of currencies, a variety of cultures, and a variety of laws and commercial practices. The project is also large and capital intensive, with a total cost of U.S. $1.1 billion. ESCONDIDA PROJECT Escondida, the largest known copper ore body in the world, was discovered in March of 1981, by Utah International in a joint venture with Getty Oil Company. In 1984, both Utah and Getty were involved in ownership changes, Utah being acquired by BHP. A later restructuring of the ownership of Escondida resulted in BHP, as manager, carrying a 60% interest, Rio Tinto-Zinc Corporation (RTZ) 30%, and a consortium of Japanese companies led by Mitsubishi Corporation with 10%. The Japanese consortium is incorporated as JECO (Japan Escondida Corporation). This ownership structure, which spread ownership around the world, was the first tangible step toward managing both the commercial and political risk associated with the project.

Jan 1, 1990

By Ian MacGregor

INTRODUCTION I retired in 1977 and have been enjoying myself ever since doing odd jobs for various people - on occasions, politicians. I commend it to you as post retirement - get involved in situations that nobody else will take on. It produces all sorts of excitement, it is a lot of fun and, courtesy of the media, you provide great raw material for their current Punch and Judy shows. The example of the adventures in the Escondida financing made me think about the history of the minerals industry in the United States. In order to see more clearly what is going to happen in the future, we have to look at the past and what we have learned, and try to extrapolate from that a scenario for the future. This paper is about global material cycles and the financial needs of the extractive industries. Since about 2,000 years B.C. we have been living in the Iron Age. Since about 4,000 B.C. we have been living in the Copper Age. These have been the two foundations of modern industrial society. Understanding the use of metals and materials helps us understand the civilization in which we live today. Let me focus more closely on the United States, particularly in this century. In the first two-thirds of this century the United States was growing and expanding and developing. It was providing for its inhabitants a society which was enjoying the benefits of a rising standard of living, improved opportunities and the ability to support a population growing at quite a dramatic rate. It is still growing. In the Department of Commerce, there is a clock that shows how many people there are in the United States. It turns all the time; the numbers are going up. On January 21,1980, when Ronald Reagan was sworn in as President, the number on that clock was a little over 220 million, and in the last week before he left, it was travelling towards 245 million. During his period in Washington, we have added , the equivalent of one total state such as California. That gives the dimensions of the U.S. appetite for raw material inputs. The inputs are of critical importance. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE During the first two-thirds of this century, the minerals sector enjoyed comparative advantages. There was a clear understanding of the importance of minerals enshrined in the tax legislation of the country from the early decades of this century - the depletion allowance. No other country identified as clearly that the supplies of minerals were finite. As they are used up, just as with a wearing-out machine, one must get capital back to replace the resource when the time comes. Within the last decade, that idea has been questioned and criticised. It is now seen as giving money away to a preferred part of the economy, instead of recognizing what depletion is all about. In previous times it insured that the U.S. always was able to regenerate the capital in its minerals industry, so that it could remain competitive. The U.S. had plenty of everything, including energy. We had a growing population. Equally important, we had an agriculture that led the world in productivity, even as far back as the turn of the century. It continues to do so. We still retain that comparative advantage, an ability to produce our foodstuffs in quantity and quality at excellent cost. Look at another ingredient of our comparative advantage, the energy position. We ran through the first two-thirds of the century with ever- decreasing energy costs. In the 1940s and 1950s the coal industry went into a decline. Why? Because the $3.00 - $5.00 a ton cost of mining coal in the U.S. represented relatively expensive energy. A ton of good grade bituminous coal contains 25 million BTU's. $0.20 a million BTU's represents $5.00 a ton at the pithead. That price was undermined by the increasing ability to find petroleum at even lower costs. At the apex of the growth of development of the American dominated

