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By R. F. Favreau, Favreau Patrice

"The economy profits from the rock excavated in mines and quarries and the excavations required for the construction of roads and buildings. However such excavations are achieved by blasting withexplosives, and explosions create fly rock and vibrations which in some cases may throw rock far intoinhabited regions and may vibrate buildings excessively in these regions. Society, however, no longeraccepts that their quality of life be disturbed by the risks of fly rock or the perturbation of vibrations.Thus it is important to know how to design blasts that do not cause excessive fly rock or vibrations, and to understand why sometimes a blast does create excessive vibration or fly rock. An article presented at the 2015 ISEE (reference 1) explains how unacceptable vibrations can be avoided, while the present article explains why dangerous fly rock occurs and how it can be avoided. The article shows by rigorous calculations with the blast simulator Blaspa that long range fly rock can be due to short collar or short burden, but mainly it explains how inadequate blasting that allows the floor to rise can cause even further reaching fly rock, a situation not usually recognized by most blasters."

Jan 1, 2016

By Gustavo Huerta Valer, Jorge Cárdenas Miranda, Johan Salas Flores

One of the challenges of mining is the optimization of the blasting process, which has an important impact downstream in the processing of crushed ore in the plant, that is why mining companies ensure the results of granulometry obtained from the blasting process through a joint work with companies specialized in the process of loading with explosives.

Feb 6, 2023

By R L. Mayville

The author explains why the strategic location and important limestone reserves at Chattanooga Quarry led to a decision to extend operating life by continued benching down to lower levels. He discusses the steps taken to accomplish this objective. These include relocation of the primary crusher from the second level to the fourth level, pre-testing of explosives designs and powder factors, control of a substantial water problem, and computer monitoring of stone production costs.

Jan 1, 1984

By Steve Dillingham

Blasting crews, explosive product drivers, drillers, blasters, supervisors, and salespeople all arrive daily at customer blast sites in vehicles of every type whether passenger cars, pickup trucks, or bulk trucks. The majority of these vehicles are company owned and re p re s e n t a substantial investment and risk for the company. That may explain why the costs resulting from blasting incidents is often surpassed by those involving motor vehicle accidents.

Jan 1, 2003

By Sandra Penttinen

To assist blasting professionals with the creation, documentation, and appropriate methodology to standardize the data collection of the pre and post blast investigation process. Penttinen Associates will present a logical non-technical presentation focusing on: Why pre-blast surveys SAVE How to prepare for pre-blast inspections What to do in preparation of pre-blast inspections The creation of an industry standard all-inclusive pre-blast document Establishing pre-blast inspection operational standards Preserving the data.

Jan 1, 2001

By Thomas E. Brown

Commercd explosives have evolved through this century f?om dynamite through ANFO to the current lines of Water Gels and Emulsions. Water Gels and Emulsions evolved to counter the lack of water resistance and density of ANFO yet maintain its low cost position verses dynamite. Today, explosives must be safe and inexpensive and perform under a wide range of temperatures, function efficiently in wet or dry boreholes and have a good shelf life. Emulsions meet this criterion, which is why they are the current trend products worldwide.

Jan 1, 1998

By R. F. Favreau, Patrice Favreau

In many quarries and construction sites visited by the authors over the last 50 years, the latter have observed muck piles from blasting with explosives, which included numerous large blocks, in some cases of dimensions larger than the input to the crusher. The names of these sites cannot be given in the article because the owners insist that data obtained on such visits be kept confidential. Often the blasters felt that the natural fissures in the rock would compensate for the use of a low powder factor, and they asked the authors to explain why such blocks were present. A detailed analysis of the situation often indicated that the cause of the blocks is that explained by figures such as 6 and 7 below in the article.

Jan 1, 2018

By John T. Aler

The U.S. Bureau of Mines has been studying the problem of why explosives detonate weakly or misfire during blasting in underground coal mines. Cross-borehole shock wave interaction has been identified as a predominant mechanism causing explosives to function improperly (1)(Underline numbers in parenthesis refer to items in the list of references at the end of this report.). Cross-borehole shock wave interaction can be simulated in a laboratory setting, making possible the replication of tests in sufficient numbers to understand and quantify some of its effects on permissible explosives (2). The work presented here investigates the capacity of explosives to partially recover from the desensitizing influence of the shock wave. The recovery trend of different explosives can indicate optimum blasting patterns useful for minimizing borehole charge malfunctions.

