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By B Newcombe

From many years practical industrial experience the author has drawn together a list of the key points to consider when embarking on a large-scale geometallurgical project. Fundamental aspects which must be considered include (but are not limited to):understanding the variability of the orebody both laterally and with depth;comminution properties and variability;flotation properties, requirements and variability – differing ore zones may have substantially different requirements for optimal performance;the role of texture – the consequences of both grain size and distribution and how the circuit will handle these;realistic expectation in terms of the financial requirements and time frame results are required within; andintegration of, and communication between key personnel within the various departments of the site (mining, geology and processing) is a fundamental aspect of any geometallurgically based processing system. An example of a highly complex nickel sulfide ore will be used as the basis of discussion.

Sep 5, 2011

By Ian Thomson

The Social License to Operate ? We are operating in an era where social license in the resource industry is as important ? if not more important ? than mineral potential ? Concept proposed by Placer Dome executive Jim Cooney in 1997 as essential requirement for the future survival of the mining industry ? ?You don?t get your social license by going to a government ministry and making an application or simply paying a fee? It requires far more than money to truly become part of the communities in which you operate.? Pierre Lassonde, President of Newmont Mining Corporation (2003). What it is ?Granted by the local community ? Intangible, informal, non-permanent ? Has to be earned and then maintained ? Defined as ? Ongoing Acceptance (a lower level) ? Ongoing Approval (a higher level) ? Expression of the quality of the ?relationship?

Aug 1, 2013

By Jonathan K. Hrica, CASSANDRA L. HOEBBEL, Jennica L. Bellanca

Accidents involving powered haulage and mobile equipment such as haul trucks often account for the greatest number of fatalities in the mining industry each year. Despite previous analyses that have identified root causes and other contributing factors, there is still a need to better understand the events leading up to these types of accidents, what lessons may be learned, and what strategies can be employed to prevent fatal accidents from occurring. This study examines Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) using the critical decision method (CDM). The CDM is a retrospective interview approach used to explore timelimited, high-stakes, decision-making. In this study the CDM is used to obtain more information about what happens prior to, during, and after a potentially fatal situation such as a near-miss event, loss of control, or minor accident involving equipment damage. Researchers captured firsthand accounts from 21 haul truck operators involved in near-miss events from mine sites of various sizes and commodities throughout the United States. These accounts provide rich and detailed narratives from the perspective of haul truck operators themselves and reveal insights into what decisions haul truck operators make, what sensory cues they perceive, and what strategies they employ during challenging and non-routine situations. Decision-related themes that emerged from the data are presented and discussed. These results, along with potential solutions offered by study participants, can help to inform future research, raise awareness about hidden hazards, and build more creative interventions and realistic training scenarios for use by the industry to address haul truck safety issues.

Feb 1, 2024

By J. A. Marts, R. C. Gilmore, Jr. Bogin, S. A. Saki, J. F. Brune, J. W. Grubb

"Most, if not all longwall gobs contain explosive gas zones (EGZs), i.e., zones of explosive methane-air mixtures that can cause – and have caused – mine fires and explosions. If the coal is prone to spontaneous combustion, oxygen penetration into the gob must be avoided. This paper summarizes the significant research findings from five years of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) modeling research conducted at the Colorado School of Mines (CSM) under funding from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). CSM Researchers have developed CFD modeling techniques to identify where and under what circumstances EGZs can form in longwall gobs and how EGZ formation and oxygen penetration depend on the ventilation method, face and bleeder ventilation parameters, injection of inert gases and the operation of gob ventilation boreholes. Recognizing these explosion and fire hazards is an important first step in improving the safety of longwall coal mines. CSM modeling research has shown that EGZ formation can be effectively controlled by adjusting ventilation parameters, choosing the proper ventilation pattern and injecting inert gases where necessary. INTRODUCTION In a project sponsored by the NIOSH Office of Mine Safety and Health Research, researchers at the Colorado School of Mines have examined gas compositions and flows in longwall gobs in order to assess explosion and fire hazards. Since gob areas are inaccessible, researchers developed a series of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) numerical modeling tools to characterize these hazards. A variety of CFD models were developed to cover progressively sealed as well as bleeder ventilated gobs for both coal and trona mines. The explosion and fire hazards posed by EGZs in longwall gobs can be summarized as follows.• If the EGZ lies closely behind the longwall face, flames and pressures from an explosion can penetrate the shield supports and reach the active face area, creating blast trauma, burn hazards and toxic, unbreathable atmospheres. • EGZs can be pushed around inside the gob by roof collapses and cave-ins. If they get pushed out into the face area, sudden methane inundations and explosion hazards in face areas can result. • Fresh air flowing into the gob can create an explosion hazard as the gas composition in the gob moves from fuel-rich inert to explosive, creating EGZs. • Ignition sources inside the gob can be frictional ignitions or spontaneous combustion. • Bleeder ventilated gobs are surrounded on all sides by an EGZ that forms along the fringe areas between the fresh-air ventilated bleeder entries and the methane-rich interior of the gob. It is suspected that diffusion flames can propagate rapidly along these EGZ fringes if an ignition occurs"