Jan 1, 1990

By Klaus M. Zeitler

INTRODUCTION One cannot discuss the subject of "Raising Capital in the 1990s" without having a crystal ball and a reliable fortune teller. This discusses "Raising Capital for the 1990sW, which is what Metal1 Mining Corporation did in 1987. We raised (3166 million in an IPO (initial public offering) that was originally planned for only some (375 million. Why did we raise this money? How did we do it, and why was this IPO so successful? The answer to the first question requires a description of the promoter and principal shareholder of Metal1 Mining Corporation, Metallgesellschaft AG. This West Germany company was founded over 100 years ago in Frankfurt as a trading house for non-ferrous metals. It has developed into one of the world's leading firms in the non-ferrous metals industry. The company's worldwide activities in all areas of that business include mining, smelting and refining, the trading of ore, base and precious metals, the production of semi-fabricated and finished metal products, and the provision of engineering, construction and transportation services. Metallgesellschaft AG has also diversified into many other areas, the most significant of which are manufacturing, the production of chemicals, the development and application of technical and chemical processes, the planning and construction of industrial plants, and activities associated with finance, insurance, shipping and freight forwarding, and the provision of barter and countertrade services. The company maintains a network of more than 100 offices around the world; it employs some 25,000 people in its worldwide activities. [Selected financial data, as of September 30, 1987: (MetaUgesellschafl AG) Working Capital DM 8%.6 million CDNS 672.8 million Long Term Debt DM 568.0 million CDNS 426.2 million Sales DM 14.9 billion CDNS 11.2 billion Net Income DM 87.7 million CDN$ 65.8 million Market Capitalization at April 27, 1987: (Metallgesellschafi AG) Outstanding Shares ~,6oo,o0o DM 1,875 million CDNS 1,407 million] For the fiscal year ended September 30, 1987, Metallgesellschaft AG had, on a consolidated basis, net sales of DM13.3 billion, net income of DM100 million and total assets of about DM7.0 billion. Metallgesellschaft AG established the American Metal Company, a predecessor of AMAX Inc. one of the largest ventures undertaken by Metallgesellschaft AG then was the acquisition, through the American Metal Company, of a majority share in the Mexican Penoles mine, a large lead and silver deposit. METALLGESELLSCHAFT AG Figure 1 depicts an overview of Metallgesellschaft AG before and at the time the initial public offering of Metall Mining Corporation's shares took place. It shows that mining was far from the centre of Metallgesellschaft's activities. Therefore, it could not expect to receive an extraordinary amount of board attention. Thus, mining investments not only had to compare well with other mining opportunities, but were in fierce competition with projects from other divisions. In addition, mining was sub-divided into two separate departments -- domestic and international. These two departments had different management styles and diverging interests which resulted in a minimum co-operation between them. The domestic mining department was primarily interested in the survival of the local mines. These mines were characterized by rising operating costs and declining ore grades. It took a special commitment and continued ingenuity to develop and adjust to local conditions, and modern mining and processing technology, in order to remain competitive, or at least survive within the international mining industry. Local management

Jan 1, 1990

By R. E. Ray, J. W. Stevenson, J. A. Berry

Conventional concrete block plastered with a cementitious coating is the most common material used in the construction of permanent stoppings to direct airflow in underground mines in the US. All mines experience various degrees of strata convergence depending on depth of overburden, geological conditions, and type of roof support employed. Strata convergence will cause cracks and joint openings in masonry stoppings, resulting insignificant air leakage losses. Where strata convergence is severe, complete structural failure of the stopping can ultimately occur. Reconstruction of damaged or destroyed stoppings adds expensive overhead to mining operations, and even greater expenses are incurred from the additional fan horsepower required to overcome leakage losses. Ideally, a stopping should maintain high resistance to airflow while yielding to strata convergence. By properly incorporating a polyisocyanurate rigid foam material within the masonry block structure, stopping service life can be increased in mines experiencing strata convergence problems such as floor heave, roof loading, and lateral rib movement.

Jan 1, 1986

By C. Richard Tinsley

INTRODUCTION Documentary complications arise from the risk apportionment in project financing which generally means that once the project is up and running and has satisfied the lender's completion test, the loan agreement specifically limits the lender's recourse to the project and its assets. It is the purpose of this paper to describe the special considerations which apply to industrial minerals projects and explore the reasons why so few project financings are negotiated in this industry. SIZE Small projects do not warrant the relatively high costs of negotiating and documenting project financing. The extent of the documentation is directly proportionate to either (a) the degree of risk apportionment, or (b) the amount of control given to lawyers to negotiate the documents. Although one would like to believe that project-finance documentation could be off-the-shelf, it is almost always necessary to tailor the documents to the mine development itself and the individual desires of the borrower. Accordingly, the documentation costs and initial expenses are seldom less than $40,000, and for complex projects can reach $400,000. In addition, banks often charge an up-front fee to partly compensate them for their staff time and partly to increase their yield on what is deemed to be a "riskier" loan asset. Another factor is the generally lower debt:equity ratio when bankers are uncertain of the accuracy of the cash flow projections. The ratio of the amount of cash flow left over after debt service to debt service itself is a key tool for project finance (debt service coverage). Bankers will require a higher coverage ratio for industrial minerals projects because of the relatively higher uncertainties in the following categories: Prices Markets Geology/Quality Transportation Environmental This, in turn, means that lower debt:equity ratios are the norm for new industrial minerals projects. INDUSTRY STRUCTURE It is hardly worthwhile to generalise about a field as diverse as industrial minerals, but there are four other structural reasons why project financing has not been widely applied. 1. The most obvious example is the predominance of small-sized operations, largely a function of transportation economics. Geological conditions also contribute to their dispersion. 2. Often, the product is only a small part of a company's business in contrast to many petroleum, metals, or coal companies whose sole business is the production of the raw material. The construction industry is a good example here for cement, gypsum, crushed stone, sand and gravel, and the drilling-mud services business for barite and bentonite. A company is unlikely to jeopardise its main business through the failure of a project financing on one of its key inputs. The corrollary is that the mined input is often regarded as a cost centre and not run on the sort of economic basis suitable for project financing. 3. There may be a reluctance to reveal key aspects of an industrial minerals venture to an outsider for purely competitive reasons. Unlike the other minerals industries which readily share technical information at plant visits and