Jan 1, 1991

By Dirk Voogt, Quentin Steyl, D. Scott Scovira

A South Africa iron ore mine reported a decline in blast performance and ore and waste fragmentation. Preliminary investigation by the explosives services company found that the straight gassed bulk emulsion was breaking down and collapsing inside of some loaded slept blastholes. The bulk emulsion loaded at the subject site was manufactured in country and shipped to various clients throughout the region, with normal function in blasts at other sites. Historically, the bulk formulation emulsion being used at the subject mine site also performed well and without issue. This raised the question, “why is this bulk emulsion now breaking down and not firing in blastholes?”. Iron ore mines are not typically associated with reactive or acidic ground, and ground sample reactivity testing against the emulsion confirmed this. So, if not reactive ground or acidic water, then what is causing the emulsion to breakdown?

Feb 6, 2023

By Charles R. Barnhart

The Nitrogen Dioxide Cloud: After one year of testing it can be stated that we do know and understand a great deal about why the nitrogen dioxide formation is exacerbated in cast blasting. Picture 1 is an example of how concentrated the NOx can be from a cast blast. It has long been felt that 300 or more milliseconds of timing needs to be put between each row of detonations to allow the rock a maximum time of flight so the cast percentage is high. Our experiments have found that higher cast percentages can make with timing between 150 to 200 milliseconds between rows. Picture 2 show a definite improvement in nitrogen dioxide concentration and most of that was the result of shooting a previously shot end of the cast pattern that had not been dug, thus no confinement of the powder columns.

Jan 1, 2004

By Andreas Bienz

The safety of persons from accidental explosions and fires during manufacture, storage, transport etc. of explosives, pyrotechnics, propellants, firework and ammunition is most commonly assessed according to prescriptive rule-based approach: Safety is given when all requirements which are listed in numerous regulations and directives (such as e.g. safety distances, limited quantities, protective installations etc.) are complied with. Such a deterministic prescriptive rule-based approach is quite easy to apply but has got disadvantages, however: The actual state of safety in a specific case is not explicitly and quantitatively expressed, and it is not distinguished between the endangered individuals and the whole group. As a result, the effects of the safety measures cannot be measured. This is why uneconomical and in the worst case useless safety precautions cannot be avoided. In addition, waivers are difficult to negotiate, meaningful and sound arguments for pro and con being lacking.

Jan 1, 2007

By FM Murray

SAFEX International is a global organisation with more than 85 members, all of whom are manufacturers of explosives. On joining each member signs a declaration saying that they are willing to exchange information with regard to any accidents or near misses they may have in order to prevent the recurrence of the incident. SAFEX International was formed 50 years ago in Europe and has now built up a database of more than 700 accidents in the explosives business. Once every three years, an International Congress is held in which members address specific safety themes associated with the explosives industry, and also give details of "what went wrong?", "why?", and lessons learned. The next Congress will be held in Amsterdam between the 29th May and the 1st June 2002. This paper describes the operation of SAFEX International, which is dedicated to the international exchange of experience on industry connected accidents of the explosives business.

Jan 1, 2002

By Zhang Shixun, Wang Xuguang, Wang Guoli

A massive millisecond blast at an open-pit mine of large scale can be realized by using the blasting technology of pre-loaded explosives, which can enlarge production scale, reduce the frequency of blasting and of large production equipment movement, and raise the production efficiency. The reason why application of this technology is restricted at high sulfide ore deposits of variable and complex geological conditions is that an exothermic reaction will take place when explosives contact sulfide ores, which could lead to accidents such as spontaneous burning and detonation of explosives pre-loaded in boreholes, influencing blasting and production safety. The thermal decomposition reactions of emulsion explosives of different prescriptions in contact with pyrite have been studied by differential thermal analysis (DTA), kinetics parameters calculation and accelerating rate calorimetry (ARC), and on the basis of the above studies, the safety of emulsion explosives used in sulfide mines has been evaluated with the safe contact time of different emulsion explosives with pyrite determined.