Jan 1, 2015

By T. V. Nethery

Introduction A brief account of the East Malartic fire is essential if this paper is to serve the purpose implied by its title. The fire originated in the timbers of No. 4 shaft at the 10th, or 1,570-foot, level; this was the top or collar of the underground sinking operations. At the time, sinking was in progress and the shaft bottom was 242 feet below the 12th station horizon, or 618 feet 'below the l0th level. Above the l0th level, the shaft was not in use as the surface plant was not yet completed. The shaft crews descended from surface in No. 3 vertical shaft to the l0th level, where they transferred to No. 4 shaft, a distance of 1,450 feet. Of the sixteen shaftmen mucking at the shaft bottom, four were able to reach safety. One shaftman was overcome by fumes midway between the two shafts on the l0th level, while attempting his escape. The remaining eleven men climbed as far as the 11th station and there succumbed to carbon monoxide. No. 4 shaft, inclined at 61 degrees, bad been raised and timbered from the 10th level to surface; this bad been followed by sinking operations below the l0th. Two air hoists had been set up in the footwall of the shaft, 110 feet above the 10th level, and directly behind compartments No. 2 and No. 4. The waste from the shaft bottom was hoisted in 28-cubicfoot buckets on mono rails and dumped over standard shaft sinking doors into waste chutes built into No. 1 and No. 3 compartments. The five-compartment shaft, 7 ft. 8 in. by 34 ft. 6 in. overall size, was heavily timbered. In addition to the standard shaft timbers of 8 in. by 8 in. and 8 in. by 10 in. B.C. fir, the hanging-wall and ends of the shaft were laced with 4-inch spruce lagging. This represented approximately 300 board feet of timber in placee for every foot of shaft. The cause of the fire bas never been determined, despite every effort to do so. The inquest held for those who lost their lives in the fire was an extremely thorough one, but only the location of the origin, and not the cause, was established.

Jan 1, 1950

By E. Sigal

Overview ?Intrinsik has completed several wide area HHRA and ERA studies of mining and smelting communities ?Several ?Lessons Learned? ?Key areas related to: ?Study Design ?Data Quality ?Bioaccessibility ?Speciation ?Weight-of-Evidence Approaches ?Advances in Ecological Risk Assessment Techniques

May 1, 2009

This paper passes on some personal insights into what helps to make a well-executed feasibility study. Lessons learned are illustrated with examples from the authorÆs experience. Lessons include the place of the preliminary feasibility study, credibility, ore reserves, the use of expert consultants, responsibilities and challenges for the ownerÆs representative, technical tools for the study manager, the human side of project organisation and dealing with technical auditors.

Jan 1, 1998

By Yuan Le, Dominic Reda, Vojtech Ernst Gall, Kurt Zeidler, Tomasz Kecerski

High Speed 2 (HS2) mandated that Building Information Modelling (BIM) processes be implemented during design and construction. Gall Zeidler Consultants (GZ) was responsible for developing the BIM Models for the portals, tunnels, and cross passages of the of the 16 km-long Chiltern twin-bore Tunnel. In addition, GZ developed the GBR for the Chiltern Tunnels and incorporated the relevant information into the Project’s BIM framework. This paper presents the implemented BIM framework, describes the modelling approach, and discusses the advantages and challenges of implementing BIM, particularly how BIM improved interface coordination and how BIM was used in feasibility assessments of different construction options.