Jan 1, 1985

By Henry J. Sandri

ACQUISITION JUSTIFICATION There are many reasons why companies consider acquisitions as a means to expand their operations. Some wish to reduce the impact of business cycles on their businesses. Others seek firms within the same industry for expansion and increased market share. Still others diversify in order to avoid takeovers. Whatever the reasons or justification, an evaluation of an acquisition candidate should be systematic and thorough. To many financial managers the concept of a systematic acquisition evaluation indicates the need for a regular set of evaluation criteria. While these are available from numerous sources, one basic parameter frequently overlooked is the application of these criteria to an industry which is different from the acquirer. This becomes particularly important when evaluating firms within the mineral industry. The mineral industry is significantly different from other industries to require different valuing techniques. • This paper will present a number of reasons why an acquisition candidate in the mineral industry should be evaluated differently from other acquisitions, including by other mineral firms. Additionally, this paper will review the most appropriate means of valuing a mineral firm. • Firms considering the acquisition of a mineral firm should understand the nature of the industry before ever making a tender offer. Some of the general considerations include the following: • Level of Capital Intensity: In the mid-1980's the start up cost for a gold mine has been between 20-200 million dollars and 500-1,500 million dollars for a bauxite operation. • Global Nature of Competition: Except for certain industrial minerals, most minerals and metals are traded worldwide and many on national exchanges, such as COMEX. • Start-Up Time: Many mining operations in developed and developing countries have long lead times, 7 to 10 years in some cases, prior to the start-up of production. • Long Term Nature of Investment: For most mineral operations payback usually occurs at least 7 years after production has started. Additionally, many mining operations will continue producing for 80-100 years. • High Level of Risk: The number of factors that a mining firm cannot control such as grade, volume, world supply and demand, plus the long payback periods tend to classify mineral firms at a higher than average risk compared to other investments. • Cyclical Nature: The mineral industry is cyclical in nature, experiencing long troughs and explosive peaks, thus making timing a critical issue. • Labor Intensive: Even with the large capital requirements needed to operate a mine, most mines are labor intensive in proportion to their capital equipment. • Location: Obviously, the nature of this industry requires operators to work in difficult locations, frequently far from civilized localities, in poor weather conditions and without proper supply and distribution infrastructure. One of the most important considerations is an understanding of asset replacement and asset value. Unlike manufacturing concerns, firms in the mineral industry are working toward the elimination, through depletion, of their asset base. Product flexibility is not available to a mining operation. A mineral firm basically has two options as its resource base is depleted: 1) replace the asset with new production, or 2) deplete the asset and close down operation, as in the South African gold mining model referred to later in this paper. An understanding of the

Jan 1, 1985

By Charles Berry

Conventional and nonconventional insurance is examined from the point of view of a financier of a major mining and minerals project. The paper reviews the elements of a conventional insurance program; explains why such a program is not fully responsive to the project financier's needs; examines some of the new insurance coverages that can supplement a traditional program; and emphasises that these insurance markets are still in the early stages of their development with consequent effects on capacity (insured amount) and to some extent price (insurance premium).

Jan 1, 1985

By M. S. Azun

The authors' paper did not explain the facts and reasons why state companies are established and what their role is in international industrial mineral trading. Also. I do not agree with the conclusion implying that the main goal for state companies is to capitalize natural resources. Almost all state companies are founded by certain laws and their activities are arranged by state regulations. Their only aim is to operate mineral deposits for their people and to protect the rights of the people. Although some ore deposits, such as nonstrategic or small, may be exploited by privately owned companies, the state has the right to control the operation and production. Activities of state companies may or may not be widened because of the character of the deposits and the importance of the mineral market involved. For some countries, although governments may occasionally change hands, the policy of the mineral trading system is not affected by this change. There is no doubt that any government desires to make more earnings to increase GNP, when it is involved in operating and trading mines. It wants to produce and sell the finished products, instead of unprocessed ones, if possible. When it is known that some mineral deposits are relatively rare, such as Turkish boron deposits, the government can nationalize the mines to control production and affect the market. If there is an abundance of a certain mineral in the market, the government can cut production and set a floor price, such as Canadian potash. Also, when production of a specific mineral is unique, such as Turkish chromite, the price of such mineral may be set by correspondent government. One may add that if some governments with their state companies produce a certain mineral in a larger amount, they may decide to establish a cartel to protect their production and price. These are the facts followed by government-owned state companies and partially government-owned companies. The reason being charge of many deposits by the state companies is always the same: "protect" the mineral rights of the people.