Jan 1, 1998

By Peter Moser, Michael Messner, Florian Bauer

The existence of ammonia in underground blasting fumes was frequently measured in various field tests (6, 7). Ammonia in fumes with a TLV (threshold limit value) of around 30 ppm (slightly different in various countries) is a toxic gas but not considered to be a high risk for the underground work force as ammonia smells very itching and is extremely annoying. This might be the reason why ammonia is hardly measured in routine underground blasting fumes control. Another reason for the lacking measurement might be the circumstance that ammonia is a very reactive gas and the ammonia sensors available on the market are very cross sensitive to other gases like carbon monoxide. Nevertheless, especially since the introduction of bulk emulsion explosives in underground blasting, complaints from miners about ammonia in the blasting fumes increased. Research work by various institutions [8] around the world relates the ammonia in the fumes back to various mechanisms. Amongst others these comprise: a) non ideal (low temperature) detonation of explosives, with NH3 in the reaction products; b) reaction between rock and non detonated bulk explosives (especially when the rock is of a basic nature (high pH value); c) reaction between shotcrete and non detonated bulk explosives. Numerous blasting tests in an experimental underground set up have been made in order to check these hypotheses for ammonia origin in blasting fumes. None of them has been found to be responsible for sometimes high concentrations of ammonia in the fumes. The major reason for ammonia concentration in blasting fumes has been found in mine water of a high pH value (either natural or from using shotcrete). The mechanism identified is as follows: the moment a non detonated ammonium nitrate bearing explosive comes in contact with mine water of a high pH value, ammonia is formed immediately. The source for the undetonated explosive is twofold: firstly there is a certain spillage of explosives when the holes are charged (especially when using bulk products) and secondly not the entire explosives detonate completely. These undetonated remaining of the explosives end up in the muck pile after blasting. In case there is water of a high pH value the reaction between the explosives and the water starts immediately. This explains also the observation why ammonia can be measured in the blasting fumes quite a long time after the blast. The majority of the ammonia is not formed during the detonation; it is formed inside the muck pile even a considerable long time after the blast.

Jan 1, 2010

By Paul Worsey, Randall Franklin

This paper is based on an undergraduate research project undertaken for the explosives emphasis in the UMR mining engineering degree program by the first author. The purpose of the selected research topic was to investigate the impact sensitivity of commercial detonators to determine their relative safety for handling and how much abuse they can take without accidentally firing. A modified BAM tester was used for the investigation. Both electric and non electric detonators were impacted at incremental positions along their length to determine the relative effect of their various components. Repeat impact tests were also conducted to see how a damaged cap would react to repeated abuse. The results indicate that it takes a significant amount of impact energy to initiate commercial detonators. They also indicate that repeated abuse can increase sensitivity. Modern commercial detonators appear to be relatively insensitive to impact (an order of magnitude above RDX in the standard BAM test) and this is mainly due to their construction. This explains why damaged caps with exposed powder are more sensitive. Their measured insensitivity correlates with rough handling not being a major cause of blasting accidents.

Jan 1, 2004

By Syed Haq, Kyle Optt, David Campo, Doug Anderson

Limitations on allowable levels of vibration from construction activities generally consider either annoyance or damage. While activities such as drilling and roller compaction primarily create annoyance, the major concern for blasting is usually damage. Many years of research have developed correlations between peak particle velocity and either threshold or structural damage. We emphasize the term “correlation” for two reasons. First, peak particle velocity is only a single-valued representation of a vibration waveform, and does not characterize it completely. Second, a given peak particle velocity by itself, even a particle velocity waveform, will not damage anything – strain does. Why not measure strain all the time? Strain is very localized, and can vary substantially over short distances, so choosing the appropriate strain measurement can be difficult. Measurement of strain is appropriate when either the behavior of a specific structural element is needed, or the overall response of a structure can be adequately represented by a well-selected strain measurement. We will discuss the appropriateness of both particle velocity and strain as deformation and damage descriptors, in general. We will also describe a specific case history, from a tunnel project in New Jersey, correlating strain with peak particle velocity. Finally, we will make recommendations for the choice of measurement type for some common situations.