Jun 13, 2023

By D Preedy, J K. Claflin, S R. La Brooy

A gold mine in north-eastern Africa has expanded throughput from 5 to 10 Mt/y in recent years. The original carbon regeneration kiln was incapable of achieving required throughput or meeting process conditions to reactivate the carbon due to heavy fouling by high molecular weight frothers and collectors. A new high temperature kiln was required.The design criteria for the carbon reactivation kiln and associated equipment were revised, then implemented in close cooperation with a kiln vender who had previously supplied kilns operating successfully on highly fouled carbon. The result is a whole facility, holistically designed to achieve the technical criteria.The new carbon reactivation facility has been operating since 1 July 2014. What have we learned? What has performed to expectations? What could be done better?This paper presents lessons learnt regarding the design, implementation, operation and maintenance of the Ausenco Carbon Reactivation Kiln. ‘Lessons’ are associated with threats and opportunities (risks) that have that have been realised. The importance of identifying and managing risks for even small straightforward projects is demonstrated.CITATION:Claflin, J K, La Brooy, S R and Preedy, D, 2015. Lessons learnt and performance – installing and commissioning an Ausenco carbon reactivation kiln in Africa, in Proceedings MetPlant 2015, pp 163–174 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: Melbourne).

Sep 7, 2015

By H R. Phillips

During the 1980s and early 1990s, the South African coal industry experienced a series of methane explosions in which well over 200 coal miners lost their lives. In addition, a fire and an explosion in the gold mining sector claimed a further 240 lives. These tragic incidents resulted in the establishment of a research facility at Kloppersbos dedicated to explosion and fires research and the funding of an extensive research program, and almost certainly influenced the government of the day in its decision to establish, in 1993, the Leon Commission of Enquiry into Mine Health and Safety. The results of this focused research program, the wide-ranging recommendations of the Leon Commission and the determination of the coal mining industry to improve its safety record all combined to result in the past 20 years without a major explosion.This paper lists some of the research outcomes and, through three case studies, illustrates what can be learnt from investigations following explosions. The paper concludes with an evaluation of some of the findings of the Royal Commission on the Pike River coal tragedy. Many of the Commission’s conclusions are pertinent and relevant to the coal mining industry worldwide and their implementation could significantly improve coalmine safety; however, a careful study of the available facts indicates there could well be an alternative explanation of the source of the methane, the location of the ignition and the size of the explosion at the Pike River coalmine.CITATION:Phillips, H R, 2015. Lessons learnt from mine explosions, in Proceedings The Australian Mine Ventilation Conference, pp 19–28 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: Melbourne).

Aug 31, 2015

By A Atkins

Six recent case studies were selected based on the eight main causes of mine disasters (Table 1; Quinlan, 2014) and where credible information sources, such as Royal Commission Reports, Coronial Investigations and textbooks, were available. The six case studies are listed below. Details are available via this link or the conference PowerPoint accompanying this paper. 1. Beaconsfield, Tasmania – 2006 Fall of Ground/Seismic Event (Chandler, 2009; Melick, 2007; Wright, 2012). 2. Bingham Canyon, USA – 2013 Manefay Slide (Ross, 2017). 3. Bronzewing, WA – 2000 Hydraulic Fill Inrush (Hope, 2002). 4. Brumadinho and Samarco, Brazil – 2015 and 2019 Tailings Storage Facility (TSF) failures (Bowker, 2019; Darlington et al, 2019; Demajorovic, Lopes and Santiago, 2019; Morgenstern, 2016). 5. Northparkes, NSW – 1999 Cave Air-blast (Bailey, 2003; Hebblewhite, 2003). 6. Pike River, NZ – 2010 Methane Gas Explosion (Macfie, 2013; Panckhurst, Bell and Henry, 2012.

May 5, 2022

By C Armstrong, B Wentzinger

Upstream embankment raises often represent the lowest cost option for increasing the capacity of tailings storage facilities (TSF), but also pose the highest stability risk due to constructing on top of previously deposited tailings.This paper presents an overview of key aspects in the geotechnical investigation and design of upstream raises and some recent lessons learnt from experience across a number of TSFs in Australia. A summary of recommended field investigation and laboratory testing methods is provided with a focus on collecting quality information for design purposes. A strong focus is given in developing an accurate assessment of pore water pressures, which, if not correctly understood can have disastrous consequences on tailings strength parameter interpretation and wall stability assessment in static and post-seismic conditions.The assessment of the contractive or dilative shearing behaviour of the tailings material and rigorous interpretation of design characteristic values are presented. Some comments on stability analysis options and proposed methodology are also provided.CITATION:Wentzinger, B and Armstrong, C, 2018. Lessons learnt in geotechnical investigation and stability analysis for upstream tailings storage facility raise design, in Proceedings Mine Waste and Tailings Stewardship Conference 2018, pp 333–348 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: Melbourne).