Jan 1, 1985

By Peter H. Fletcher

THE ECONOMIC THEORY It will assist in the understanding of the Resource Rent Tax ("RRT") proposals in Australia if the economic theory behind the tax is briefly explained. The idea goes back to the concept of rent put forward by the nineteenth century economist David Ricardo. His analysis was broadly as follows: A tenant who farms land which is just on the margin of economic viability cannot afford to pay his landlord any rent, because the value of the crop produced by such marginal land is equal to the cost of producing the crop, plus the cost of keeping the tenant alive. There is nothing left out of which to pay rent to landlord. A tenant who farms good land can afford to pay his landlord rent -- but the maximum amount of rent that he can be asked to pay is the excess of the value of the crop produced by the good land over the cost of producing the crop and of keeping the tenant alive. Adapting this theory to the taxation of mining projects, modern economists who favour this system of taxation say that a profitable mining (or resource) project produces rent in the Ricardian sense. The amount of the rent is the excess of the profits by the project over the amount of profit which is required to attract the taxpayer to invest in the project in the first place. This explains why the tax is called "Resource Rent Tax". PAPUA NEW GUINEA PRECEDENT Although Papua New Guinea ("PNG") is now independent of Australia, there are still close links between the two countries, and strong similarities between their respective tax regimes. PNG introduced an Additional Profits Tax ("APT") in 1978. In many respects, Australia's RRT proposals follow the precedent set by PNG1s APT. However, in practical terms, not a great deal can be learned at this stage from PNG's experiences since, according to the writer's understanding, no PNG mining project has yet paid any APT. The Bougainville mine is not liable to APT, being subject to tax under its own separate Act, which contains a different formula. Outline of PNG Additional Profits Tax. PNG has two versions of Additional Profits Tax ("APT) - one applying to general mining, the other to petroleum mining. The two versions are very similar. The general mining version is described below. The tax applies on a licence by licence basis. This means that losses on Licence A cannot be offset against profits on Licence B. Expenditure relating to two or more licences, is apportioned "in such manner as the Chief Controller thinks reasonable". Tax is levied on the "accumulated value of net cash receipts" at the rate of (70 - n)% where n=the rate of income tax. The accumulated value of net cash receipts ("av") is calculated as follows: Calculations commence from the first year in which substantial expenditure was incurred on the construction of facilities for the carrying out of mining operations on the licence. For that year the av consists of the total allowable expenditure to date on that lease. For the second year, the av is the av at the end of year one indexed in accordance with the statutory formula set out below, plus the total allowable expenditure in year 2. For year 3, the av is the av at the end of year 2 adjusted by the index factors, plus the total allowable expenditure in year 3. This process is repeated year after year. When the licence starts to earn revenue, the revenue is deducted from total allowable expenditure for that year. If revenue exceeds total allowable

Jan 1, 1985

Jan 1, 1985

By Peter Allen, John R. Stuermer

COUNTRY RISK ANALYSIS A company operating in a foreign country assumes all the risks that it would at home. However, beyond these, it assumes risks that arise from the unique political economic, financial conditions of the foreign country which it operates. These risks are known as "country risks". The importance of these risks has grown appreciably in the recent past (particularly in the aftermath of Iran's revolution in the late 1970s and Mexico's debt rescheduling of 1982-83), and as a result, country risk analysis has become an increasingly useful management tool. Country risk analysis seeks to assess the probability that countries will service their aggregate foreign liabilities on time, as well as the probability that country conditions could inhibit the debt service capability of private sector debtors. This involves assessment of both the ability and the willingness of countries to meet their external liabilities in a timely fashion. "Ability" is linked economic and financial variables: principally, a country's economic structure, foreign exchange generating capacity and debt service burden. On the other hand, "willingness" is tied to political factors: mainly the economic/financial orientation of government policy and the stability of economic decision making. Ability: Economic, Financial Conditions and Prospects Judgement of a country's ability to meet foreign financial obligations begins with a detailed study of a country's external balance sheet which compares the country's foreign liabilities and assets. Table 1 below presents country balance sheets for Mexico, Korea and Indonesia. [TABLE 1 The External Balance 3-,-et 1983 (billions of dollars; Indonesia Mexico Korea Foreign Liabilities 31.1 67.6 40.5 By Source: Bank 13.1 75.5 26.3 Non-bank 18.0 12.114.2 Foreign Reserves 9.3 4.7 7.0] The large magnitude of Mexico's external debt (nearly $90 billion), compared to foreign assets of approximately $5 billion, illustrates the weakness of this country's external payments position, and the main reason that it has been unable to meet interest and principal payments and been forced to reschedule its foreign debt. On the other hand, the relationship between Korea's external liabilities and assets ($50.5 billion and $7 billion, respectively), is more favorable and helps explain why Korea has been able to meet debt service payments and maintain its access to the international capital markets. Indonesia has even a more favorable relationship between its foreign assets and liabilities, $31 billion and $9 billion, respectively, and its debt is mostly lower interest rate, non-bank debt, making for a less onerous debt service burden. After the balance sheet, the analysis turns to a comparison of the country's foreign exchange earning capacity and its prospective financing requirements, that is, the country's future earnings stream