Jan 1, 2004

We had a cold, gray winter here in Kansas City and I spent a lot of time watching out my den window at the squirrels and birds trying to get by in the lousy weather. I remember too well working in the cold, loading shots. I was frostbitten several times since I couldn’t tie in MS connectors with gloves on. Those old connectors had a piece of detonating cord on either end of a metal tube that held the delay and you tied them to the trunk lines with square knots. Doing this on a “warm” day in Alaska or Montana shooting ditch for a pipeline could be a frosty experience. Also remember how hard it was to connect up electric caps (detonators to you new guys) in the cold. Now I don’t want you to feel sorry for me ‘cause I suspect most of you younger fellows have also paid your dues in the cold and for that matter in the heat too. Wowee, the heat at the bottom of a Chicago dolomite quarry in August was enough to fry the brains of all that were there. Maybe that’s why the third deck of my brains doesn’t exist.

Jan 1, 2004

By Brian Stump, Chris Hayward

Blasting operations at one copper mine are studied in detail to examine the relation between blast design parameters and near-shot, in-mine, and regional seismic and acoustic observations. Five observational experiments, namely collection of blast design data, near source recordings, GPS synchronized video, near mine recordings and distant regional observations were performed during one week in August. A variety of seismic and infrasound instruments were installed near the shot, on the perimeter of the open pit mine, and at several locations up to 500 km distant. Time tagged video recordings were taken of several shots. Three shots were used in the preliminary analysis, a 350,000 lb pattern with long delays, a 60,000 lb pattern with short delays, and a 256,000 lb pattern with short delays. Maximum peak-to-peak amplitudes of the seismic signals in the mine are not a simple function of the total size of the shot, but are related to the pattern timing. Peak pressures have a less clear relation to peak pressure but match the relative amplitudes of spectra modeled from the pattern design. The predicted spectrum based upon a simple impulse model fits the observed spectrum for ground acceleration measured near the pattern and explains why in this case a pattern of 60,000 lb results in the same seismic disturbance as the 350,000 lb pattern.

Jan 1, 2002

By Gary Cavanough

The spontaneous exothermic reaction of ammonium nitrate explosives with sulphide-containing rocks, commonly referred to as reactive ground, is a site-specific condition that can lead to spontaneous detonations. Mine sites typically carry out regular assessment of ground for reactivity. In Australia, reactive ground testing is conducted according to the Australasian Explosives Industry Safety Group (AEISG) Code of Practice. This paper presents a new method to assess reactive ground. The new method can be completed on the mine site or in the laboratory. The new method allows samples to be tested in hours not weeks, as required when using the method prescribed in the AEISG Code of Practice. The new method also provides an explanation of why ground is reactive or not reactive, Whereas the AEISG Code of Practice provides a reactive, not reactive or marginal results with no understanding of reason for these results. Case studies on the use of weathering agents, pH, sulphide content and carbonate content will be reported. These case studies identify instances where the testing as per the AEISG Code of Practice provides false positive and false negative results. A false positive result will require the use of inhibited products when they are not actually required which increases costs and reduces productivity due to the need to used multiple explosive products. A false negative result increases the risk of an unplanned initiation of a blast hole.

Feb 6, 2023

By Ralph E. Burnham, Jeff Taylor, Jonson Montgomery, J. Kelly Ratliff, Rennie Montgomery, Martin Brashear

Top priorities for all blasting companies and individual blasters are risk management, safety of company personnel and the general public, regulatory compliance, and liability protection. On a daily basis, hundreds of shots are detonated by well-trained, skilled, and experienced blasters without incident. Unfortunately, accidents inevitably occur, which is why blasting is considered an “ultra hazardous” or “inherently dangerous” activity from a legal perspective. Despite countless regulations, recent advances in technology, improved training, ongoing research, and improved communication in the industry, mistakes and the resulting incidents continue to occur during blasting operations. These result in dangerous or deadly flyrock, site security lapses, increased complaints, blast damage claims, and lawsuits, which lead to increased insurance costs and other financial tolls for blasting companies. In life, lessons learned the hard way are rarely forgotten. The same is true in blasting operations. Blasting missteps and the resulting events are often the best catalysts for improving risk management and thereby reducing accidents, liability, and financial tolls. This paper provides a summary of two incidents, one safety and the other liability related, and the errors that resulted in a fatality in one case and a multi property lawsuit in the other. The two incidents provide examples that serve as a case study for lessons learned the hard way in blasting operations and offer guidance for the considerations that blasters and blasting companies should incorporate into daily operating procedures.

Jan 1, 2018