Jul 23, 2018

By Robert B. Parsons

"Next month will mark the anniversary of the release of an important federal study on a mineral policy for Canada. The study, entitled ""Mineral Policy-A Discussion Paper"", provides well-researched coverage of a broad range of issues that are of interest to the mining industry. Unfortunately, there is a real possibility that the discussion paper will wither and die on the vine, unless the federal and provincial governments, and the private sector, collectively ensure that some of the key considerations which are raised by the paper are acted upon.IntroductionAlmost one year ago, on March 8, 1982, Federal Mines Minister July Erola released an important study entitled ""Mineral Policy-A Discussion Paper"". The discussion paper, which presents the government's assessment of the opportunities and constraints facing the Canadian mineral industry in the 1980s, was prepared within the context o f three principal objectives-strengthening the resource base on which the industry rests, ensuring the adequacy of research activities needed to support development of the resource, and furthering the development of markets for the resource It is clear that, in today's economic climate, not even the most generous incentives would turn the industry around: what is needed is a sound base for future development, when this is possible. In this regard, the discussion paper is an excellent stepping stone, in that it reviews a wide range o f fundamental policy issues which touch on all facets o f the mining industry."

Jan 1, 1983

By Dale D. Teeters

Today, I would like to talk about ways to maximize the efficiency of surface coal operations. I doubt I will present any startling new ideas, but my comments may, hopefully, stimulate some conversation today and later back at your own operations. Strip mining is a very old technique used by ancient societies. Only with the coming of the machine age in the early twentieth century did we attempt to increase the magnitude of our operations. The industry, as we know it today, really only got started in the early 1900s with the advent of steam shovels. In the first portion of this presentation, I will attempt to show that we have, in many cases, not changed the basics of strip mining, only the scale. In doing so, quite often we have complicated the operations to the point of being unmanageable and unprofitable.

Jan 1, 1981

By James A. Clem

Approximately 2,000 years ago, the Lord Admonished the Scribes (Lawyers) and Pharisees (Religious leaders of that time) that they had paid the tithe but had omitted the weightier matters of law, Judgement, Mercy, and Faith. (Matt. 23:23). I want to talk about "The Weightier Matters of Law." In a situation where big government is trying to have an effect on even small details of a work activity, otherwise simple situations become complex. Regulations are written to such detail that constant compliance with strict interpretations can be a nightmare--not to mention off the target of the intended purpose for the regulation. One soon re- cognizes the oneros characteristics of Federal statues