Jan 1, 1985

By James L. Poole

INTRODUCTION Companies in the mining industry are subjected at times to currency exchange rate risks and interest rate risks. The former occurs any time a firm deals in more than one currency. The latter occurs anytime a firm is financing itself with borrowings that have a floating interest rate (although a fixed rate can be a problem at times). FOREIGN EXCHANGE RISKS There are two general reasons why exchange rate risks (FX risk) can occur: First, a firm may be building a mine or plant in another country where financing for the plan is denominated in funds other than the country hosting the plant. For example, if a Canadian firm is building a smelter in another country which is being financed with Canadian dollars, the C$100 million for labor, which must be paid in the local currency, has subjected the firm to a C$100 million FX exposure risk. If after the cost estimates were made the local currency appreciates 30% against the Canadian dollar, the cost of labor has increased to C$130 million. (Of course, the local currency could also devalue during this period making the labor cost component less than estimated.) The other reason exchange rate risk arises is due to the fact that the costs of production in one country producing minerals may be incurred in one currency while the production is sold in another currency, such as coal being exported from Canada to Japan under contracts denominated in Yen. In this example, the Canadian firm is exporting coal to Japan and being paid in yen in 30 days at a contract price of 100 Y per ton. Furthermore, assume that the mining firm anticipates a depreciation of the yen against the Canadian dollar of 5% in the next 30 days. Therefore, the mining firm stands to lose 5% of the value of its shipment in a month's time not including carrying costs. In both cases, the mining company risks an adverse change in the exchange rate, that is, the currency the company holds may decrease in value relative to the other currency. There are a number of ways to mitigate the exposure to foreign exchange which can be utilized by the mining company. Optimally, a company should try to match all their inflows and all their outflows in the same currency. For example, if a Canadian firm has mining costs and debt service costs both denominated in Canadian dollars then 100% of their receipts would need to be in Canadian dollars. If a Canadian firm has 70% of its cash outflows in Canadian dollars and 30% of its cash outflow in American dollars in the form of a loan amortization then their receipts would need to be 70% in Canadian dollars and 30% in U.S. dollars. This general principle of matching cash receipts and cash costs in the same currency works fine in a perfect world but what of the real world when these cannot be matched? In actual practice, however, the financial markets have developed a number of ways in which foreign exchange risks can he managed or reduced. FORWARD MARKETS One method is to use the forward markets which are made on a world-wide basis by the commerical banks for foreign exchange. If a firm wanted to lock in the current exchange rate for the receipt of a foreign currency at some point in the future, they could do so by contracting on the forward market with a bank selling that foreign currency at the current rate at the future date. For example, assume that a Canadian firm is exporting coal to Japan which would pay yen in 90 days. If a firm wanted to lock in today's exchange rate they could contract with a bank to sell on the forward market yen in 90 days. When the yen was received the contract would be executed by selling the yen to the bank and receiving the previously agreed upon number of Canadian dollars. Generally speaking, the forward market can be used to sell forward about 12 months. The costs of selling (or buying) forward

Jan 1, 1985

By John S. Brock

INTRODUCTION The Oxford Dictionary says that the word "promoter" has usually been used in an opprobrious sense since at least 1876. This popular image of mining promoters is of cigar-chomping shysters and Brooklyn-Bridge vendors, improving their standard of living with the aid of funds raised through the sale of stock to little old ladies. It is unfortunate that mining promoters are considered crooks until they can prove their integrity and honesty by finding a mine. A common rule of thumb states that for every 1,000 prospects, 100 come to be drilled, and one becomes a mine. However, it is also a statistic that there have been mining promotions, where money raised has gone elsewhere than into the ground; Junior exploration companies can be handy vehicles for unscrupulous financial activity. One must remember though that every stock exchange has had its share of sound mining promotions that, because of the one in 1,000 odds, have failed for legitimate reasons. The promoter must be able to rationalize the worth of a mineral discovery which, on an industry- average basis, probably cost more to find than the discounted value of its net return, which return is not an assured percentage of invested capital, and furthermore, is ultimately from a wasting asset. So, it is easy to understand why the promoter must constantly justify the credibility of his operation to his grubstakers during the course of the "five phases of exploration," those being (1) euphoria, (2) disillusionment, (3) search for the guilty, (4) punishment for the innocent, and (5) distinction for the uninvolved. The promoter with the exploration organization that does not have the benefit of positive cash flow, by definition for the sake of this article, works for a promotional outfit, a Junior Company, that must raise its exploration budget from a variety of sources. Promotion, as discussed here, will not entirely refer to the formation and operation of a joint- stock company but rather to the overall methods of raising risk capital for mineral exploration ventures from outside sources. THE NECESSITY OF PROMOTION In Canada, the publicly financed Junior Company has had an enviable record of mine-finding success. In the Province of British Columbia alone, the discovery of fifteen out of twenty-four mines has been as a result of the activity of the Junior Company (B. C. & Yukon Chamber of Mines, 1977). In the Province of Ontario, one research study indicated that between 1951 and 1974 the 'Juniors' spent only 28 percent of the total exploration funds but were responsible for 62 percent of all economic discoveries (Freyman, 1978). The reasons for the success of the Juniors are tied to a variety of factors, the main one being personal initiative based on incentive. In other words, the principals, or their employees have 'a piece of the action.' The smaller companies can operate faster and more efficiently than their larger counterparts. The Junior Company is also destined to take some bigger risks, the 'long shots,' many of which efforts by virtue of the Junior's perseverance coupled with a touch of 'ore is where you find it' philosophy, result in major discoveries. The individuals, syndicates, private and publicly financed Junior Companies, because of high costs of exploration and development, cannot hope to finance most mineral prospects all the way to production. Exceptions do exist, those being the lower capital cost, small, high-grade deposits. Private investors and publicly financed Junior companies, therefore, can usually afford to finance most exploration through the initial drill-testing stage. The major resource company will enter a mining deal with a Junior Company usually by way of option or joint venture agreement, and will finance to production to earn an equity in the prospect or the Junior Company or both. The conventional lending institutions, banks and government agencies, will usually only participate through loaning a portion of capital

Jan 1, 1985

By C. Richard Tinsley

INTRODUCTION The economic analysis (Chapter 3), the engineering studies (Chapter 10), the credit structure (and the consequential funding sources) - Chapter 11, and the overall feasibility structure for any venture are all directed to determining one major decision element: How much and how certain is the reward for taking these risks? Risk assessment is a surprisingly weak area of analysis and is usually addressed in a checklist fashion. It is much preferable to deal within a risk system so that the inevitable tradeoffs among risks are correctly made. DEFINITION The first step toward risk definition must be to ascertain all of the risks to which a project or a company is exposed; otherwise one will remain ignorant of the possibility of a financially crippling loss until it occurs. (Carter and Crockford, 1974). However, simply stating what "risk" is can lead to debate. For example, risk could be (adapted from Vaughan, 1982): -the chance of a loss - uncertainty of loss -possibility of loss - uncertainty -dispersion of actual from expected results - probability of an outcome different from the one expected - possibility of an occurrence of an undesirable contingency -a condition in which a possibility of a loss exists. For the minerals industry financier, the last definition is probably the most appropriate. However, from a mineral company's point of view the definition might well include the possibility of not achieving the expected financial return. RISK CLASSIFICATION Risk identification will be readily agreed as the all-important first step. There are five major "branches" of risk classification. These are: -Statistical -Modellers -Checklist -Project Financing -Insurance The Statistical set discovered probability theory and any risk discussion soon deteriorates into a mathematical jungle (Megill, 1977; Hartman, 1976; Reutlinger, 1970; and Pouliquen, 1970).Their use of terminology tells its own story: coin toss (binomial distribution), gamblers' ruin, delphi (oracle) techniques, monte-carlo simulations, random walks, etcetera. These techniques inadequately represent the judgements necessary in an increasingly complicated and interrelated world. The risk Modellers have turned to the computer to handle these inter-relationships but soon find barriers because of "simultaneity". Certainly the computer has its uses to conduct various analyses (marketed as "sensitivity" analyses) but very often one finds that this involves changing one or two variables at a time, all other things being equal. Unfortunately, in a modern and complex world all other things do not remain equal. The statisticians will, no doubt, jump to their own defence by citing this

Jan 1, 1985

By Edwin A. Rides

HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF THE EXPORT CREDIT AGENCIES Almost since the inception of international commerce sellers, having manufactured and/or sold and shipped goods to an overseas buyer, have been obliged to accept the risk that they will not be paid for one reason or another. There are many reasons why payment may not be forthcoming, for example, the goods may be lost at sea, or rejected by the buyer or the buyer nay simply not be creditworthy. These risks were brought into sharp relief as international trading became more sophisticated and the practice of giving credit to buyers gathered momentum. Inevitably enterprises sprang up which offered same mitigation of this exposure, accepting houses and later confirming houses and banks were prepared to assure acceptable credit risks an behalf of the seller, usually by discounting trade paper, and for many years the market ticked over reasonably satisfactorily. However, after the 1914-18 War international trade was at an extremely low ebb and its inherent risks were accentuated to a point where they were often commercially unacceptable. Yet a healthy and vigorous international market was indispensable to recovery of the world economy and a number of governments, led by the United Kingdom, perceived a need to offer their exporters a comprehensive form of insurance, particularly to facilitate the extension of credit to foreign buyers. In the United Kingdom the Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) was set up to encourage trade through the provision of export credit insurance. Over the ensuing years others followed suit and now most of the developed trading nations and many developing nations have similar agencies. PRESENT DAY IDLE OF THE EXPORT CREDIT AGENCIES (ECAS ) Traditionally then the BA's role was to encourage trade through the provision to exporters of insurance against the risks of non-payment by overseas buyers of their goods and services. However, during the 1970's the manufacturing industries of most of the developed nations found themselves facing severe competition for business, particularly in the developing world. As a result the more aggressive ECA's began to introduce ancillary forms of cover designed to reduce exporters' risks outside of the credit field. For instance, most of the European agencies now have a form of cover against foreign exchange risks here contracts are denominated in currencies other than that of the exporter's country. Most of the agencies also provide cover to exporters against the risk of unfair calling of bid, advance payment, performance bonds etc and in certain countries, where high inflation rates were endemic, a form of cover against cost escalation. In certain circumstances it is also possible for an exporter to obtain cover against losses arising as a result of the involvency of a partner in a consortium or joint venture. These are all forms of insurance but, also during the 1970's, many of the national export credit programmes took a major step away from their original raison d'etre by facilitating the provision of preferential financing terns for the acquisition of capital equipment by an overseas buyer. This new line of business quickly became an important ingredient of major export financing packages and, as we shall see later, turned out to be extremely costly for the countries providing it.