Jan 1, 1979

By James A. Clem

Approximately 2000 years ago, the Lord admonished the scribes (lawyers) and pharisees (religious leaders of that time) that they had paid the tithe but had omitted the weightier matters of law, judgment, mercy, and faith. (Matt. 23:23) I want to talk about "The Weightier Matters of Law." In a situation where big government is trying to have an effect on even small details of a work activity, otherwise simple situations become complex. Regulations are written to such detail that constant compliance with strict interpretations can be a nightmare-not to mention off the target of the intended purpose for the regulation. One soon recognizes the onerous characteristics of federal statutes. Another admonition the Lord gave those lawyers and pharisees back then was that they tended to strain at a gnat and swallow a camel! He meant that the pharisees were given to devoting themselves to the strict interpretation of law by writing hundreds of subrules or interpretation to law. In doing so they eventually lost sight of the original purpose of the law. I think they were being told, keep the law-but don't neglect to humanize it Keep it simple Recognize the purpose of why the law. "Mix in" a common sense approach. Someone once said, "Common sense is instinct -enough of it is genius." Today, as 2000 years ago, we need more "genius" displayed by legislators in considering the weightier matters of law. First of all true legislature genius calls for a declarative statement about the purpose of the statute and a fair, objective analysis of the ground rules by which it will be implemented. In the Health & Safety Act of 1969, the "findings and purpose" as set forth in Section 2 do define its purpose. I believe most of us affected can be in accord with the reasons advanced for the legislation. However, beyond those well-intentioned few paragraphs, we very quickly run into trouble. Congress complicated the simplicity of the statement of purpose by mandating government intervention into areas that cannot be effectively legislated, nor even should be legislated. The Act provided for broad gaged regulation which is unnecessary, inappropriate, and tremendously costly. Frankly, it detracts from a constructive, cooperative effort by the parties involved. These are strong negatives which characterize inappropriate legislation. Appropriate legislation and subsequent regulation, which is realistically conceived and practically enforced must be born of an honest desire for improvement, based on a working knowledge of common problems which are thoughtfully analyzed. Then the legislation must be written in clear concise language so that there can be little or no doubt as to its literal meaning and intent. To be practically enforced, it must be understood by all who will enforce it and by all who are subject to it. That is to say, an effective law or standard cannot be fixed or inflexible so that it cannot be tempered in human judgment. There must be an elasticity in the statute to provide for consideration of all of the relevant facts of a given situation. Such elasticity makes the compliance effort as meaningful as it can be for the time and dollars invested. Meaningful compliance requires room for common sense. Today, we in business along with our associates in government and labor, urgently need to pause, and assess our current situation. The problems arising from the 1969 Act have been intensified through the Mine Safety & Health Act of 1977. After reading the "findings and purpose" of this legislation, and by process of elimination, we should all clearly see what is and is not the purpose of the Act. 1) It is not to turn the management of private industry over to government. 2) It is not to impair the efficient operation of business. 3) It is not to reduce productivity and profits. 4) It is not to reduce national unemployment. 5) It is not to perpetuate the bureaucracy. 6) It is not to increase the tax burden on an already overburdened people. 7) It is not to increase our balance of payments deficit. 9) It is not to replace management/labor relations in working together to solve problems.

Jan 1, 1981

By Wayne T. Brooks

The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, although providing no precise definitions of safe and healthful working conditions, specifies mandatory duties, and methods and procedures -- "to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the nation safe and healthful working conditions." The dynamics of the workplace ad the dynamics of this coextensive Act both spring from the same source. Both require at any given time an application of the then con- temporaneous highest state of the art. Both are flexible, ongoing, adaptive, changing; both advance by a blending of experience and research.

Jan 1, 1972

By Aurel Goodwin

I chose the title "Let's Clear the Air" for this afternoon's presentation because it has two meanings, the literal and the figurative. Most of you know what MSHA is. Most of you know what MSHA does. And, for the most part, most of you know why. What I hope to accomplish today is to "clear the air" around our health standards, to clarify for you how MSHA views its congressional mandate under Title I Section 101(a)(6), (7), and (9) of the Mine Safety and Health Act. Asbestos, silica, radiation, noise, welding fumes, carbon monoxide, lead, hydrogen sulfide, nitrogen dioxide - the list of physical and chemical hazards encountered in the metal and nonmetal mining industry is as diversified as the industry itself, possibly even more so. In addition, miners are often exposed to several of these health hazards simultaneously.

Jan 1, 1980

By Nielen van der Merwe

Mr Janisch' s comment' in the August issue on Dick Stacey's remarks about safety factors indeed requires wider debate. The example he quoted to illustrate the successful application of the safety factor concept in coal mining, namely the Salamon formula, is to my knowledge the only recognized application of that concept. Not only that, but that particular formula should be used only for what it was intended, namely to prevent major disasters. It was never intended to indicate long-term pillar stability, and it should not be used for that.

Jan 1, 1993

Through the courtesy of Mr. J. H. Batcheller, we are able to give the following extracts from a letter written by Mr. Caetani: It has been a nice idea of yours to collect for me all those scraps of news I received a few days ago and to send me such a long interesting letter. In four years war I have had practically no news. Burch wrote several times but several of his letters were lost and so mine. I believe I even wrote to you. Much has changed since our last days in Telluride; here and there many have disappeared. Of myself I will tell you in a few words: for a year I was in Cadore(?), where I had the good luck to do to the others what they wished to do to me, and had good luck on my side. Then I went to Macedonia for 5 months, did little fighting but lost my faithful fellow officer and companion.

Jan 6, 1919