Jan 1, 1985

Andy H. Vassiliou – Introduction Ladies and gentlemen,.good evening and welcome to the Paul F. Kerr Memorial Symposium dinner. I believe we are all here to honor the memory of a great teacher and advisor, and a true friend -- Professor Kerr, or Dr. Kerr, or to most of us who were his students, "Pappy" Kerr. Most of us who attended the Paul F. Kerr Memorial Symposium earlier today at the New York Hilton had the opportunity to read, or listen to, or discuss scientific papers presented in honor of Dr. Kerr. In addition, all of the speakers had the opportunity to reminisce about their association with Dr. Kerr, who was credited as having contributed substantially to their graduate education and the development of their careers. Dr. Kerr's two daughters -- Ruth and Nancy -- who attended the Symposium at the Hilton are also here with us tonight. I think we should keep tonight's festivities on an informal basis since we are all old friends or former students of Dr. Kerr. Some of us may want to say a few words about our experiences at the time we were students at Columbia, and hopefully include some anecdotes relating to Professor Kerr. I would like to invite everyone to do so, but first we have arranged for two of us to be the lead speakers, whom I will introduce in a few moments.

Jan 1, 1985

By D. E. Spiller

Introduction Precious metals recovery from ore can generally be accomplished using gravity concentration, flotation, and/or hydrometallurgical (leaching) techniques. The objective of this paper is to show why gravity concentration can be an important part of recovery systems that employ leaching as the primary unit operation. A brief discussion of modem gravity concentration equipment is also presented. Discussion Gravity concentration of ores has generated increasing interest in recent years. Reasons for this interest include: • Gravity concentration is environmentally attractive. There is little or no use of reagents. Hence, it is relatively nonpolluting. • The cost of cyanide has continued to increase. Therefore, cost savings may be realized whenever leaching feed tonnage can be reduced by preconcentration. • Compared to flotation and leaching, gravity equipment costs are low per processed ton. Field installation costs for gravity circuits usually are less because many' units are supplied as self-contained modules. Also, the cost required to supply services, particularly power, to a gravity plant site are also less. In situations where preconcentration at coarse particle size is applicable, significant grinding equipment savings may be possible. • Gravity circuit operating costs are also relatively low compared to typical flotation and leaching circuits. Reagents, power, maintenance, and manpower savings in a well-engineered gravity plant may be realized. Again, if grinding is reduced, significant power and steel (media and liners) savings are possible. •In recent years, more efficient gravity concentrating devices have been developed. Benefits to Precious Metal Leaching Gravity beneficiation can complement precious metal leaching in two ways. First, the recovery of coarse liberated values before leaching may reduce leach time requirements and may reduce reagent consumption. Second, gravity preconcentration can reduce the size of a leach plant by decreasing the quantity of material to be leached. Coarse gold and silver have been shown to leach rather slowly. Kameda (1949) and Habashi (1967) have investigated the kinetics of cyanide leaching systems. They concur that in a heterogeneous reaction, the rate of gold and silver dissolution is directly proportional to the surface area. Thus, the instantaneous rate of dissolution for spherical 0.37 mm (400 mesh) gold is theoretically -25 times faster than for the same amount of gold at .841 mm (20 mesh), based on data from Fuerstenau, Chander, and Abouzeid (1979). Conversely, coarse liberated, +.841 mm (20 mesh), gold is more readily recovered by gravity concentration than is fine, -.037 mm (400 mesh) gold. Therefore, it is apparent that the two recovery systems complement one another. Figure 1 data demonstrates the potential synergism. A sample of - 3.327 mm (6 mesh) Nevada gold-bearing ore was cyanide leached using conventional bottle-roll test procedures. Gold extraction was determined as a function of leaching time. A second sample split from the same leach feed material was hand jigged to remove a coarse heavy mineral fraction, including virtually all of the +.210 mm (65 mesh) liberated free gold. This second sample, with the coarse gold and heavy minerals removed, was subjected to an identical cyanide leach procedure. Figure 1 presents the resulting comparative extraction data. Note that the percent gold extraction for the sample containing no +.210 mm (65 mesh) free gold includes the coarse gold recovered by gravity. The data show that the sample containing coarse gold required about 72 hours of leaching time to achieve 80% extraction. This compared to about 22 hours of leaching time for 80% gold recovery from the sample that contained only -.210 mm (65 mesh) free gold. Thus, there was a 69% reduction in leaching time. The improved extraction data is not wholly attributable to coarse gold removal, but rather it was the combination of gold removal and rejection of other heavy mineral cyanide consumers or leach retardants. Further investigation was not warranted at this time. Preconcentration is the second manner in which leaching systems can benefit from gravity concentration. The premise is that preconcentration can reduce the quantity of leach feed, which, in turn, may reduce leaching costs. Figure 2 presents preliminary data developed by CSMRI for US Minerals Exploration (USMX). Centennial Exploration Inc., in agreement with USMX, is proceeding with evaluations to determine the suitability of various processing schemes for recovery of gold values from the Montana Tunnels property. The data shows how the ore can be preconcentrated by gravity techniques to result in a reduced feed tonnage to secondary extraction techniques, presumably flotation or cyanide leaching. Testing has shown that Reichert cones, followed by treating the cone concentrate on spirals, can deliver about 88% gold recovery in about 13% weight, that is, 87% weight rejection. Consequently, fine grinding and reagent costs are attributable to only 13% of the plant feed rate. Cost data is not yet available, but the potential exists for significant cost savings.

Jan 1, 1985

By Fred H. Brooks

INTRODUCTION The toughest job for any mining company, large or small, is to locate and identify a property which it feels has the potential for development and which can be tied up through location, lease or option under terms within their means. In the case of a small company, this precludes grass-roots exploration with its attendant high costs and the extended time required to develop a prospect to the point of being a project. The small mining company, therefore must limit its search to known properties which, for various reasons, have been shut down or were never thoroughly developed at the time of discovery. These types of prospects are located either through literature search, familiarity with many mining areas in general, or through contacts and submittals from a variety of sources. In order to develop a marketable presentation to any investor, the basic requirements are the same: - the property must demonstrate the potential to provide a satisfactory return on investment - the evaluation study must be thorough and professionally developed. In order to promote any mining property, it is first necessary to know what you have. INFORMATION DEVELOPMENT We normally begin with a detailed literature search of the district, assembling all available data on the basic geology, production records, and old reports of this or neighboring properties and any other information which can be found. This will aid in the general understanding of the basic geology and hopefully allow a fairly detailed knowledge of the specific occurrence. With this information one can begin to speculate on the reserve potential and develop some high and low figures for estimating purposes as to mining method, production rate, metallurgy and begin developing estimated capital and operating costs. Cashflow runs are developed for varying tonnages (high and low), estimated high and low grades of metal and at differing market prices for the product. FINANCE CONTACTS Brooks Minerals, from its inception, has been an operating company and we have been able to assemble a small but experienced operating staff. For this reason we try to put together projects and joint ventures where we can be the operator and maintain a certain degree of control. Whether due to familiarity with many colleagues in the mining industry or due to unfamiliarity with the banking houses and securities markets, the approach to raising finance has generally been to contact the established mining companies. This requires a familiarity with the corporate philosophies of these companies with respect to their development goals and financial capabilities. A common mistake is to shotgun the proposal to many companies of different sizes and goals in hopes that one might be interested. It is more beneficial, when possible, to tailor a proposal to each company, stressing the positive points where the specific proposal best meets their interests. One company may be more interested in a development program with fairly certain and conservative return potential. The property may well contain both possibilities but a lack of understanding of the individual company's method of operation could spoil the deal. In another instance, one company may look at a property as a moderate income producer over an extended life, yet a second may elect to high-grade the deposit over a shorter period in order to provide early cash flow or take advantage of a favorable market situation. MAKING THE DEAL There are as many types of deals as there

Jan 1, 1985

By Willard C. Lacy

Survival of the mining industry as a viable economic entity in the United States is being seriously threatened by declining grades of ore reserves, rising operational and capital costs, and increased governmental taxes, restrictions, and subsidizing of third world competition. Discovery of major high-grade deposits is becoming increasingly unlikely. International competitiveness of the U.S. deposits will depend upon 'Yankee Ingenuity, ' innovations in mining methods, metallurgical treatment, and financial arrangements, and a viable national strategy. This will require not only effective management for control of operations, but management that encourages breakthroughs in technology, financing, labor relations, and in public and governmental understanding. The mine geologist and the exploration geologist both have important roles to play in all aspects of this fight for survival of the industry.

Jan 1, 1985

By John T. Popp, Jodi A. Rulli, Anthony T. Iannacchione

Anomalous geological features in the coal and surrounding strata of a mine in northern West Virginia have fractured and deformed an inherently weak roof rock prior to mining. Horizontal stresses, as much as six times greater than overburden related horizontal stresses, have induced cutter roof failure. This failure was distinguishable from rock deformation associated with geological anomalies because it was induced by mining. The characterization of these features has allowed for the prediction of zones of unstable roof rock and the determination of failure trends on gateroad stability. Geological anomalies included clastic dikes and a narrow zone of sandstone roof. Clastic dikes, representing intrusions of shale and claystone, were invariably accompanied by local roof rock instability, and often formed the boundaries of roof falls. Shale was the dominant roof lithology except where a small sandstone occurred in the northwest portion of the longwall mining area. The sandstone occurs in two phases: a sandstone-filled channel, 5-m- thick and 60-m-wide, which eroded and replaced the shale roof and the upper part of the coalbed; and a sheet sandstone unit which was crossbedded to interbedded with the underlying shale. Horizontal stresses are naturally relieved through the initiation of cutter roof failure. This failure may extend from a few meters to several tens of meters horizontally, and from a few centimeters to several meters vertically. Orientations of entries and crosscuts has a greater influence on the direction and total length of cutter roof failure at the rib-roof intersection than does the principal directions of the in situ horizontal stresses. Seventy-four percent of the cutter roof failures occurred along the rib-roof intersection. Orientations of cutter roof failure away from the rib- roof intersection were clustered in the north-south direction and may have been influenced by the horizontal stress field.

Jan 1, 1984